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Abstract 
Nearly one in ten labour force participants is out of work in Sri Lanka 
currently. This unemployment rate is much higher than that of most 
countries in the Asian region which have been following economic policies 
similar to those of Sri Lanka. By examining output-employment data of the 
last 5 decades along with the behaviour of major mismatches, the study 
arrives at the conclusion that insufficient demand for labour at aggregate 
level in the economy has been more responsible than other reasons for the 
emergence of a high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka. During the 
above period it was found that the retardation of labour demand in the 
manufacturing sector, in particular, contributed much to exacerbate the 
unemployment issue of the country. 
The failure to create sufficient amount of employment through import-
substitution industrialisation (ISi) strategy from the late 1950s paved the 
way to change the industrial strategy to export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOI) under the 1977 economic reforms. Although the latter strategy 
brought about a substantially higher growth in manufacturing output and 
labour absorption, the manufacturing sector's employment share after 1996 
has become stagnated around 16 per cent. Also, the examination of the 
manufacturing sector output-employment data by this study reveals a 
widening gap between the industrial output and employment in the 1990 
decade, indicating a weak trend in labour absorption by manufacturing 
industries. This inadequacy in employment creation, in this study is 
assumed to have come into being on account of the factor market 
distortions, labour productivity behaviour, increasing trends in capital 
intensity, real wage behaviour and the lower level of backward linkages in 
the manufacturing sector. 
The study, therefore, attempted to assess the impact of these factors on 
labour absorption in the manufacturing industry by making a set of prior 
hypotheses at the beginning of the study and testing them in the 
subsequent chapters. 
The comparison of selected labour regulations with the other countries in 
the region discloses that regulations related to the employment security, 
social security, and holidays and leave, along with poor state of industrial 
relations have increased labour market distortions in Sri Lanka even after 
the 1977 economic reforms. Further, the test results of the other 
hypotheses reveal that although the financial market reforms carried out 
from 1977 onwards have been substantially successful in reducing capital 
market distortions its progress has been considerably retarded by the 
currency appreciation in most of the time in the reform period. 
Consequently, factor market distortions entrenched in the regulated regime 
before 1977 have not been significantly removed in the reform period. 
Labour productivity measured through the traditional growth accounting 
(Solow Residual) procedure by the study, shows a moderate increase in 
the private sector industries while it has gone down in the public sector 
industries during the 1990s. Capital intensity in the private free trade zone 
(FTZ) sector shows somewhat declining trend while it has increased in the 
private non-FTZ sector after 1996 and the public sector throughout the 
1990s. The real wage behaviour throughout the reform period was found 
to be not increasing and therefore it has not discouraged labour demand. 
However, the study observes that backward linkages in the Sri Lankan 
industries remain at a very low level and the manufacturing industry's 
dependence on less value added products has further increased over time, 
limiting the employment generation in the manufacturing sector. 
11 
Finally, the study attempted to find whether further changes in relative 
factor prices (costs) through removing factor market distortions could have 
any impact on increasing labour absorption by estimating the long-run own-
wage elasticity of the manufacturing industry in Sri Lanka. 
The estimation results of the flexible and data dependent Box-Cox function 
for labour demand based on 4-digit manufacturing data for the period 1990-
98 show that employment weighted, average long-run own-wage 
elasticities of the major branches of manufacturing industry is as high as -
0.80. However, this elasticity considered only wage cost of labour, not non-
wage costs arising from high costs associated with labour termination, 
other costs of undue regulatory impositions on labour and costs of poor 
industrial relations. To the extent that these non-wage costs remain high, 
the potential for labour absorption, indicating by this relatively higher 
average wage elasticity may not be realised. Consequently, the study 
concludes that there should be a great potential to increase labour 
absorption in the manufacturing industry by reducing the all aspects of non-
wage costs of labour, particularly, in an environment of already having a 
low level of real wages, and by reducing the relative cost of labour to 
capital through removing capital market distortions. 
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Chapter-1 
Introduction 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the overall thesis, covering the 
background of the study, its significance, the statement of the research 
problem, research objectives, research methodology, limitations of the 
study, the thesis structure and the summary of the overall conclusion. 
1.1 Background and the Significance of the Study 
Sri Lanka's modem economic development commenced with the 
introduction of large scale commercial plantations by the British colonial 
rulers from the 1830s. The economy that came into existence in this 
manner with the dominance of the plantation (modem) sector was later 
branded as a 'classical' export economy. All the major macroeconomic 
variables such as the imports, government revenue and expenditure, 
investment, and national income in this economy depended entirely on the 
level of export receipts of a few primary commodities. However, except for 
some limited boom periods, during most of the other times the terms of 
trade under this economic structure turned against the country's economy. 
Consequently, from the beginning of the export economy some 
diversification was felt to be necessary for any substantial economic growth 
to raise the people's living standard. 
Thus, having realised the vulnerability of depending on the export earnings 
of a few primary commodities, starting as far back as the early 1920s a 
number of commissions and experts recommended that Sri Lankan 
economy be diversified by the setting up of new industries, mainly to cater 
to the domestic market, and thereby making the economy less susceptible 
to the caprices of the market abroad. 
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Yet, irrespective of various efforts to develop industries, the classical export 
economy continued without much change until the late 1950s. 
The industrial policy throughout this era, except during the Second World 
War and the post-war period until 1952, predominantly persuaded the 
private sector to invest in industry. The Executive Committee of Labour 
and Industry and Commerce (1933) emphasised that the government 
industrial function should, in normal years, be to conduct research, 
construct and operate model factories and grant loans to private 
enterprises mainly to invest in industry (Oliver, 1957). This policy could be 
considered logical since there was a well established private sector in Sri 
Lanka from the beginning of the 20th century unlike in most of the other 
developing countries (Karunatilake, 1987). But this sector largely engaged 
in primary product processing activities, plantation, and import-export trade, 
and showed a great reluctance to engage in industries that competed with 
high quality imported industrial products which were freely available in the 
domestic market. In this background, the government first had to 
commence a number of pilot industrial projects with a view to encouraging 
the private sector investors in industry. However, the private sector as 
expected could not be persuaded to invest in manufacturing. After the 
Second World War the existing public sector industries, too, became an 
increasing burden to the government. In this background, on the 
recommendations of the World Bank Committee (1952), steps were taken 
to reduce the direct involvement of the state in industry and the new policy 
again attempted encouraging the private sector to engage in industry. 
Yet, the continuation of the classical export economy without considerable 
change in the economic structure until the late 1950s indicated that the 
industrial policies followed during this long period were not strong enough 
to achieve the objectives visualised. In the literature, inexperience in 
manufacturing and lack of capital have been stated as two major reasons 
for the private sector to be disinclined to invest in industry. 
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Some critics attributed the failure to attract the private sector capital to 
manufacturing industry, to the first two post-independence governments' 
(1948-56) policy of apathy towards industrialisation (Authukorala and 
Jayasuriya, 1996 and Karunaratna, 1973). But, further, this study finds that 
the incentive structure provided from the beginning was not strong enough 
to persuade the private sector to be engaged in manufacturing industries in 
an environment following laissez-faire economic policies. Also, the study 
attributes the emerging market distortions, which favoured local businesses 
in the period before and after the political independence in 1948, to the 
discouragement of foreign investment in industry. Further, the study found 
that even the weakness that appeared in the way of adoption of foreign 
technology, especially by the public sector industries, largely contributed to 
the failure of industrialisation from the inception and this situation also 
discouraged the private sector's participation in industry. 
Meanwhile, the role of industrialisation was further widened by the need to 
provide employment for a rapidly increasing workforce which surfaced by 
the population explosion commencing in the late 1940s, particularly in an 
environment devoid of opportunities in providing jobs in the plantation and 
subsistence agricultural sectors. During this time the country's foreign 
assets started to decline rapidly. As a result, laissez-faire economic 
policies so far followed had to be abandoned, and the industrialisation 
strategy, too, was changed over to an import-substitution industrialisation 
(ISi) from the late 1950s. Under the new policy the government took a 
leading role in developing basic industries through the public sector 
ownership giving an attractive package of incentives and protection to the 
private sector investors to engage in other areas of manufacturing 
industries. 
Unlike the laissez-faire economic policy regime, the incentives provided 
with the backing of import controls in the regulated era (1959-77) gave a 
stimulus to the private sector to invest in industries. 
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Yet, this strategy, too, failed in achieving the desired results mainly due to 
conflicts which surfaced owing to the way the ISi policy was commenced 
and developed. The IS industries emerged mainly as a by-product of 
persistent balance of payments difficulties which the country encountered 
from the late 1950s. The balance of payments difficulties first brought 
about a curtailing of inessential imports, and thereby provided the highest 
protection to domestic investors to manufacture substitutes for these 
restricted luxury items. Under ISi, the government also supported these 
types of industries, initially by freely allocating foreign exchange for 
importing machinery and other input requirements; little realising that such 
imports would very soon have to be curtailed by further deterioration in the 
balance of payments. This situation quickly led to creating increasing 
supply side restrictions for industries, not allowing the ISi to surpass even 
the easy substitution phase. So, import-substitution industries, which 
entirely depended on the earnings of the structurally weak primary sector 
export products for obtaining the input requirements, frequently 
encountered shortages of required inputs, resulting in underutilisation of 
industrial capacity. 
Moreover, the interventionist policy measures followed in this era (1957-
77), brought about a high level of factor market distortions, encouraging the 
adoption of labour saving technologies which, in turn, conflicted with the 
objective of increasing employment through import-substitution 
industrialisation. Thus, ISi too failed in achieving not only the diversification 
of the economy through acquiring an industrial development but also the 
creation of sufficient amount of employment for a rapidly growing labour 
force in the 1960s and the 1970s. During the heyday of ISi (in 1973) the 
level of unemployment reached 24 per cent of the labour force which was 
the highest rate of unemployment ever recorded in Sri Lanka in its recent 
history (Korale, 1988). 
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Increased unemployment along with other depressing economic 
performance experienced in the controlled era of two decades brought 
about a drastic change in economic policies in 1977. Accordingly, the ISi 
strategy was changed over to the export oriented industrialisation (EOI) 
strategy under which the private sector was considered to be the principal 
agent to be engaged in the manufacturing industry. Even so, the private 
sector in the first phase of the economic reforms (1977-89) was mainly 
limited to participating in the non-tradable sector. This deviation can be 
attributed to the contradiction between the liberalisation policy and the 
government policy of promoting large-scale public sector projects and the 
maintenance of loss making state owned establishments (SOEs) that 
crowded out the private sector investment in industry. 
However, reforms made under the second and third waves of liberalisation 
(after 1989) reduced most of the conflicts in the policy that appeared in the 
first phase of the reform period and created a better environment for the 
private sector to function as the engine of growth. This resulted in a 
continuous increase in industrial output and labour absorption by the 
private sector manufacturing industries, particularly by those operated in 
FTZs as evidenced by the increase in capacity utilisation in manufacturing 
industry and the decreasing unemployment in the country from the 
beginning of the 1990s. Even then, when Sri Lanka's present level of 
unemployment is compared with that of the countries in the Asian region, 
Sri Lanka's is the highest (WER, 2001 ). This evidence indicates that two 
and a half decades of export led industrialisation too, has failed to create a 
sufficient level of employment for the growing labour force in Sri Lanka. 
However, the export oriented industrialisation (EOI) after the 1977 reforms 
unlike the ISi has been successful in transforming the export structure of 
the country by increasing the share of manufactures (excluding petroleum 
products) in total merchandise exports from 5 per cent in 1976 to 77.2 per 
cent in 2001 (Athukorala, 1996; CBSL, 2002). 
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Nevertheless, a few low skilled industries rather than a diversified range of 
manufactured exports have dominated Sri Lanka's export growth, indicating 
that the country's economy has been only partially diversified. 
Consequently, even after following EOI policies for more than two and a 
half decades the two major objectives of industrialisation; diversification of 
the economy and providing sufficient level of employment have not been 
met as expected. In this setting, it is vitally important to examine why the 
export led industrialisation has not been successful in achieving its 
objectives, particularly with regard to generating a substantial amount of 
employment in Sri Lanka. 
1.2 Research Problem 
The research problem in this study is to identify why the manufacturing 
industrial sector, even after following EOI policies for a period of two and a 
half decades in Sri Lanka, compared to other countries, has not adequately 
absorbed labour and thereby not contributed much to reducing 
unemployment to an acceptable level. Providing employment to the rapidly 
increasing labour force from the mid 1950s required the acquisition of a 
speedy industrialisation in Sri Lanka. Yet, the failure of nearly two decades 
of government led import-substitution industrialisation (ISi) led to the 
adoption of export oriented industrialisation (EOI), assigning the primary 
role of developing industries to the private sector from 1977 onwards. 
Although the EOI performed much better in providing employment than the 
ISi its employment share has stagnated around 16 percent of the employed 
after 1995. Also, the two-digit unemployment rate which appeared in the 
mid 1950s continued for two decades even after introducing the EOI 
strategy in 1977. Even by 2002 nearly one in ten of the labour force was 
out of work. When this rate of unemployment is compared with the rates of 
unemployment in most of the countries in East, South-East, and South Asia 
which have been following open market policies similar to Sri Lanka, Sri 
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Lanka's rate is the highest. This indicates that EOI and other changed 
policies under economic reforms have not adequately generated 
employment in Sri Lanka. 
This phenomenon is further confirmed through the analysis of industrial 
output-employment data by this study for the reform period since 1977. 
Accordingly, the average industrial output-employment gap of 1.40 in the 
period 1977-1989 has increased to 3.30 in the period 1990-2000. This size 
of output-employment gap is abnormal for a developing country like Sri 
Lanka which is still in the initial phase of its industrialisation. This 
increasing output-employment gap confirms that labour absorption in 
industry has progressively been retarded, and there is a phenomenon of 
jobless growth in the manufacturing industry. Consequently, this study 
attempts to find out reasons for the appearance of such an increasing 
output-employment gap or the retardation of employment generation in the 
manufacturing sector assuming that the manufacturing sector should 
contribute much to relieve unemployment under the present policy context 
in Sri Lanka. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The basic objective of this study is to examine why the two and a half 
decades of export led industrialisation (ELI) has failed to reduce the 
unemployment in Sri Lanka adequately when compared with that of other 
countries which have been following similar policies, in the Asian region. In 
this context, the study primarily expects to determine whether high level of 
factor market distortions entrenched in the regulated policy regime before 
1977 have continued after the 1977 reforms as well, and have further led to 
the holding back of labour absorption in the manufacturing industry. Also, 
the study aims at identifying the other major reasons such as the level of 
labour productivity, the real wage behaviour, and linkage effects which 
might have contributed to retardation of labour absorption in the Sri Lankan 
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manufacturing sector, and accordingly to suggest policy advocacy to 
generate more employment in the manufacturing industry with the view to 
further reducing unemployment pressures in Sri Lanka. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology used in this study consists of both qualitative 
and quantitative research approaches. The preliminary examination of 
manufacturing output-employment data by the present study corroborates 
the general view that labour absorption by the Sri Lankan manufacturing 
industry is relatively weak and that it has contributed substantially to keep 
unemployment in Sri Lanka at a higher level than in most of the other 
countries in the Asian Region which are following similar policies to Sri 
Lanka. Having taken this situation into consideration, at the beginning, the 
study made 5 prior hypotheses with a view to identifying the impact of the 
possible causes on retardation of labour absorption in the manufacturing 
industry. These hypotheses are as follows: 
1. 'The high level of unemployment prevailing in Sri Lanka has stemmed 
from a situation of disequilibrium between labour supply and labour 
demand at aggregate level rather than from the structural and some 
other mismatches', 
2. 'The cost of labour market distortions has decreased during the 
economic reform period' (1977-2000), 
3. 'Financial market liberalisation under economic reforms since 1977 
has reduced the capital market distortions', 
4. 'The trends in labour productivity, capital intensity, wage behaviour 
and linkage effects in the manufacturing industry have not retarded 
employment generation in the reform period (1977-2000)', and 
5. 'Further changes in relative factor prices (costs) will have a positive 
impact on labour absorption by the manufacturing industry'. 
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The first hypothesis is formulated to weigh the importance of the two main 
sources for appearance of a high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka in 
order to narrow down the analysis to the most important source. 
Then, the next three hypotheses are formulated based on the behaviour of 
possible causes such as labour market and capital market distortions, the 
state of labour productivity, trends in capital intensity, wage behaviour and 
degree of linkage effects which are assumed to be responsible for 
inadequacy in employment generation in the manufacturing industry. The 
final hypothesis is formulated with the view to making a policy advocacy to 
increase labour absorption in manufacturing, based on the possibility of 
increasing factor substitutability. Out of these hypotheses first 3 
hypotheses are tested using a more qualitative research approach while 
the last 2 hypotheses are tested using a more quantitative research 
approach through such methods as data dependent traditional growth 
accounting (Solow Residual) method and the Box-Cox transformation 
method respectively. The study mainly uses 4-digit industrial data on the 
manufacturing industry for the 1990s collected by annual surveys of 
industries conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics in Sri 
Lanka. 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
The empirical investigation of the study is limited mainly to the industrial 
data for the 1990s due to unavailability of continuous data for the earlier 
period in Sri Lanka. Thus, measuring labour productivity and the degree of 
capital intensity and the estimation of elasticites in the study depends on 
the data for the decade of the 1990s. But, this does not cause a significant 
disadvantage to the conclusions arrived by the study since the private 
sector as the main agent to bring about a rapid industrialisation under the 
1977 economic reforms was allowed to perform its role fully only after 
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1989. Therefore, the private sector's performance under new policies in 
industrial expansion is fully reflected by the data in the1990s. 
Although the study covers almost all the major variables such as labour 
productivity, wage behaviour, and linkage effects which can affect labour 
demand in the manufacturing industry, its major emphasis is on assessing 
the impact of factor market behaviour on labour demand during the reform 
period. Therefore, a more detailed analysis is done in respect of factor 
market distortions while the analysis of other factors that affect labour 
absorption in the manufacturing industry is somewhat limited. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of 1 O chapters. The chapter - 1 gives a brief 
introduction to the overall study, covering the background and the 
significance of the study, the research problem, the research objectives, 
the research methodology, limitations of the study, the thesis structure and 
the summary of the conclusion. Chapter - 2 reviews the available literature 
with regard to the output-employment gap in developed and developing 
countries, factor market distortions, technological choices and factor 
substitution on which the whole study is centred. Chapter - 3 provides an 
overview of the industrialisation in Sri Lanka under each industrial policy 
from the beginning of the industrial efforts with a view to establishing a 
background to form a set of logical prior hypotheses. Chapter - 4 states the 
hypotheses formulated, and explains the methodology and data employed 
for testing each hypothesis. 
The subsequent chapters have been devoted to test the hypotheses stated 
in the fourth chapter. Accordingly, Chapter - 5 brings together the evidence 
to assess the importance of increasing labour demand relative to other 
factors for reducing unemployment. Chapter - 6 examines labour market 
distortions and their trends while the Chapter - 7 tests how distortions in 
capital markets may result in retarding labour demand in the manufacturing 
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industry. Chapter - 8 assesses the impact of labour productivity, degree of 
capital intensity, wage behaviour and linkage effects on labour demand. 
Chapter - 9 estimates substitution elasticity, the own wage elasticity and 
the output elasticity of labour demand of the branches of the Sri Lankan 
manufacturing industry to judge whether further changes in relative factor 
prices will have a positive impact on labour absorption by manufacturing 
industry. Finally, Chapter - 1 O gives an overall summary of the study, 
conclusions and policy implications along with some suggestions for further 
research. 
1.7 Summary of the Overall Conclusion 
Depending on the test results of the hypotheses and other evidence 
presented the study concludes that: 
1. Insufficient demand for labour arising from the poor economic 
performance at aggregate level in the economy is instrumental in 
aggravating the unemployment in Sri Lanka rather than the influence 
directed from the structural mismatch and some other such reasons 
as the superiority attached to the public sector jobs and the wedge 
between 'good' and 'bad' private sector jobs to causing a high level of 
unemployment in Sri Lanka. 
2. The manufacturing sector is the strongest and the most dynamic 
sector in the economy for generating employment. Yet, we find a 
trend of a widening industrial output-employment gap in the 1990s, 
suggesting that labour absorption in the manufacturing sector is 
increasingly weakening, and it has contributed much to keep 
unemployment in the country at a higher level compared to other 
countries in the Asian region. 
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3. The high level of labour market distortions entrenched in the regulated 
regime before 1977 has further increased in the reform period and 
has had a substantially negative impact on labour absorption in the 
manufacturing sector. 
4. The excessive degree of capital market distortions which appeared in 
the pre-reform period (before 1977) has only partly been reduced 
during the reform period on account of retardation of the success of 
the financial market liberalisation mainly due to the appreciation of 
exchange rates in most of the years during the reform period (1977-
2000). 
5. Labour productivity in the private free trade zone (FTZ) sector and the 
private non-FTZ sector has moderately increased and has not acted 
as a hindrance to labour absorption in these two sectors, while rapidly 
decreasing labour productivity in the public sector has made a 
negative impact on labour absorption in the public sector industries 
during the 1990 decade. 
6. Capital intensity in the private non-FTZ sector after 1996 and the 
public sector throughout the 1990s has increased while it has shown 
somewhat decreasing trend in the private FTZ sector, and, the study, 
therefore, concludes that this tendency has substantially contributed 
to reduce the labour absorption in the private non-FTZ and the public 
sectors than the private FTZ sector during the 1990s. 
7. Real wage has remained fairly stable during the reform period and 
therefore has not contributed to a deceleration of labour absorption 
throughout the reform period. 
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8. Backward linkages in the Sri Lankan manufacturing industry have 
remained at a low level abnormally for a longer period of nearly 3 
decades with having a further decrease in recent years. Accordingly 
the study concludes that the low and further diminishing trend in 
backward linkages have considerably retarded the employment 
generation in the manufacturing industry during the reform period 
after 1977. 
9. Based on the high level of own wage elasticity (-0.8) which considers 
the wage cost, not non-wage costs arising from labour market 
distortions and the output elasticity (0.9) of labour demand, the study 
finally concludes that there is a larger potential to increase labour 
absorption in the manufacturing industry, by lowering non-wage costs 
arising from distortions in the labour market and lowering the labour 
cost in relation to capital costs arising from the capital market 
distortions, and by increasing manufacturing output through following 
correct economic policies respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review on Output-Employment Gap, Factor 
Market Distortions, Technological Choices and Factor 
Substitution 
2.1 Introduction 
The review of the selected literature under this chapter commences with 
highlighting the output-employment gap which has been identified to have first 
existed in developed countries. Then, the review is directed to the output-
employment gap in developing countries, paying special attention to their 
manufacturing industrial sector and the issue of employment demand in that 
sector which is the mainstay of this study. The tendency of employing the 
developed country technology on the influence of factor market distortions has 
been traced in the literature as a root cause for widening the output-
employment gap in the manufacturing sector and thereby limiting the 
employment generation in developing countries. In this setting, the debate 
over labour market intervention as a source of distortion is also emphasised. 
Assuming the scenario that factor prices influence technology choices, 
consideration is next given to the importance of estimating elasticities of factor 
substitution, highlighting the results of some of the major empirical research 
undertaken in developing countries. The overall aim of the literature review is 
to form a theoretical and empirical foundation to examine the impact of factor 
market distortions on labour absorption in manufacturing industries in Sri 
Lanka. 
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2.2 Output-Employment Gap in Developed and Developing 
Countries 
Demand for labour is a derived demand in that it depends on output. Output 
growth should, therefore, boost labour demand and be positively associated 
with employment growth (Navaretti et al. 1999). Historical evidence also 
confirms such a functional relationship between economic growth and 
employment growth. For example, Maddison (1982), presenting data for the 
period 1870-1979, showed that in industrial countries growth of total 
employment was paralleled to that of real GDP (see table - 2.1 ). 
Table 2.1 
Long Term Trends in Output and Employment Growth in Industrial 
Countries, 1870-1979 a 
Period Real GDP growth Total employment Elasticity of 
(%per year) growth (% per employment b 
year) 
1870-1913 2.5 1.2 0.5 
1913-1950 1.9 0.7 0.4 
1950-1973 4.9 1.3 0.3 
1973-1979 2.5 0.6 0.2 
Source: Maddison (1982) 
(a) 16-18 countries, (b) Ratios of average employment and real GDP growth over the 
various periods. 
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Despite the differences which bear on employment conditions between 
developed and developing countries during the course of economic 
development, Bairoch ( 1975) identified a positive relationship between real 
GDP and employment growth in the period 1900-1960 for developing countries 
also. A similar trend between these two variables in ensuing decades was 
further confirmed by the empirical studies of Sabolo (1975), Gregory (1980), 
Harris and Rashid (1986), Grilli (1994), and the ILO World Employment 
Reports (1994 and 1998-99) (see table - 2.2). Notably, these later studies 
were based on more improved and reliable data gathered in developing 
countries. 
Table-2.2 
Long-term Trends in Output and Employment Growth in Developing 
Countries, 1900-1990 
Period Real GDP Growth Total Employment Elasticity of 
(% per year) (% per year) Employment 
1900-1960 1.7 1.2 0.70 
1960-1970 5.1 2.8 0.54 
1970-1980 6.8 3.3 0.49 
1980-1990 5.1 2.6 0.51 
Source: Bairoch (1975), Sabolo (1975), Gregory (1980), Harris and Rashid (1986), Grilli 
(1994), ILO (1994) and Navaretti et al. (1999). 
At the aggregate level, the dependence of employment growth on the growth of 
output can be justified by classical, Keynesian and neo-classical models. 
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In the classical labour market, shifts in the demand schedule for labour come 
from output growth in the short run and from capital stock and technology 
changes in the long run. They result in an increase in both the quantity of 
labour demanded and the equilibrium wage rate. In the Keynesian framework, 
the long-term growth of output driven by that of investment among the 
components of aggregate demand will normally generate a corresponding 
increase in labour demand (Soete, 1987; Grilli and Zanadla, 1999). During the 
1950s and 1960s, Harrod-Domar and other neoclassical models of economic 
growth captured a prominent place in the development literature and 
emphasised that successful economic development could be realised only 
through the twin forces of substantial capital accumulation and rapid industrial 
growth. Accordingly, the 'big push', 'critical minimum effort' and 'take-off 
became the 'code words' in the popular models for growth and development , 
and these models highly influenced developing countries to invest heavily in a 
modem industrial sector to serve the domestic market and facilitate the 
absorption of surplus labour in the urban economy (Rangarajan and Dholakia, 
1980; Todaro, 2000;). 
However, an increasing amount of doubt emerged from the 1980s onwards 
over the potential of output growth, particularly of manufacturing industry, to 
generate increased employment in developing countries. Ginneken (1988) 
states that the long-term propensity to increase employment in response to 
output growth in developing countries may have broken down. Grilli and 
Zanalda (1999) use a sample of 34 developing countries and show that the link 
between the estimates of employment and economic growth was somewhat 
weaker than in the previous decade in the 1980s, but remained positive. This 
study divided the sample countries into two groups and estimated the elasticity 
of employment with respect to output of each group for the 1980s and the 
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1990s. Accordingly, the employment elasticity was reported as about 0.14 in 
the faster growing group of developing countries comprising mainly the first 
and the second generations of NICs; whereas in the slower growing group of 
developing countries, mainly consisting of African, South Asian and Latin 
American countries, employment elasticity was around 0.6 1. The fast growing 
countries already seem to exhibit employment-output behaviour similar to those 
of mature industrial countries. In these fast developing countries, growth of 
output is reflected only partially (less than one-fifth of the total) in employment 
growth. Instead, growth in output mainly reflects higher labour productivity 
(Young, 1995; Grilli and Zanalda, 1999). Alternatively, it could be argued that 
these countries are near to full employment level and the equilibrium lies on the 
upward-sloping part of the labour supply schedule. Fast output growth 
therefore, translate mainly into real wage increases and productivity growth in 
the fast developing countries. The manifestation of higher labour productivity 
in output growth is consistent with the rates of capital accumulation in NICs 
over the past several decades, in absolute terms as well as relative to other 
developing countries (Grilli and Riedel, 1995). In the remainder of the 
developing countries, which were generally slower growing and with lower 
investments than those of NICs during the 1980s (and before), labour 
productivity grew much slower, and, therefore, output growth required, 
comparatively, a faster growth of labour demand (Todaro, 2000; Grilli and 
Zanalda, 1999). 
1. Researchers have found that the employment elasticity of output declines with the level of 
income. From 1870 to 1979 as shown by the table 2.1 the employment elasticites of real 
output growth in developed countries have decreased considerably due to technical progress 
and the widespread adoption of labour saving technologies. The same trend can be seen in 
developing countries also. For example, the cross country evidence in developing countries 
shows that the employment elasticities of output were higher before the 1960s than in the 
later years (see table 2.2). 
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However, the progress achieved by a large number of developing countries in 
employment generation from the time of their political independence was not 
up to expectation. For example, in Sri Lanka, unemployment increased 
continuously after obtaining its political independence in 1948 up to the late 
1970s. Similarly, in the 1960s and the early 1970s, although the industrial 
countries had mostly reduced open unemployment to about 3 to 6 percent of 
their labour force, the comparable figures for other parts of the world were 
frequently over 1 O percent, and on top of this there were other forms of under 
employment (ILO, 1971). In such a background of increasing unemployment, a 
flurry of writings and research by economists on employment and income 
distribution emerged with the reflection of a growing professional and political 
judgement that development policies pursued through the 1950s and 1960s, 
although fairly successful in terms of overall rates of growth in GNP, have 
largely failed in their implicit goal of making the bulk of poor people better off 
(Timmer et al. 1975). This situation was partly reflected by the persistent level 
of high and rising rates of urban unemployment occurring simultaneously with 
the slow growth of manufacturing sector employment, and high and rising 
capital-labour ratios in industries in many developing countries (White, 1978; 
Gupta, 1989; ILO, 1996/97). 
As unemployment grew worse from the beginning of the 1960s, international 
organizations such as the ILO and UNIDO took a serious view of this problem. 
For example, the ILO adopted the Employment Policy Convention-1964 (no. 
122), committing governments to adopt "active" full employment policies, with 
an accompanying recommendation urging the establishment of employment 
targets, indicating the lines of policies to be followed, and proposing both 
bilateral and multilateral forms of international co-operation (ILO, 1971 ). 
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Further, these organisations started sponsoring a large number of studies 
related to the problem of employment creation in developing countries. 
However, doubts about the capacity of economic growth, particularly of the 
ability of industrialisation to generate employment existed and remained 
widespread (Friedman and Sullivan, 1974; Farooq and Ofosu, 1992). 
According to Gupta (1989), the rate of labour absorption in the manufacturing 
sector of developing countries has been quite inadequate. In most cases, 
wider conflicts have emerged between major objectives with regard to the 
choice of different technologies selected to industrialise these economies. It is 
argued that there is a trade-off between output and employment expansions, 
because efforts to increase output do not always imply employment expansion. 
There are also good reasons to believe that the employment-output nexus can 
be affected by policies having to do with factor growth, and more generally by 
the incentives that they provide to firms to use more capital in their production 
choices (Grilli and Zanalda, 1999). In this background, the growth of 
manufacturing output for many developing countries, even during the rapid 
growth years of the 1960s, exceeded the growth of employment by a factor of 
3 or 4 to 1 and this phenomenon of jobless growth (output-employment lag) is 
expected to continue further (Todaro, M. P., 2000). In a normal well 
functioning economy, manufacturing employment is expected to grow less 
rapidly than manufacturing output because of capital deepening and 
technological change. Thus, the observation of a gap in growth rates should 
not by itself be a cause for concern. But the very large differentials that are 
observed and believed to be caused by the introduction of capital-labour ratios 
far above the average indicate that the manufacturing sectors in many 
developing countries are not functioning as expected (White, 1978). 
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Hence, in relation to the surge of interest in the employment issue in 
developing countries, there has been considerable discussion of the extent to 
which there is a conflict between the employment and output objectives in the 
designing of development strategies (Pack, 1980; Agarwala, 1983 and Gupta, 
1989). Much of this debate has been centred on the question of choice of 
appropriate factor proportions within the industrial sector and on whether or not 
factor price distortions have favoured the choice of more capital-intensive 
techniques and reduced employment. Thus, the question of appropriate factor 
proportions for developing countries has emerged as an important area for 
research and for policy from the 1970s. The "appropriate factor proportions" 
mean a combination of factors that are roughly in line with the overall factor 
availabilities in an economy. The poorer the country, the less capital (physical 
and human) relative to labour is expected to be found and, hence, the more-
labour intensive the appropriate proportions would be (White, 1978: 28). 
Thus, prevailing techniques of production in developing countries might be 
regarded as inappropriate. If labour is more abundant and capital is scarcer in 
developing countries than in developed countries, we might expect to observe 
the use of more labour-intensive techniques of production in the industrial 
sector of developing countries. In practice, however, it is the other way round. 
Especially in the modern sectors of developing countries, techniques are much 
more capital-intensive than would be predicted on the basis of knowledge of 
factor endowments (Thirlwall, 1994). For example, in Pakistan at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the capital-labour ratio (K / L) in small scale 
enterprises was only 20 percent of that in the large scale modern sector 
(Kemal, 1993). In Bangladesh, the large industry sector may be termed as 
moderately capital intensive, but there also, fixed assets per worker in large 
industries is nearly 4 times higher than that in small industries and 31 times 
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higher than cottage industries (Rahman and Bakht, 1997). The study carried 
out by Bajpal (1992) on the Concentration of Capital in Indian Factory Sector 
estimates that the degree of concentration of capital in larger factories 
increased by one and a half times, that was from 0.506 in 1979/80 to 0.731 in 
1984/85. Also, it was found that K / L ratio in Indian manufacturing industries 
increased from 1.51 in 1969/70 to 47.4 in 1989/90. Karunatilake (1987) reports 
that Sri Lanka's public sector was 10 times more capital-intensive compared to 
the private sector in the 1970s and the 1980s. These figures indicate that 
even in highly populated countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Sri 
Lanka, capital intensity not only in small industries relatively to their large 
industries but also in large-scale industries is high and has increased rapidly. 
This evidence proves the fact that most of the developing countries have 
adopted inappropriate factor proportions, particularly in their modern sector 
industries. 
2.3 Factor Market Distortions in Developing Countries 
Factor price distortions exist when the prices of capital, labour and other 
factors do not correctly reflect their scarcity or opportunity costs. Such 
distortions may be caused by monopolistic tendencies in the private and the 
public sectors. In other instances, governments, sometimes deliberately and 
sometimes inadvertently, introduce price distortions in pursuit of some social or 
economic objectives (Agarwala, 1983). 
Since the presentation of Adam Smith's famous insight that the 'invisible hand' 
of the price market system brings about the harmonisation of private and public 
interest that launched economies on its scientific path of development, many 
economists have emphasised the efficiency of free market forces in resource 
allocation (ibid, 1983). 
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According to Rains (1973), a successfully growing developing economy can be 
said to be moving from a land intensive to a labour and ultimately a skill and 
capital intensive phase of development. But the growth path within these 
various regimes, and more importantly, the transition from one to the other, are 
much facilitated if, in fact, the signals reflecting changes in factor endowment 
over time are permitted to be transmitted correctly to the decision-making units 
in the society. Freeman (1992) is of the opinion that in the absence of 
interventions, labour markets set wages at opportunity cost levels and 
determine Pareto-efficient levels of employment. 
But the allocation role of price is not free of questioning. A number of market 
failures are emphasised in the literature, and those economists who highlight 
them rigorously advocate state intervention in economic activities. Historically, 
the great depression fuelled the view that markets were inefficient, and that 
intervention was desirable. Those ideas were still powerful in the early post 
war period and underpinned the creation of welfare states and mixed 
economies, characterised by a deep and pervasive presence of government in 
economic activities. 
Similar to this interventionist role in welfare states and mixed economies, the 
development economics in the 1940s and 1950s was dominated by what Little 
(1982) has described as the 'structuralist school'. Members of this school 
included such distinguished figures as Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Lewis, 
Prebisch, Singer, and Myrdal. Their approach played down the role of prices 
and flexibility in resource allocation and assumed that the government can, on 
the basis of the past experience, find out the optimum patterns of development 
for a country and can implement the necessary program of resources 
mobilisation and allocation through administrative fiats (Agarwala, 1983). 
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Free trade, in the opinions of the structuralist school, was regarded as a 
colonial imposition likely to perpetuate economic dependence on the centre 
(that is, on the developed, industrial countries) even after political 
independence. Thus, political independence of a large number of developing 
countries after the Second World War created an environment conducive to 
more government intervention in economic activities, even though these 
countries mostly maintained laissez-faire economic policies in the pre 
independent periods when they were under colonial administration. 
Pessimism about the demand for exports of primary products surfaced from the 
great depression and fluctuation in export earnings strengthened the 
arguments in support of commencing industries to cater to the domestic market 
(secondary inward looking policies). In the 1940s and 1950s, the strategy of 
industrialisation through Import substitution (IS) was ubiquitous among 
developing countries. Advocates of import substitution believe that LDCs 
should initially support domestic production to substitute previously imported 
simple consumer goods (first-stage IS). The next stage of import substitution 
expands domestic production to a wide range of more sophisticated 
manufactured items (second-stage IS) - all behind the protection of high tariffs 
and quotas on the competing imports that the local production is substituting 
for. In the long-run, IS advocates cite the benefits of greater domestic 
industrial diversification ('balanced growth') and ultimately expect an improved 
ability to export previously protected manufactured goods as economies of 
scale, low labour costs, and positive externalities of learning by doing, cause 
domestic prices to become more competitive with world prices (Todaro, 2000). 
During the period when ISi was most popular, it was universally concluded that 
rapid industrialisation was synonymous with rapid growth (Krueger, 1995). In 
this context, the infant industry argument was thought to be applicable on a 
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wide front. The USSR experience in industrialisation also seemed to suggest 
that industrial growth was possible and that industries were important for 
economic growth and defence needs. 
However, the outcomes of the IS industrial strategy largely deviated from 
expectations, and its costs were evident by the 1960s. Even the earlier 
proponents of the ISi strategy (for example, R. Prebish) recognised several 
costs brought about through this strategy by the1960s. But they were not 
convincingly demonstrated until several in-depth studies (Bagwati, 1978; 
Krueger, 1978; Balassa, 1977, Little, et al. 1970), pointed out the adverse 
effects of this strategy. Amongst the most common adverse effects of the ISi 
strategy were high capital intensity, excess capacity, low value added at 
international prices, loss of economies of scale, lack of competition, and growth 
of production of luxury goods behind trade barriers. The trade studies on ISi 
strategy carried the discussion further by putting the problems in a political 
economy context emphasising the 'bureaucratic failures' inherited in the ISi 
strategy. When protection was provided through quantitative restrictions, it 
created strong temptations for corruption. Efforts to prevent corruption, in tum, 
led to mechanical methods of allocation of import licences or to imposing of 
other quantitative restrictions on the basis of 'past shares', which tended to 
shelter the existing inefficient firms and reduce the speed of adjustment in the 
economy. Since the ISi strategy did not involve budgetary costs for the central 
government (in fact, it generally produced budgetary revenues for the treasury 
from tariffs), the national welfare costs were spread over many consumers and 
exporters. Thus, most of the distortions occurring under the ISi strategy were 
more likely to be carried to extremes without being detected (Agarwala, 1983). 
Thus, the policies followed by many developing countries, particularly from the 
immediate post independence era, gradually created a high degree of market 
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distortions. Especially, 'factor market distortions' that emerged in this manner 
have been frequently cited as a major cause that stimulated developing 
countries to adopt inappropriate (developed country) technology in their 
manufacturing which limited the employment generation. The international 
body of development economists thus began to perceive gradually that 
strategies resulting in growing unemployment and poverty are no longer 
acceptable to concerned economic decision makers in developing countries. 
New directions, therefore, are being sought and the past experience helps to 
review the neoclassical vision of the world in development economics. In this 
vision economic agents respond well to price signals (Krueger, 1995, 
Agarwala, 1983, White, 1978, Timmer, et al. 1975). In this background, the 
response has now been to the following familiar checklist of obvious sources of 
distortions which are believed to have retarded employment creation in most of 
the developing countries; 
1 . The interest rate is too low relative to what a free market would set as its 
value. 
2. Foreign exchange (and hence imported machinery) is priced well below 
its opportunity cost to the economy on account of maintaining overvalued 
exchange rates. 
3. Internal terms of trade are highly favourable for industries that produce 
for the domestic market, and 
4. Wage levels are made artificially high through premature labour union 
pressure or government regulations. 
These characteristics represent deviations from free market conditions and can 
cause only less than optimal allocation of productive resources. 
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Consequently, these departures from optimality are popular with economists as 
a means of explaining the chronic unemployment problem in developing 
countries (Gupta, 1989; Agarwala, 1983). The developing countries firmly 
believed in following a low and controlled interest rate policy owing to a number 
of reasons. They included: a desire to keep down the cost of servicing public 
sector debt; the suspicion that the free market charges exorbitant rates of 
interest that is harmful for small borrowers; the belief that without a lower 
interest rate, investment cannot be promoted, and the concern that higher 
interest rates create inflation (Chowdhury and Islam, 1993; Agarwala, 1983). 
Then, the policy of import-substitution adopted by most of the developing 
countries consisted of a combination of overvalued exchange rates and 
favourable internal terms of trade for industry which made the import of capital 
goods less costly. Moreover, a number of other incentives, such as tax 
concessions, and accelerated depreciation on investment in capital goods etc., 
are given to investors to promote industrialisation. On the other hand, labour 
became very costly as a consequence of union and government pressure via 
minimum wage and other labour legislation, mandated fringe benefits, and 
restrictions on the ability to lay off workers (Agenor, 1996). In such a 
background, the credit offered at artificially low interest rates, together with real 
exchange rate overvaluation and preferential treatments accorded to capital 
goods imports in controlled trade regimes in developing countries, encourages 
capital intensity in industry, and thereby lowers the employment creation 
(Krueger, 1983). 
Thus, in the literature, it is often stressed that the relative prices of capital and 
labour are frequently badly out of line with their true economic values. It is 
widely believed that these reasons (extremely low interest rates, overvalued 
foreign exchange rates, favourable internal terms of trade for domestic market 
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industries and artificially high wage levels etc.) as stated above have mainly 
led to distort factor markets by making capital cheaper though it is scarce while 
increasing the labour cost though labour is abundant in developing countries 
and thereby more scarce capital has been substituted to relatively plentiful 
unskilled labour in the economy's production function. Thus, adoption of 
developed country technology results in a low employment generation in 
manufacturing industries. In developed countries, an anti-labour bias can 
always be seen in technical progress since labour is relatively scarce in these 
countries. If technical change takes this direction in developing countries as 
well, it will obviously tend to weaken the output-employment growth 
relationship in these economies. 
Thirlwall (1994) among other commentators explains the undue capital bias in 
developing country production through the 'Leonteif Paradox'. Although labour 
may be abundant and its money price may be lower than in developed 
countries, it is not necessarily cheaper or less costly to employ, because its 
productivity may be lower along with other implicit costs created by factor 
market distortions. In other words, the so called 'efficiency wage' (wage rate 
divided by the productivity of labour), or wage cost per unit of output, may differ 
very little between developing and developed countries 2. Evidence shows that 
in a number of countries, the relative distortion of labour and capital prices, 
rather than getting better, has become worse during the years since the 
Second World War. 
2. The measure of unit labour costs represents a direct link between productivity and the cost 
of labour used in generating one unit of output. Accordingly, a more than proportional rise in 
labour costs relative to productivity is a threat to a country's cost competitiveness. Therefore, 
the unit labour costs can be used for production costs comparisons among countries. But the 
international comparability through this criterion has been severely restricted owing to lack of 
relevant data, particularly for developing countries such as Sri Lanka. For a detailed 
description of this measure see Report on Key Indicators of Labour Market (1991, ILO). 
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For example, according to Witte as cited in White (1978), the wage/capital-
rental ratio for all Mexican manufacturing rose from an index of 100 in 1954 to 
280 in 1964; for Peru, the same factor-price ratio for a number of industries 
rose from 100 in 1958 to a range of 190-270 in 1966. Also, Romer reports that 
the same ratio in Ghana rose from 100 in 1960 to 124 in 1966 (but substantially 
fell to 90 in 1970). But generally the pattern reported is raising real wages in 
manufacturing in most LDCs, while capital remains cheap or becomes 
cheaper, and this might further increase wage/capital ratio (White, 1978). 
However, since the early 1980s (in some cases from the late 1970s), removing 
market distortions has been at the core of economic policy reforms. 
Developing countries have implemented structural and sectoral adjustment 
programs, usually with the support of the World Bank and other donor 
agencies. These reforms include liberalising foreign trade, curtailing subsidies, 
suppressing legal monopolies, and eliminating direct allocation of credit and 
foreign exchange through domestic market liberalisation among other things. 
Although these reforms have been positive to a considerable extent, some 
disturbing facts remain. Some countries that had begun the process of 
liberalising eventually built up new distortions that represented a major 
departure from the initial program (Rama, 1997). 
Thus, analysis of the employment issue, especially in developing countries, 
has frequently cited "factor market distortions" as a major cause of 
unemployment, and leading to the adoption of capital intensive technologies 
and, ceteris paribus, to a lower demand for labour. In contrast to this, in the 
absence of gross distortions in the factor prices and of large anti-labour bias in 
production technology, output growth should normally be strongly employment 
generating, particularly in the early stages of economic development 
(Frieddman and Sulliva, 1974; Farooq and Ofosue, 1992). 
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2.4 Debate over Labour Market Distortions 
There is an intense controversy among economists over the impact of labour 
institutions and regulations on the functioning of labour markets in developing 
countries. Thus, two divergent views appear to demonstrate this controversy: 
the "advocate" view and "distortionist" view (Agenor, 1996; Freeman, 1992). 
The advocate view holds that labour regulations such as minimum wage laws 
have welfare enhancing effects such as reducing poverty, raising productivity, 
and less turnover etc. (Cahue and Michel, 1996; Dasguptha and Ray, 1986). 
This group stresses the potential benefits of interventions and holds that 
regulated markets adjust better than unregulated markets, and endorse 
tripartite consultations and collective bargaining as the best way to determine 
labour market outcomes. The distortionist view, by contrast, suggests 
government regulation of wages, mandated contributions to social funds, job 
security, and collective bargaining as distortions, and that they lead to 
excessively high wage costs with the effect of restraining the expansion of 
labour demand (Rama and Tabellini, 1995). The debate over advocate view 
versus distortionist view can be tested against some available evidence in the 
literature under such sub-topics as public sector employment, labour market 
regulations, and labour market institutions. 
2.4.1 Public Sector Employment 
Public enterprises in developing countries particularly act as model employers, 
and may be required to serve as employers of last resort and seek to protect 
workers against declines in the wage rate (Squire and Narueput, 1997). Under 
this background, distortional viewers pointed out that, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
government interventions in many developing countries in favour of formal 
sector workers created a massive public-private, formal-informal, or urban-rural 
wage differentials and labour market distortions (Freeman, 1992). 
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Particularly, the high and increasing government employment during this period 
raised concerns that a large public sector itself might be a major distortion in 
the labour market, and a bloated government sector can choke off productive 
employment and economic growth (Gelb et al. 1991 ). In this background, 
public enterprise employment and wage bills have often grown very rapidly and 
have remained large. Nunberg (1988) found an excessive wage bill in public 
sector employment to be a major problem for the majority of countries. Hewitt 
and Caroline (1995) present data on central government wages based on a 
group of 99 countries over the period 1980-90. Accordingly, they have found 
that wage expenditure of the central government in developing countries has 
averaged about 7.5 per cent of GDP as opposed to 5.5 per cent for industrial 
countries. However, regional differences in public enterprise employment 
remain large. Between 1986 and 1991 the share of public enterprises in total 
employment in Africa was 18.1 percent, significantly larger than the 
corresponding share in Latin America (3.7 percent) and Asia (4.7 percent). 
This share was as high as 46.4 percent in Niger, 45.3 percent in Senegal, and 
37.2 percent in Zambia (Galal, 1994). 
Thus, the massive size of the public sector creates distortions through a 
number of ways such as lowering productivity, reducing investment in fixed 
capital, and compressing the wage structure in favour of unskilled workers. 
For example, Harrison (1993) found that in Mexico, overall productivity in 
formal manufacturing fell between 1985 and 1990 with a larger decline in the 
public sector. Yet, the real wages in the public sector in that period increased 
by 0.4 per cent per year. In Bangladesh, five out of seven public enterprises in 
the 1980s experienced a growing trend in average labour cost that outpaced 
increases in productivity (World Bank, 1994). 
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Further, with fiscal constraints, governments may seek to protect employment 
by reducing spending on materials. This led to increase the ratio of wage to 
non-wage public expenditure in many countries indicating an imbalance in the 
input mix of public sector production. In Liberia, for example, the wage bill in 
relation to revenues increased from 36 percent in 1977 to 66 percent in 1981 
(Lindauer, 1988). The government may also compress the wage structure to 
protect the employment of lower paid workers, often reducing wages for their 
more skilled employees below those offerea for equivalent skills in the private 
sector (Squire and Narueput, 1997). 
However, from the advocate viewers' perspective the government influence 
does not create distortions and rigidities in the labour market to the extent that 
distortional proponents stressed. In their opinion, the sluggish world economy 
and the debt crises in the 1980s were major tests to check for the flexibility of 
labour markets of developing countries. Accordingly, at a crude level, the 
sharp drops in real wage disprove distortionist fears that labour market 
institutions or interventions produce wage rigidity when declines are necessary 
(Freeman, 1992; Horton et al. 1991). Fallon and Riveros (1989) concluded 
that 'there is little prima facie evidence on downward real wage rigidity based 
on a study of 16 countries including Latin America and Africa.' In Africa, the 
public sector real wages for the lowest salary groups fell 45 percent between 
1975 and 1985, whereas the highest salaries in the public sector fell more than 
60 percent on average during the same period (Squire and Narueput, 1997; 
Colclough, 1991; and Lindauer, et al.1988). In Chile and Argentina, real wages 
fell more than 30 percent, while in the case of Bolivia real wages more than 
halved in the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, according to the advocate view, 
declines and changes in relative wages in many developing countries from the 
1980s showed that government intervention in large public sector enterprises 
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does not create a high level of distortions and labour market rigidities. 
Moreover, distortions viewers point out that Public enterprises act as 
employers of last resort. To reduce unemployment, governments in many 
developing countries often guarantee jobs and provide funds to hire graduates. 
For example, in Egypt, such a policy has resulted in significant overstaffing in 
public sector organizations and a rapidly increasing wage bill, which grew from 
22 percent of government expenditure in the mid-1970s to 33 percent in the 
late 1980s (Banerji and Sabor, 1994; Gelb et al. 1991). In Sri Lanka, the public 
sector enterprises were considered by politicians as the easy way of providing 
jobs, leading to having over staffing in those organisations. 
Further, it has been emphasised that the public sector salaries are higher than 
those of the private sector in most developing countries. On the other hand 
drawing on studies of Bombay's labour markets, Mazumdar (1989) revealed, 
that even 'long before the era of trade union or government intervention, 
wages in large textile factories were high in comparison with alternative 
earnings'. Large wage discrepancies were found in urban labour markets in 
Indonesia, where the institutional apparatus for wage determination was at a 
rudimentary level. Calculating standard deviations of log earnings among 
manufacturing industries based on the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics 
Freeman (1991) reveals that wage differentials are greater in less 
interventionist, than in the more interventionist high-income countries. 
2.4.2 Labour Market Regulations 
In the literature labour regulations in most countries are considered as a major 
source of labour market distortions. Those who hold the distortional view, 
especially emphasise the effect of the minimum wage policy in discouraging 
labour absorption and present evidence for a number of such occasions. 
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Accordingly, Castillo and Freeman (1991) highlight that the application of the 
U.S. minimum wage (1983) to Puerto Rico, where productivity and earnings 
are considerably below mainland levels, raised average earnings on the island 
and lowered the aggregate employment I population ratio by a significant 
amount, and shifted employment away from low wage sectors, which had to 
raise pay substantially to meet the minimum wage. Fallon and Robert (1991) 
showed that the large increase in minimum wages in Zimbabwe after 
independence had substantially affected the wage structure. 
But institutional viewers do not believe that minimum wage policy has any 
employment retarding effect. Freeman (1992) shows that real minimum wages 
fell precipitously in many countries in the 1980s and therefore the minimum 
wage floor proved to be sawdust not hardwood as distortional viewers feared. 
In Latin America, for example, the average real minimum wage in 1991 was 
$88 a month - 35 per cent below the 1980 level. Minimum wages during the 
period 1980-1991 fell 40 percent in Venezuela, 60 percent in Mexico, and 85 
percent in Peru, and the reasons for this deterioration are threefold: 
accelerated inflation, weaker union bargaining power, and deliberate policies to 
abandon the minimum wage for the sake of stabilisation and adjustment 
(Tokman 1992). Similarly, Fallon's (1987) study of labour regulation in India 
rejected the importance of minimum wages, stating that unskilled wages were 
substantially above minimum rates in large establishments, and in small 
establishments advisory boards use going wage rates as the basis for setting 
minimum rates in the first place. 
However, Paldam and Riveros' (1987) review of minimum wages in Latin 
America reports mixed results of the effects of minimum wages on wage 
determination. They conclude that the existence of the minimum wage causes 
aggregate effects only when it is used aggressively as a policy tool. 
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The ILO researchers report a statistically insignificant relationship between 
changes in real minimum wages and changes in real average wages in the 
1970s and 1980s in fourteen African and Latin American countries (ILO, 1992). 
T okman ( 1992) emphasises that the risk of increasing already high wages and 
hence of reducing employment in the modern sector through minimum wages 
is not great, because the entry level of wages, which is determined through 
collective bargaining in those sectors, is usually more than twice the minimum 
wage. Comparing minimum wage rates with starting wages for production 
workers in Ghana over the period 1970 to 1995, Teal (2000) reveals that for 
nearly all these years, starting wages were substantially higher than the official 
minimum wages. On the other hand, Lopez and Riveros (1989) reveal mixed 
effects of minimum wages on skilled and unskilled workers in Latin America. 
Accordingly, the minimum wage raised the wages of skilled workers in 
Argentina, reduced the skilled workers wages in Chile, Colombia and Uruguay 
and had a weak effect on wages of unskilled workers in all cases. 
Institutional viewers emphasise that the effect of the minimum wage policy on 
wage determination has further diminished due to increasing non-compliance 
with labour laws. For example, household survey data for Mexico discloses 
that, in 1988, 16 percent of all full-time male workers in the informal sector and 
as many as 66 percent of female workers in various sectors were paid below 
the minimum wage (Bell, 1994). Only 18.2 percent of all enterprises in 1988 
were estimated to have been fully meeting all legal requirements regarding 
commitment and contributions (Standing, 1991 ). In Colombia, in 1983, 4. 7 
percent of even the large manufacturing enterprises did not comply with the 
minimum wage legislation (Bell, 1994). In Morocco, more than 50 percent of 
the firms paid their unskilled workers less than the minimum wage in 1986 
while in Puerto Rico, non-compliance (in the entire population of workers) rose 
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from around 20 percent in 1979 to 35 percent in 1983, when the minimum 
wage increased (Harrison, 1993). The survey of the informal sector firms 
conducted by Morrison (1993 as cited in Squire and Narueput, 1997) revealed 
that, in Nigeria, 293 out of 300 did not comply with minimum wage regulations. 
In Swaziland, 242 out of 290 failed to comply with the minimum wage. Only 49 
out of 503 firms in Thailand, and 29 out of 269 in Ecuador, were in non-
compliance with minimum-wage regulations. On the other hand, there are 
some occasions where non-compliance in some countries has reduced with 
wage decreases. For instance, the non-compliance in Mexico decreased along 
with the costs of non-compliance when the real minimum wages decreased 
during the 1980s. The ratio of the minimum to the average wage for blue-collar 
workers fell from 0.42 to 0.34 from 1984 to 1989, while the percentage of large 
manufacturers paying average wages below the minimum similarly fell from 3.0 
to 1.9 percent (Bell, 1994). 
Another trend in diminishing the effect of minimum wages has appeared 
recently. For example, certain regulations such as exemption of teenagers, 
apprentices, workers in training, and part-time workers, from the minimum 
wage legislation provides significant inducement for legal avoidance in many 
countries. In Morocco, for instance, firms are allowed to pay as little as 50 and 
80 percent of the minimum wage for 14 to 15 years olds and 17 to 18 years 
olds, respectively. The renewal of temporary contracts is also a common 
means of avoiding payment of the minimum wage in Mexico (Squire and 
Narueput, 1997). Morrisson's (1993) as cited in Squire and Narueput, (1997), 
survey of informal sector firms, further shows that even when firms formally 
comply with minimum wage regulations de jure, they may have avoided them 
de facto by hiring "false apprentices". In Algeria, Jamaica, and Thailand, 
compliance with minimum wage legislation was significantly higher than 
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compliance with regulation regarding the payment of overtime. In Jamaica, 
while 58 percent of firms complied with minimum wages, only 21 percent 
complied with the payment of overtime. In Algeria and Thailand, 54 and 77 
percent respectively complied with the payment of minimum wages, but only 46 
and 64 percent respectively complied with the payment of overtime (Squire and 
Narueput, 1997). Thus, this phenomenon indicates that the labour regulation 
on minimum wages does matter to labour market outcomes to an extent as the 
distortional viewers emphasised. 
A further critical area highlighted by distortional viewers as a source of 
potential labour market distortions is institutionally induced non-wage costs of 
labour ranging from payroll taxes and unemployment compensations to other 
fringe benefits. It is normally stressed by intervention viewers that to the extent 
that these costs add to the competitive market cost of employment, they will 
reduce the number of workers. But against this, Riveros (1989) argues that in 
most less developed countries the existence of non-wage costs does not 
necessarily constitute a distortional effect. 
Job security and other employment regulations are also considered to be a 
further source of labour market distortions. Job security regulations require 
firms to comply with strict worker dismissal regulations including high 
severance payments. Fallon and Robert (1991) reveal that there is only little 
evidence to prove that job security laws in India and Zimbabwe have affected 
wages, but there is considerable evidence to prove that they reduced total 
employment in relation to output. On the other hand, Standing (1989) reports 
that almost all firms in an ILO survey stated that job security laws in Malaysia 
had no impact on employment. 
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However, Spain's experience with job security regulation provides a strong 
case in favour of distortional views, in which relaxation of regulations spurred 
job growth. In 1980, the government introduced fixed-term employment 
contracts as an alternative to permanent contracts. This resulted in increasing 
flexibility in labour hiring and firing regulations with increasing number of fixed 
term workers substituting out those in permanent contracts. Ultimately, this led 
to achieving a growth of aggregate employment. 
Forteza and Rama, (2001) in a study of 119 countries, conclude that abolishing 
minimum wages or curtailing social security benefits might not contribute much 
to economic performance at all. They do, however, state that specific labour 
market regulations such as mandated job security are very distortional, and 
efficiency gains from removing or by passing those regulations could be 
sizable. 
2.4.3 Labour Market Institutions 
Trade unions as a labour market institution play a very significant role in 
determining both labour market functioning and economic growth. The political 
and social effects of independent trade unions are generally thought to be 
positive. Unions fought for democracy in Poland, equality and the end of racial 
segregation in South Africa, and national independence in Bangladesh, India 
and Sri Lanka. But the impact of labour unions on efficiency, equity, and 
growth, however, are not clear (Devarajan et al. 1997). Consequently, 
distortional viewers and institutional advocate viewers bear different opinions 
on this matter. In the distortional viewers' perspective, unions can act as 
monopolies, increasing their members' wages and discouraging investment 
and job creation. The wage premiums that unions obtain for their members are 
often at the cost of slower growth and lower wages and employment for 
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unorganised workers (Teal, 1994; Panagidies and Harry, 1994; Moll, 1993; 
Standing, 1992; and Park, 1991 ). 
The ratio of trade union members to the total workforce in many countries is 
considerably low. Most workers in developing countries are in the rural and 
informal sectors where unions do not exist. But the strategic importance of the 
unionised sector is much greater than is indicated by its share in total 
employment or gross domestic product (GDP) (Devarajan et al. 1997). In 
some countries, unions have strong ties to political parties and they can exert 
pressure on the government, particularly they are strong in highly protected or 
subsidised sectors. Accordingly, unions have been increasing their pressure 
on governments to ensure continued protection and support for their members. 
This pressure has taken the form of widely publicised nationwide strikes and 
hartals (lockouts with civil protests) in many countries. Thus the existence of 
militant unions clearly raises the political cost of economic liberalisation 
policies. 
Moreover, distortional viewers highlight that the countries with more rigid 
labour markets respond very slowly to economic policy adjustments. Forteza 
and Rama (2001 ), comparing annual growth rates across 119 countries, using 
data from 449 adjustment credits and loans given by the World Bank between 
1980 and 1996, indicate that countries with relatively 'rigid' labour markets 
experienced deeper recessions before adjustment and slower recoveries 
afterwards, and reforms have been successful in countries where trade union 
membership and government employment are small. Further, many policy 
makers think that organised labour has become a key opponent to economic 
reforms. In countries like Nigeria and Venezuela, street riots and political 
turmoil led to reversal of the reform program. In the Ukraine, striking by coal 
miners forced the government to put an approved plan of pit closure on hold. 
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In Zambia, the reform program was derailed because of opposition by trade 
unions (Rama, 1997). 
In contrast to the above mentioned distortional views on unions, Lee and Nam 
(1994), and Panagides and Harry (1994) present evidence that unions improve 
the distribution of income and reduce discrimination against women and ethnic 
minorities. Standing (1992) indicates that unions can help to raise productivity 
and improve competitiveness. Under the ILO's World Employment 
Programme, an enterprise level survey of 3000 establishments in Malaysia 
(Standing, 1991, 1989) on the micro-effects of unions on wages, mobility, 
flexibility, training and productivity shows that unionism is associated with wage 
and non-wage outcomes similar to those found in industrial countries. The 
analysis also reveals that industrial unions have greater effects on some 
outcomes and smaller effects on others than weaker 'house' or company 
unions. The overall effect of unions is positive, despite the welfare triangle 
losses from higher wages and lower employment. 
Further, institutional advocate viewers emphasise that the experience of 
developed and developing countries in general does not sustain any 
generalisation that less unionism means more growth but rather shows that 
unions are no impediment to rapid economic development. For example, 
Japan and Germany, in particular, have had outstanding growth records with 
highly unionised labour institutions. The poor performance of the U.S. 
economy in the 1980s, when the private sector was largely non-union 
compared with the 1950s and 1960s, also shows that low levels of unionism 
are no guarantee of economic success (Freeman, 1992). Lindauer's (1991) 
analysis of the labour market in Korea emphasises the importance of letting 
trade unions to function freely. Accordingly, the suppression of labour in South 
Korea was associated with high accident rates and produced an extremely 
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disgruntled work force despite large gains in real wages. Similarly, evidence is 
presented that weakening the unions in countries such as Bolivia does not 
seem to be sufficient to ensure recovery. Thus, the role of labour market 
institutions cannot be considered in isolation from other economic structures 
and developments. Union responses to economic adjustment programs range 
from militant opposition to an active cooperation and that the strength of unions 
need not bear any simple relationship to the prospect for recovery. 
2.5 Non-price Factors Influencing Technology Choices by 
Developing Countries 
Most of the commentators highlight that factor market distortions (or distorted 
prices) are mainly responsible for selecting inappropriate technologies in 
developing countries which retard employment creation in the manufacturing 
industry. But an in-depth analysis of the adoption of inappropriate factor 
proportions in the manufacturing sector of developing countries may reveal that 
factor price behaviour alone does not seem to offer a complete explanation of 
this issue. A number of other factors, which are not directly related to factor 
prices, have been emphasised in the literature linking technology adoption by 
developing countries with job creation. 
There is a strong tendency for firms in developing countries to adopt 
developed-country mechanised technology as the ideal, regardless of relative 
factor prices. The major argument in favour of such decisions is that modem 
mechanised technologies are simply more productive and efficient than labour-
intensive alternatives (White, 1978). If markets are imperfect, entrepreneurs 
seem to be willing to sacrifice some of their potential monopoly profits in order 
to achieve the goal of mechanisation, thinking that modem technologies are 
the most efficient. Thus, though alternatives might exist in a technical sense, 
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they would be sometimes considered inferior. 
On the other hand, from the foreign aid side, the practice of donor countries 
very often prevents developing countries from obtaining capital goods in 
suitable forms from the cheapest sources. The requirement of using aid 
through donor country firms or buying products from the donor country 
frequently forces the recipient developing country to acquire modem, 
mechanised technologies irrespective of their requirements, and factor price 
situations. Even without a compulsory requirement of buying machinery from 
the donor countries, both recipient and donor country engineers tend to select 
developed country technology since they are highly influenced by the advanced 
donor country thinking that the latest technology usually dominates in every 
respect (Forsyth, 1990). Also, badly conceived capital-intensive large scale 
public sector projects discourage labour-intensive selection of production. This 
situation is further aggravated by what is often called the 'excessive 
preference' of policy makers in developing countries for capital-intensive 
industries, derived from a misguided desire to modernise and industrialise 
along the lines prevailing in more advanced countries. 
In certain instances, choice of technology in developing countries may be 
explained by a skill constraint. As a result, a shortage of skilled manpower is 
considered to be an obstacle to development and adopt more labour-intensive 
technology. Some of the expert studies commissioned by the World Bank and 
ILO confirm that labour intensive small-scale projects require a great deal more 
of skilled personnel per unit of output, both technical and managerial, who are 
in even shorter supply in most LDCs (Pack, 1980; Bhalla, 1976). In this view, 
compared to labour-intensive techniques capital-intensive techniques require 
mainly a preponderance of semi-skilled labour to undertake routine tasks. 
Hence, capital may be substituted for skill in developing countries. 
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Further, developing countries will still have to depend on techniques turned out 
by developed countries since they do not have a robust capital goods industry 
(Uniamikogbo, 1992; Forsyth, 1990). Consequently, it would be difficult to 
order suitable machinery locally because of the almost complete absence of 
mechanical engineering. 
Moreover, most of the developing countries at present obtain technology 
through Foreign Direct investment (FOi), encouraging multinationals to 
establish local production facilities (Glass and Saggi, 2002). Bloom (1992) 
finds that substantial technological transfer has taken place in South Korea 
through multinationals. Pack (1997) reports that in the chemical industry in 
Taiwan during the mid-1980s, almost 50 per cent of all engineers and 63 per 
cent of skilled workers quit multinationals to join local firms. Now more East 
Asian firms (investment) go to other developing countries with certain amount 
of new technologies. However, it is generally assumed that the technology 
transferred by multinationals is inappropriate. Also, they have come to be 
widely criticised for the non-provision of learning facilities for local employees, 
and perpetuating technological dependency on host countries. In this 
background, it is unlikely that foreign firms will undertake major expensive 
alterations to technology, simply to suit local conditions by taking into 
consideration the factor price relations in the country that these firms function. 
In the circumstances mentioned above, direct pricing factors in developing 
countries are not much relevant in technology choices. Thus, in contrast to 
conventional wisdom (in the literature more emphasis is given to price factors), 
it is logical to assign considerable weight to non-price factors, too, when 
analysing the reasons for developing countries to adopt mostly developed 
country technology. 
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Although the aforementioned analysis highlights that most of the developing 
countries obtain technology mainly from developed countries studies on 
technology transfer very often emphasise that technology transfer is not an 
easy one way flow of knowledge transfer. In other words, the accumulation of 
technological capability should be treated not as a by-product of some other 
activity but as an activity in its own right (Yan Aw and Batra, 1998). 
Accordingly, a successful technology transfer requires the capability, on the 
part of the host country as well, to acquire advanced technologies and 
management skills used by the foreign firms. This is what the Japanese 
systematically acquired from the Meiji era onwards (Lakshman and Ratnayake, 
2003). In this perspective technological capability is defined as the ability to 
adapt or assimilate technology imported from abroad and to incorporate the 
additional and distinct resources needed to manage and put to productive use 
the newly acquired technology (Yan Aw and Batra,, 1998: 59). These 
resources include skills, efforts, knowledge, experience, and institutional 
structures and linkages. Technological adoptability through this manner 
requires the host country firms to play a critical role, by developing in-house 
technological capabilities. Rosenberg (1990), Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and 
Desai (1980), among others highlight that firms with more investment in 
developing in-house capabilities have been able to receive greater benefits 
from technology imports in terms of their own product and process 
development which will be more suitable to the local environment. 
Thus, enterprise's technological learning is important, and is likely to be 
embodied in its employment of scientists, engineers and technologists (SETs), 
and the level of research and development (R & 0). Countries such as South 
Korea and Taiwan fully realised the importance of acquiring and developing 
appropriate technology by firm level efforts. 
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For example, under the "Ten-Year Science and Technology Development 
Plan" (1986-1995) the Taiwan Government called for increasing the share of 
private sector R & D from 40 per cent in 1986 to 60 per cent of total R & D 
expenditure by 1995 (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1990). However, in other 
developing countries attention to pay in-house technological development and 
the proportion of expenditure going into industrial research are negligible with 
the result that there is little possibility of developing a technology tailored to the 
needs of developing countries. In India, Goldar (1998) found that growth of R 
& D expenditure in the post reform period after 1990 has in general been 
sluggish, and in many cases there has been a decline in real R & D 
expenditure 3. Accordingly, manufacturing firms in LDCs appear to spend only 
less than 1 % of their sales revenue on R & D. As a whole, R & D expenditure 
in LDCs is equivalent to 5 per cent of all R & D conducted in developed 
countries. The G-7 countries have spent 2.4 per cent of their GDP on R & Din 
the year 2000 (ILO, 2001). Also, in most of the developing countries R & D 
activities are carried out by the public sector institutions. Yet, technologies 
developed by these institutions never reach the shop floor (Deasi, 1980). 
In this setting, it is appropriate to outline how Sri Lanka as a developing 
country has so far obtained its technological requirements. A comprehensive 
study carried out by the Marga Institute for the UNTAD Secretariat on 
"Technology Transfer & Reverse Flow'' (Gunatilleke, 1978) identifies the 
various sources of technology transfers to Sri Lanka from the 1940s to the mid 
1970s and their drawbacks. 
3. A number of indicators have been developed by statistical agencies to measure science 
and technological development in a country. But the most commonly used measure of a 
country's level of innovative performance is R & D spending. For a detailed description on 
this matter see Hall (2002). 
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In the post-independence period (1948-56), Sri Lanka had a small state-owned 
manufacturing sector which was inefficient and unprofitable, and consequently 
a burden on public revenue. The Marga study attributed this failure mainly to 
the weaknesses of the procedure of technology transfer for manufacturing at 
that time. At that stage, the government was not interested in joint ventures 
with foreign partners, and did not normally follow the "turnkey" method whereby 
one single contractor is held responsible for all parts of a project. The 
government sought to distribute various elements of a project to different 
foreign agencies. Then coordination problems arose, thus causing numerous 
operational difficulties. The technology selected in this manner was later found 
to be not the most suitable one. 
After the change of the government in 1956, Sri Lanka entered another phase 
in the transfer of technology. Accordingly, a number of large-scale factories 
were set up by obtaining the project aid from the socialist bloc countries. In 
comparison with the pre 1956 situation a number of positive aspects with 
regards to the technological transfers from the socialist bloc countries have 
been identified by the Marga study, as follows: (1) in the case of the socialist 
package the seller of the goods, the provider of the technology, and the 
consultants and experts who managed the whole operation from feasibility 
studies to the running of the plant all came from the same source; (2) any 
restrictive conditions in regard to procurement of raw materials or marketing of 
products abroad were absent; (3) facilities were set up to improve the local 
technical capabilities to run the plant; and (4) socialist governments offered the 
plant on long-term credit at a lower rate of interest when compared with the 
suppliers credit given elsewhere. Yet, this method of technology transfer also 
had a number of shortcomings (Gunatilleke, 1978). Sometimes, there were 
projects whose processes and types of production were found to be 
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inadequate, mainly in terms of technological strength. On the other hand, most 
of the socialist bloc country projects were too big compared with the market 
size and the requirement of the industries, and they were more capital 
intensive. 
Next, with the commencement of the ISi era from the late 1950s, various forms 
of technology transfers took place in the private sector manufacturing also, 
mainly with the collaboration of foreign partners. Many of the local partners 
who invited foreign participation were totally dependent on the foreign partners 
for selection of technology since local partners did not have a sufficient 
knowledge of the technology required. In these cases, the technology 
selected, the costs of buying raw materials, and the level of technological 
transfer, were not in the best interests of the host country. At this time, the 
local entrepreneurs' interest in technological choices was confined mainly to 
technologies which would minimise the problems relating to labour 
management (ibid, 1978). 
Then, after introducing 1977 economic reforms attempts were made to obtain 
technologies mainly through attracting foreign direct investment (FOi) by 
providing them with a number of attractive incentives and facilities. Foreign 
direct investment in this era increased substantially. Yet, most of these firms 
are considered foot loose type of industries, and therefore, the contribution 
coming from these firms is not considered much influential in developing the 
country's technological capabilities. 
Thus, as a whole, it seems that like most other LDCs, in Sri Lanka too the 
attempts made at both at the national level and the enterprise level to develop 
technological capabilities of the economy are grossly inadequate (Rahaman 
and Bakht, 1997). 
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At the national level, the institutional arrangement for scientific and research 
work relating to such issues as industrial applications, and acquisition and 
adaptation of new technologies has not been expanded from the mid 1950s. 
Only two government institutions; IDB and CISIR, are involved in technology 
development related activities and the annual funds allocated even for these 
institutions are very often inadequate to expand their activities to cater to the 
national needs. Also, their findings very rarely reach the shop floor. Anecdotal 
evidence shows that from the private sector firms' front too, unlike such 
countries as Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and India, the Sri Lankan firms are not 
geared to develop any in-house technological capabilities from the inception of 
Sri Lankan industrialisation. 
Thus, at the enterprise level also, very little in-house efforts are being made to 
improve product quality, innovate improved technology, raise workers' skill 
levels or improve management practices. This poor attention paid to 
technological innovation is reflected by the failure to graduate to higher value 
added products in the export structure in Sri Lanka even after following an 
export oriented industrialisation policy for two decades. 
The aforementioned reasons suggest that in most of the developing countries 
such as Sri Lanka, choice of technology has been influenced not only by 
distorted prices but also by a number of other non-price factors. Moreover, 
technologies selected in these countries have not been changed to suit the 
local needs and the factor endowment, and they have very often become anti-
labour biased, and the consequences of this strategy would be the reduction of 
the contribution that industrialisation can make to employment generation. 
48 
2.6 Fixed Factor versus Variable Factor Production 
Functions 
As explained in the preceding section there has been a strong tendency for 
adopting capital-intensive technologies by investors in developing countries, 
reflecting a lesser labour absorption irrespective of substantial investment and 
growth in industrial output. Accordingly, the lack of alternative technologies 
available to developing countries suggests that the elasticity of labour 
substitution may be close to zero giving rise to an 'L-shape' production function 
(Gillis et al. 1996; Thirlwall, 1994) (see Figure 2.1 ). In this case, if we accept 
the scenario of institutional advocate views on the labour market as explained 
earlier and assume that the non-price factors rather than price factors 
dominate the choice of techniques, the whole issue of the impact of price 
distortions on the output-employment conflict becomes invalid. 
In contrast, those who emphasise the factor market distortions (distortionist 
view) as the major cause that influences developing countries to adopt more 
capital-intensive techniques implicitly believe that there is a spectrum of 
alternative technologies, and correcting distortions leads to selecting 
technologies that absorb more employment. According to this line of thinking, 
the success in increasing employment should depend on both the availability of 
alternative technologies and the size of substitution possibilities between 
labour and capital (see figure 2.2). 
International organizations such as the ILO and UNIDO etc. are consistently 
persuading developing countries to promote and adopt "appropriate 
technology" for solving their persisting unemployment problems from the 1970s 
onwards. 
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Figure 2.1 
Factor Substitution with Relatively Fixed Factor Proportions 
{Low Elasticity of Substitution) 
Capital (K) 
lsoquant 11 
-------- (200,000 
units) 
lsoquant I 
~------- (100,000 
units) 
Labour {L) 
Possibilities for producing a given level of output with different factor combination 
under the technology represented by the figure 2.1 are severely limited, and therefore 
the elasticity of substitution is extremely low. In this setting, factor price changes do 
not bring about a higher employment level. 
Source: Gillis, et al. (1996), Economics of Development, 4th edition, pp.242 
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Figure 2.2 
Factor Substitution with Relatively Variable Factor Proportions 
(High Elasticity of Substitution) 
Capital (K) 
B, 
I 
I 
I 
lsoquanl I 
(100,000 
~ -------~--- ----
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Labour (L) 
Possibilities for producing a given level of output with different factor combinations 
under the technology represented by the figure 2.2 are high, and therefore the 
elasticity of substitution may get a high value. In this setting, if the wage-rental ratio 
falls, the amount of capital used is sharply reduced while employment expands 
significantly. 
Source: Gillis, et al. (1996), Economics of Development, 4th edition, pp.243. 
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Empirical evidence (Forsyth, 1990; Pack, 1980) also reveals that developing 
countries, which have already adopted more developed country technologies 
(capital-intensive techniques), can create a higher level of employment through 
adopting more appropriate technologies. Moreover, researchers on 
engineering or process-analysis studies show that there are alternative means 
of producing the same volume of a given product (White, 1978). Historical 
evidence shows that in the 19th century Japanese spinning industry, the 
number of workers per identical spindle was seven times that used in the U. S. 
The Japanese increased the speed of their machines, used cheaper raw 
materials, i. e. lower staple cotton, arranged two or three shifts, and engaged 
more workers to the tasks of repairs and maintenance (Rains, 1973). Pack 
(1980) reported that similar capital-stretching; labour-intensive techniques were 
being used in Korea and Taiwan in textiles, electronics, woodworking, and 
other industries in the 1970s. Also, he points out that, even for products in 
which there may be technical rigidity in some main production processes, there 
are always peripheral processes like material handling and packaging which 
can be done efficiently with labour-intensive methods, so that the overall 
production of the product still has scope for labour-capital substitution. 
Another important type of capital saving or labour using innovation is the use of 
the putting-out or cottage system. Accordingly, certain processing activities 
are spread to homes, adjoining sheds and small workshops under sub-
contracting. Even under export bonded processing schemes, the sub 
contracting, which can be so important a feature of labour-using technological 
changes was being increasingly used at the international level by Korea and 
Taiwan after Japan. More recently other developing countries have 
increasingly adopted subcontracting system of production. All these are 
substantial technological adaptation in response to international differences in 
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factor endowment if these differences in factor endowment are permitted to be 
reflected in the relative price signals in factor markets in developing countries. 
Factor substitution can also be made possible through changing demand side 
factors also. So far the issue of factor substitution was examined taking supply 
side factors such as factor prices or distortions into consideration. Demand 
side factors also play a major role in factor substitution. Demand patterns have 
potentially important implications for both employment and output (Thirlwall, 
1994). It has been shown that income distribution in LDCs is heavily skewed 
towards the rich and as a result, there is a relatively high demand for capital 
intensive luxuries, thereby lessening the demand for labour intensive products. 
An export orientation may be another possibility to enhance factor substitution 
in developing countries. The economic success achieved by such countries as 
South Korea, Taiwan. Hong Kong and Singapore can be largely attributed to 
gearing their economic policies to producing for exports. Hence, developing 
countries can produce according to the factor endowment by exploiting their 
comparative advantages. This leads developing countries to produce more 
labour-intensive products, and thereby increasing factor substitution. The 
model developed by Feerstrined and Hanson (1996) shows that capital flows 
from the North to the South through FOi has increased the labour demand in 
the South. 
The above observations suggest that factor substitutions are possible, and 
therefore, the fixed factor proportions view is far form being accurate in respect 
of LDCs. The econometric analysis of the next section, too will confirm that 
labour-capital substitution is possible. Thus, by following appropriate policies 
factor market distortions and other obstacles to choose correct technologies 
can be removed, and such policies are useful in contributing to employment 
53 
growth. However, the ultimate success of these policies in absorption of labour 
depends on the degree of labour market substitutions or the size of the 
elasticity of substitution. 
2. 7 Econometric Studies 
Although a few alternative approaches are available to measure factor 
substitution the most common method is to estimate the production function 
through an econometric analysis. Such analysis provides the elasticity of 
substitution between factors and allows determining the role of factor prices 
and output on the demand for labour (Gupta, 1989). 
The technological relationship between output and inputs can be summarised 
by a production function (Kmenta, 1986). The concept of a production function 
plays an important role in both micro and macroeconomics. At the macro level 
it forms the basis for development of the theories of economic growth and 
distribution. At the micro level it is a useful tool for assessing the substitution 
possibilities between the various factors of production and the extent to which 
firms experience different returns to scale as output expands (Thomas, 1993). 
An early effort at specifying the production relationship led to the introduction of 
the Cobb-Douglas production function which is commonly given by the 
following form. 
(A > O; 0 < a, p < 1) 
Q = quantity produced 
A = an efficiency parameter 
K=capital 
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L = labour 
a =elasticity parameter 
p =elasticity parameter 
After the famous study by Charles W. Cobb and Paul H. Douglas in the late 
1920s on the U.S. manufacturing sector for the period 1899-1922, the Cobb-
Douglas production function has been estimated using cross-section and / or 
time-series data of different firms, industries, and countries (Kmenta, 1986). 
Douglas was mainly interested in the factor shares of output which under 
perfect competition are given by the elasticity parameters. A major 
shortcoming of the Cobb-Douglas specification is that it is restricted to imply 
that elasticity of substitution is constant and equal to one. One of the purposes 
of production function analysis is to examine the extent to which factor 
substitution is possible and such substitution may obviously vary between firms 
and industries. In this case, if we wished to compare the substitution 
possibilities in two different industries, the estimation of Cobb-Douglas 
functions for each industry could tell us nothing of value (Thomas, 1993). 
Cobb-Douglass function also limits the returns to scale parameter to be the 
same at all levels of output. As a result, the technology cannot exhibit 
increasing returns at a low level of a firm's output and decreasing returns for a 
high level of output, and in other words, it implies that the average cost curve 
cannot take the standard text book 'U - shape'. 
Unlike Douglas later economists showed more interest in measuring 
substitution elasticities, especially between capital and labour based on 
production function estimations. The study carried out by Ragner Freish 
( 1935) on measuring input substitution possibilities in the chocolate 
manufacturing industry can be considered the first empirical attempt of this 
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nature. He computed substitution coefficients directly through a number of 
mathematical approximations, rather than using regression or other statistical 
methods (Berndt, 1991). Next (in 1961), Kenneth J. Arrow, Hollis B. Cheneray, 
Bagicha Minas, and Robert M. Solow developed the "constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function" which can be considered as a more 
direct generalisation of Cobb-Douglas specification, and given in the form of: 
Q = r [ g K -8 + ( 1 - g ) L -8] - 11 8 
Q = quantity demanded 
K=capital 
L = labour 
r = an efficiency (scale) parameter 
g = distribution parameter 
e = substitution parameter 
In the CES technology, although elasticity of substitution is constant, it is not 
constrained to be equal to unity like the Cobb-Douglas form. The fact that the 
elasticity of substitution can take different values means that the CES function, 
unlike the Cobb-Douglas function, is a more suitable tool for investigating the 
varying substitution possibilities between different industries (Thomas, 1993). 
The CES production function has gained a great degree of popularity because 
it subsumes a number of other specialised production functions. Thus CES 
can be considered a family of production functions that includes Cobb-Douglas, 
input-output and linear production functional forms, depending on the value 
assigned to the "substitution parameter" of that function (Bairam, 1988; 
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Kmenta, 1986; lntriligator, 1971 ). 
An alternate approach for the estimation of production function is that of the 
dual cost function. Such a cost function is dual in the sense that it embodies 
all the parameters of the underlying production function. Moreover, the 
production function parameters can, sometimes, be uniquely recovered from 
the estimation of the parameters of the dual cost function (Berndt, 1991 ). 
Econometric implementations of cost and production functions differ in their 
assumptions concerning exogeneity. In the production function regression 
equation, output is endogenous, and input quantities are exogenous. By 
contrast, in the dual cost function, production cost and input quantities are 
endogenous, while input prices and the level of output are exogenous. 
Through a pioneering study on the electric utility industry in the U. S. Marc 
Nerlove in 1963, for the first time, derived and estimated the Cobb-Douglas 
dual cost function (Nerlove, 1967). The problem of this specification was that it 
required the elasticity of substitution among inputs to be equal to unity. A cost 
function that was dual to the CES production function could be used instead 
but this also required the elasticities to be constant. As a consequence, 
Nerlove was interested in developing a more flexible functional form in which 
substitution elasticities between different pairs of inputs did not have to be 
equal to each other and which also allowed for the possibility that restrictions 
vary with changes in the input mix. 
W. Erwin Diewert's (1971) 'generalised Leontief(GLJ functional form was the 
first in a series of developments in the modelling of flexible functional forms for 
cost and production functions. These functions place no prior restrictions on 
substitution elasticities and are consistent with the constraints that are typically 
assumed in economic theory (Berndt, 1991 ). 
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A generalised Leontief (GL) cost function can be written as follows. 
where C denotes total cost, Y is output, P; and Pj are input prices and d ij are 
parameters. 
Another prominent flexible form is the one introduced by Laurits R. 
Christensen, Dale W. Jorgenson and Lawrence J. Lau in 1970, and is known 
as the 'transcendental logarithmic' (or translog) production function. This form 
is flexible in that it arbitrarily approximates production technologies in terms of 
substitution possibilities. A flexible form for the cost function can be 
represented similarly by any arbitrary cost function in terms of a second-order 
Taylor's series approximation in logarithms. These functional forms either in 
the form of a production or a cost function, respectively, are given by: 
In Y = lna0 + Ia; lnX; + Yz'LLPY lnXlnX j 
i j 
n n n 
lnC = lna0 + Ia; lnP; +tIIr!i lnP; lnPj 
j=l i=l j=l 
n 
+ay ln Y +tr w(Inf )2 + Ir ;y lnP; ln Y 
j=I 
1 
2 
where Y denotes output, C is total cost a i, pij and r ij are parameters which 
are different in the two specifications, ao represents the state of technology, X; 
are X j are inputs with prices P;. and P 1 , respectively. 
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Note that the 'translog specification' reduces to Cobb-Douglas by restricting the 
parameters of the quadratic terms to be equal to zero. A Shephard's Lemma 
can be applied to the cost function, by differentiating the function with respect 
to P;, to obtain (cost minimising) input demand functions. Alternatively, by 
assuming profit maximisation, the production function can be differentiated with 
respect to X,, to obtain a system of factor demand equations. Other types of 
flexible functional forms, which in some cases can be considered even more 
general than GL and 'translog', include the symmetric generalised McFadden, 
the generalised Box-Cox, the Fourier, and Minflex Laurent functions (Berndt, 
1991, Bairam, 1988). From these flexible forms, the one most commonly used 
in applied econometrics is the so-called 'Box-Cox transformation' (Kmenta, 
1986). A Box-Cox function for labour demand is shown as follows. 
where oo- ~ e,l ~ oo+, L is employment, tis time trend representing the rate of 
technological change, w is the wage rate, and Y is output. 
Special cases of the Box-Cox transformation include the linear form (J. = 1) and 
the log-linear form (J. = 0). Box-Cox specifications in which each regressor is 
transformed using different values of J. are possible. 
Economic theory provides little guidance on what the functional form should be, 
aside from requiring that any given form chosen should conform to the 
underlying theoretical restrictions. A production function may theoretically have 
advantages over another function. While the translog function has the 
advantage over the CES function in that the elasticity of substitution is allowed 
to vary, it may also have some potential disadvantages such as a high degree 
of multicollinearity in the multi-factor case and a substantial loss of degrees of 
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freedom (Hsing, 1993). Thus, without actually testing the data, we cannot 
ascertain the functional form suits the sample better. One possibility is to 
specify the function as a generalised Box-Cox model (Bairam and Dasguptha, 
1988). The Box-Cox function minimises the multicollinearity problem also to a 
greater extent. In estimating the demand for labour with time series data, 
seemingly autoregressive residuals may be a result of either an incorrect 
functional form or autoregressive disturbances, or both. This may result in a 
biased estimation of regression parameters (Hsing, 1989). 
Thus, it may be argued that Box-Cox transformations by letting the data 
determine the functional form address to some extent some of the modelling 
specification issues. Although such a development in empirical production 
functions could be seen as promising, the models, mainly used in the context 
of developing countries are still limited to Cobb-Douglas, CES and a few uses 
of 'translog' cost functional forms. The problems of these studies bearing on 
concepts, data, and econometric techniques, have been reviewed by a number 
of authors in the literature (Berndt, 1991; Gupta, 1989; Bhalla, 1976; Morawetz, 
1974 and 1976; O'Herlihy, 1972). 
According to these reviewers, most of the studies are circumscribed by a 
number of shortcomings. In some studies the dependent variable is not 
defined clearly, i. e. whether it is production workers or non-production 
workers. In some cases, variables such as wage, output etc were not deflated, 
which is clearly inappropriate. Most of the studies were confined to only two 
factors; capital and labour, and this does not permit other important factors to 
come into the picture. 
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Both labour and capital are assumed to be uniform. Mostly, it is assumed that 
firms operate under perfect competition in the factor and product markets, and 
also have constant returns to scale in most cases, which may be more 
appropriate for developed countries than developing countries. It is also 
supposed that firms are on their production frontier which is also not realistic 
for most of the developing countries. Thus, experiencing difficulties in 
incorporating technical changes, working capital, skilled and unskilled labour 
and changing rates of capital utilization over time has been common. 
Although such shortcomings are found in some of the studies a majority of the 
empirical studies are substantially rational and indicate that efficient factor 
substitutability is possible. These estimates of elasticity of substitution mostly 
vary between the 0.5 and 1.2 values, and thus, considerable substitution 
possibilities do exist. A higher elasticity of substitution indicates that there 
exists flexibility of substituting the faster growing primary factor easily to the 
slower growing one. 
Accordingly, if the factor market distortions are removed by following more 
appropriate policies, labour absorption can be increased by substituting more 
labour for capital in manufacturing industries in most of the developing 
countries where labour is abundant and capital is scarce. The estimated 
coefficients of elasticity of substitution of factors of some of the selected 
studies for industry are summarised in table-2.3 (see table 2.3). 
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Table - 2.3 
Factor Substitution Elasticities of Selected Studies 
Of Developing countries 
Researcher Study year Substitution 
Elasticity 
Eriksson Cross section estimates across 1969 Average about 
industries within each country for 30 to 0.7 
75 industries in Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico 2 
Williamson Pooled cross section time series 1971 Most greater 
estimates for six industry groups in than 1 and three 
Philippines 1 below0.4 
Bruton Cross section estimates for 18 two-digit 1972 Most in the 
industries in 22 developing countries 2 range of 0.5 to 
1.2 
Lumas and Pooled cross section estimates for four- 1981 From 0.1 to 0.7 
Williams digit industries using major industrial with most above 
group data in India 2 0.4 
Kown and Pooled cross section estimates for four- 1982 From 0.3 to 1.1 
Williams digit industries using major industrial with most above 
group data in Korea 2 0.4 
Bairam and Cross regional data for Indian 1988 From 0.56to 
Dasguptha manufacturing 2 1.79 
Jaforullah Cross section estimates for Bangladesh 1997 1.0 
hand loom textile industry 1 
Source: Eriksson (1969), Williamson (1971), Bruton (1972), Lumas and Williams (1981), Kown and Williams 
(1982) as cited in Gupta (1989); Bairam and Dasguptha (1988); and Jaforullah (1997). 
Note: 1 = production workers, 2 = not clear 
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2.8 Selected Empirical Studies on Factor Distortions in 
Developing Countries 
There are only a few empirical studies in the literature on factor market 
distortions and their effect on labour absorption in manufacturing industries in 
developing countries. The study carried out by Byerlee et al. ( 1983) in 1979 on 
"Employment-output conflicts, factor price distortions and choice of technique" 
in Sierra Leone was one of the early studies on this topic. This study was 
based on the data collected through a nationwide survey in 197 4/75, which 
covered a number of fields including 250 small industrial firms in both rural and 
urban areas, together with secondary data on large-scale industries, with a 
view to accounting for the different types of production techniques employed in 
the entire industrial sector. 
The study identified that both capital and labour markets were distorted. 
Banks were charging negative real interest rates due to higher inflation and 
were giving preferential treatment to large-scale firms, against the small-scale 
producers that were charged higher interest rates. Small-scale producers had 
to pay substantially higher tariffs on imported inputs than the large firms. The 
study estimated that the 'Leone', currency of Sierra Leone, was overvalued by 
approximately 15 percent, and that this overvaluation provided a greater 
benefit to large-scale producers, who imported a larger proportion of their 
inputs. 
Byerlee et al. (1983) found that the wage rate for unskilled labour was 
adversely affected by the dichotomy between small-scale and large-scale 
sectors. The wage rate paid by large private firms for unskilled labour was 
about double the wage in the small-scale sector, and higher than the wage 
rates dictated either by a competitive market or government minimum wage 
legislation. 
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But this sector employed only less than 1 O percent of urban unskilled labour. 
The wage rate in rural sectors was, on average, 55 percent of the wage in 
urban small-scale sectors. However, the largest wage differentials appeared in 
urban areas between the large-scale private sector firms and the small-scale 
firms, rather than between rural and urban sectors. The study identified that 
small-scale firms were associated with higher output-capital ratios than large-
scale sectors and concluded that both employment and output could be 
expanded by correcting the factor price distortions, especially between the 
large and small-scale sectors. 
Another study directly related to factor price distortions is Agarwala's (1983) 
study, which attempts to assess the impact of distortions in prices of both 
traded and non-traded goods, and factor prices and exchange rates on growth 
performance of developing countries in the 1970s. The basic approach 
followed in this study was to contrast the average growth performance of 
countries with high price distortions with that of low distorted countries. The 
study used the available World Bank data for a panel of 31 developing 
countries, which represent more than 75 percent of the population of the 
developing world, excluding China. The distortions in this study, were not 
measured against some theoretical model, but were practical approximations 
commonly used in policy analysis. 
Based on the gross effective protection rate as an indicator of trade-related 
distortion in the pricing of value-added in manufacturing, the study revealed 
that the countries with high protection were particularly concentrated in South 
Asia and East Africa. In the case of the exchange rate, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Chile, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uruguay had high distortions, whereas, most 
countries in Asia had low distortions during the 1970s. In several countries, 
credit was provided at negative real interest rates. 
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The cost of credit market distortions was mainly borne by savers losing 1 O 
percent a year in real terms, on the average, for the whole 1970s decade. In 
some cases, particularly in Latin America, the real interest rate was lower than 
minus 20 percent per year. In most cases, the highly negative rates were not 
deliberate policy decision but the consequences of high inflation rates. Only 
Thailand and Ethiopia out of the 31 countries investigated could manage to 
have positive real interest rates over this period. Where labour market 
distortions were concerned, the study identified that Tanzania, the Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Egypt, Chile, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were the worst 
affected. 
The countries studied were classified into high, medium, and low distortion 
categories on the basis of an average degree of distortions in different prices. 
A negative relationship between growth and price distortions was found. 
Accordingly, the average growth rate of countries with low distortion in the 
1970s was about 7 percent a year which was 2 percentage points higher than 
the overall average. Countries with high distortions had an average growth 
rate of about 3 percent per year, which was 2 percentage points lower than the 
overall average. Regression analysis accompanied in this study indicated that 
price distortions explained only one-third of the total variation in growth rates. 
The overall conclusion of the study is that price distortions do, among other 
factors, have an effect on growth. 
Gupta's (1989) study was an attempt to identify the factors that determine the 
demand for labour in the manufacturing sector of 13 developing countries from 
1960 to 1983. He proceeded at two different levels of aggregation in three 
parts. Part 1 used annual time series data for three-digit industries for India 
and South Korea and reported estimates for each industry separately. In part 
2, pooled time series and cross section data were used to estimate labour 
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demand functions for total manufacturing as well as for three separate groups, 
namely, consumer goods, intermediate goods, and capital goods for the 
remaining eleven countries. In Part 3, using pooled data, inter-related demand 
functions are estimated for India and South Korea, for the same three sectors 
as well as for total manufacturing. 
This study examined the effects of two factor prices only (capital and labour) 
for India and South Korea and one factor only (labour) for the other eleven 
countries due to data limitations. For India, a number of patterns were 
reported. First, with the exception of the period after 1971, the two factor 
prices moved fairly close together for all industries. Second, there were less 
marked fluctuations in the user cost of capital than in the real wage rates. 
Third, after 1971, real wage rates showed considerably greater variability than 
for the earlier period. Fourth, it has been shown that, contrary to popular 
belief, factor prices in general have not moved in favour of capital. Finally, 
there was no evidence of significant overall increases in real wage rates, 
except after 1971 for a few industries. The study reported that for almost all 
industries, the wage-rental ratio remained virtually constant during the decades 
of the 1950s and the 1960s, but there were some fluctuations thereafter. The 
main point is that there was no systematic increase in the cost of labour 
relative to that of capital in India. Relating to South Korea, the data showed 
quite a different pattern in the behaviour of factor prices. The real wage 
steadily increased in almost all industries in South Korea. The behaviour of the 
real user cost of capital, on the other hand, was almost the opposite of that 
observed for India. After reaching a peak level around 1965, it steadily 
declined until 197 4, then rose until 1980, and then started to decline again. 
The wage-rental ratio, therefore, indicated a definite break around the late 
1970s. Relative factor prices turned in favour of capital after this period, 
66 
whereas for the earlier period the ratio seemed to be decisively in favour of 
labour. In the case of seven of the other eleven countries, with the exception of 
Chile, The Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Panama, the real wage rate 
increased at the aggregate manufacturing level during the period 1970-81. 
Gupta assessed the distortion in the price of labour through wage-productivity 
comparison. Accordingly, in both countries, India and Korea, at the aggregate 
level real wages grew at a lower rate than productivity. In India, the real wage 
would appear to have either remained stagnant or experienced very low growth 
rates. In South Korea, on the other hand, real wages grew at a very high rate. 
But what is more important is that in both countries, the real wage did not 
increase, on the whole, at a rate higher than productivity. In the other eleven 
countries, except Colombia, Malta and Tanzania, rates of growth in productivity 
were higher than that of real wages in total manufacturing. On the basis of 
these comparisons Gupta concluded that labour markets in most of the 
countries were not distorted as assumed. 
Evidence about the cost of capital in this study was available only for India and 
South Korea. It was found that the degree of distortion was sensitive to the 
measure of an alternate rate of interest used in estimating shadow prices for 
the cost of capital, as well as to the time period used, and on this basis, it was 
concluded that the distortion was somewhat more severe in India than in South 
Korea. The standard view that the capital cost in developing countries tends to 
be distorted in the downward direction generally tended to be confirmed. But 
the study revealed that distortions in the rental cost of capital have been more 
costly than those in the wage rate, as measured by the percentage of 
employment lost. Thus, it concluded that the extent of distortion in wages in 
the countries in the sample is far less pervasive than the standard belief. The 
main finding of this study is that, in the long-run, factor price changes as well 
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as output changes play a considerable role in determining employment. But to 
achieve a target rate of employment, output expansion rather than factor price 
manipulation has been identified as the preferred strategy. 
A comparison can be done between Agarwala's and Gupta's studies with 
regards to the cost of labour in respect of some countries in the 1970s decade. 
For Chile, Agarwala reports a high degree of distortion, whereas Gupta reveals 
that the real wage declined more than productivity declined. In respect to 
Colombia, Agarwala finds a low degree of wage distortion, while Gupta 
indicates that productivity growth was negative while the real wage had 
increased. In the case of India, Agarwala finds a medium degree of wage 
distortion, while Gupta shows that productivity had increased at a much higher 
rate than the real wage increase. However, these discrepancies might be 
mainly on account of the different methodologies adopted and the different 
sources of information used in these two studies. Overall, these empirical 
studies confirm that factor markets in developing countries were considerably 
distorted and policies designed to correct the distortions bring about an 
increase in employment growth. 
2.8 Summary 
The literature review begins with highlighting that corresponding to developed 
countries there has been a considerable output-employment gap in developing 
countries also during the past few decades. This phenomenon is considered 
as evidence to suggest that employment generation, particularly in the 
manufacturing industry as the most dynamic sector of many developing 
countries is limited. In the literature, such a retardation of employment creation 
in manufacturing is mainly attributed to following the developed country 
technology due to factor market distortions. 
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However, a debate has emerged of the causes of factor market distortions, 
particularly of those of labour market. Therefore, the literature review outlines 
this debate as well. 
Also, the review emphasises the role played by non-price factors in selecting 
developed country technology. Next, the evidence of adopting alternative 
factor substitutions in some of the fast developing countries is presented. 
Afterwards, outlining the theoretical evolution of production function analysis, 
the possibility of factor substitution is further established by presenting the 
results of a few selected studies of econometric estimations of elasticity of 
factor substitution. Finally, results of a few empirical studies on the subject are 
reviewed, and the chapter ends with emphasising the significance of correcting 
factor price distortions so that the manufacturing industry can adopt alternative 
production techniques to absorb more labour, and thereby generating more 
employment for developing countries such as Sri Lanka. 
69 
CHAPTER 3 
An Overview of Industrialisation of the Sri Lankan 
Economy 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the evolving of industrial policies in 
Sri Lanka underlining a rationale to adopt each subsequent industrial 
strategy. Accordingly, the first to be identified is the industrial policy in the 
pre Second World War period. Then, the industrial strategies implemented 
during the Second World War, post-war and post-independence eras are 
considered, highlighting strengths and weaknesses of each policy stance 
respectively. Then, the causes that forced the adopting of import-
substitution industrialisation (ISi) from the late 1950s are discussed, 
highlighting its impact on creating factor market distortions which are 
assumed by this study to be a major cause for limiting labour absorption in 
manufacturing industries. The last section of the chapter demonstrates 
how ISi led to taking on an export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) from 1977 
onwards. The chapter concludes with an emphasis on the manufacturing 
industrial sector's relative strengths and weaknesses in absorbing labour, 
in order to make a background to form a set of prior hypotheses for the 
study and to test them in the subsequent chapters. 
3.2 Different Trade Policies Followed 
Most developing countries have employed varying trade policies in their 
efforts to speed up development. While these policies have had different 
degrees of emphasis at one time or another, in many cases it seems that 
they have been pursued chronologically in the following order: 
70 
• Primary inward looking policies (Mainly agricultural self-sufficiency), 
• Primary outward looking policies (Encouragement of agricultural and 
raw material exports), 
• Secondary inward looking policies (Manufactured commodity self-
sufficiency through import substitution), 
• Secondary outward looking policies (Promotion of manufactured 
exports) (Todaro, 2000: 499). 
Sri Lanka's developmental efforts too can be reviewed in accordance with 
the above stated typology. Prior to the establishment of commercial 
plantations by the British colonial rulers from the 1830s onwards, the 
international trade of the country was limited to native-grown cinnamon, 
pearls, ivory, and other exotic commodities for which 'Ceylon' 1 had been 
renowned since ancient times (Snodgrass, 1966: 16). The economy in that 
era was a closed feudal agrarian subsistence economy. 
Then, from the middle of the 19th century the British introduced commercial 
plantations on a large scale and more emphasis was laid on the export of 
those products, so the country became a primary commodity exporter. The 
primary outward looking policy that emerged in the British colonial period 
was followed without much change even until a decade after the country's 
gaining political independence in 1948 (Snodgrass, 1966). 
However, by the late 1950s the country's major primary exports - tea, 
rubber, and coconut, began encountering persistent unfavourable price 
trends in the world market while the prices of imports continued to increase. 
1 In 1972 Ceylon was renamed Sri Lanka and the Ceylonese were named as Sri Lankan 
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This unfavourable trend in the terms of trade, along with the change in the 
political leadership in 1956, induced a policy shift resulting in the 
abandonment of the liberal economic policies that the country had followed 
from the inception of the colonial era {Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1996). 
Thus, the broad economic policy that came into effect from the late 1950s 
was more protective, and could be identified as a secondary inward looking 
policy with the emphasis on import substitution {IS) industrialisation. This 
inward looking policy continued for about two decades, and by the mid -
1970s the Sri Lankan economy had become one of the most inward-
oriented and regulated economies outside the socialist bloc countries 
{Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 2000). Then, responding to the depressing 
outcomes of the closed economy era, the country adopted a more outward-
oriented strategy from 1977 onwards under which a more prominent place 
has been given to promoting export oriented {EO) industrialisation. 
3.3 Industrial Efforts Prior to 1956 
3.3.1 Industrialisation in the Pre Second World War Period 
Modern economic development of Sri Lanka commenced with the 
introduction of large-scale coffee plantations from the 1830s onwards. The 
coffee industry expanded rapidly and flourished until 1870. Subsequent to 
the devastation of coffee, its place was taken by tea plantations which 
propelled the economy forward during the period, 1888-1913. After 1913 
rubber plantations started growing faster than tea. By the turn of the 20th 
century the overwhelming pattern of dominance of the three major 
plantation crops - tea, rubber, and coconut, had firmly taken root in the 
economy (de Silva, 1977: 66). Thus, the plantation system brought about a 
profound effect on Ceylon, transforming its economy from a closed feudal 
agrarian subsistence status, which had a history of more than 2000 years, 
into a dual economy comprising a plantation sector (par excellence) and a 
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backward subsistence agrarian sector (Karunaratna, 1973: 11 ). The 
economy that emerged in this manner was later branded as an export 
economy (Athukorala and Huynh, 1987: 35). An export economy is defined 
as one with not merely a high ratio of imports and exports to national 
income, but one in which all the important macro economic variables -
government revenues and expenditures, private investment, import and 
national income itself possess strong functional dependence upon the level 
of export receipts (Snodgrass, 1966: 17). 
Thus, the rapidly expanded estate sector in Sri Lanka during the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries became an engine of growth for the economy for 
more than a century (ibid, 1966: 50). The plantation economy particularly 
showed a rapid growth in the periods of 1913-29, the Second World War, 
the Korean War boom in 1950-52, and the tea boom in 1954-55 
(Snodgrass, 1966; Karunatilake, 1987). But apart from these limited boom 
periods, most other times the terms of trade turned against the island's 
economy. So, densely populated Ceylon was not able to raise her people's 
living standard appreciably through the exports of primary agricultural 
products alone. Some diversification, therefore, appeared essential for any 
substantial long-run development (Oliver, 1957: 29). 
For the first time, the experience during the First World War (1914-1918) 
led the government to realise the vulnerability to external vagaries of an 
economy, which was specialising in a few plantation crops for export 
(Karunaratna, 1973: 11 ). As a result, the colonial government took some 
steps to make Ceylon less dependent on plantation crops commencing as 
early as in 1916 with the appointment of the 'Industries Commission' with 
the objective 'to inquire into and report upon what measures are desirable 
to encourage such industries (other than agriculture) as exist in this island, 
and to promote the establishment of new industries' (Report of the 
Industries Commission, 1922: 1 ). The Industries Commission Report that 
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was issued in 1922 identified a number of new industries such as glass, 
paper, soap, cement, cyanamid, charcoal, acetic acid, alcohol, and other 
chemical products, fish oil, fish manure and tinned fish as suitable new 
industries to be set up in Ceylon. Nevertheless, recognising the increasing 
cost of imported fuel, the Commission emphasised the importance of 
having a cheaper source of power for establishing manufacturing 
industries. In this regard, the Commission recognised the potential that Sri 
Lanka had for generating hydro-electricity. Also, the importance of 
scientific research for developing industries was highlighted. The 
Commission recognised the difficulty of inducing the private sector to sink 
capital in the first instance into these new industries and recommend the 
government to start new industries purely on an experimental basis, and for 
this purpose the establishment of a Bureau of Industry and Commerce was 
proposed (ibid, 1922: 8). Further, the Commission identified the 
importance of developing home industries (handicrafts), and suggested 
establishment of a central institute, a 'School of Handicraft' for promoting 
such domestic industries (ibid, 1922: 12). 
Next, the Banking Commission Report (1934), the Report on Industrial 
Development and Policy (1946), foreign advisors as well as Ceylonese 
professionals suggested that the island should strive to be less dependent 
upon the plantation industry, and that it should increase local production 
including essential manufactures. Yet, as shown by Snodgrass, industrial 
activity remained an insignificant part of Ceylon's economy before the 
Second World War (Snodgrass, 1966: 168). 
At the beginning of the 20th century a few industries such as aerated water, 
beer, textiles, and confectioneries etc. could be seen in the economy. 
Apart from these industries, hundreds of primary product processing 
factories such as tea factories, rubber mills, and coconut oil mills, did spring 
up mainly throughout the Central and South-Western Provinces in the 
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island where commercial crops were grown. Others were the industries 
that provided engineering requirements for the plantation industry (Reports 
of the Industries Commission, 1922; 1 ). By 1939 the total number of 
primary product processing factories in Sri Lanka was over 2000 
(Karunatilake, 1987: 93). This spread of primary product processing 
factories indicated that Sri Lanka, unlike many other less developed 
countries at that time, was not without an entrepreneurial class. 
In this background, taking the Industries Commission's recommendations 
(1922) into consideration with the view to diversifying the economy, the 
colonial government appropriated funds for commencement of a Hydro-
electric Power Scheme in 1924 and voted into the establishment of the long 
demanded State Mortgage Bank. However, the success of these projects 
was not entirely impressive. The hydro-electricity project, due to a number 
of obstacles, could not provide power until 1950. The State Mortgage Bank 
established in 1931 played an insignificant role in promoting the setting up 
of industries, mainly on account of its limited powers, and cautious loan 
policies followed plus investor apprehension, especially during the great 
depression (Karunatilake, 1987; Oliver, 1957). 
Then, in 1939 the Bank of Ceylon was established on the recommendation 
of the Ceylon Banking Commission (1934), aiming at narrowing down the 
gap created by the failure of the State Mortgage Bank to provide funds to 
local investors for manufacturing and the reluctance of the expatriate banks 
to finance projects other than plantation activities. In the decade of 1940s, 
the industrial drive was further expanded by establishing a coir factory and 
a plywood factory as the government's pilot projects. However, mainly the 
outbreak of the Second World War disrupted work on other planned public 
sector model factories such as paper, glass, and rubber goods (Athukorala 
& Rajapatirana, 2000; Karunatilake, 1987; Oliver, 1957). 
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During the period prior to the Second World War, the aim of the industrial 
policy was largely to promote private enterprises to commence industries. 
Even the recommendations of the Industries Commission (1922) were 
meant for assigning a larger role to the private enterprises for engaging in 
manufacturing industries after commencing them by the government. In 
1933 the Executive Committee of Labour, Industry and Commerce argued 
that the government's industrial functions should, in normal years, be to 
conduct research, construct and operate model factories, and grant loans 
to private enterprises. Even the Banking Commission (1934) 
recommended promoting the private sector to engage in industry. 
Throughout this era the State Council hoped to channel funds from the 
state-aid bank to private enterprises (Oliver, 1957: 81). 
Yet, despite various promotional efforts taken throughout the 1920s and the 
1930s there was a great reluctance on the part of the private sector to 
participate in industrial manufacturing. For instance, in the case of the 
plywood factory, the government prepared land and offered the project to 
the private sector, but no response was forthcoming (Karunatilake, 1987: 
92). In this era the domestic private sector was dominated by merchant 
capital (Dunham and Kelegama, 1994: 8). Also, in a background where 
funds were not available for investing in manufacturing and high quality 
manufactured products being imported without any restriction, the 
reluctance of the private sector to engage in the manufacturing industry 
was understandable. 
3.3.2 Industrialisation in the Second World War Period 
The Second World War (1939-1945) disrupted international trade and 
communication and created severe shortages of all kinds of goods in the 
domestic market (Karunatilake, 1987: 91). This led both the government 
and the private sector to engage in manufacturing more effectively than 
previously. On the government's side, quick actions were taken to start 
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plants to produce a wide variety of products such as hats, coir products, 
leather goods, acetic acid, quinine, steel-rolling, glass, ceramics and paper 
factories (Snodgrass, 1966: 77). Most of the war-time factories had been in 
the pre-war scheduled list. But these industries were geared towards 
short-term import substitution (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 2000: 30). 
During the war years most of the government factories reported a net profit. 
However, costs and prices of the war-time factories were high and the 
quality of the end product was low, but in the sellers' market of the early 
1940s nobody objected (Snodgrass: 1966: 77; Oliver, 1957: 81 ). Private 
manufacturers too, under the war-time industrial programme, responded 
well to the sellers' market. However, the resumption of industrial imports 
after the end of the war put a sudden stop to the 'war generated industrial 
import substitution boom' without leaving any significant lasting effect on 
the structure of the classical economy (Athukorala and Huynh, 1987: 36-
37). 
In 1946 a new policy statement on industries was issued taking into 
consideration the failure to attract private capital into industries, particularly 
during the pre-war period and the situation that industries faced just after 
the war. Under the new industrial policy state ownership and management 
were considered the preferable means to progress in industries. 
Accordingly, the government undertook the responsibility for promoting 
basic industries while the other industries were left to government, private 
and mixed enterprises (Oliver, 1957). The 1946 industrial policy continued 
as the official policy until 1952. 
3.3.3 Industrialisation in the Post Independence Period up to 
1956 
After the Second World War there was a much greater acceptance of 
interferences in the market mechanism and planning in developing 
countries. State planning, which included interventionist trade policy, was 
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intertwined with colonial independence and Keynesianism (Thirlwall, 
1994:5). Post independent Sri Lankan governments too showed some 
interest in economic planning. Accordingly, the first six-year plan (1947/48 
-1952/53) was issued in 1950, and the second plan as a new six-year 
programme of investment (1954/55-1959/60) was presented in 1955. 
Oliver (1957) analysed industrial policies that appeared in the first six-year 
plan and the subsequent six-year investment programme under three 
periods - 1947-50, 1951-53, and 1954-56. During the first period the 
government industrial policy was framed in line with the 1946 industrial 
policy statement. Accordingly, 'basic industries' were further left for the 
State sector. The government in this phase continued to operate most of 
the war-time factories and announced the setting up of several new 
factories also. 
During the second phase (1951-53) the initial industrial policy was 
questioned, mainly by the recommendations of the World Bank Mission that 
came to the country to study the performance of the various sectors of the 
economy in 1952. The Report criticised certain industrial projects already 
commenced or under study and recommended the closure of most of the 
inefficient war-time ventures at the earliest possible date. Disapproving 
complete state ownership and management, the Mission stated that 
Ceylon's main industrial growth at present should be centred on the 
development of numerous small and medium-sized industries rather than 
large ones. The Mission further recommended that government assistance 
should include technical advice, tax incentives, marketing and similar 
measures to encourage the private sector to perform its role (World Bank, 
1952). 
During the third phase (1954-56) the government adopted a programme 
formulated mainly in line with the World Bank Mission's recommendations 
(1952). The main objective of the industrial strategy under this programme 
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was to reduce the state's direct involvement and to encourage the private 
sector (Six Year Programme of Investment, 1954/60: 238). Accordingly, 
steps were taken to transfer government owned factories that were 
functioning at the time to private ownership by the enactment of Acts such 
as the Government Corporation Act No.19, (1953) and the Government 
Sponsored Corporation Act No. 19 (1955) for facilitating of this conversion. 
Thus, in the last phase (1954-56), the government's policy indicated a shift 
of emphasis from the large-scale to small-scale industries and the role of 
the state to that of a promoter rather than a sole entrepreneur. 
The government's policy change towards industrialisation was reflected by 
the reduction of funds allocated for industries during the post war period. 
For example, figures in table - 3.1 reveal that for the six-year plan period 
(1947-53), only 5.25 per cent of the total budgetary outlay was set aside for 
industry while it was 4.43 per cent for the next six-year investment 
programme (1954-60). In contrast to the lower allocation of funds for 
industries, the agricultural sector's allocation for the first six-years was as 
large as 7.95 times of the industrial budgetary allocation and the 
corresponding figure for the subsequent six-year programme was as large 
as 8.25 times (see table - 3.1 ). 
Some critics argued that the high ratio of agricultural to industrial outlay had 
represented a deliberate attempt to slow manufacturing growth, first by the 
colonial government and next by Ceylonese-planter governments (Oliver, 
1957). On the other hand, considerable economic prosperity which was 
enjoyed by the economy as a result of war-time export prosperity, the 
Korean War boom (1950-52) and the tea boom (1954-55) had brought 
about a false sense of security about the viability of the existing system. 
This erroneous attitude too led the post-independence governments to 
continue with the plantation economy. (Athukorala and Huynh, 1987). 
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Table-3.1 
Budgetary Outlays of Six-year Plan and Six-year Investment 
Programme 
(1947-53 and 1954-60) 
Six-year Plan, 1947-53 Six-year Investment 
(Rs. Million) Programme, 1954-60 
(Rs. Million) 
TotaJ development outlay 1,246.4 2,528.0 
Agriculture, fisheries 518.8 923.0 
and forestry 
Transport 302.4 546.0 
and communication 
Fuel and power 74.2 292.0 
Industry 65.4 112.0 
Other 285.6 655.0 
Source; Oliver Jr M H (1957), Economic Opinion and Policy in Ceylon. 
Some other commentators are of the view that Sri Lanka did not make use 
of its relatively high economic strength in the post-independence era to 
increase its economic advancement (Karunaratna, 1973). For example, in 
the 1950s, Sri Lanka's per capita income was much higher than such 
countries as Thailand and South Korea and it was marginally lower than 
Malaysia (see table - 3.2). However, from the beginning of the 1960s, Sri 
Lanka slipped below these and many other countries (Athukorala and 
Rajapathirana, 2000:545). 
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Table-3.2 
Sri Lanka and Selected Asian Countries: The Level and Growth of 
Purchasing-Power-Parity-Adjusted Per Capita GNP 1950-1995 
Level relative to united States Average annual 
growth 
1950 1960 1977 1995 1960-77 1978-95 
India 7.1 7.4 5.7 8.7 0.8 3.1 
Indonesia n.a. 5.8 6.4 13.2 2.9 5.3 
Malaysia 14.6 15.0 20.4 37.8 4.5 7.1 
Pakistan 9.0 6.8 6.5 7.8 2.5 2.3 
Philippines 10.3 11.5 11.4 9.5 2.5 0.1 
Singapore n.a. 16.6 39.2 85.4 7.5 6.1 
S. Korea 7.6 8.7 18.7 48.9 6.2 7.1 
Sri Lanka 11.4 12.5 9.4 13.1 0.8 5.1 
Thailand 9.9 9.6 12.8 27.0 4.3 5.4 
Source: Premachandra Athukorala and Sarath Rajapathirana - Liberalisation and 
Industrial Transformation: Lessons from the Sri Lankan experience - The World 
Economy Vol.23 No.3 
March 2000 
n.a. - Not available 
Political independence of most of the countries after the War led almost 
immediately to a major emphasis on industrialisation through direct 
government intervention as a means of ending economic dependence 
(Krueger, 1990). But the behaviour of the first two post-independence 
governments in Sri Lanka was very much in contrast with that of most of 
the other countries at the time. The failure of the diversification of the 
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economy through development of manufacturing industries was reflected 
by the size of the contribution of the major primary products to the total 
export earnings of the economy even by the end of this era (by the late 
1950s). For example, tea, rubber, and coconut contributed 90 per cent to 
the total export earnings of the country in 1959 (Snodgrass, 1966: 54). 
When the pre 1956 industrial attempts from the 1920s are taken together, 
we can clearly notice that official policy had only little success in attracting 
private enterprise to the manufacturing industry, regardless of the fact that 
Sri Lanka had an entrepreneurial class that was engaged in the primary 
product processing industry from the latter part of the 19th century. 
Failure to channel the local entrepreneurial class out of the old familiar lines 
such as estate agriculture, real estate, and trade into manufacturing was 
largely attributed to the free trade policy followed throughout this era, 
capital shortage, lack of skills and technical knowledge, and inexperience in 
the manufacturing industry (Karunatilake, 1987; Snodgrass, 1966; Oliver, 
1957). Under the liberal trade policies high quality products manufactured 
in foreign countries were freely available in the domestic market, and in this 
background, if local investors were to compete they had to manufacture 
their products at least to be on par with the price and quality of imported 
products. Thus, less experienced private sector local investors were 
apprehensive to go for competition with free imports, and they merely 
confined to safer and familiar business areas, especially in relation to the 
plantation industry and trade. On the other hand, local industrialists and 
other nationalists pointed out that the protection provided by the 
government in this whole era was not strong enough to keep imports out to 
an extent great enough to encourage local manufactures 2• 
2. Protections provided at that time were limited to some import duties, import quotas, and 
the statute like the Industrial Product Act, which compelled traders to buy certain 
percentages of their supplies from local producers. 
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The failure of the government model factories also discouraged the private 
sector's participation in manufacturing industry. This failure, as explained 
in the literature review chapter, can be attributed to the wrong way of 
technology adoption by the public sector industries. The International Bank 
Mission (1952) emphasised another facet of the issue of the inability in 
attracting local investors to manufacturing. Accordingly, credit institutions, 
research agencies and other bodies set up to aid Ceylonese private 
business had accomplished little to attract investors to manufacturing 
(World Bank, 1952). 
Further, in the late 1940s and early 1950s the government's announced 
policy was not to let any private firm enter 'basic' manufacturing industries. 
According to Oliver (1957), blocking the entrance of the private sector to 
'basic' manufacturing industries might have kept out at least a few foreign 
firms from investing. Also, the government had reserved certain areas of 
business for local private enterprise through import and export quotas 
allowing only Ceylonese firms to receive quotas for 'new' trade. The legal 
restrictions such as land policy denied foreigners the right to buy public 
land. Restrictive government actions that transferred income and 
economic power to locals by forcing foreign firms to hire more Ceylonese 
also discouraged foreign investors. 
In Oliver's view (1957) vocal leftists and nationalists did much of the job 
without government help, frightening away foreign capital that otherwise 
might wish to enter. Thus, with these evidences, it is possible to conclude 
that these various types of restrictions created some distortions in the 
market although the economic policies followed were mainly laissez-faire at 
that time. Thus, various efforts made in persuading the private sector to be 
engaged in manufacturing from the 1920s to the late 1950s were not 
successful, and the concentration of private capital mostly on plantation 
related activities continued until the late 1950s. 
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The reluctance of the private sector to invest in manufacturing indicated the 
inadequacy of the facilities provided and the incentive mix offered through 
proper government policy interventions, particularly in a highly competitive 
market for manufacturing products that were imported under laissez-faire 
trade policies. Also, some government policies brought about a certain 
level of market distortions, and activities of political and national 
movements discouraged foreign investors' participation in manufacturing. 
As a combined result of all these factors, the classical export economy that 
emerged with the inception of the British colonial administration without any 
significant change continued even after the political independence (1948), 
and until the late 1950s. 
3.4 Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISi) (1957-1977) 
3.4.1 First Phase of the ISi (1957-1964) 
As noted in the previous section, the national political leadership in the 
post-independence period was predominantly interested in plantation and 
related commercial activities. Therefore, they felt no need for a structural 
change in the economy. Accumulated foreign assets from the war-time 
through 1955 helped that regime to maintain sound budgetary operation 
(except in 1953) still bearing a high level of welfare expenditure, enabling 
Sri Lanka to maintain a higher position relative to many other countries in 
Asia at that time (Ten Year Plan, 1959: 5; de Silva, 1977: 146) (see table -
3.2). 
However, the change of political power from the right of centre United 
National Party (UNP), which governed the country from 1948, to the left of 
centre People's United Front (PUF) in 1956, brought a decisive policy shift. 
The limited growth potential of the subsistence agricultural and plantation 
sectors to absorb the rapidly increasing workforce which surfaced due to 
the population explosion commencing from the late 1940s, was clearly 
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apparent by the mid 1950s (Ten Year Plan, 1959; 345). As a result, the 
new government, with its different political ideology, placed the 
restructuring of the classical export economy that was based on a few 
plantation crops high on the political agenda (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 
1996; 3). The new regime's commitment to diversify the economy through 
industrialisation was evidently shown by its relative allocation of funds 
between industry and agriculture in comparison to that of the previous 
regime. For example, in the Ten-year plan (1959/68), 20.6 per cent of total 
investment was allocated for industry with agriculture and fisheries being 
allocated only 24.5 per cent of the total investment outlay. Corresponding 
allocations in the Six-year investment programme of the previous regime 
(1954/60) were 4.4 per cent and 36.5 per cent respectively (see table -
3.1). 
The industrial policy of the new regime appeared to reverse the pre 1956 
trend by shifting the emphasis back from cottage to factory industries, and 
from private to public investment. Basic industries appeared once again to 
be reserved for the state (Oliver, 1957:87). The industrial strategy of the 
new government was clearly stated in such documents as the Report of the 
Director of Industries (1957) and the comprehensive Ten-Year Plan (1959-
68) issued in 1959. Accordingly, the new industrial policy proposed a two-
pronged strategy, dividing industries into 'planned' and 'unplanned' sectors. 
The planned sector of the industrial program consisted broadly of, though 
not rigidly, industrial projects to be undertaken by the government. For this 
purpose, the government enacted the State Industrial Corporation Act No. 
49 of 1957, which facilitated setting up and operating state owned industrial 
undertakings and taking over industries carried out by any other 
organisation. For the projects that fell into the unplanned sector (small-
scale industries), the government was expected to provide facilities, 
construction of industrial estates, and to establish incentives through 
taxation and protection (Ten Year Plan, 1959; 349). 
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The Ten-year plan argued that if Ceylon were to pursue industrialisation on 
a substantial scale there would appear to be no alternative but to initiate a 
serious and effective policy of protection. The Planning Secretariat (1957) 
showed that the local market was sufficiently large enough for 
industrialisation via import replacement, and emphasised that such a policy 
of protection would have to go beyond the familiar 'infant industry' 
argument (ibid, 1959; 34). According to Athukorala and Jayasuriya, (1996) 
the development strategy chosen in this manner to industrialise the 
economy was a 'forced' import-substitution strategy, depending on the then 
prevalent ideological bias in development thinking. Thus, the 1956 
government planned on transforming the colonial economic structure into a 
self-reliant public sector dominant industrial policy, based on administrative 
controls and selective intervention (Athukorala and Rajapathirana, 2000: 
27). 
However, the government had to abandon the most promising Ten-Year 
Plan just after the first few years of its formulation due to the political 
confusion in 1959-60, and subsequent rapid depletion of the country's 
reserves. As data in table - 3.3 reveal, the country's foreign reserves had 
fallen just sufficient to secure only 3.2 months import requirements by 1960 
from the level of 20.9 months of import ability in 1946. Hence, by the end 
of 1960, maintaining the free flow of imports into the country became 
completely impossible (Snodgrass, 1966: 216). In the background of 
rapidly depleting foreign assets that the country possessed in the late 
1950s and little foreign loans available, the government followed a drastic 
course of action to curtail imports to a level that would be consistent with 
the basic balance in the external accounts. 
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Table - 3.3 
Foreign Assets, 1946-60 (Rs. Million) 
Year Total assets Change In terms of months 
(End of year) (During year) Imports 
1946 1,210.3 -49.6 20.9 
1947 947.3 -263.0 11.8 
1948 997.9 50.6 13.4 
1949 963.7 -34.2 11.3 
1950 1,132.9 169.2 11.6 
1951 1,216.8 83.9 9.5 
1952 873.8 -343.0 6.1 
1953 640.4 -233.4 4.7 
1954 944.3 303.9 8.2 
1955 1,228.8 284.5 9.2 
1956 1,275.7 46.9 9.7 
1957 1,061.9 -213.8 7.2 
1958 933.2 -128.7 6.5 
1959 734.0 -199.2 4.5 
1960 541.3 -192.7 3.2 
Source: Snodgrass, 1966. 
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Starting with the 1957/58 budget, the emphasis on import duty policy had 
gradually been turning away, first from revenue increasing to protection of 
infant industries and then, to correct the economy's external imbalance 
(ibid, 1966). Hence, the 1957/58 budget raised the duty rate by 100 per 
cent for some consumer luxuries while reducing import duties on capital 
equipment and raw materials (Hettiarachi: 1991; 10). This change in the 
fiscal strategy can be considered as the starting point of creating a high 
level of factor market distortions in the Sri Lankan economy. The same 
fiscal strategy continued to be followed in the subsequent budgets too, 
creating an increasingly high level of capital market distortions in the 
ensuing period until 1977. 
Meanwhile, the government formulated a Three-Year Action Programme of 
1961/62-1963/64 after leaving behind the Ten-year plan. The overall 
objectives and targets of the Three-Year Action Programme of 1961/62-
1963/64 remained much the same as in the previous Ten-Year Plan, but 
greater emphasis was laid on the situation of faster worsening balance of 
payments and also the country's position of the rapidly increasing 
population. In this background the action programme recommended a shift 
in favour of more labour-intensive investments. 
However, the policy of import duties that commenced from the late 1950s 
had only a limited success in curbing imports. Goods for which higher 
duties were imposed were still flowing in abundance, and this led the 
government to take more vigorous action from 1961 onwards. Accordingly, 
import duties were abandoned as the chief tool of commercial policy, and 
import and exchange controls came to play the dominant role to curb 
imports (Snodgrass, 1966; 218). Consequently, for all practical purposes, 
Sri Lanka had turned into what can be called a closed economy by the mid 
1960s (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1996). Thus, tightening controls from 
1957 onwards diminished the free flow of imports that could be seen in the 
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classical economy, and obviously raised the necessity of imports-
substitution (Snodgrass, 1966; 221 ). The earlier attempts to encourage 
industrialisation through private sector participation since the independence 
and even before by providing finance, infrastructure facilities and other 
facilities, met with only limited success, particularly because of the absence 
of a supporting policy of vigorous protection (Corea, 1971 a). But now they 
showed no tendency to be discouraged by such factors as capital 
shortages, lack of skills and technical knowledge, inexperience of the 
manufacturing industry, or other problems to which their former inactivity 
had long been ascribed (Snodgrass, 1966: 222-227). 
In this setting, the government policy of curtailing imports while 
encouraging the establishment of domestic industries that started from the 
1957/58 budget continued further. The automatic protection and other 
government measures for import-substitution production in almost all 
developing countries constituted a highly powerful incentive for private 
producers (Krueger; 1995: 3). No exception could be seen in Sri Lanka, 
and the private sector producers responded well to the strong 'sellers' 
market created by this new situation. For example, between 1960 and 
1963, over 1000 new small and medium-scale industries were granted 
approval within the private sector, compared to approximately 500 
industrial establishments approved during the preceding 15 years 
(Karunatilake, 1987). In the first half of the 1960s, industrial development 
in the public sector too expanded rapidly. The number of large-scale public 
sector manufacturing establishments was increased from 12 in 1958 to 20 
in 1965 (ibid, 1987). Although more expansion in industrialisation could be 
witnessed during the early phase of import-substitution industrialisation 
(1960-1964) than the preceding period, import-substitution industrial 
progress began to face increasingly strong supply-side constraints in the 
form of difficulties in obtaining necessary imported materials and equipment 
(Snodgrass, 1966; 221 ). As a result, the IS industrialisation reached a limit 
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within a short time of its commencing. The increasing trend in the balance 
of payments difficulties in an environment of foreign finance not being 
forthcoming further curtailed the import of all the industrial requirements 
leaving an increasingly unused capacity in IS industries 3. 
An assessment of the progress made in industrialisation at the initial phase 
of the import-substitution era (1960-64) was difficult because information 
from all industrial firms was not available (Karunatilake, 1987). However, 
data in table - 3.4 indicate that output continued to rise. The share of 
manufacturing output was only 3.9 per cent of GDP at current factor cost in 
1950, and industrial growth averaged around 11.5 per cent of the GDP in 
1960, it rose to 12.5 per cent by 1965 (CBC, A. R. various). 
Table- 3.4 
Indexes of Industrial Production, 1958-62 
(1952 / 56 = 100) 
1958 1959 1960 
Mining and quarrying 53.3 73.0 101.0 
Manufacturing 113.8 124.5 133.0 
Electricity 140.7 157.5 174.4 
Industrial production 114.2 125.1 135.0 
Source: Snodgrass D. R., 1967. 
1961 1962 
87.1 86.8 
139.0 151.3 
185.0 202.3 
141.1 152.3 
3. The nationalisation of the oil firms in the early 1960s and the failure to settle the 
compensation claims closed the door to foreign aid from the Western countries. 
90 
On the employment front, while some new jobs were created in import-
substituting industries, other sectors (wholesale and retail trade, especially 
the large import firms and department stores) experienced a sharp decline 
in employment, mainly on account of drastic reduction of trade with 
increasing import control. 
But industrial employment from 1961 to 1963 increased by 30 per cent 
(Karunatilake, 1987). However, the expected amount of employment could 
not be generated through industrialisation in this period due to two main 
reasons. The first reason was that the required inputs for IS industries 
were not forthcoming due to increasing balance of payments difficulties, 
and the second reason was the high capital intensity of industries brought 
about by the increasing factor market distortions due to the attractive 
incentives given for investors starting from the 1957/58 government budget. 
Although IS industrialisation during its first phase was more successful in 
many ways compared to that of the pre 1956 era, it could not expand as 
visualised. Unlike most developing countries that followed IS 
industrialisation, Sri Lanka could not reach even the 'easy import-
substitution phase'. Limitations of the industrialisation were enforced by 
the highly deteriorating balance of payments situation which restricted the 
forthcoming of raw materials for IS industries to meet domestic demand in 
textiles, footwear, some food processing and a number of other light-labour 
incentive activities. 
As a whole, industrialisation under the first phase of ISi was entirely 
dependent on the earnings of the primary export products. Therefore, in a 
background of severely deteriorating export earnings of major primary 
export products, availability of industrial inputs through imports was 
severely limited. The quantum of foreign aid inflow was also not large 
enough to fill the gap in import capacity. The uncertain economic condition 
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created mainly by socialist measures, taxation and restriction on 
repatriation of dividends discouraged the inflow of foreign capital in this 
period as well. Even the expatriate multinational firms were confined to the 
domestic market. As a result, industrial production from the beginning of 
the ISi could not be geared for exports, and the manufacturing sector had 
to depend totally on the poor export earnings of the structurally weak 
primary commodity sector. In this background, the IS industrialisation even 
in its first phase could not pass the easy substitution phase and its effort 
became stifled within a shorter period from its initiation. 
3.4.2 Second Phase of the ISi (1965 -1969) 
The previous section highlighted that the first phase of the IS 
industrialisation reached a standstill position by 1964 due to supply side 
limitations brought about by a rapidly widening trade gap. This 
phenomenon led the policy makers to place more emphasis on export 
promotion in an uncertain environment of severely limited availability of 
other supply-side enforcements such as foreign aid, foreign loans, and FDI. 
Meanwhile, shifting the political power to the right-of-centre coalition led by 
the United National Party (UNP) brought about a considerable change in 
Sri Lanka's economic policy setting from 1965. The development strategy 
of the new government was within the broad framework of the prevalent ISi 
policy, but with a different mode (Abeyaratna, 1997). Accordingly, the new 
policy consisted of a moderate liberalisation in import trade and exchange 
payments. In the literature this policy was known as a half-hearted or 
partial liberalisation attempt. 
Thus, the second phase of the IS industrialisation (1965-70) commenced 
with dismantling some of the protectionist barriers erected in the first phase 
of the IS industrialisation by the 1960-64 regime (Karunaratne, 2000). 
Accordingly, steps were taken to abolish tariffs totally in 1965 on a range of 
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goods including foodstuffs, textiles, and some petroleum products 
(Abeyaratne, 1997). Then later, in the face of worsening balance of 
payments conditions, the government was forced to take two important 
measures in respect of the exchange rate policy. This was done as part of 
a stand-by agreement entered into with the IMF. The first policy measure 
taken was the nominal devaluation of the rupee by 20 per cent against the 
sterling pound in 1967. The second measure was a major change in the 
exchange rate policy; that was to replace the contemporary unified system 
of exchange rate with a dual exchange rate system under the Foreign 
Exchange Entitlement Certificate (FEEC) scheme introduced in 1968 (ibid, 
1997). 
During this regime (1965-69) a number of incentives were granted for non-
traditional exports. The Bonus Voucher Scheme (BVS) introduced in 1966 
gave exporters of specified non-traditional goods an import entitlement 
quota to the value of 20 per cent of the f.o.b. value of their exports. This 
import entitlement given in the form of bonus vouchers was transferable 
and could be utilised for the purchase of machinery, spares, accessories 
and raw material, over and above the level of quotas already approved by 
the government. The BVS was replaced by the FEEC scheme in 1968. 
Under the latter scheme discrimination was made in favour of non-
traditional exports4. 
Further, the FEEC scheme sought to free a category of imports from import 
control through auctioning quotas of foreign exchange for those particular 
imports, which were placed on general license. In this way the new system 
was expected to move slowly in the direction of the market driven economy 
(Gunatilleke, 2000). 
4. The dual exchange rate followed under the FEEC scheme had many negative impacts 
also. Among them the most serious one was its negative impact on traditional exports. 
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Besides, the government (1965-69) recognised the importance of attracting 
export oriented foreign direct investment (EOFDI) too for strengthening the 
export earnings. With this objective the government issued a white paper 
on foreign investment announcing a set of highly attractive incentives in 
1966 and certain institutional arrangements were also set up to promote 
exports. But, according to some commentators (Abeyaratne, 1997; 
Cuthbertson and Athukorala, 1991 ), these measures were inadequate to 
provide much by way of achievement, primarily because a high level of 
'anti-export' bias prevailed in the economy throughout this period. 
Consequently, the episode of partial liberalisation failed to accelerate the 
export engine of growth (Karunaratne, 2000). Sri Lanka's export earnings, 
both in total and per capita terms, declined steadily during the 1960s with 
the exception of a single year, 1965. The decline in export earnings was 
particularly steep after 1965. During the period 1965-69, export earnings 
took a step backwards in each succeeding year (see table - 3.5). 
Table- 3.5 
Average Annual Growth of Exports (Percentages) 
Year Total Exports Per Capita Exports 
1950-59 +6.1 +3.6 
1960-69 -1.2 -3.7 
1965-69 -2.4 -4.8 
Source: Corea. G, Aid and the Economy, 1971b. 
Accordingly, in a background of continuously declining external reserves 
since the mid 1950s, particularly in the face of continued recession in 
exports, two methods were followed to sustain the flow of essential imports. 
The first was to sustain imports as much as possible chiefly by drawing 
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down external reserves, and this method continued until 1965. Then, when 
reserves were no longer available imports were supported by foreign aid 
and other external credits in the period 1965-70 (Heawavitharana, 1975; 
Corea, 1971 b). 
On the initiative taken by the new government (1965) along with the World 
Bank, some foreign agencies and countries came together as a consortium 
to assist Sri Lanka. The quantum of aid received in this way was 
considerable (Gunatilleke, 2000). However, the original estimate of aid 
requirements was made on the assumption that export earnings would 
themselves rise from year to year. But mess up of this assumption 
together with a number of other unexpected happenings resulted in a 
situation totally different to that originally anticipated of aid. Thus, collapse 
in export earnings and the shortfall in aid compelled the government to 
meet the growing current account deficit by borrowing heavily in the 
international money market on commercial terms in ensuing years. As a 
result, the foreign debt to GDP ratio increased to 10.0 per cent in the 
1965/70 regime from the level of 4.6 per cent in the 1956/64 regime 
(Karunaratne, 2000). 
However, a higher amount of external finance obtained in the latter years of 
the 1960s helped to enhance the supply of raw materials and other inputs 
for industry from foreign sources which resulted in rapid output growth (see 
table - 3.6). A number of institutional arrangements were also made after 
1965 with a view to promoting industries, and among them the setting up of 
the Industrial Development Board and the Bureau of Standards was 
prominent. Consequently, in the latter part of the 1960s, the economy 
began to expand rapidly than the first part (see table - 3.6). 
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Table - 3.6 
Average Annual Growth Rates at Constant 1959 prices(%) 
1960-1969 1966-1969 
Gross domestic product 4.5 6.1 
Export agriculture 1.9 0.8 
Domestic agriculture 4.8 9.5 
Manufacturing 9.8 12.6 
All other sectors 4.9 6.4 
Source; Corea G (1971b), Ceylon in the Sixties 
Note: Manufacturing excludes processing of tea, rubber and coconut 
This level of growth was made possible by a number of measures taken 
after 1965. These included the concentration of efforts on domestic food 
production, restraining of essential consumer imports, deployment of 
foreign resources to production purposes, and the liberalisation of imports 
of raw materials and other production inputs. 
However, when Sri Lanka's economic growth was compared with that of 
some other countries in the Asian region in the 1960s, Sri Lanka could not 
be considered as a fast growing economy (see Table - 3.7). The data in 
table - 3. 7 indicate that there was a high correlation between the GDP 
growth and the growth of imports in most of the countries. It is well-known 
that economic development generally involves a rising value of imports 
particularly of intermediate and capital goods and, to some extent, 
consumer goods as well (Corea, 1971 b). But Sri Lanka was an exception 
where GDP growth of 4.5 was achieved with an extremely low import 
growth of 0.8 per annum in the 1960s. 
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Table- 3.7 
Average Annual Growth Rates of Selected Asian Countries 
1960-1969 
Country GDP Population Per Exports Imports Coefficient of 
capita foreign trade 
GDP dependency 
(d) 
Korea 8.4 2.7 5.6 29.1 23.1 30 
Taiwan 10.0 3.1 6.8 24.0 17.8 42 
Thailand 7.8 3.1 4.6 10.0 11.9 38 
Malaysia 5.9 3.1 4.6 5.0 3.7 83 
(a) 
Pakistan 5.6 2.1 3.4 6.3 7.8 16 
Philippines 4.6 3.5 1.1 6.3 7.8 37 
Sri Lanka 4.5 2.4 2.1 -1.4 0.8 53 
(c) 
India 3.3 2.5 0.8 3.8 2.5 10 
Indonesia 2.6 2.4 0.2 1.1 4.4 22 
Burma (b) 1.3 2.1 -0.7 -5.6 -3.5 32 
Source: Corea (1971b), Ceylon in the sixties. 
Note: (a) 1960-66; (b) 1960-67; (c) 1960-69, (d) The sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP. 
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The increase in production in the domestic sectors such as agriculture, 
industry and construction explains why Sri Lanka was able, particularly in 
the latter part of the 1960s, to accelerate the rate of growth despite a 
negative growth in export earnings. This trend was in contrast to the 
situation that prevailed from the colonial time where the growth of GDP was 
largely determined by the fortunes of the export earnings of traditional 
exports - tea, rubber and coconut. 
Table - 3.8 shows how industrial expansion that took place, particularly 
after 1968 has brought about a substantial increase in both the value of 
industrial products and employment opportunities. However, the overall 
economic expansion during the 1960s fell short of what was needed in 
terms of employment generation for the rapidly growing workforce which 
surfaced due to the population explosion in the 1950s. In other words, a 
high rate of overall economic growth does not always ensure a 
corresponding rate of employment growth. For example, while the share of 
manufacturing of GDP increased from about 6 per cent in 1963 to 1 O per 
cent in 1972, the share of employment in that sector increased only from 
9.2 per cent to 9.6 per cent during this period, and the level of 
unemployment was on the increase in the 1960s (Corea, 1971a). 
During this regime also incentives offered to industrialists to promote 
investment in plant and machinery continued. This resulted in increasing 
capital intensity further in IS Industries. As a result, IS industries generated 
a lesser amount of employment. Hence, ISi did little to relieve the 
unemployment problem from the initial period (Athukorala, 1986). The data 
in Table- 3.8 reveal that industries even in the partially liberalised period 
also operated with lesser capacity utilisation (see table 3.8). 
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Table - 3.8 
Production, Employment and Capacity Utilisation of Industry 
(1962 - 1976) 
Year Value of production Employment Capacity 
(Rs. Million) utilisation 
(percentage) 
1961 332 6300 -
1962 388 14930 -
1963 432 26304 -
1964 537 34222 -
1965 847 56835 -
1966 850 61418 -
1967 954 73955 -
1968 1398 101348 67 
1969 1626 103276 65 
1970 1945 108105 66 
1971 2239 110191 64 
1972 2441 123986 64 
1973 2758 105715 60 
1974 4099 96668 61 
1975 5555 107544 63 
1976 6061 113463 64 
Source: Karunatilake, H.N.S. (1987), The Economy of Sri Lanka. 
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Although in the years such as 1968 and 1969 where full raw materials and 
intermediate input requirements were available, capacity utilisation 
remained at a level around 65 per cent. This partly proved the fact that ISi 
industries were more capital intensive and generated a limited level of 
employment (see Table - 3.8). 
In the literature, the liberalisation introduced in this period, was considered 
partial or half-hearted and it could not bring about any long-lasting 
restructuring of the economy. This regime's failure to take the economy 
forward more vigorously in the direction of a more open and market 
oriented development policy was attributed to the lack of political 
determination because of the government's suspicion of arousing strong 
anti-government agitation against such a level of reforms (Athukorala and 
Jayasuriya, 1994; 16). In Gunatilleke's view (2000: 143), the government 
probably waited for the return to power at the next election in 1970 with a 
larger majority and a full endorsement of its policies before making some of 
the harder economic decisions. 
As a whole, however, the second phase of the IS industrialisation (1965-
69) showed better progress than the first phase (1960-64) in terms of both 
growth in industrial output and employment. The better performance of the 
manufacturing industry in the second stage of the IS industrialisation can 
be attributed mainly to the extent of success of removing some of the 
supply side limitations by following more liberal economic policies. 
3.4.3 Third Phase of the ISi (1970 -1977) 
The 1965-70 regime could not get a fresh mandate at the 1970 election to 
go ahead with its unfinished liberalisation agenda. The radical left-wing 
coalition led by Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) comprising two major 
Marxist parties, with a vision of establishing a socialist society, was elected 
to power with a two-third majority of the parliament in 1970. 
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This United Left Front (ULF) government took action immediately to 
reverse the 1965-70 trend towards partial liberalisation, thinking that the 
liberalisation efforts of the former government was a 'wasteful' experiment 
which squandered valuable foreign exchange on non-essential imports 
(Rajapathirana, 1988: 1146). 
Consequently, the new government returned to a stringent ISi strategy with 
greater direct government involvement than the 1960-64 regime. 
Imposition of rigorous controls and establishing high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers were attributes of this regime. For example, the nominal tariff 
reached the high water mark of 500 per cent on some imports. 
Furthermore, under protection and price controls, rent seeking and directly 
unproductive lobbying activities became widespread (Karunaratne, 2000). 
However, from the government's point of view such a hurriedly tightening of 
control on imports and exchange payments was needed to face the critical 
balance of payments situation that the government faced at the beginning 
of its regime in 1970. Yet, the new government continued some of the 
major policies followed by the outgoing regime. For instance, the new 
government continued the dual exchange rate system introduced by the 
outgoing government. Also, deviating from its earlier practice during the 
period 1960-64 the new government began to maintain good relations with 
multilateral agencies in seeking for foreign aid. 
The Five-year Plan 1972-76 was the major document that presented the 
development policy framework that was expected to be followed by the new 
government. The immediate social objective of the Plan was to provide 
employment (Five Year Plan, 1972: 2). 
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The other major document, the Report of the ILO Mission on Employment 
issued in 1971, also influenced the government to move in the direction of 
redistribution of income and correcting the mismatch believed to be created 
by the existing education system for reduction in the high level of 
unemployment (Gunatilleke, 2000: 145) The Five-year Plan stated that the 
present unemployment situation was a direct reflection of past investment 
policies which almost totally ignored the need for creating employment, 
primarily because of employing more capital intensive modes of production 
by both public and private sectors (ibid, 1972: 5). Consequently, the Five 
Year Plan, among other things, placed more emphasis on promoting labour 
intensive industries with a view to create more employment opportunities. 
However, at the same time, the Five Year Plan basically gave high priority 
to the establishment of several large-scale basic industries under state 
ownership. The government particularly wanted to promote heavy public 
sector basic industries to produce inputs for other industries, essentially 
with the view to save foreign exchange. Even though the predominant 
development effort fell within the ISi strategy framework, export promotion 
strategies initiated in the second half of the 1960s continued to have a 
place in the 1970-77 policy agenda as well. The importance of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) too was acknowledged in the five-year plan by 
recognising opportunities such as capital contribution, new technologies, 
modern managerial skills, and export outlets to be acquired through foreign 
investors (ibid, 1972: 95). 
Conversely, the macroeconomic assumptions on which the Five Year Plan 
was based were largely hamstrung by three major global shocks in the first 
few years of this regime; the international monetary crisis, first oil crisis, 
and the world food crisis. These global and domestic crises forced the 
government to move further in the direction of redistribution and the 
expansion of the public enterprises (Gunatilleke, 2000). Consequently, the 
102 
government introduced a large-scale programme of land reform in 1972, 
essentially in response to the youth insurrection which took place in 1971. 
Then, foreign owned plantations were nationalised in 1975. Besides, the 
enacting of the Business Undertakings Acquisition Act (1971) empowered 
the government to acquire private businesses. The enacting of the 
Termination of Employment Act (1971) prevented employers from 
retrenching workers without the prior sanction of the Labour Commissioner. 
The government enforced a large number of restrictions on exchange 
transactions under the Exchange Control Act of 1971. These steps were 
obviously not congenial for both domestic and foreign investors 
(Gunatilleke, 2000; Karunaratne; 2000; Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1994). 
In consequence, the government policies and strategies actually followed 
were largely deviated from what was stated in the Five-Year Plan. In this 
period, capital intensity in industry was further increased contrary to the 
emphasis being made by the Five-Year Plan to adopt more labour intensive 
techniques in manufacturing. 
Therefore, if the policy environment in the period 1970-77 is closely 
reviewed, it suggests that the major policy stunts were contradictory to 
each other. While emphasising the needs for manufacturing development 
behind protective barriers for the domestic market, steps were taken to 
promote industrial exports through providing certain export incentives and 
attempting to attract FDI in a very hostile environment for such 
investments. Thus, as Abeyratna (1997: 361) points out, this policy 
package became a peculiar mixture of 'autarky' and 'controls' on the one 
hand and 'export promotion' on the other hand. 
Decline in the manufacturing sector's share in GDP from 16. 7 per cent in 
1970 to 14. 7 per cent in 1977 proved the failure of IS industrialisation in this 
period (see table - 3.9). The annual average increase of industrial 
employment for 7 years from 1970 also remained at a very low level. 
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Table - 3.9 
Real Growth of GDP and Production Sectors 1960-1982 (Percentages) 
1960-1965 1966-1970 1971-1977 1978-1982 
Agriculture, forestry & 3.2 4.2 2.1 4.0 
Fisheries. 
Mining & quarrying. 1.6 15.1 56.8 7.7 
Manufacturing 5.4 7.3 1.1 4.6 
Service 4.7 5.4 3.2 7.6 
GDP 4.2 5.3 2.9 6.2 
Manufacturing To GDP 1.3 1.4 0.4 0.7 
ratio 
Export growth 1.4 
. 
0.5 -2.9 6.4$ 
Terms of trade -4.6 
. 
-2.1 1.1 5.2$ 
Current A/C deficit to -2.1 
. 
-3.1 -1.0 -7.7$ 
GDP ratio 
. 
Budget deficit to GDP -5.3 -6.5 -6.8 -14.7$ 
. 
Inflation 1.2 3.6 5.7 12.6 
. 18.7 50.6 
. 
Foreign debt to GDP 4.6 10.0 
ratio 
Source: Abeyaratna. S, (1997), Dilemmas of Development, Fifty years of economic Change in 
Sri Lanka, 358; Karunaratne N. D (2000), Sri Lanka's Development since Independence, 174; 
Central Bank Reports (various) 
* For the period 1956-64, $ for the period 1978-87 
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In 1973 and 1974 employment levels went down as evidenced by the 
highest unemployment level ever recorded in Sri Lanka which was 24 per 
cent of the labour force. 
However, the number of employed in public sector industries increased and 
accounted for one third of the total employed in industry in this controlled 
period (Karunatilake, 1987). But, most of these jobs were not considered 
productive since political supporters were excessively employed in the 
public sector industries. In this environment, some commentators show 
that corresponding to the expansion of the public sector there was a 
relative contraction of the private sector and multinational industrial activity 
in this period (Kelegama and Wignaraja, 1991: 32). As a result, 
employment creation in the private sector industries was largely restricted 
during this era. As a whole, on many fronts, the development efforts during 
this period suffered a setback. 
In the period 1970-76, although foreign borrowing decreased, there was an 
increase in domestic borrowing. The GDP growth rate remained at a low 
level of an average of 2.9 per cent per year. The government welfare 
policies increased the budget deficit to 6.8 per cent of GDP. Despite the 
price controls, the inflation rate went up to 5. 7 per cent; almost double the 
rate of the previous regime. At the sectoral level, the average annual rates 
of manufacturing growth dropped from 5.4 per cent in the early import-
substitution industrialisation phase of the early 1960s to 1.1 per cent in the 
period 1970-76. 
3.4.4 Underlying Reasons for the Failure of ISi 
The following inconsistencies can be identified as the main contributing 
factors to the failure of the import substitution industrialisation during its 
entire period, 1957-77. 
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1. The government did not have a carefully planned and clearly defined 
industrial approval policy, particularly at the inception of the IS 
industrialisation (Corea, 1971a). Almost all applications made by 
investors to commence industries were approved, irrespective of the 
nature of the products and their usefulness (Karunatilake, 1987). 
The IS industrialisation surfaced as a by-product of balance of 
payments difficulties. The balance of payments difficulties first 
affected imports of luxuries and brought about the greatest measure 
of protection for that category of imports. This created a high degree 
of motivation among investors to set up industries to manufacture 
these luxury goods. Thus, IS industries from the beginning led to 
misdirection of scarce resources and pushed the economy into a 
deeper crisis. On the other hand, whereas one or two industrial 
units would have been sufficient to meet a certain requirement of the 
domestic market, several firms were given approval to produce 
those requirements, creating a 'premature widening' of its industrial 
structure, with a large number of small, relatively inefficient, high-
cost firms serving a small domestic market, which were unable to 
take advantages of economies of scale. 
2. One of the major objectives of adopting the ISi strategy was to 
lessen the foreign currency expenditure of the country and thereby 
solving the persistent deficit of Balance of payments. Instead, in 
actual practice, this industrialisation worsened the foreign reserve 
situation. Although import-substitution did save foreign exchange 
significantly in the import of final consumer goods, this was 
outweighed by the foreign exchange that had to be spent on the 
import of raw materials, intermediate goods and capital goods. 
Consequently, although the import coefficient in final goods declined 
over time, the total volume of imports increased, resulting in a higher 
foreign expenditure outlay. 
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3. As expected, the growing unemployment problem could not be 
relieved through import-substitution industrialisation, as evidenced 
by the highest rate of unemployment being recorded during this 
period. For instance, the rate of unemployment in 1971 was 15.6 
per cent while it had reached 24.0 per cent in 1973; this was the 
highest level of unemployment ever recorded in Sri Lanka (Korale, 
1988). 
Most of the government budgets presented in this era were used to 
offer a large number of incentives to investors with the view to 
promote industrialisation. They included granting tax concessions, 
accelerated depreciation allowances, tax holidays, and other 
incentives, which encouraged industrialists to employ technologies 
that were capital-intensive. Government policies were designed to 
keep real interest rates low (mostly negative) during most of the 
years in the ISi era. For example, Athukorala and Rajapatirana 
(1991), and Athukorala and Jayasuriya (1994), estimated that the 
average saving and commercial bank deposits and lending rates 
had negative real interest rates for the period 1965-1977. The 
imports of capital equipment were permitted at free or very small 
customs duties under overvalued exchange rates. Thus, as Krueger 
(1983) highlighted credit rationing at artificially low interest rates, 
together with real exchange rate overvaluation, and preferential 
treatment accorded to capital goods imports in a controlled trade 
regime, encouraged choosing capital-intensive technologies at the 
expense of employment creation. On the average, public 
enterprises in Sri Lanka, which accounted for 62 per cent of 
industrial output in 1976, were ten times more capital-intensive than 
those in the private sector (Karunatilake, 1987). This selection of 
the capital-intensive technologies led to creating over capacities in 
many industries and underutilisation of capital once it was installed. 
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For example, the average industrial capacity utilisation remained at 
the level of 63 per cent in the period 1970-76 (see table - 3.8). 
On the other hand, high wages in urban centers (where much of the 
import-substituting industry was located), caused by trade union 
pressure and a larger number of stringent labour regulations made 
labour very costly in the industrialists point of view. During the 
1956-1976 period, which covered the entire IS industrialisation era, 
13 labour legislations (excluding amendments to Acts) had been 
enacted. In the investors view, out of these, the Termination of 
Employment of Workmen Act (No 45 of 1971) was the most 
disturbing piece of labour legislation (Jayaratna, 2003; M L, 1998). 
A considerable amount of IS industries were set up with the 
collaboration of foreign partners. In these instances, local partners 
mainly depended on foreign partners for selection of technology 
since their knowledge on technology was weak. 
However, in these instances local partners' interest was confined 
mainly to technologies which would minimise the problems relating 
to labour management (Gunatilleke, 1978). So, the technology 
selection in this way was contrary to the increase of employment 
through IS industries as emphasised by policy recommendations in 
the Three Year Development Action Programme (1961/62-1963/64) 
and the Five Year Plan (1972-76). 
Moreover, the uncertain economic situation, lack of any form of 
specific guarantee on nationalisation, high taxes, and prohibition of 
repatriation of dividends, discouraged the inflow of foreign capital 
also during this period. Despite policy rhetoric of promoting Export 
Oriented Foreign Direct Investment (EOFDI), in practice the 
government was indecisive between an apparent need for and 
political suspicion of EOFDI. For instance, in 1974, the proposal to 
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set up a free trade zone in Trincomalee was not allowed, saying that 
it would pose a threat to national sovereignty. Another instance was 
that at least 17 joint venture proposals to set up export-oriented 
garment factories were rejected during the period 1970-76 on the 
grounds that purely locally owned companies could succeed without 
foreign capital in this diffused technology product area (Athukorala, 
1997: 395). This unfavourable attitude towards EOFDI also 
severely restricted the export receipts that could be obtained from 
manufacturing exports. 
4. In a background where traditional exports were failing to earn a 
sufficient amount of foreign currency, low cost foreign loans were not 
available, and EOFDI was not forthcoming; the responsibility lies on 
the industrial sector itself to earn foreign currency to imports its input 
requirements, particularly through the promotion of industrial 
exports. However, heavy protection received by the import 
substitution industrial sector and highly overvalued exchange rates 
produced a significant anti-export bias in the economy in the 1970s 
(Pyatt and Roe, 1977). 
Clements and Sjaastad (1984 as cited in Wong and Brook 1989) 
emphasise that the impact of protection created by giving subsidies 
to exportables and tariff imposed to importables in the controlled 
regimes may favour the production of home goods and importables 
relatively to the production of exportables 5. 
5. Read Wong, A. and Brooks, R. (1989), 'New Zealand's True Rate of Protection', Reserve Bank 
Bulletin, Vol 52, No. 1, 1989, p. 27-36, for a more detailed analysis of Clements - Sjaastad 
Hypothesis. 
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Thus, the existence of a highly protected domestic market implied relatively 
low profitability in production for exports. As a result, manufacturing 
products under the ISi era could not penetrate the export market in order to 
reduce the manufacturing sector's dependence on the fortunes of the 
structurally weak traditional export sector. For example, by the mid 1970s, 
total earnings from manufactured exports could cover only 6 per cent of the 
total import requirements of the industrial sector. In this background, a limit 
was set on the growth of industry in Sri Lanka by the balance of payments 
difficulties well before the completion of the easy import-substitution phase 
(Athukorala, 1997). This phenomenon was not in line with what happened 
in most developing countries which followed ISi strategy. In these 
countries, rapid expansion of the domestic industry continued until the 
'easy' import-substitution opportunities were used up (i.e. meeting domestic 
demand in textiles, footwear, some food processing, and other light labor-
intensive activities). It was only then that the cost of additional investment 
in new import-substitution activities began to rise and growth slowed down. 
But, contrary to majority view some commentators (Corea, 1971a, 
Karunaratne, 2000) pointed out that certain structural changes had taken 
place from the latter part of the 1960s. Accordingly, the economy could 
acquire a respectable level of GDP growth in the late 1960s and then a 
somewhat lesser growth in the 1970s in a background of having an 
increasingly negative growth of export earnings because of the strength of 
IS industries and the domestic agricultural sector. 
Further, under infant industry protection, the IS industries generated some 
positive externalities such as learning-by-doing, and created a pool of 
trained personnel (technicians, engineers, chemists, managers, and 
entrepreneurs). Also, the industrial expansion acquired in this era 
reshaped institutions and infrastructure designed to serve the colonial 
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plantation economy to meet the needs of an emerging manufacturing 
sector. Karunaratne (2000) argues that these spillover effects, as 
emphasised by endogenous growth theories (Romer, 1988; Sala-I-Martin, 
1990 as cited in Karunaratne, 2000), constitute the lifeblood of sustainable 
growth. 
However, as a whole, the above analysis suggests that If a planned 
procedure was first followed for approving and setting up of the more 
essential nature of IS industries at the beginning, the available foreign 
exchange could have been used in a more efficient way to lessen the 
aggravation of the balance of payments problem. Secondly, if a proper 
incentive scheme had been designed to promote the adoption of more 
appropriate technologies, employment creation could have been increased. 
Finally, if more prudent policies had been followed to attract EOFDI, 
industrial exports could have been increased as expected, and it would 
have obviously reduced the dependency on earnings of traditional exports 
for obtaining industrial sector requirements. So, if this nature of prudent 
policies had been followed, IS industrialisation could have been able, not 
only to surpass the easy substitution phase, but also to gear industrial 
production for export. 
3.5 Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) (1977-2000) 
3.5.1 Background Reasons to Introduce EOI Strategy 
As highlighted in the previous section, lower economic growth, high 
unemployment and some other unfavourable trends seen in the Sri Lankan 
economy under extremely stringent control policies indicated that Sri Lanka 
was moving in the opposite direction of its development spectrum by the 
middle of the 1970s. 
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The World Bank in its 1980 Report confirmed this downward trend stating 
that the Sri Lankan economy has become more vulnerable than before to 
fluctuations in the terms of trade at the end of the two decades of 
industrialisation based on import-substitution. It was against this 
background that the new government (1977) determined to revitalise the 
economy through a drastic change in strategy with wide ranging reforms. 
The new strategy emphasised an outward-looking policy of export-led 
growth along with the replacement of an interventionist regime by a 
liberalised economic environment where market forces would be allowed to 
perform their role more freely. 
The new strategy was in line with contemporary development thinking. 
Increasing evidence that import-substitution failed to promote development 
in Latin America, South Asia and elsewhere began to stimulate a shift of 
opinion towards outward-looking policies (Grilli & Riedel, 1995: xiv). Thus, 
by this time, it was clear that those economies that adopted sustained 
outward-oriented trade strategies experienced economic performance 
superior to those which did not. For example, East Asian economies such 
as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, which relied on the 
international market for industrialisation through exporting, exceeded 
'maximum attainable rate of growth' between 6 and 8 per cent suggested 
by Chenery and Strout ( 1966 as cited in Krueger, 1995). These economies 
actually exceeded that rate of growth for an extended period of time, with 
Taiwan and Korea each achieving periods of decades or longer with rates 
in excess of 1 O per cent (Krueger, 1995: 5). But, on the contrary, the South 
Asian countries with greater state control over economic activity could 
achieve much lower average growth rates of gross national product. In 
Bangladesh, it was 3.6 per cent, Burma 2.5 per cent, India 2.5 per cent, 
Pakistan 4.5 per cent and Sri Lanka 2.9 per cent during the first half of the 
1970-decade (UNH-ITDS, 1981). 
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The dramatic gains made by the NICs in the East Asian Region over the 
years have not been confined to economic growth, but also have been 
accompanied by notable improvements in health and education, by a large 
increase in life expectancies and, perhaps most strikingly, by substantial 
reduction in absolute poverty (Riedel 1988; World Bank 1993; Grilli 1994). 
Thus, on one hand, having realised the implications of controls and 
restrictions and, on the other hand, seen the spectacular development 
achieved by NICs following more open economic policies, Sri Lanka too 
accepted liberalised economic policies from 1977onwards· So, for Sri 
Lanka as for most of the other countries, the outward-oriented trade 
strategy became a sine qua non to acquire a type of rapid growth 
commensurate to the growth experienced by East-Asian economies 
(Krueger, 1995: 22). In this shift in trade policies, Sri Lanka is not only the 
first country in South Asia which embraced liberalised economic policies, 
but also the one that opened its economy within a shorter period than her 
neighbours in the region. To date, the South Asian economies (except 
briefly, or completely, in the case of Sri Lanka) have failed to adopt the 
policies needed to make the model work as it did in East Asia (Grilli and 
Riedel, 1995). 
The previous inward-looking regime (1957-77) was proved to be anti-
export, anti-private sector, and an impediment to growth. Their removal 
was, therefore, taken up as the core of the reformist agenda in making an 
outward orientation for the economy. Thus, the main objectives of the 1977 
liberalisation policy included a) achieving a higher level of economic 
performance through a diversion of resources to the export sector by 
making, especially industrial (non-traditional) exports more attractive than 
import-substitution, b) diversifying the economy and achieving a 
progressive improvement in the balance of payments, c) generating greater 
employment and income opportunities for a growing population, and 
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d) ensuring a more equitable distribution of income and improving the 
physical quality of life of the people (Vidanapathirana, 1991 ). These 
objectives were mainly expected to be achieved through stimulation of 
private sector initiatives, especially by making this sector as the 'engine of 
growth' and attracting export oriented private foreign investment (EOFI). 
However, the reforms introduced in 1977 can be considered as only a 
significant commencement of a series of reforms taking place in the 
ensuing period. In the literature, a debate has surfaced as to whether the 
liberalisation should be a single-stage policy (one-shot program) or a slow 
and gradual process 6. The comparative success of reforms in Poland is 
giving additional credence to the proposition that 'faster is better' (Krueger, 
1995). Michaely (1991) argues that the liberalisation process should be 
shorter; if there was less rigidity in the labour market (e.g. weak trade 
unions), physical and human capital were less specific, responses of 
entrepreneurs were more flexible and adaptable, and the life span of the 
physical capital in the contracting activities was shorter. 
Yet, if the cost of swift and sudden adjustments were higher than the 
gradual transition, it appears that a gradual, multi-stage, implementation of 
a liberalisation policy would be superior to a one stage, immediate act 
involving a large change. Under these circumstances, the Sri Lankan 
experience suggested that a one-shot program of transition was not 
feasible since supply potentials were weak in the tradable sector and other 
structural rigidities existed in the economy (Kelegama, 1989). 
6. For more details on the debate of the timing, speeding and sequencing of economic 
reforms. Read ILO World Employment Report 1996/97. 
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So, Sri Lankan liberalisation became a gradual process rather than a one-
shot transition, consisting, so far, three phases or waves of liberalisation; 
the first wave of liberalisation (1977-1989), the second wave of 
liberalisation (1989-1994) and the third wave of liberalisation (1994 
onwards). 
3.5.2 EOI in the First Wave of the Liberalisation (1977- 89) 
Some of the more important measures taken under the first wave of 
liberalisation are enumerated below. 
1. Before 1977 quantitative restrictions (QRs) played a greater role in 
import trade, and tariffs for some imports were as high as 500 per 
cent. Under the new reforms, most of the QRs were replaced by 
lower levels of tariffs placing domestic import-substitution industries in 
a more competitive environment. The multitude of duty bands was 
rationalised and reduced from 6 bands to a 4 - band structure 
(Karunaratne, 2000). 
2. The highly overvalued exchange rate system which continued from 
the earlier protectionist era was changed. Accordingly, the dual 
exchange rate system which was functioning since 1968 was unified. 
The rupee was devalued by 45. 5 percent in 1977 and a managed 
float were adopted with a view to making the exchange rate an active 
policy instrument (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1994). 
3. Many restrictions on capital account transactions enforced in the 
previous protectionist era were lifted with the view to integrating the 
domestic capital market with the global market (ibid, 1994). A few of 
such changes were; permitting repatriation of proceeds from sales of 
shares of companies without having the prior approval of the 
Controller of Exchange, allowing transfer of shares freely as long as 
they did not exceed the ratio of non-resident shareholdings originally 
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approved, and relaxing stringent restrictions on the release of foreign 
exchange for foreign travel and study abroad. 
4. The Finance Act 1961 was amended to facilitate the setting up of 
branches of foreign banks once again in Sri Lanka. This was 
accompanied by a foreign currency-banking unit scheme being set up 
with commercial banks (ibid, 1994). 
5. Most price controls were removed, and Public sector import 
monopolies were terminated except in the case of food grains and 
petroleum. A program of rationalising the operation of existing public 
sector undertakings was also introduced. Accordingly, the 
government advocated the transfer of unprofitable public corporations 
to private ownership or management and or privatisation of them. 
6. The universal food subsidies were replaced by a food stamp scheme. 
7. Interest rates were adjusted for them to become more realistic, 
encourage financial savings and discourage speculative imports as 
well as capital outflows. 
8. The tax structure was rationalised and simplified with a view to 
encouraging private sector initiative including foreign capital to enter 
into industrial activity in general and export-oriented industries in 
particular. 
9. Under the 1977 reforms, export expansion was accorded high priority. 
In addition to creating a conducive environment for export expansion, 
some agencies were set up to facilitate and encourage exports. They 
included setting up of the Greater Colombo Economic Commission 
(GCEC), Export-processing Zones, the Export Development Board 
(EDB) and the Sri Lanka Export Credit Insurance Corporation 
(SLECIC). 
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The short-term responses of the economy to these initial 1977 reforms 
were remarkable. For example, the average GDP growth increased from 
the level of 2.9 per cent in the previous 1970-77 regime to 6.2 percent in 
the period 1978-82 (CBSL various). But this initial step of liberalisation was 
soon confronted with a macro economic crisis from the early eighties and 
this development subsequently slowed down the success of the 
liberalisation process. 
The government, along with the initial reforms, implemented a package of 
stabilisation measures (cuts in public expenditure and tightening of credit) 
with a view to reducing macro economic imbalances. The government 
effort to maintain sound macroeconomic management was needed to make 
the reforms a success. The evidence suggests that success in reforms in 
the developing world is positively associated with a coherent set of trade 
and industrial policies and a prudent macro economic regime (World Bank, 
1993; Bhagwati, 1988). 
But, the Sri Lankan government's macroeconomic fundamentals 
deteriorated in ensuing years due to the government's fiscal profligacy. A 
number of mega infrastructure projects contributed to the fiscal laxity 
(Karunaratne, 2000). Altogether, between 1978 and 1982 these projects 
absorbed about 75 per cent of public investment (Athukorala and 
Rajapatirana, 1991). The government could cover only a part of the burden 
of these projects through foreign funding and the balance had to be found 
through deficit financing. As a result, the inflation rate increased to an 
annual average level of 12.6 per cent in the time period 1978-87 
(Karunaratne, 2000). But the annual average rates of inflation between 
1980 and 1990 were 5.1 in South Korea and 4.6 in Taiwan (ibid, 2000). 
Thus, the persistence of a relatively higher level of inflation in Sri Lanka 
contributed to a loss in competitiveness relative to trading partners and 
competitors. 
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As a result of all these trends the budget deficit and the current account 
deficit reached a record high level of 7. 7 per cent and 14. 7 per cent of GDP 
respectively in the period, 1978-1987 (ibid, 2000). As a result of all these, 
the real exchange rate continued to appreciate, which weakened the 
switching effect of the devaluations and inter alia worked against promoting 
export. 
Moreover, on the fiscal front, a clamp down on wages and salaries and a 
sharp reduction in food subsidies during the reform period were not strong 
enough to avoid the need to resort to expansionary financing. This so 
happened because there was another drain of public funds channelled to 
float massive public sector enterprises in a liberalised policy environment. 
The World Bank in its (1984) Report proposed to reduce expenditure and 
stop the drain of public funds going to highly inefficient public sector 
enterprises through rationalising and privatising, especially the loss making 
public enterprises. However, contrary to the World Bank advice, a number 
of public corporations for political reasons were accorded preferential 
treatment including high tariffs and import licensing regulations (World 
Bank, 1986). On the other hand the government's defence expenditure too 
continuously swelled owing to the ethnic violence which started in 1983 and 
continued thereafter. 
Further, in spite of receiving a sizable amount of external finance in the 
initial years, the lowering of tariffs and granting tax concessions to many 
sectors soon after the liberalisation weakened the government's financial 
strength. In this background, to find more revenue the government 
increased taxes (and prices), little realising that they were the very sectors 
that the government was intending to promote. Moreover, from time to 
time, the government had to adjust the tariff rates on an ad hoc basis in 
response to political pressures to appease some local manufacturers who 
were adversely affected by the initial reform of the tariff structure. 
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Because of these developments, the initial steps taken to remove market 
distortions of the economy through tariff reforms became less effective. As 
a result, the effective protection coefficient (EPC) of the manufacturing 
sector for total sales rose from 1.5 in 1979 to 1.8 in 1989 (Edward, 1993). 
In this background, a comparison of the 1987 tariff structure with that of 
1977 reveals that Sri Lanka has still not completed the first stage of 
liberalisation proposed by Michaely (1991), i.e., moving from a non-uniform 
to a uniform tariff structure. The 1987 tariff structure also had a six-band 
structure as that of 1977, although the range was narrower than before. 
Also there were 17 different tariff rates occupying these bands. 
Further, under outward-oriented trade policies, some steps were taken to 
make the exchange rate regime more appropriate. One of the hallmarks of 
the East Asian policy regimes has been the relatively narrow range in 
which real exchange rates have fluctuated (Krueger, 1995). Thus, at the 
initial stage of the reforms, steps were taken to correct the exchange rate, 
which was highly overvalued in the previous control era, through the 1977 
devaluation of the rupee, and as a result, it reached a more real value. But 
after that, with the increasing of subsequent macroeconomic imbalances, 
the exchange rate became overvalued throughout the first reform period 
except the brief time of 1985/86. 
As a whole, the liberalisation process did not acquire much progress during 
the first stage of reforms. The performance of the economy in the initial 
years of the 1977 reform era was impressive. But in ensuing years, the 
growth surge could not be maintained. The average annual GDP growth 
rate lowered to 2 per cent by 1988/89. The official foreign exchange 
reserves were sufficient only for 6 weeks imports, while the service 
payments on external debt had risen to 28 per cent of export earnings by 
the end of 1988 (CBSL, 1989, 1990). Thus, during the first wave of 
liberalisation as Lall and Rajapathirana (1989) put it, while the economy 
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was partially liberalised, it was not being stabilised. This trend in Sri Lanka 
was in contrast to what could be evidenced in the East Asian success in 
which stabilisation and structural reforms went together in complementing 
each other. 
3.5.3 EOI in the Second Wave of the Liberalisation (1989-1994) 
The fiscal profligacy resulting from the mega projects of the previous 
regime led to increase inflation, and the subsequent macroeconomic 
imbalance was further confounded by a series of political crises. These 
difficulties made stabilisation problematic. However, irrespective of this 
troubled situation of the economy, the United National Party (UNP) 
government under a new president elected in 1988 was able to secure 
generous adjustment assistance from the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and aid donors, but with the condition of acquiring a fiscal 
austerity, carrying out further liberalisation and accelerating the 
privatisation (Karunaratne, 2000). 
Accordingly, the rupee was devalued by 17.4 per cent against the US dollar 
as part of the second wave of policy reforms in 1989. Besides, the 
Presidential Tariff Commission (PTC) came out with a four-year tariff-
phasing programme for achieving a reasonably uniform tariff regime 
(CBSL, 1992). Thus, in this period, nominal tariffs were scaled down by 40 
per cent and both corporate and income tax rates slashed by 40 per cent. 
The liberalisation of current account transactions qualified the economy in 
1994 for entry into the article xiv status of the IMF. 
The Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC) and the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Committee (FIAC) were amalgamated into one 
organisation called the Board of Investment (801) for coordinating and 
encouraging FDI more efficiently. From 1990 onwards, the joint ventures 
outside the FTZ were offered the same incentives accorded to the intra-
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FTZ ventures if they were geared for export oriented production. Also, 
steps were taken to expedite the privatisation of SOEs after 1989. With 
these policy measures in place and a more nominal condition prevailing in 
the country, the economy sprang back from 1990 with a remarkable 
resilience. The average growth rate during 1990-94 was 5.5 per cent 
compared to 2. 7 per cent during 1985-89. The manufacturing sector 
particularly spearheaded growth performance during this second wave of 
reforms. The export growth rate rose to 6.9 per cent per year during this 
episode (EPISL, 1998). Furthermore, there was a sign of the twin deficit 
(budget and current account deficits) being brought under control 
(Karunaratne, 2000). 
3.5.4 EOI in the Third Wave of the Liberalisation (1994-2000) 
The economic recovery acquired under the second phase of reforms by the 
UNP regime (1989-93), as detailed in the previous section, did not lead that 
political party to win the 1994 election. Thus, the alternative political force 
to the UNP, the SLFP led People's Alliance (PA), formed a new 
government in 1994. The new government too, contrary to its earlier policy 
stance declared that 'economic policy will in general be market friendly and 
the private sector will be considered the principal engine of growth' 
(Government of Sri Lanka, 1995: 1 ). With this declaration, nearly five 
decades old ideological feuding on market driven versus state driven 
policies promoted by UNP and SLFP respectively ceased to continue. The 
neo-liberals hailed this policy convergence in accepting open economic 
policies by the two major political parties in the country as a dramatic 
change in Sri Lanka's political landscape in recent years. 
The cardinal role, so far, assigned to FOi and private enterprise in the 
implementation of the EOI strategy from the commencement of the reform 
package has been highlighted by the new Industrial Policy Statement 
(1995) as well. Also emphasised were the needs to upgrade and diversify 
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the industrial base and to use manpower and physical resources efficiently. 
Thus, the government announced a package of incentives with the view to 
increasing productivity and competitiveness through the 1996 budget 
consisting of attractive tax and import duty concessions for investors who 
utilise advanced technology. Also the government highlighted its 
determination to promote regional industrialisation and thereby to narrow 
the growing rural-urban economic gap. The privatisation of SOEs was fast-
tracked. Further, the government continued to reduce progressively and 
harmonise tariffs towards a single rate (CBSL, 1996 and 1999). 
Thus, measures so taken under the third wave of liberalisation contributed 
to increase export earnings at 6.8 per cent per year delivering a GDP 
growth rate of 5 per cent after 1994. However, the biggest failure of the 
1994 regime could be identified as its inability to resolve the festering 
ethnic conflict, which increased the country risk and defence expenditure 
which deterred foreign investment in more desired fields like electronics, 
and crowded out investment in other areas of the economy respectively. 
The foreign debt average too reached 71 per cent of GDP during the third 
phase of the liberalisation. Both these figures are very high in Sri Lanka's 
historical experiences (Karunaratne, 2000). As a whole, all these trends 
contributed much to weaken the macro economic management in the 
country in the latter part of the 1990s. 
3.6 Industrial Expansion and Employment under EOI 
Employment generation remains one of the most prominent objectives to 
be achieved through industrialisation from the beginning of the ISi era in 
the late 1950s. The foregoing sections highlighted the failure of the ISi 
strategy in meeting this objective. In this section, the success of the EOI 
strategy so far achieved in labour absorption is evaluated briefly with a view 
to make a background to form some prior hypotheses for the present study. 
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The level of investment in the economy increased substantially after the 
1977 economic reforms. As a result, GDP grew, on average, by 6.2 per 
cent per annum during the first five years (1978-82) following the trade 
liberalisation as compared to the lower GDP growth rate of 2.9 per cent 
recorded in the control era, 1970-77. Then, the GDP growth rate declined 
to 4.1 per cent in the period 1983-87, and to 4.0 per cent in the period, 
1988-92. Then, the average growth rates of GDP increased to 6.3 per cent 
in 1993-94, and again it fell to 5.2 per cent in 1999-2000 (CBSL A.R. 
various). 
Industrial performance also in the post-liberalisation period (1977-2000) 
was substantially superior to that of the pre-1977 import-substitution 
regime. During the 1970-77 era, the average annual growth of the 
manufacturing sector was 1.1 per cent, whereas it increased to 4.6 per cent 
during the period 1978-82, and to above 6 per cent during the rest of the 
period except in 1999. Where the growth rates of the major sectors are 
compared, the service sector showed a higher growth rate than the 
manufacturing sector in the period 1977-82, and then, in the ensuing years 
the manufacturing sector grew more rapidly than the service sector (see 
table - 3.1 O and figure - 3.1 ). 
Thus, parallel to high economic performance brought about by the 1977 
reforms employment generation too remarkably increased as evinced by 
the reduction of the rate of unemployment from 20 per cent in 1977 to 11 
per cent by 1981/82 (Budget Speech, 1978 and CFS, 1981/82). However, 
it has been highlighted in the literature that rather than the direct measures 
taken under the economic reforms, some other factors such as migration, 
construction and service sector expansion were mainly responsible for 
employment generation in the initial period of reforms 1978-82. 
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Table- 3.10 
Real Growth of Production Sectors and GDP, 1978-2000 
Average Annual Rates of Growth (percentages) 
1978- 1983- 1988- 1993- 1995-
1982 1987 1992 1994 1998 
Agriculture, 4.0 2.0 1.9 4.1 1.1 
forestry & fishing 
Mining & 7.7 7.0 1.5 9.0 2.6 
quarrying 
Manufacturing 4.6 6.7 6.8 9.8 8.7 
Service 7.6 4.4 4.1 5.8 5.2 
GDP 6.2 4.1 4.0 6.3 5.1 
Source: Annual Reports (various), Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
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Conversely, with the weakening of these forces the overall employment 
creation reversed, particularly after 1982. As a consequence, in the 
second half of the 1980s, the unemployment rate remained high at around 
16 per cent. But the reawakening of the private sector under the second 
wave of liberalisation, commencing from 1989 onwards with the gradual 
fading of some shocks which emerged in the latter part of the 1980s 
reduced the high unemployment trend. The recovery this time was mainly 
brought about by a rise in the private sector employment, mainly in 
industries set up first, under the Greater Colombo Economic Commission 
(GCEC), and later under the Board of Investment (801). For example, local 
employment in GCEC firms increased from 10,538 in 1980 to 386,034 in 
the 801 firms in 2001. The employment in the non-801 private sector firms 
also increased up to 108,542 in 2001. 
This expansion could be realised manly through the private sector as the 
main engine of industrial growth in the economy. The public sector's share 
in industries dropped to 5 per cent in 2000 from that of 21 per cent in 1991 
with expediting privatisation of SOEs after 1989 (CBSL AR., various). As a 
result, the industrial sector became more efficient as evidenced by the 
increase of capacity utilisation in industries in the latter part of the reform 
period. For example, the capacity utilisation of industry increased from 
80.1 per cent in 1990 to 85 per cent in 2000 (CBSL AR., various). In 
addition, self-employment schemes such as 'Janasaviya' and the credit 
schemes for small and medium scale industries which came in the form of 
market supporting policies also created a considerable amount of new 
employment (Kelegama and Tiruchelvam, 1995). Thus, the manufacturing 
sector increased its share of total employment from 12 per cent in 1990 to 
16.6 per cent in 2000 and contributed highly in reducing the rate of 
unemployment from 15.9 per cent in 1990 to 7.6 per cent of the labour 
force in 2000 (CBSL, A R. various). 
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However, compared to other countries in the region Sri Lanka's 
unemployment rate is substantially high (see table - 3.11 ). 
Table- 3.11 
Unemployment Rates in Selected Countries in the Asian Region 
Country Unemployment rate(%) year 
Hong Kong 4.7 1998 
Korea, Republic of 6.3 1999 
Taiwan 3.1 2000 
Bangladesh 2.5 1996 
Pakistan 5.9 2000 
Sri Lanka 8.9 1999 
Indonesia 5.5 1998 
Malaysia 3.4 1999 
Singapore 4.6 1999 
Thailand 4.3 2000 
Source: World Employment Report 2001, ILO. 
This proves that two and a half decades of export oriented industrialisation 
has not been able to make a substantial impact on reducing unemployment 
relatively to other countries which have followed economic policies similar 
to Sri Lanka. 
In this background, a considerable doubt arises of the labour absorption 
capacity of industries. The behaviour of the output-employment 
relationship (gap) under each trade policy regime highlighted for the first 
time by this study gives a clear indication of how well manufacturing 
industries performed in labour absorption. Accordingly, the average 
industrial output-employment gap under the ISi policies during the period, 
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1970-76 shows a negative value (- 0.10) for the period 1970-76 (see table 
- 3.12 and figure - 3.2). This negative relationship is contrary to the normal 
behaviour which can be seen between these two variables under any trade 
policy regime in developing countries. 
The experience in many developing countries confirm that the growth of 
manufacturing output substantially exceeded the growth of manufacturing 
employment from the beginning of their industrialisation (Todaro, 2000). 
But in Sri Lanka, the performance of the manufacturing industrial sector 
became weak under the ISi strategy due to a number of specific reasons 
which contributed to reduce industrial output and increase employment 
than allowed by the limited output produced by IS industries, resulting in a 
negative relationship between output and employment. The volume of 
output that could be produced by IS industries became limited due to 
frequent supply shortages of raw materials and intermediate inputs and 
producing for a limited domestic market. On the other hand, particularly the 
public sector industries, which dominated the industrial production and 
employment in ISi era were characterised by overstaffing and low 
productivity since they became an easy channel for political supporters 
being employed under each government. Even the private sector 
industries could not adjust the number of their employees for output 
fluctuations mainly due to stringent labour protection regulations such as 
Termination of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA) No. 45 of 1971. 
These occurrences resulted in a negative relationship between industrial 
output and employment in the ISi era. 
On the other hand, the negative output-employment gap appeared in the 
pre 1977 period turned to a positive gap, and it averaged to a level of 1.40 
during the first phase of the economic reforms (1978-89), indicating a more 
realistic relation between these two variables after economic reforms. 
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Table - 3.12 
Growth and Gap of Manufacturing Industrial Output and Employment 
(Percentages) 
Year Output growth (1990 Employment growth Output-
constant prices) (average) employment 
gap (average) 
1970-1976, import-
substitution era 1.1 1.2 - 0.10 
1977-1989, first 
phase of economic 6.6 5.2 1.40 
liberalisation 
1990-2000, second 
and third phase of 9.2 5.9 3.30 
economic 
liberalisation 
Source: Compiled from the Annual Reports (various), Central Bank of Sri Lanka; Karunatilake 
HNS, The Economy of Sri Lanka 1987; Labour Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector in Sri 
Lanka, Department of Financial and Planning, Colombo, 1997. 
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The supply-side constraints disappeared with opening up of the economy 
under the 1977 reforms, and as a result, the industrial capacity utilisation 
increased from 63 per cent in 1977 to 79.2 per cent in 1989. Also the 
private sector reported higher industrial expansion under EOI policies. 
These tendencies contributed to the appearance of a more realistic 
association between industrial output and employment. However, during 
the second and third phase of liberalisation (1990-2000) the output-
employment gap continued to expand to a level of 3.30 although the 
industrial capacity utilisation further increased from 81.1 in 1990 to 85 per 
cent in 2000 implying a jobless growth or an insufficient labour absorption 
in industry (see table - 3.12 and figure - 3.2). 
In this setting, it is appropriate to assess the manufacturing sector's 
strength in absorbing labour. When compared with the other sectors, the 
employment share of the industrial sector is the lowest. For example, the 
industrial sector's employment share of the work force was 16.6 per cent in 
comparison to the agricultural sector's employment share of 36 per cent 
and the service sector's share of 40.3 per cent in 2000 (CBSL, 2001 ). 
Although the industrial sector's employment share is relatively small, it 
plays a vital role in providing jobs, especially in a background in which the 
agricultural sector indicates a declining trend while the service sector 
became stagnated in employment generation (see table - 3.13). The 
agricultural sector shows little room for further expansion mainly due to 
limited availability of irrigated lands, increasing population density, and 
increasing cost of farming. The population density increased by threefold 
from 103 persons per sq kilometre between 1946 and 2000 (EPISL, 1998; 
and CBSL, 2001). On the other hand, it is difficult to assume that an 
employment boom similar to the one that occurred in the service sector just 
after the 1977 liberalisation will appear again in the near future. Under this 
scenario the manufacturing industrial sector has recorded the highest 
percentage of employment growth. For example, there has been a 40 per 
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cent employment growth in manufacturing compared to an 18 per cent 
increase in employment in the service sector, and the agricultural sector's 
28 per cent of negative employment growth from 1990 to 2000 (see table -
3.13). Further, the major policy prescription still to develop the economy by 
the policy makers and the donor agencies, and also accepted by the two 
major political parties is also the export-oriented industrialisation. In this 
background, more responsibility lies in the manufacturing sector in 
absorbing more labour. The following simple estimate suggests the 
percentage of annual industrial development that should be required for the 
absorption of the total annual increase of the labour force. 
Table - 3.13 
Employment in Different Sectors 
ercen 1ges (P ta ) 
Year Agriculture, Manufacturing Construction Service 
Fisheries and 
Mining & 
Quarrying 
1990 50.0 11.9 4.6 33.7 
1991 45.1 12.9 4.0 37.9 
1992 41.4 13.8 5.4 39.4 
1993 46.6 13.3 3.8 36.3 
1994 41.6 14.0 4.8 39.6 
1995 38.6 14.8 5.4 41.2 
1996 39.3 14.8 5.5 40.4 
1997 38.7 15.7 5.4 40.2 
1998 40.7 15.3 5.0 39.0 
1999 36.2 14.8 5.3 41.9 
2000 36.0 16.6 5.5 40.3 
Source: Compiled from the Annual Reports (various) Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
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On the basis of 16.6 per cent of the labour force being employed in the 
manufacturing sector in 2000 and the 2.0 per cent average annual increase 
of labour force from 1992 to 2000, the employment growth to be acquired 
by the manufacturing industrial sector, at least, to absorb fully the annual 
increase of labour force (new entrants to the labour force each year) can be 
estimated in the following manner. 
(Employment x industrial growth I ?) =Growth of the labour force 
0.166 X 0.12 = 0.02 
Accordingly, the industrial sector should acquire an annual growth rate of 
12 per cent to absorb the entire annual growth of the workforce. Under the 
EOI strategy, so far, that much industrial growth rate (at constant prices) 
has not been achieved (see table - 3.10). Yet, it shows that the industrial 
sector alone with the average annual real growth of about 6.0 per cent 
between 1991 and 2000 has absorbed 1/2 (50 per cent) of the new 
entrants to the labour force annually. This indicates that the relative 
strength of the manufacturing sector's labour absorption is very high. Thus, 
this estimate indicates that the heavy reliance upon the manufacturing 
sector to solve the unemployment problem is a policy advocacy made in 
the right direction. Consequently, more confidence can be placed on the 
manufacturing industrial sector to generate more labour employment. In 
this context, first, it is necessary to identify constraints that limit this sector 
in the creation of employment, and, then, to examine the further potentials 
that the manufacturing industrial sector possesses in absorbing more 
labour. Accordingly, the widening industrial output-employment gap found 
by this study suggests that employment growth in the manufacturing 
industrial sector has been weakened after the first phase of the economic 
reforms. In the literature, three causes have been mainly identified for 
having a substantially high output-employment gap or jobless growth, and 
they can be cited as follows; 
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1. Adoption of more capital-intensive technology in production, 
2. Growth of labour productivity, and 
3. Having less backward linkages among industries. 
Upholding higher capital intensity is believed to be a major reason to 
weaken the labour absorption in developing countries. Accordingly, in Sri 
Lanka also as identified by Agarwala's (1983) study, the factor market 
distortions reached the highest level in the ISi era by the late 1970s, and 
continuation of the same trend afterwards might have contributed to 
increase capital intensity further in industries, limiting employment creation. 
In this setting, this study mainly aims at examining trends in factor market 
distortions, and to judge how far they have contributed to retard labour 
absorption by manufacturing industry in Sri Lanka after introduction of wide 
ranging economic reforms from 1977 onwards. 
On the other hand, labour productivity can also play a dominant role in 
determining the degree of labour employment because there is a close 
relation between labour productivity and labour absorption. By definition, 
the rate of growth in output minus the rate of growth in labour productivity 
approximately equals the rate of growth of employment as shown follows 
(Todaro, 2000; 277); 
6Y /Y - 6 (YI L) / (Y/ L) =ill/ L where L = labour, Y= output. 
The above-mentioned relationship suggests that if labour productivity is 
rising, fewer workers are required to produce any given level of output 7. 
7. However, contrary to this view, some commentators (Horton at el, 1994; Athukorala, 1996) argue 
that there is a positive association between labour absorption in industry and labour produciivity. 
The underlying explanation for this bearing is that higher produciivity of labour means greater profits, 
which in tum, if a sufficient proportion of profit is invested (more in capital saving technology), 
demand for labour can be increased. Also, maintaining a higher labour produciivity than competitors 
leads to attrad more foreign investors and thereby generates more employment. 
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In this background, it is necessary to identify the labour productivity 
behaviour to evaluate its impact on labour absorption in manufacturing 
industry. The EOI unlike the ISi played an important role in the 
transformation of the export structure of the country. By the time of the 
introduction of the EOI strategy in 1977, the share of manufactures 
(excluding petroleum products) in total merchandise exports was only 5 per 
cent. 
Manufactured exports since then have emerged as the most dynamic 
element in the export structure. Then, the share of manufactures in total 
merchandise exports increased to 77.2 in 1998-01 (CBSL A. R, various). 
As a result, the share of non-traditional exports of the country rose from 
25.7 percent in 1977 to 85.0 percent in 2000. In this transformation of the 
export structure of the economy, the role of foreign firms was substantial. 
For example, the share of foreign firms in total exports of manufactures 
increased from 24 per cent in 1977 to over 79 per cent in 2000 (CBSL AR, 
1978, 2001 ). However, the robustness of the direct private foreign 
investment is questioned because a few low skilled industries rather than a 
diversified range of manufactured exports have dominated Sri Lanka's 
export growth. Thus, Sri Lankan manufacturing industries are believed to 
be characterised by lack of backward linkages of manufacturing industries 
with the rest of the economy that should be an important factor that limits 
employment creation. 
Thus, identification of the existence of a widening output-employment gap 
or a jobless growth in the manufacturing industry and analysing the 
underlying theoretical reasons such as factor market distortions, level of 
labour productivity and poor backward linkages to emerging such a gap 
provide a background to form a set of hypotheses to be tested in the 
subsequent chapters in this study. 
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3.7 Summary 
The oveNiew of industrialisation in Sri Lanka in this chapter identifies how 
the role of industrialisation has expanded from the early 1920s to 2000. 
The continuation of the classical economy without considerable change in 
the economic structure with the phenomenon of increasing unemployment 
until the late 1980s, suggests that industrial policies followed during this 
long period were not strong enough to achieve the visualised objectives of 
industrialisation. During the pre and post Second World War periods 
although the government attempted to develop industries, mainly through 
attracting the private sector investment it became a failure in an 
environment of following laissez-faire economic policies. The present study 
highlights that the incentive structure provided under these regimes was 
not strong enough to overcome the private sector investors' apprehension 
to go for a competition with imported industrial products rather than the 
private sector's inexperience and lack of capital to be invested in 
manufacturing industries, as highlighted by some commentators. Also, 
some distortions which appeared for the first time during this period badly 
affected industrial growth through foreign participation. Further, poor 
technological adoptability, particularly in the public sector industries 
contributed much to this failure. 
In contrast to the laissez-faire economic policy regime, the incentive 
structure provided with the backing of import controls in the inteNentionist 
era (1957-77) provided a great stimulus for the private sector to invest in 
import-substitution industries. But the import-substitution industrialisation 
commenced in this way too failed in achieving the desired results. The 
inteNentionist policy measures followed in this era caused factor market 
distortions to be increased to the highest level, encouraging adoption of 
more labour saving technologies and whereby limiting employment 
creation. 
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Then, the failure of the ISi strategy for nearly two decades paved the way 
to switch over to the EOI strategy under which the private sector was 
considered to be the principal agent to be engaged in the manufacturing 
industry. Yet, the private sector in the first phase of the economic reforms 
( 1977-89) was mainly limited to participating in the non-tradable sector. 
However, reforms made under the second and the third waves of 
liberalisation (after 1989) created a better environment for the private 
sector manufacturing firms to function as the engine of growth. This has 
resulted in a continuous increase in industrial output as evidently shown by 
the increasing capacity utilisation in the manufacturing industry. However, 
widening of the industrial output-employment gap in the 1990s suggests 
that the degree of labour absorption by the manufacturing industry is still 
limited even under the EOI strategy. 
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Chapter-4 
Hypotheses, Methodology and Data 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by providing a background for the forming of a set of 
prior hypotheses for the study. Then, the hypotheses formulated are 
presented with the rationale of structuring such a set of hypotheses. Next, 
testing procedure of each hypothesis (methodology) is discussed. Finally, 
the data used are explained, emphasising their limitations. 
4.2 Background for Formation of the Hypotheses 
The urgent need for providing employment to a rapidly increasing labour 
force that emerged from the late 1950s has expanded the role of 
industrialisation because of the limited prospects found in other sectors to 
generate new employment. Yet, the import-substitution industrialisation (ISi) 
effort of two decades ( 1957-77) proved to be a failure in generating sufficient 
amount of employment as evinced by reaching the unemployment to the 
highest level in the ISi era. This failure, along with other dismal economic 
performance experienced in the regulated regime, led to change the 
industrial strategy from ISi to export oriented industrialisation (EOI) under a 
set of far reaching economic reforms introduced from 1977 onwards. The 
new strategy compared to the earlier ISi era brought about a substantial 
higher growth in manufacturing output. In spite of that, the two-digit level of 
open unemployment experienced from the mid 1950s continued even after 
the 1977 economic reforms until 1997, and by 2002 nearly one in ten labour 
force participants was still out of a job. Furthermore, Sri Lanka's current 
unemployment rate is substantially higher than those of most of the countries 
in East, South-East, and South Asia (W.E.R., 2001). 
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In this background considerable doubt arose on the strength of 
manufacturing sector to reduce the unemployment in the country. 
Accordingly, the study carried out a prior assessment of the strength of the 
manufacturing sector job creation for the period 1990-2000. This reveals 
that the manufacturing industrial sector has recorded the highest percentage 
of employment growth, which was 40 per cent compared to the 18 per cent 
increase in employment in the service sector. The agricultural sector has a 
28 per cent of negative employment growth during this period. Moreover, 
the study estimated, on the basis of 16.6 per cent of the labour force being 
employed in the manufacturing sector in 2000, and the average annual 
increase of labour force of 2. O per cent, that the industrial sector should 
acquire at least 12 per cent of annual growth rate (at constant prices) to 
absorb fully the annual increase of labour force in the country. In this 
scenario, the industrial sector alone with the average growth of 6.0 per cent 
achieved between 1991 an 2000 has already absorbed % (50 per cent) of 
the new entrants to the labour force annually. This suggests that the relative 
strength of the manufacturing sector's labour absorption is very high. 
Yet, the examination of the manufacturing sector output-employment data 
during the reform period by this study shows a widening gap between the 
industrial output and employment in the reform period. Accordingly, the 
average output-employment gap of 1.40 at constant prices in the 1st phase of 
the liberalisation under the 1977 economic reforms (1979-89) has increased 
to 3.30 in the 2nd and 3rd phases of liberalisation (1990-2000). This widening 
output-employment gap indicates that the amount of labour absorption by 
manufacturing industries is inadequate. This inadequacy in employment 
creation in this study is mainly assumed to have appeared as a result of 
holding back labour demand on account of the factor market distortions, 
while the study gives some weight to labour productivity behaviour, the 
increasing trend in capital intensity, real wage behaviour and the poor 
backward linkages as some other factors which may have further contributed 
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to widening the manufacturing sector output-employment gap. The study, 
therefore, attempts to assess the impact of the above mentioned factors on 
the retardation of labour absorption in the manufacturing industry by making 
the following set of prior hypotheses and testing them through the 
subsequent chapters. 
4.2.1 Hypotheses 
1. The high level of unemployment prevailing in Sri Lanka has stemmed 
from a situation of disequilibrium between labour supply and labour 
demand at aggregate level rather than from the structural and some 
other mismatches. 
2. The cost of labour market distortions has decreased during the 
economic reform period (1977-2000). 
3. Financial market liberalisation under economic reforms since 1977 has 
reduced the capital market distortions. 
4. The trends in labour productivity, capital intensity, wage behaviour and 
linkage effects have not retarded employment generation in the reform 
period (1977-2000). 
5. Further changes in relative factor prices (costs) will have a positive 
impact on labour absorption by the manufacturing industry. 
The rationale of structuring the first hypothesis is basically to evaluate the 
importance of labour demand at aggregate level against various mismatches 
in the labour market which have been emphasised by some economists as 
the major reason for appearance of a high level of unemployment in Sri 
Lanka, and thereby to find grounds for the forming of the other relevant 
hypotheses for the study. 
Historical evidence in both developed and developing countries as 
highlighted in the literature review of the study shows a close relationship 
between output growth and employment growth. 
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Sri Lankan data too basically confirm that the level of employment has varied 
in accordance with the ups and downs of the economy during the last five 
decades, implying that economic growth matters more than anything else in 
determining employment growth. But quite often in the Sri Lankan literature 
more importance has been attached to mismatches for the emerging of a 
high level of unemployment without giving due recognition to the former. In 
this setting, in a study related to labour absorption such as the present study, 
it is logical at the outset to weigh the influence of these two basic sources for 
the appearance of a high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka. Therefore, for 
this purpose the study formulated the first hypothesis. Dependent on prior 
available evidence it was decided, going against the conventional wisdom, 
that labour demand at the aggregate level is more important in analysing 
employment issue than mismatches. This importance of labour demand at 
aggregate level suggests that labour demand at sectoral levels such as 
manufacturing is also significant in employment creation. In fact, from the 
late 1950s industrial sector has been identified as the most important sector 
in generating employment in the country. 
Then, based on the relevant theoretical guidance, a few critical reasons 
which substantially have some impact on determining the level of 
manufacturing labour demand in developing countries such as Sri Lanka 
were identified for further testing. They include mainly factor market 
distortions related to both labour and capital markets and the degree of 
capital intensity, the level of labour productivity, real wage behaviour, and 
the degree of linkage effects among manufacturing industry. Next, the study 
expects to evaluate how these factors changed over time, particularly from 
the ISi era to the EOI era and to assess their impact on labour demand by 
testing the formulated hypotheses. 
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4.3 Methodology 
First three hypotheses of the study are tested through a more qualitative 
research approach while the last two hypotheses are tested mainly following 
a quantitative approach. 
4.3.1 Procedure for Testing the First Hypothesis: 
In testing the first hypothesis - 'the high level of unemployment prevailing in 
Sri Lanka has stemmed from a situation of disequilibrium between labour 
supply and labour demand at aggregate level rather than from structural and 
some other mismatches' - first, it is expected to realise how employment 
growth has varied with economic growth achieved in each era, starting from 
the early 1950s to see whether the economic growth has brought about a 
corresponding employment growth. Then, various mismatches presented in 
explaining unemployment will be examined to see whether their rigour has 
changed over time. Next, the trend in severity of mismatches over time is 
compared with the economic growth achieved in recent decades to 
determine that mismatches have any impact on creating a high level of 
unemployment. 
4.3.2 Procedure for Testing the Second Hypothesis: 
Testing the second hypothesis - 'the cost of labour market distortions has 
decreased during the economic reform period (1977-2000)' - is expected to 
be made through assessing the degree of labour market distortions and 
examining their trends over time. The ideal way to measure distortions is to 
estimate how far the relevant prices have deviated from their equilibrium or 
shadow prices directly. A few such direct methods for estimating shadow 
prices have been developed (Thirlwall, 1999; Gupta, 1989). They include 
UNIDO approach and Little-Mirrlees approach. However, it is difficult to 
have such direct calculations in practice, particularly with regard to the 
developing countries such as Sri Lanka, mainly due to data constraints, and 
certain methodological problems associated with these direct methods. 
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Consequently, we have to depend on indirect methods in measuring 
distortions. In Agrwala's (1983) extensive study on 'price distortions and 
growth' in 31 developing countries, distortions are not measured against any 
theoretical ideal, but they have been judged in terms of their variations from 
a selected base year as the practical approximation commonly used in policy 
analysis. Consequently, this study also follows the Agrwala's method for 
judging factor market distortions wherever direct measures of distortions are 
not possible to apply. 
However, the study directly compares the cost of major labour regulations in 
Sri Lanka with those of neighbouring and some of the fast developing 
countries depending on the data availability for the period for the 1980s and 
the 1990s and how these laws and regulations have changed from the ISi 
era to the EOI era within the country. For this comparison, laws and 
regulations such as minimum wage laws, job security laws, social security 
laws, holidays and leave entitlements, and maternity leave, around which 
much of the controversies have arisen with regard to creating labour market 
distortions, are selected. In addition, the labour relations system is also 
assessed to judge how far it has contributed to decrease labour market 
distortions and increase the flexibility of labour market. The degree of labour 
market distortions is expected to be measured through a number of criteria 
related to each selected major law and regulation, as stated below; 
Minimum Wages 
1. The minimum wage index is compared with the consumer price index 
for the reform period to determine that minimum wages have operated 
as a binding constraint to create any positive impact on increasing real 
wages during the reform period, 
2. A simple criterion is developed by the study based on the minimum / 
average wage ratio to see how far minimum wages are closer to the 
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average wages to acquire a clearer idea of the effect of minimum 
wages on wage determination, and 
3. The minimum/ average wages ratio of the Sri Lankan wage structure is 
compared with that of other selected countries in the region. 
Employment Security Legislation 
The Sri Lankan employment security regulations are compared in terms of 
period of notice given to retrench employees, the size of the severance pay 
and the easiness of retrenching employees with other neighbouring 
countries in the region to judge the ability of the Sri Lankan employers to 
restructure their businesses. 
Holidays and Leave 
1. First, attempts are made to identify the holidays and leave entitlements 
of different categories of employees in Sri Lanka, and 
2. Then, a comparison is made of the Sri Lankan private sector workers 
leave and paid public holidays with those of other countries in the 
region depending on the data availability. 
Maternity Protection 
1. Maternity leave is measured considering the length of leave, and then it 
is compared with that of other countries, and 
2. Other additional payments and facilities available with regards to 
maternity leave in different countries in the region are considered. 
Social Security and Non-Wage Labour Costs 
Social security costs are measured comparing the size of the contributions 
which have to be made by employers to different social security programmes 
among other countries in the region. 
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Industrial Relations. 
The success of labour relations is measured by looking at; 
1. The average number of days lost per year on account of strikes, 
2. The efficiency (delays) of dispute settlement procedure, and 
3. The nature of work culture among employees and management styles 
followed by employers. 
4.3.3 Procedure for Testing the Third Hypothesis 
The third hypothesis - 'the financial liberalisation under economic reforms 
since 1977 has reduced capital market distortions' - is aimed at assessing 
how far capital market distortions which appeared as a result of following 
repressed financial policies prior to 1977, have become less acute on 
account of following financial market liberalisation in the reform period. This 
hypothesis is expected to be tested using a number of criteria, such as; 
1. The trend in real interest rate; 
2. The financial deepening measured through M1 / GDP, M2 / GDP, and 
M3 / GDP ratios; 
3. Trends in volume of credit channelled to the different sectors, and 
4. The behaviour of the real exchange rates, covering both regulated and 
open economic eras. 
4.3.4 Procedure for Testing the Fourth Hypothesis 
The fourth hypothesis - 'the trends in the labour productivity, capital intensity, 
wage behaviour and linkage effects have not retarded employment 
generation in the reform period, 1977-2000' - is expected to be tested 
through the following methods; 
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Labour Productivity; 
The study expects to examine the recent trends in labour productivity using 
the traditional growth accounting (Solow residual) procedure related to the 
firms in the private FTZ sector, the private non-FTZ sector and the public 
sector based on the 4-digit disaggregated industrial data for the 1990s. The 
labour productivity is defined traditionally in the following manner; 
LP= V/L (1) 
where LP = Labour productivity, V = value added, L = number of workers 
(Athukorala, 1996) 1 
Then, the labour productivity growth can be defined as a residual growth in 
value added after accounting for growth of labour input (employment) as 
follows; 
LPG= .1V - .1L (2) 
where .1 V and .1L are the corresponding growth rates. The equation - 2 
clearly shows that labour productivity growth is simply the residual growth in 
value added after accounting for growth of labour input (employment). 
Labour productivity growth or the residual growth obtained in this manner 
can be further disaggregated into two components, namely total factor 
productivity growth (TFPG) and capital labour substitution (capital 
deepening) in the production process. The procedure for decomposing 
labour productivity growth into TFPG and capital-labour substitution can be 
further understood through the following production functional relationship. 
1 . The same methodology used to measure labour productivity in the manufacturing sector 
in Sri Lanka by Athukorala (1996) is adopted. 
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(3) 
where V denotes output, K and L represent capital and labour inputs 
respectively and A is the index of Hick's neutral technical progress. 
Logarithmic differentiation of (3) yields; 
(4) 
where the lower case letters v, k and I are logarithms of V, K and L 
respectively, and Evk=(af/ok) (K/V) and Ev1 = (at/81) (UV) are output elasticities 
of capital and labour respectively, d is the difference operator, and dA.1 is 
total factor productivity growth (TFPG). In order to isolate TFPG, equation 
( 4) is written as; 
TFPG t = dvr Evk dk - Sv1dl (5) 
Under the assumption of perfect competition, the elasticity of output with 
respect to each input is equal to its value shares in output. Further, these 
value shares sum up to one when the production function is assumed to be 
homogeneous of degree one. With these two assumptions, the discrete-time 
approximation to equation (5) can be written as: 
TFPG t e = dVt- Svk dkt- Svidl t (6) 
where TFPGe is 'estimated' total factor productivity growth and Svk and Sv1 are 
the average shares of capital and labour in total value added which can be 
obtained in the following manner; 
Svk = Yz[Svk(t)+Svk(t-1)) 
Sv1 = %[ Sv1(t)+Sv1(t-1 )], 
assuming that 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Further, the equation (6) can be arranged to reflect labour productivity 
growth consisting of its two components (as defined by the equation - 2), 
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namely the growth of total factor productivity (TFPGe) and the contribution of 
capital deepening to labour productivity represented by [Svk(~k- ~I)] in the 
following way. 
LPG = TFPGe + Svk(~k-~I) 
Capital Intensity; 
(10) 
The contribution of capital intensity to the widening output-employment gap 
with regard to the private FTZ sector, the private non-FTZ sector and the 
public sector manufacturing industries is attempted to be captured using 4-
digit disaggregated industrial data for the 1990s through calculating few 
ratios such as; 
1. Capital / labour (KIL) ratio, 
2. Growth of the capital stock (flK), and 
3. Capital deepening (flK-flL) 
Wage Behaviour 
The wage behaviour is expected to be judged by; 
1. Examining the trends in real wage index in the reform period, and 
2. Comparing Sri Lanka's wage level with that of neighbouring countries 
in the region. 
Spread Effects 
The study will attempt to identify backward linkages depending on; 
1. The result of a recent empirical study, 
2. Examination of changes in the domestic cost structure of firms based 
on the data availability, and 
3. Examining the pattern of changes in employment between high skilled 
and low skilled industries in the reform period. 
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4.3.5 Procedure for Testing the Final Hypothesis: 
The final hypothesis - 'further changes in relative factor prices (costs) will 
have a positive impact on labour absorption by manufacturing industry' - is 
tested by finding long-run own wage elasticity of labour demand and output 
elasticity by estimating labour demand function for the major branches of the 
Sri Lankan manufacturing industry based on the flexible and data dependent 
Box-Cox transformation method using data on 4-digit industrial categories for 
the period 1990-98. The derivation of this functional form can be explained 
in following steps. 
A general specification of the long-run labour demand function of an industry 
is: 
L=f(Y,w,t) ( 1) 
where L is the labour employed, Y is real output or value added, w is the real 
wage rate and tis a time trend representing technological change (see, for 
example, Hsing, 1989). 
But to estimate equation (1) a functional form must be chosen and this can 
entail unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the production 
technology in the industry. For example, variants of the log-linear functional 
form: 
(2) 
where the b; are estimated coefficients and u is a random error, are widely 
used in labour demand studies because of the convenience of interpreting 
the coefficients directly as elasticities. However, equation (2) implies that the 
industry uses Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production 
technology: 
(3) 
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where y is the efficiency parameter, </J is the rate of Hicks-neutral technical 
progress, a is the distribution parameter, p is the substitution parameter, the 
scale parameter u=1 if there are constant returns to scale and 
r, v > O, O <a< I, and p ~ -1. The coefficient b2 in equation (2) estimates the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, a = 1/(1 + p), and forces 
this to be a constant. Similarly, the b1 coefficient implies that the returns to 
scale do not vary, which is also an untested restriction. Another feature of 
equation (2) is that the estimated coefficient on the wage rate has to be 
adjusted to give the usual constant-output own-wage elasticity of labour 
demand lJLL· Specifically: 
T/u = -[1-mp (4) 
where mis the share of labour in total costs or total revenue (Hamermesh, 
1986: 433). 
In contrast to the restrictive nature of CES production, there are many 
reasons for expecting cr to vary. In many studies, this flexibility is achieved 
with translog functions (Christensen, et. al, 1971 ). But there can be 
multicollinearity problems when estimating these functions because of the 
need to form cross-product terms between all inputs (Hsing, 1993). 
Moreover, in many developing countries the full ranges of data on industrial 
input prices are not readily available, which limits the practical application of 
the translog cost function approach. 
Another approach to allowing variable substitution elasticities is to use the 
general Box-Cox (1964) transformation of variables, so that equation (1) 
becomes: 
(5) 
where oo - s O, J s oo +. Depending on the different values of 8 and ')... 
estimated from the data, equation (5) covers a variety of functional forms, 
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including log-linear when (} = 1 = O, linear when O = i = 1, semi-log when 
O = O, 1 = 1, and reciprocal when O = 1, i = -1. The elasticity with respect to 
any independent variable, X; is given by: 
(6) 
which depends on the values of /J;, X;, L, (}, and X Only in the special case 
where O = 1 = O, does the elasticity reduce to a constant of f);. Hence, 
equation (5) allows variable output, substitution and wage elasticities, while 
needing no more data than is used by the standard log-linear model. 
Therefore, we use equation (5) to estimate labour demand functions for Sri 
Lankan industry. 
4.4 Data and the Data Constraints 
To test the first three hypothesis data are abstracted mainly from the Central 
Bank Annual Reports for various years and Report on Consumer Finance 
and Socio Economic Surveys in Sri Lanka, World Employment Reports and 
other ILO publications, and Labour Statistics published by the Department of 
labour, Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka State of the Economy (various) published by the 
Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, Gunatilaka (1999), Athukorala, (1996), 
and Athukorala and Jayasuria (1994), 
For testing 4th hypothesis industrial data are obtained from the Annual 
Survey of Industries (ASI), which are a total enumeration of industrial 
establishments with 25 or more employees and a random sample of 
establishments with 5-24 employees. Although this survey covers over 2000 
establishments per year, the data on individual establishments are not 
available because of confidentiality restrictions. The other notable matter is 
that time series data on the performance of manufacturing industries are not 
available in Sri Lanka for analysing factor productivity growth through an 
econometric estimation of production functions. 
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Consequently, the traditional growth accounting (Solow residual) procedure 
was selected to be used to estimate productivity growth. This methodology 
enables us to employ industry level data from discrete time intervals for the 
1990s. 
Data on employment, value added, input and end of year capital stock for 
manufacturing is extracted at the 4-digit ISIC level of industrial classification 
from both published and unpublished data records of Sri Lanka Census and 
Statistics. The study is carried on the 1990s annual data. But with regard to 
all three sectors [private free trade zone (FTZ), private non-FTZ and public 
sectors], data for 1992 is not available. Compared to the other two sectors, 
more consistent data is available for the FTZ sector. Moreover, some years 
with highly fluctuating data for non FTZ private sector and the public sector 
are dropped from the analysis by making a comparison with the Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka's sample data published in its annual reports. But such a 
drop out does not make a big difference since Solow residual method can be 
used for data from discrete time intervals. 
In order to allow for inflation in inter-temporal comparisons, value added is 
deflated using the Central Bank of Sri Lanka's wholesale price index of 
commodity wise while capital and other inputs are deflated using sector wise 
of the wholesale price index. For the purpose of calculating labour 
productivity number of workers was used. Labour input is not measured in 
terms of the number of hours worked, although it is the ideal measurement 
to be used. But the number of hours worked can be changed due to change 
in part-time and full-time work arrangements, alteration of standard hours 
worked, and extraneous factors such as trade union actions, power cuts etc. 
For testing the final hypothesis demand for labour function is estimated, 
again using industrial data obtained from annual surveys of industries carried 
out by the Department of Census. In this case aggregate data covering all 
three sectors (the private FTZ and non-FTZ and the public sectors) were 
taken together. 
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The usual alternative estimation strategy, of using a time-series of averages 
for specified industries, is also not available. Therefore, we follow the 
approach of Gajanan and Ramaiah (1996) and create a pooled time-series 
cross-sectional database of sub-industries observed across different years. 
Specifically, data were gathered on 59 UNSIC 4-digit industrial categories, 
over the 1990-98 period. 
4.5 Summary 
This study formulates 5 prior hypotheses at the outset and they are tested in 
the subsequent chapters based on qualitative and quantitative research 
methodologies. Therefore, the study does not depend on a single model. 
Accordingly, the first 3 hypotheses are tested based on more qualitative 
evidence whereas the last 2 hypotheses are tested quantitatively using the 
data dependent traditional growth accounting (Solow residual) method and 
the Box-Cox model since the lack of time series data on the manufacturing 
industry in Sri Lanka greatly prevents the employment of a more 
comprehensive econometric analysis. 
151 
Chapter-5 
Labour Market Behaviour Before and After the 1977 
Economic Reforms 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter opens with an explanation of the Sri Lankan labour market 
behaviour in terms of labour supply and demand at aggregate level 
covering the period before and after the 1977 economic reforms. The 
trends in the labour supply are viewed depending on the growth of the 
population, changes in the population structure and the labour force 
participation, while the labour demand is observed in terms of changes in 
the structure of employment and the status of employment over time. 
Then, attempts are made to analyse the lack of labour absorption 
(unemployment problem) in the country through examining the behaviour of 
output-employment gaps in the economy during each sub period starting 
from the early 1950s, and the structural 'mismatch' and other mismatches 
to set the stage for testing the first hypothesis of the study - 'the high level 
of unemployment prevailing in Sri Lanka has stemmed from a situation of 
disequilibrium between labour supply and labour demand at aggregate 
level rather than from the structural and some other mismatches'. 
5.2 Labour supply 
5.2.1 Trends in Population 
Labour supply, an essential force involved in the production of goods and 
services in a country, is determined by a number of short-run as well as 
long-run factors. In the short-run there are three major factors which 
decide the volume of labour supply: 
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1 The number of persons who supply labour from a population of a 
given size (participation in the labour market); 
2 The number of hours supplied by each person to the labour market 
(the timing of working hours); 
3 The intensity of efforts associated with each 'person hour'. 
In the long-run there are two more factors which determine labour 
supply: 
4 The number of persons who are available to supply labour, 
associated with the size and structure of the population due to 
demographic factors (i.e. births, ageing, deaths, immigration and 
migration); 
5 The amount of education, training and experience, including learning 
by doing (which affect the level and nature of skills offered by each 
individual) (Bosworth et al. 1996:9) 
Further to the aforementioned demographic related factors a cluster of 
socio-economic factors too affect the labour supply. Therefore, maintaining 
a proper balance in the behaviour of the factors which determine the labour 
supply of a country is critically important; otherwise they lead to 
engendering a number of problems. For example, some of the most crucial 
issues facing less developed countries surfaced mainly due to the larger 
size and the higher growth rate of their population. The rapid population 
growth in these countries especially is often viewed as the central reason 
for the persistence, and in some cases deepening, of their unemployment 
and poverty. For example, about a half billion workers around the world 
cannot earn enough to raise their families above the US $ 1 a day poverty 
line (Betcherman, 2002: 2). In this setting we can see how Sri Lanka's 
population behaved in the recent past. 
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In Sri Lanka over a period of half a century, the population increased by 
nearly threefold from 6.3 million in 1946 to 18.3 million in 1996, resulting in 
an excess supply of labour (a larger number of unemployed) since the 
economy was not strong enough to absorb such an increase of labour 
supply (EPISL, 1998: 30). In this background, the first part of this chapter 
analyses mainly the trends of long-run demographic factors, such as the 
size, growth and structure of the population in Sri Lanka in determining 
trends of labour supply while the influence of education, training etc. and 
other short-run factors will be covered in the appropriate sections in this 
chapter and the subsequent chapters. The remaining sections of the 
chapter are devoted to discuss how labour has been demanded so far by 
the economy. 
However, economists have divergent views of the population growth as the 
most critical factor that determines labour supply and its impact on 
development. Pessimistic views in this regard originated with Malthus and 
then were supported by Ricardo. They believed that diminishing returns 
would be encountered as the population expanded. Coale and Hoover 
(1958), developing "Dynamic Model of Population Growth and 
Development", emphasised that a reduction in birth rate would help to raise 
per capita income, especially in less developed countries like India. During 
the 1970s, the US Agency for Development, the World Bank, and other 
international donor agencies laid heavy emphasis on the population policy 
as a criterion for judging the development efforts of potential aid recipients 
(Gillis et al. 1996). World population conferences (1974, 1984) have 
recognised that the rapid growth of population impedes the economic and 
social progress of developing countries. The UN Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo (1994) emphasised the right of women to control 
the number and timing of children and urged countries to provide universal 
access to family planning services as a part of their demographic policy 
(Siddhisena, 1994). 
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Thus, these 'anti-natalists' as branded in the literature (Tan, 1997:35) argue 
that a high rate of population growth will cause a reduction of savings and 
investment, a fall in productivity due to capital-shallowing, and ultimately 
lead to a decline in the rate of economic growth. 
However, there are some non-conformists also, with the majority opinion 
that rapid population growth is harmful to economic development in the 
third world countries. These contrary views have received some empirical 
support as well. Clark (1969) claims that the empirical relationship 
between the growth rate of the population and that of per capita income is 
in fact positive. Boserup ( 1981) points out that population growth may spur 
technical progress in both agriculture and industry out of the pressures 
created by high population density. Simon (1986) presents a number of 
arguments in favour of population growth. One of such arguments is that a 
larger population is likely to contain more entrepreneurs and other 
inventors, who can make major contributions to solving the problems of 
humanity. The US National Academy of Science Report (1986) implies that 
the negative approach to impact of the population growth on development 
has been very much exaggerated by agencies like the World Bank, and 
there is no simple correlation between a low rate of population and a rapid 
economic growth. Thus the new consensus would reject casting population 
growth as the 'villain' in the story of third-world development, although it 
may be the 'accomplice' (Gillis, et al. 1996: 212). Thus, 'pro-natalists' in 
contrast to 'anti-natalists', emphasise that population increase may have 
growth enhancing effects through increased demand and production, scale 
economies and induced technological change. Consequently, there is a 
paradox due to recognising negative as well as positive effects of 
population increase on economic growth. However, as a balanced view 
the UNCED report (1987 as cited in Gillis, et al. 1996) emphasises that a 
sustainable development can only be pursued if population rise and growth 
are in harmony with the changing productive potentials of the ecosystem. 
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In this setting, it is appropriate to see how developing countries such as Sri 
Lanka deviate from developed countries with regard to the population and 
resulting labour supply issues. The most developed countries have a 
population growth rate of less than 1 per cent per annum. By contrast, 
population growth in many developing countries is higher. For example, 
the population growth in the latter countries varied from 2 per cent to 3.5 
percent per annum for the period 1990-1997 (WDR, 1998). Consequently, 
the current population in LDCs is believed to be doubled in less than 30 
years. But Sri Lanka's present position in this regard is different. Based on 
the 1.2 percent of population growth in 1998, it has been forecasted that Sri 
Lanka's current population would double in 58 years (CBSL, 1999). This 
proves the fact that despite the fast rapid growth in population in the 1950s 
and 1960s, Sri Lanka has been able to control its population growth well 
within a relatively short period. 
The large differences, however, in population growth rates among 
developed and developing countries, in a historical context, can be 
explained by the concept of demographic transition, which is a phasing-out 
process of population growth rates from a virtually stagnant growth stage 
characterised by high birth rates and death rates, through a rapid growth 
stage with high birth rates and low death rates, then to a stable, and finally 
to low growth stage in which both birth and death rates are low (Todaro, 
2000: 738). The population at the last stage of the demographic transition 
is essentially stationary or even declining. France is the first country which 
reached the last stage of the demographic transition. Britain, USA, 
Canada, and most Western European countries are also in the final stage 
of the demographic transition. These developed countries have reached 
the end of the process of the demographic transition over a period ranging 
from 100 to 150 years. On the other hand, Japan and high performing East 
Asian countries started their demographic transition from high to low fertility 
and mortality much later than the Western developed countries at a much 
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faster rate and a relatively shorter period of 30 to 50 years for reaching the 
last stage of population transition (IPS, 1998). Meanwhile, the world 
demographic data reveal that many developing countries are in stage-2 of 
the demographic transition where the crude death rate (CDR) has fallen 
significantly but the crude birth rate (CBR) has remained high. Under this 
framework, the process of Sri Lankan demographic evolution can be 
viewed too. 
The smooth demographic transition that took place in modern industrial 
countries during the early stage of economic development was not 
repeated in Sri Lanka (Saker, 1957). Yet, Sri Lanka is one of the few Asian 
countries which reached an advanced phase of demographic transition in a 
comparatively short period at a relatively low per capita income level 
(CBSL, 1996). Until about the mid 20th century Sri Lanka's population grew 
slowly, at an average annual rate of 1.4 per cent, and this period was 
counted as the initial phase of the country's demographic transition. This 
slower growth of population was attributed to high mortality and fertility 
levels prevailing in that era in the Sri Lankan demographic literature. This 
demographic situation was primarily due to the country's poor health 
standards which prevailed during the 19th century and early 20th century. 
This situation continued until the 1930s (Sanderatne, 1998). In this 
background, before 1946 immigrant labour played a vital role on population 
growth. In the period 1871-1901 especially migration has had such an 
impact on population growth on account of bringing labourers from South 
India by the British colonial administration to work in coffee and tea 
plantations and for road construction. The net migration accounted for 50 
to 70 per cent of the total growth of population during this period (1871-
1901) and the net migration rate was positive up to 1953 (Silva, 1994). 
The country's socio-economic situation, particularly the health situation, 
began to improve rapidly as a result of the effects that came from a number 
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of progressive steps taken under the Donoughmore Constitution (1931) 
during the British Colonial Rule. This Constitution gave the Board of 
Ministers of the State Council (local leaders) wide powers in the 
administration of agriculture, health, education and other domestic policies 
which resulted in improving health, education and other amenities in the 
country. As a result, by 1939, Sri Lanka's control of infectious diseases 
had shown a remarkable success (Sanderatne, 1998; IPS, 1998). 
The second phase of the demographic transition commenced from 1947 
and continued until the beginning of the 1990s. In the single year 1946-47, 
Sri Lanka witnessed what Kinsley Davis has called 'an amazing decline in 
mortality' (as cited in Sanderatne, 1998). Accordingly, the crude death rate 
fell from 20.2 per thousand in 1946 to 14.3 per thousand in 1947, primarily 
as a result of the total control of malaria. But the crude birth rate remained 
at a high level, around 38 persons per thousand for the most part of the 
late 1940s and the 1950s (ibid, 1998). As John Robinson put it, it was a 
phenomenon of juxtaposition of a primitive birth rate with a modernised 
death rate (Robinson, 1959:9). The commitment to improve medical 
facilities gained further momentum after gaining independence in 1948. 
The relatively good economic conditions at that time permitted the 
government to spend about 7 per cent of GDP on health, education, 
housing and food subsidy. This drive continued into the mid sixties by 
increasing the expenditure on health, education and welfare payment to 8. 1 
percent of GDP in 1956-61 and to 10.5 per cent of GDP in 1961-65 
(Jayasundara, 1986). The outcome of increasing expenditure on health, 
education and other social welfare activities was the significant 
improvement of health indicators. The crude death rate (CDR) fell from 
12.6 per thousand in 1950 to 8.6 in 1960. The mortality rate declined -
seen in all age groups, and it reached a relatively low level of 5.9 per 
thousand in 1981 and since then appears to have established around 6.0 
per thousand (Sanderatne 1998). 
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Because of the steep decline in mortality rates Sri Lanka has achieved a 
remarkable increase in life expectancy, which at birth rose from 35 years in 
1901 /1902 to 44 years in 1945/1946, then to 62 years in 1953 and to 73 
years in 1990/1991 (EPISL, 1998). 
The impact of the development of demographic variables after the late 
1940s was a sharp increase in the rate of population growth in the 1950s. 
The population grew at an annual average of 2.8 percent in the 1950s, 
continued to be high at 2.6 per cent in the 1960s, and declined only slightly 
to 2.4 per cent in the 1970s (Abeykoon, 1994). However, migration, which 
was a decisive factor in determining the population growth in the first phase 
of the demographic transition, showed a negative effect on population 
growth during the second phase of the demographic transition due to 
repatriation of a large number of Indian labourers. Further, employment 
opportunities found in Middle Eastern countries from the mid 1970s 
absorbed a considerable amount of Sri Lankan labour and a sizeable 
percentage of minority Tamils left the country due to ethnic clashes after 
1982. These trends resulted in having a net migration of -3.4 per thousand 
of the population in the 1970s and -2. 7 in the 1980s (ibid, 1994). Under the 
aforementioned demographic characteristics it took Sri Lanka 60 years for 
the population to double from 2.4 million in 1871 to 5.3 million by 1931. 
Then, it took 32 years to double the population again, and reached 10.6 
million in 1963. Afterwards, it took 35 years for the level of the population 
to reach 18.3 million (it was a 73 per cent increase of the 1963 population) 
by 1998 (EPISL, 1998; CBSL, 1999). This trend proves the fact that after 
1963 the population has started increasing at a slower growth rate. 
Although Sri Lanka's population has been remarkably controlled compared 
with neighbouring South Asian and most of the other developing countries 
by the end of 1980s, Sri Lanka is still considered a highly densely 
populated country in the world. 
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Over the past 50 years, the density of population has shown a significant 
increase. For example, the population density increased from 103 persons 
per sq. km in 1946 to 292 in 1996. The projections indicate that this would 
increase to 311 by 2005. The rate of urbanization in Sri Lanka has also 
been considerably high. The share of urban population to total population 
increased from 15 per cent in 1946 to 22.4 per cent in 1971. But, 
thereafter, this ratio has dropped marginally and reached 22 per cent in 
1995, creating a sizeable informal labour force in Sri Lanka (ibid, 1998). 
According to Sanderatne (1998) these demographic developments, 
especially taken place during the second phase of the demographic 
transition (1947-1990), had a significant impact on the economy and on the 
society. The high social expenditure consequent on this rapid population 
growth was an enormous strain on public finances. Population growth also 
meant an increasing dependency ratio entailing a low capacity for 
household savings. This phenomenon then leads to 'capital shallowing' 
(Tan, 1997). The high population growth witnessed in the 1950s and the 
1960s transposed into a surge in the labour force by the beginning of the 
1970s. Yet the country's economy was not able to absorb these educated 
youth. Thus, in most of the commentators' opinions the growing 
unemployment among educated youths was the root cause that led to 
youth insurgencies breaking out in the country in 1971 and then again in 
1987/89. 
Sri Lanka's population growth started declining more clearly and effectively 
from the first half of the 1990s, indicating that Sri Lanka entered the third 
phase of the demographic transition which showed a low population growth 
and a low level of mortality rate (Kiribanda, 1997). Data gathered under the 
1981 and 2001 censuses clearly show how Sri Lanka's demographic 
variables changed during the last two decades. The effects of these 
changes on demographic variables are clearly reflected by the data 
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comparison between the 1981 and 2001 censuses. The total population, as 
estimated by Census-2001 1, was 18. 7 million persons. The annual 
average growth rate was estimated as 1.2 per cent, and this confirms the 
steadily falling trend in the population growth rate since the 1960s. The 
population growth rate in the Census-1963 was 2.7 per cent and it had 
declined to 2.3 per cent in 1971 and to 1.6 per cent in 1981 (Korale, 1988). 
In addition to declining birth rates, the lower population growth in the last 
two decades in the literature was mainly attributed to higher out-migration 
for employment as well as due to the situation arising from the protracted 
civil conflict and the loss of lives due to the continued civil war. The gender 
ratio - the number of males to 100 females, has gone down throughout the 
period. For example, this ratio stood at 113 males in 1946, and has 
steadily declined to 104 in 1981 and to 98 in 2001 (see table - 5.1) (EPISL, 
1998). 
Two major characteristics of Sri Lanka's demographic behaviour are crucial 
in forming its labour force. One is the long-run decline in fertility. The total 
fertility rate (TFR) - defined as the average number of births for women -
experienced a sharp decline from over 5 births in 1953 to 3 births in 1981, it 
has further declined to 2.8 births in 1982-1987 and to 2.0 during the period 
1995-2000 (CBSL, 2001 ). The other important feature is the trend in 
increasing population ageing which is further confirmed by Census-2001. 
For example, the proportion of those above 65 years of age, which was 3.6 
per cent until 1963, increased to 4.2 per cent in 1971 and 5.4 per cent in 
1981 (Silva and Priyadarsani, 1994 ). The corresponding figure in Census-
2001 records that the proportion of old age has further increased to around 
7 per cent. 
1. The census in 2001 was conducted after a lapse of two decades, and in the interim, it 
seems that the country has undergone a rapid structural transformation on both 
economic and social fronts. 
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Table-5.1 
Selected Indicators from the Censuses of Population 
and Housing 1981 and 2001 
Year 1981 2001 
Population (millions) 
18 Districts (a) 13.1 16.8 
7 Districts (b) 1.7 1.9 
All Districts 14.8 18.7 
Average annual growth 1.6 1.2 
rate(%) 
Gender distribution ratio 103.9 97.9 
(males to 100 females) 
Age distribution (%) 
Less than 18 years 41.6 32.9 
18 - 65 years 53.0 60.1 
Over 65 years 5.4 7.0 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 1981 and 2001 Censes 
a) Totally enumerated in both 1981 and 2001 censuses. b) Totally enumerated in 1981 Census 
and partially enumerated in 2001 census. 
On the other hand, with the declining fertility rate the proportion of 
population less than 18 years has declined significantly (see table - 5.1 ). 
According to census-1981, 41.6 per cent of the population was under 18 
years, and this ratio has fallen to 32.9 per cent in 2001. Thus, the change 
of the population structure over the past few decades is reflected by the 
changing shape of the population pyramid from a bottom heavy population 
pyramid in the 1960s and 1970s to a somewhat cylindrical shape in the 
1990s and the 2000s (see Appendix - 2). Thus, demographic experts 
conclude that Sri Lanka has an unusual fast demographic transition caused 
by a rapidly increasing life expectancy and decreasing birth rates and 
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death rates that are similar to those of developed countries (see table -
5.2). 
Table -5.2 
Population Increase and Annual Average Rates of Growth 
1991- 96 to 2031- 41(Forecasted Figures) 
Period Absolute increase Rate of Growth (per cent) 
1991-1996 1,099,328 1.25 
1996-2001 1,071,962 1.15 
2001-2006 1,009,383 1.03 
2006-2011 919,294 0.89 
2011-2016 740,609 0.69 
2016-2021 519,625 0.47 
2021-2026 304,542 0.27 
2026-2031 99,013 0.09 
2031-2036 36,154 0.03 
2036-2041 -117,241 -0.10 
Source: Silva, W. I. (1998) 
However, it is peculiar that Sri Lanka has achieved this demographic status 
by having a lower level of per capita income (CBSL, 1997: 100). This trend 
in Sri Lanka is different from the normal behaviour. In general fertility 
decline would come only with rising level of per capita income. Thirlwall 
(1994, 197) shows a clear negative relationship between fertility rate and 
per capita income in 90 countries. Further he points out that the 
relationship (curve) between fertility rate and per capita income in these 
countries has shifted towards the left with the passing of time, highlighting 
that there are important factors, particularly socio-economic factors in 
addition to per capita income, that affect the level of fertility. 
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The World Development Report (2000) too, confirms that the average 
annual population growth in Sri Lanka was well below that of most of the 
countries in the South Asian Region due to its rapid demographic 
transition, together with the improvements in other socio-economic 
conditions that have taken place for a number of years although the 
country's per capita income remains at a lower level. Because of the 
achievements in the country's socio-economic development over many 
decades Sri Lanka has been placed by the United Nations in the 'medium 
human development category'. 
Sri Lanka's score was 0. 733 in 1994 on the United Nations Human 
Development Index, which is the highest in the SAARC region (SLSED, 
2001: 63). Thus, although the problems associated with labour supply in 
many developing countries still largely emanate from the growth and the 
size of their population, Sri Lanka has particularly successfully controlled 
the growth of its population. In this setting, Sri Lanka's current labour 
supply problems emerge mostly from the size of the population while future 
population problems will largely be expected to stem from the rapid 
changes in its population structure more towards older age in a background 
of a rapidly declining population growth (see figure -5.1). 
Under the third phase of demographic transition in Sri Lanka, there are 
several aspects of the population changeover scenario to be highlighted. 
First: though the rate of increase in population is decelerating, the increase 
in absolute numbers would be significant for some time because of 
population momentum. The mothers of tomorrow are already born. Even if 
each of these has fewer children compared to their mothers, the size of the 
total population will continue to grow. For example, until 2026, the absolute 
average increase per year would be over 0.1 million (see Table-5.2). 
Second: although the population growth rate decreases, the rate of growth 
in the numbers entering the labour force would be higher than the rates of 
164 
population growth. Abeyakoon (1998) predicted that the total labour force 
would increase from 8.1 million in 1995 to 10.1 million in 201 O and to 11.1 
million in 2030 (see table -5. 3). 
Year 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
2020 
2025 
2030 
Table-5.3 
Labour Force Projection, 1995-2030 
(Thousands) 
Male Female 
5,387 2,695 
5,888 3,020 
6,343 3,244 
6,651 3,457 
6,894 3,578 
7,052 3,723 
7,172 3,790 
7,201 3,878 
Source: Abeykoon, ATPL. Demographic Projections for Sri Lanka (1998) 
Total 
8,082 
8,982 
9,587 
10,108 
10,472 
10,775 
10,962 
11,079 
Third: the age composition of the population is rapidly changing. During 
the beginning of the second half of the 20th century the country was 
grappling with the problems arising from a youthful population, a high child 
dependency ratio and a rapidly increasing labour force. In the first half of 
the 21st century population forecasts indicate that the country will face the 
problems stemming from the ageing population as depicted by table -5. 4. 
While the child dependency ratio would decline from over 50 per cent in 
1991 to around 24.6 per cent in 2031, the old age dependency ratio will 
increase from 13.5 per cent in 1991 to 36.0 per cent in 2031. 
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Table-5.4 
Dependency Ratios - 1991 to 204·i: Standard Projection 
Year Child dependency Old age Total dependency 
(less than 15) dependency (more 
than 60) 
1991 51.9 13.5 65.4 
1996 44.0 14.3 58.3 
2001 38.0 15.3 53.3 
2006 35.4 17.2 52.6 
2011 33.9 20.1 54.0 
2016 32.1 24.0 56.1 
2021 29.8 28.2 58.0 
2026 27.0 32.1 59.1 
2031 24.6 36.0 60.6 
2036 24.1 41.1 65.2 
2041 24.6 47.9 72.5 
Source: Silva, W. I. (1998) 
In this background, the total dependency ratio will decline to about 53 per 
cent in 2006 owing to a sharp decline of the child dependency ratio. Then, 
the total dependency ratio shows a rapidly increasing trend on account of 
the rapid increase in the old age dependency ratio (sees table - 5.4 and 
figure - 5.1, and table 5.5). 
The median age of Sri Lanka's population will be expected to increase from 
today's 25 years to 50 years after 2050 (CBSL, 1997; IPS, 1998). In other 
words, by the middle of the 21st century persons over 60 years of age 
would constitute about half the number between the ages of 15 and 60 
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(Silver, 1998:31). This implies that there will be an ageing population as 
well as an ageing workforce by the mid of this century. 
Figure - 5.1 
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Source: Report on Consumer Finances and Socio Economic Survey 1996/97, 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various), and DCS. 
The ageing problem in Sri Lanka is almost unique as already highlighted on 
account of experiencing unusual fast demographic transition at a relatively 
lower level of per capita income. In this setting, Sri Lanka's population is 
set to age faster than any other country. For example, the time taken for 
the share of the population aged 65 years and over to increase from 7 per 
cent to 14 per cent was more than a century in France, 60 years in USA, 45 
years in Britain and 22 years in Japan, but will be only 18 years in Sri 
Lanka. Thus, the process of ageing that faces Sri Lanka will be more 
profound, more rapid and more challenging in its wider implications than 
any other country (IPS, 1998:23). 
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Thus, the changes brought about by the rapid demographic transition have 
important implications and repercussions on the country's economy and 
society, both favourable and unfavourable (see table - 5.5). Accordingly, 
the present number of 5 million children less than 15 years would have 
gone down to 3.5 million by 2031 (Sanderatne, 1998). 
Table - 5.5 
Projected Distribution of Population of Sri Lanka 
By Broad Age Groups -1991-204·i 
(Percentages from Total Population) 
Year 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 
Age under 15 
years 
31.4 27.8 24.8 23.2 22.0 20.6 18.9 17.0 
15-59 years 
60.4 63.2 65.2 65.5 64.9 64.0 63.2 62.8 
60 & more years 
8.2 9.0 10.0 11.3 13.1 15.4 17.9 20.2 
Source: Silva, W. I. (1998). 
2031 
15.3 
62.3 
22.4 
This gives the country the opportunity at least in maintaining the current 
expenditure ratios on health and education, to improve further the pre-natal 
and post-natal health services, and the quality of the education that was 
believed to be severely eroded during the last quarter of the 20th century. 
On the other hand, contrary to the declining trend of the child population, 
the elderly population shows, first, a somewhat gradual increase in the next 
few years, and, then gaining momentum after 2011. This phenomenon 
suggests that in the first decade of the 21st century Sri Lanka's health care 
system would be required to be geared to deal with the ageing process and 
caring for illness associated with longevity and senility conditions. 
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5.2.2 Labour Force Behaviour 
For the purpose of conducting Labour Force Surveys the Department of 
Census and Statistics in Sri Lanka currently defines labour force as the 
economically active population aged 1 O years and above (SLLFS, 1998: 
43). Thus, labour force is the segment of population that represents the 
total supply of labour in the labour market. A large proportion of the labour 
force is employed in the ongoing economic activities for pay, on their own 
account, or as unpaid family workers with the rest either actively seeking or 
awaiting employment (CBSL, 1999: 110; EPISL, 1998: 34). 
The time series data generated by regular consistent surveys on 1abour 
force, employment and unemployment, are not available in Sri Lanka for 
the period prior to 1990. However, scattered information collected from 
censuses and several household surveys can be used in an attempt to 
trace the general trends of the labour force and its related variables over 
the past five decades. Due to the differences in coverage, definitions and 
assessments, and not covering the entire country by recent surveys on 
account of the unsettled situation in Northern and Eastern provinces of the 
country, this information may not be strictly comparable. Nevertheless, to 
understand the broad magnitudes of the labour force, employment and 
unemployment in Sri Lanka, such data appears to be generally adequate 
(EPISL, 1998:34; Korale, 1998). 
The magnitude of the labour force or the labour supply is determined by the 
population size, participation rate of males and females and population 
composition. In Sri Lanka, the labour force fluctuated alternatively with 
broad phases of population growth, and, therefore, the rate of labour force 
growth during the past five decades has been neither uniform nor uni-
directional (Kiribanda, 1997: 234). For example, when the population grew 
annually at 2.8 per cent per annum between 1946 and 1963, the labour 
force grew at the average level of 1.6 per cent annually. 
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Then, onwards, as the population commenced growing slowly the labour 
force started growing more rapidly (see table - 5.6 and figure - 5.2). 
Table-5.6 
Growth Rates of Population and Labour Force, Sri Lank~, 1946 200~ 
Period 
I 
Average annual Average annual labour Difference in labour 
population growth force growth rate(%) force and population I 
rate(%) growth rates(%) 
1946-1963 2.8 1.6 -1.2 
1963-1971 2.3 3.0 0.7 
1971-1981 1.7 2.1 0.2 
1981-1991 1.5 3.2 1.7 
1991-1996 1.3 3.0 1.7 
1996-2001 1.2 2.5 1.3 
2001-2006 1.1 1.7 0.6 
Source: Census Reports, 1946, 1963, 1981, SLFSs and Silva and Priyadaraani (1994) 
Between 1963 and 1971 the labour force growth rate was as high as 3.0 
per cent. It was, in fact, due to the entry into the labour force of higher birth 
cohorts, who were born during the rapid population growth phase after 
1946/47. In the intercensal period of 1971-1981 the rate of growth of the 
labour force dropped remarkably to 2.1 per cent. This slow down in the 
increase of the labour force in this period was largely attributed to the 
negative impact of both the repatriation of Indian workers in the plantation 
sector and the increasing labour migration to the Gulf States for 
employment. In this period the crude activity rate; the number of persons in 
the labour force as a proportion of the total population also declined from 
50.7 to 49.4 per cent for men and from 19.01 to 17.6 per cent for women. 
Subsequently, in the 1981-1991 period labour force growth increased to 
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the highest level of 3.2 per cent. Then, the labour force growth shows a 
continuous declining trend from 1991 onwards (see Table - 5.6 and figure 
-5.2). 
Figure-5.2 
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Source: Census Reports (various), SLLFSs and Silva and Priyadarsani (1994) 
The labour force participation rates of both males and females also largely 
contributed to increase the labour supply of the country throughout the last 
5 decades. The male labour force participation rate increased from 49.8 
per cent in 1963 to 66. 7 per cent in 2000, while that of females increased 
significantly from 14.2 per cent in 1963 to 25 per cent in 1986, and then it 
increased to 34.8 per cent in 1991 and dropped to 31.4 in 1996, and again 
increased to 33.9 per cent in 2000 (see Table - 5.7). 
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Table - 5.7 
Labour Force and Participation Rates from 1963 to 2000 
I 
Year Total labour Male Female Total 
force (000 participation participation participation 
persons) rate (a) rate (a) rate (a) 
1963 3,464 49.8 14.2 32.7 
1971 4,488 50.7 19.1 35.4 
1981 5,015 49.8 17.1 33.8 
1985/86 5,961 52.5 24.7 38.9 
1990 6,001 67.7 36.2 51.9 
1991 (b) 5,877 64.4 34.8 49.8 
1992 (b) 5,808 65.2 31.0 48.2 
1993 (b) 6,032 65.3 33.1 49.1 
1994 (b) 6,079 65.4 32.0 48.7 
1995 (b) 6,106 64.4 31.7 47.9 
1996 (b) 6,242 65.9 31.6 48.7 
1997 (b) 6,229 65.4 31.7 48.4 
1998 (b) 6,661 67.3 36.4 51.7 
1999 (b) 6,673 67.7 34.1 50.7 
2000 (b) 6,414 67.2 33.9 50.3 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics 
( a) Labour force as a percentage of household population aged 10 years and above 
(b) Data for these years exclude Northern and Eastern provinces. 
The decline in the female participation rate during 1991-96 was partly on 
account of the increase in migration of working age females for 
employment abroad. In the age group of 15-19 years the labour force 
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participation rate of males declined from 59.19 percent in 1946 to 31.7 per 
cent in 1996 while the female participation rate declined from 24.3 per cent 
to 20.9 per cent during the same period. This was due to the increased 
school enrolment and the expansion of general education facilities. 
However, there was a dramatic increase in the participation rate of females 
in the age group of 25-34 years, from 27.6 per cent in 1946 to 44.8 per cent 
in 1996. In the case of males the labour force participation rate of the 
same age group was unchanged during the same period (EPISL, 1998). 
When the more recent trends are analysed the labour force participation 
rate has varied within a range of 48 per cent and 52 per cent during 1990-
2000 (see figure - 5.3). 
Figure-5.3 
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The participation rate declined from 1990 to 1997, but rose once again to 
52 per cent in 1998. This was because the surveys from 1998 onwards 
included non-paid female family workers, such as housewives engaging in 
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supporting family income generating activities, who were counted as "not in 
the labour force" in previous years. As a result, the recent estimates were 
not strictly comparable with previous estimates. Since most of the unpaid 
family workers are employed in the agricultural sector, the decline in the 
labour force participation rate after 1998 varied due to seasonal factors 
such as insufficient rainfall and other climatic problems, and also increasing 
ethnic violence during these years in main agricultural areas of the country 
- Northern and Eastern regions. As pointed out earlier, the changing trend 
in the population structure too indicates a great impact on labour force. 
The changing age structure, especially the increase in older age in relation 
to the young age as clearly shown by comparative data reported by 1981 
and 2001 censuses, indicates that a bottom heavy population pyramid has 
now changed to a somewhat cylindrical shape (see Appendix - 2). In this 
milieu, it is estimated that the economically active population as a 
percentage of total population would drop from the current level of 65 per 
cent to 58 percent in 2041 (see table - 5.5). On the other hand, it is 
projected that the number of new entrants to the labour market in this 
century will decline. The working age population (15-60) is currently 
growing at about 2 per cent per annum. This will decline to 1 per cent by 
2010, and after 2030 the potential labour force will shrink (see table - 5.8) 
(IPS, 1998: 24). 
Thus, many economic observers now expect at least that in a scenario of a 
declining labour force, if the current rate of economic growth is maintained, 
full employment may become a reality in the next decade. Also, they 
believe that policy-makers in the second decade of this century may seek 
to encourage large scale immigration into the island as in fact occurred 
during the 19th century when labour was needed for the plantation sector 
(IPS, 1998; Kiribanda, 1997). However, Rama (1999) suspects that the 
phenomenon of changes in the age structure of the population alone can 
significantly alter the aggregate unemployment rate. 
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Rama estimates in his study that if labour force participation rates and 
unemployment rates for all age and gender groups remained unchanged at 
their 1995 levels, the unemployment rate would only decline by 2 
percentage points in the next 20 years. 
Table-5.8 
Forecasted Average Annual Rates of Growth of 
Labour Force, 1995-2030 
Period Total Male 
1995-2000 1.95 1.78 
2000-2005 1.47 1.49 
2005-2010 1.06 0.95 
2010-2015 0.71 0.72 
2015-2020 0.57 0.45 
2020-2025 0.34 0.34 
2025-2030 0.21 0.08 
Source: Abeykoon ATPL, Demographic Projections for Sri Lanka (1998) 
Female 
2.27 
1.43 
1.27 
0.69 
0.79 
0.36 
0.46 
Moreover, against the prediction of declining labour supply, this study 
suggests that the falling of the labour supply will be held back by an 
increase of labour force participation in the coming decades since Sri 
Lanka's current labour force participation remains at a much lower level (50 
per cent) compared to the level seen in developed countries (60 - 83 per 
cent) (WE R-ILO, 1996/97; DCS, 2003). 
Consequently, the present study does not have much reliance on the 
reduction of labour supply to relieve the unemployment problem in Sri 
Lanka against the predictions made by some other economists. 
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5.3 Labour Demand 
5.3.1 Structure of Employment 
The demand for labour is a "derived demand", and in view of that, labour is 
demanded as an input to produce a product or an output (Bosworth et al. 
1997: 83). In such a process of production inputs are converted into output 
using various types of technologies which, as discussed in the literature 
review chapter, also highly influence the level of labour absorbed or 
demanded by industry. However, the emphasis in this chapter is on the 
analysis of labour demand from a perspective of the whole economy. The 
analysis of the structure of employment or industrial distribution of 
employment in an economy reveals how different major sectors in that 
economy have demanded labour. With the increase in the level of 
development the employment structure expands more from the agricultural 
sector to the industry sector and then to the service sector. Accordingly, 
while industrial and service sectors in most of the developed economies 
have absorbed a higher percentage of labour, the agricultural sector is still 
the dominant employer in most of the developing countries. However, in 
developing countries also the relative share of labour employed in the 
agricultural sector is rapidly on the decrease with the acceleration of their 
economic development (see table - 5.9). 
In this setting, it is possible to see how Sri Lanka's employment structure 
has been changing over the past few decades. The share of employment 
in agriculture has declined gradually from 53.0 per cent of the total 
employment in 1963 to 36 per cent in 2000. Although the agricultural 
sector continued as the dominant sector in the 1960s in terms of providing 
employment, its relative importance is now decreasing. The slow growth of 
agricultural employment in Sri Lanka by and large explains the problem of 
unemployment (Korale, 1988). 
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A considerable proportion of public outlay during the last 5 decades was 
directed to this sector, for the development of infrastructure, including 
irrigation and agricultural settlements, as well as for producer subsidies. 
Yet employment in the agricultural sector increased only by 0.8 per cent 
during 1953-96 (EPISL, 1998). 
Table-5.9 
Long-Term Changes in the Structure of Employment in Industrial and 
Developing Countries (Percentages of Total Employment) 
Countries Agriculture Industry Service 
Industrial countries {a) 
Year 
1870 48.8 27.5 23.7 
1950 24.7 36.6 38.7 
1979 7.5 34.5 58.0 
1991 (c) 7.0 26.0 67.0 
Developing countries (b) 
Year 
1900 78 10 12 
1930 77 10 13 
1950 73 10 17 
1960 72 11 17 
1970 71 12 17 
1980 65 15 20 
1985 60 19 21 
Source: (a) Maddition (1982); (b) Bairoch (1975) and Farooq and Ofosu (1992), and (c) Wortd 
Employment Report- !LO (1995). 
The slow growth of agricultural employment suggests that the return to 
these investments is not sufficient. The expansion in employment 
177 
expected through crop diversification and increase in productivity was not 
forthcoming. The failure to sustain employment on the plantation sector 
was another factor that aggravated employment creation of the agricultural 
sector. Over the same period the population employed in plantation 
agriculture fell from 900,000 to 650,000 due to repatriation of a large 
number of Indian origin Tamil workers (ibid, 1988). Yet it is still reported 
that there is a considerable labour surplus, particularly in the plantation 
sector. 
Employment in the manufacturing sector, in contrast to the agricultural 
sector, grew more speedily, by 2.6 per cent annually during 1946-96. The 
relative share of labour employment too in the manufacturing sector 
increased from 7.3 per cent in 1963 to 16.5 per cent in 2000 (EPISL, 1998). 
In the initial period (1957-77), the establishment of basic industries in the 
public sector and import substitution industries in the private sector brought 
about an expansion of employment. The recent increases in employment 
(after 1977 economic reforms) have mainly been brought about by the 
establishment of enterprises with foreign collaboration under export 
diversification programmes. 
Employment in construction activities increased from 4.1 per cent of the 
total employed in 1963 to 7.3 per cent in 2000. In 1981, the employment 
percentage in the construction sector reached 8.8 as a result of large-scale 
public sector projects and other expanded construction activities. 
Thereafter, the employment generation by the construction sector has 
remained static or declining. Employment in the service sector increased 
from 35.6 per cent in 1963 to 40.2 per cent in 2000 (SBSL, 2003). Thus, in 
line with most of the other countries, in Sri Lanka also the agriculture 
sector's position as the largest employer has significantly eroded over the 
past few decades and its place has been taken over by the manufacturing 
and service sectors. 
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5.3.2 Status of Employment 
Breaking down employment data by status in employment is useful for 
understanding both the dynamics of the labour market and the 
development level of economies (ILO, 1999). Status in employment 
provides a statistical basis for describing workers' behaviour and conditions 
of work, and for defining individuals' social class or socio-economic group. 
If the majority of workers in a country are in the wage and salaried 
category, it indicates that the country is economically and socially more 
advanced. If the population of the self-employed and unpaid family 
workers is sizeable, it could be an indication of low job growth (low labour 
demand) in the formal economy and many have to depend on the informal 
sector for their living indicating a poor development with widespread 
poverty. This indication can be strongly linked to the employment by sector 
indicators discussed under the structure of employment in the foregoing 
section. Over the years and with growth as analysed earlier, one would 
expect to see a shift in employment from the agricultural to the industrial 
and service sectors which, in tum, could lead to more wage and salaried 
workers in many countries. A corresponding shrinking share of agriculture 
would lower the share of unpaid family workers who are very widespread in 
the rural sector in developing countries (ibid, 1998). 
According to the ILO (1999) Report, developing countries are divided into 
three groups with regard to status in employment. In one extreme of this 
grouping, there are fast-developing economies where, over time, there has 
been a fall in the share of self-employed and unpaid family workers, and a 
rise in the share of wage and salaried workers with corresponding 
economic growth and rise in living standards. The examples for such 
countries are the Republic of Korea, Jamaica, and Panama. In the 
countries of the other extreme, what can be seen is a slow growth and lack 
of job creation in the formal sector resulting in declining numbers of wage 
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and salaried workers and a rise in self-employment and the number of 
unpaid family workers. Then, the countries which are in the middle 
category in status of employment are the economies which have 
experienced a rise in the share of wage and salaried employees, as well as 
a rise in the self-employed, i. e., Thailand, Mexico, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, 
Costa Rica, and Sri Lanka. 
Nevertheless, relative rates of growth of wage employment and self-
employment differ among these countries in this category also. For 
example, in Thailand the rate of growth in wage employment has been 
higher than that of self-employment. In Mexico both ratios have gone 
upward almost by the same rate. In Costa Rica the rate of wage 
employment has been lower than that of self-employment. As indicated by 
the data in Table - 5.10, Sri Lanka's situation is not very different from that 
of Costa Rica (see table - 5.10). 
For example, in Sri Lanka, the percentage of total salaried employees 
dropped from 62.4 in 1991 to 57.0 in 2000 while the percentage of total 
non-salaried persons increased from 37.6 in 1991 to 43.0 in 2000. Further, 
data comparison in Table - 5.10 shows that job creation in the formal 
private sector is not large enough to capture job losses in the public sector 
due to the privatisation and closure of some of the SOEs under economic 
reforms intensified after 1990. In this background, the share of public 
sector employment declined from 26 per cent of the total employed labour 
in 1991 to 13.5 per cent in 2000 while the size of the private sector 
employees has only increased from 40.0 per cent to 43.7 per cent in 2000. 
As a whole, compared to the salaried employment, non-salaried 
employment in Sri Lanka has grown faster indicating that more and more 
people are engaged in low income, low productivity activities. As 
Betcherman (2002) highlights, this condition can be considered as a 
worsening of the labour market situation in Sri Lanka. 
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Year 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Public 
sector 
Table- 5.10 
Status of Employment in Sri Lanka 199·i-200u 
(Percentages of Total Employed) 
Private Employers Self- Unpaid Total 
sector employed family salaried 
employees employees workers employees 
22.9 39.5 2.2 25.4 10.0 62.4 
20.0 40.0 1.6 27.1 11.2 60.0 
17.4 42.8 2.0 27.4 10.4 60.2 
16.4 44.3 2.3 27.2 9.8 60.7 
15.6 44.3 2.5 28.3 9.4 59.9 
15.0 45.8 2.3 26.8 10.0 60.8 
15.2 44.0 2.4 29.1 9.3 59.2 
14.5 41.2 1.9 28.9 13.6 55.7 
-.- --- ·-
14.4 43.1 2.0 28.3 12.2 57.5 
13.5 43.7 2.4 28.4 12.2 57.0 
Source: Compiled from Quarterly labour force Surveys, Department of Census and Statistics 
Total 
non-
salaried 
persons 
37.6 
40.0 
39.8 
39.3 
40.2 
39.2 
40.2 
44.3 
42.5 
43.0 
This shows that the private sector under reforms, despite making it as the 
engine for growth, has not shown a substantial progress in demanding 
labour as expected. The manufacturing industrial sector especially shows 
a stagnant situation in absorbing labour after 1995. The share of labour 
absorption by this sector varies around 16.5 after 1995 (CBSL, various). 
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5.4 Labour Market Equiliu• ;um 
5.4.1 Total Imbalance between Labour Supply and Labour Demand 
Demand for labour, as a derived demand, depends on output growth or 
economic activities of a country. If the economic activities in an economy 
were not expanded enough to demand the entire labour force or the labour 
supply, the result would be the emergence of some proportion of 
unemployment. For example, out of Sri Lanka's 19 million mid year 
population in 2002, about 14.25 million were in the working age. Around 
7.3 million of such population were in the labour force of which 6.58 million 
(90.2 per cent of the labour force) were gainfully employed (demanded) 
while 0.72 million (9.8 per cent of the labour force) being involuntarily 
unemployed (DCS, 2003). Thus, the unemployed consist of an excess 
supply of labour over the total demand for labour (employment) at the 
current wage rate. From this point of view, the unemployment problem can 
be viewed from the overall imbalance between the labour supply and the 
labour demand of the country. This section, therefore, discusses the 
employment issue from the perspective of the entire labour supply and 
labour demand. 
A distinctive characteristic seen in the Sri Lankan economy during the 
previous four and a half decades until 1997 was the experience of two-digit 
open unemployment rates. The unemployment rate was highest in the first 
half of the 1970s, at the heyday of inward-orientation and state-led 
development policies. Then with the implementation of economic reforms 
from 1977 onwards, especially after 1990 the unemployment rate shows a 
continuously declining trend (see figure - 5.4). However, by 2002 nearly 
one in ten of labour force participants was still out of a job. Moreover, 
about four in five unemployed people had been seeking a job for a period 
ranging from one to two years (CFSES, 1996/97). 
182 
Further, Sri Lanka's current unemployment rate is substantially higher than 
those of most of the countries in East, South-East and South Asia (WER, 
2001 ). These figures are a source of concern not only for economic 
reasons, but also because of their political implications. In most observers' 
views, frustration over jobs was at the root of two violent uprisings by 
educated youth in 1971 and 1987-89. Some fear similar events in the 
future if nothing is done to bring unemployment rates down. Overall these 
trends suggest that the Sri Lankan labour market does not work well 
(Rama, 1999: 1). 
The major contribution to the phenomenon of high unemployment in the 
1960s and 1970s mainly came from the supply side of labour, particularly 
from the rapid expansion of the labour force and fast increase of the labour 
force participation (Rodrigo, 1994 ). 
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As highlighted in the earlier section, in the 1960s and the 1970s, the labour 
force increased at around 3 per cent per annum. On the other hand, the 
female labour force participation rate especially increased from 18.9 per 
cent in 1953 to 33.5 per cent by 2002. The male labour force participation 
rate too increased from 53 per cent in 1953 to 67.6 per cent by 2002 (EPIS, 
1998; CBSL, 2002). Thus, labour force expansion due to post war 
population momentum and increasing trends in labour force participation 
rates during this period caused labour supply to be increased, first (1946-
91), at an increasing rate and, then (1991 onwards), at a decreasing rate. 
On the other hand, it appears that employment demand during this period 
varied mainly according to the economic growth acquired during the last 
five decades under different economic regimes. This behaviour is in line 
with the analysis made under the literature review (in chapter - 2) which, 
depending on both theoretical and empirical evidence, highlighted that 
there has been a positive relationship between output growth and 
employment growth in developed as well as developing countries for a long 
period. Consequently, Sri Lanka's employment problem too can be viewed 
by looking at the relationship between output and employment growth rates 
prevailing over the past few decades. As Kelly (1993) highlights, looking at 
the employment issue in terms of the output-employment relation is 
consistent with some economists' analyses. The economy's employment 
performance over the decades has been uneven, and such an asymmetry 
can be sought to be explained with reference to the economy's uneven 
growth performance as explained in the following section (see table - 5.11 
and figure - 5.5). 
At the time Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 unemployment was not 
a major issue because the number of unemployed was relatively small at 
that time (Kiribanda, 1997: 249). However, the paucity of academically and 
professionally qualified personnel and skilled and semi-skilled workers was 
perceived as a factor limiting economic and employment growth 
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immediately after independence. Nevertheless, the demand for labour for 
these categories could be satisfied within a period of less than a decade 
depending on the already established system of educational infrastructure 
facilities in the country since the pre independent period. 
Then, from 1953 onwards, unemployment emerged as a major problem. 
For example, compared to the annual employment growth rate of 2.0 per 
cent which was accompanied by the annual output growth (GDP) rate of 
5.40 per cent in the period 1951-52, the average annual employment 
growth rate fell to 0.6 per cent for the period starting from 1953 (see table 
5.11 ). 
Table- 5.11 
Growth of Employment, Output (GDP), and Labour Force 
(Percentages) 
Year Employment Output (GDP) Labour force Employment 
growth growth growth output 
elasticity 
1951-1952 2.00 5.40 2.0 0.37 
1953-1963 0.60 3.03 1.5 0.20 
1964-1970 1.70 4.99 3.3 0.34 
1971-1981* 1.20 * 4.22* 2.5 0.28 
1981-1990 2.30# 4.40 2.0 0.52 
1990-2000 2.50 5.29 1.0 0.47 
Source: Compiled based on the relevant data available in Karunatilake, 1987; Korale, 1988; 
Rodrigo, 1994; EPISL, 1998; CBSL, 2002 
* The data in this period is related to two different regimes; the controlled era before 1977and 
the afterwards liberalized economic policy era. Accordingly, the output growth was 
reported as 2.90 per cent in the literature while employment growth was estimated by the 
researcher as 0.5 per cent per annum under the controlled era in 1970-77. In the period 
1977-81, output growth increased to 6.53 per cent while the employment growth rate 
increased to 2.70 per cent per annum under the liberalised economic era (Rodrigo, 1994). 
# The output growth was 5.05 per cent per annum for the period 1982-85 while it fell to 2.70 
per cent per annum in the period 1986-89 (EPISL, 1998). 
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This was mainly on account of a falling annual economic growth rate to 
3.03 per cent in this period (1953-63). With this lower level of employment 
growth rate (0.6) only 40 per cent of the labour force growth (1.5) in each 
year in the period 1953-63 could be employed, resulting in adding 
increasing numbers to backlog of unemployed each year (see table - 5.11 
and Figure - 5.5 ). 
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Thus, the problem of unemployment from 1953 onwards became one of the 
key questions of relevance to planning in Ceylon (Ten Year Plan, 1959: 
21). Accordingly, the first comprehensive economic plan - The Ten Year 
Plan ( 1959-1968) - placed a great emphasis on employment generation, 
and as a result of the greater weight given to employment creation in this 
plan, it was considered as an employment plan exclusively (ILO, 1971: 4). 
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The plan expected to generate 1,300,000 new jobs during the planning 
period 1957-68 with the target of achieving an annual average employment 
growth of 3.2 per cent, mainly through large-scale industries, expansion of 
small-scale industries and agricultural development. 
Yet, due to severe resource constraints the plan had to be abandoned, just 
a few years after its introduction, in 1963. However, the annual output 
growth rate increased from 3.03 per cent in the period 1953-63 to 4.99 per 
cent per annum in the period 1964-1970 with accompanying higher annual 
employment growth (1. 7 per cent per annum) compared to the earlier 
period (0.6 per cent per annum in 1953-63 period) (see table - 5.11 and 
figure 5.5). 
The partially liberalised economic policies followed in latter years in the 
1960s have been identified in the literature as the main contributing factor 
to acquiring such a higher output during this period. The unemployment 
problem became further acute after 1970, and the significance attached to 
this problem by policy makers was again reflected clearly through the 
weight given to employment generation in the subsequent Five Year Plan 
( 1972-76). For the period 1972-1976 the plan anticipated the creation of 
810,000 jobs of which 300,000 were to be in agriculture, 165,000 in 
industry, 60,000 in construction, and 285,000 in the service sector (Five 
Year Plan, 1972: 31). Nevertheless, as in the case of the previous plan, 
domestic and external factors contributed to the failure to achieve the 
employment creation objective of this plan also. The employment situation 
during this planning period in fact worsened, resulting in an increase of the 
level of unemployment to 24 per cent in 1973 (Korale, 1988). As a whole, 
in Korale's view both the Ten-year and the Five-year plans could not 
generate more than a half of their targeted levels of employment. Thus, the 
unemployment problem continued to worsen by dropping the annual output 
growth rate from 4. 99 per cent in the previous regime ( 1964-70) to 2. 90 per 
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cent in the period 1970-77, and as a result, the employment growth fell to a 
very low level of 0.5 per cent per annum in the period 1971-77 (see the 
notes under table - 5. 11 ). According to the Land and Labour Utilization 
Survey (1975) the number of unemployed reached a level of 985,000, 
which was equivalent to 19. 7 per cent of the labour force when the country 
was approaching the end of the pursuing of stringent inward-looking 
policies for nearly two decades from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. 
Then, against the depressing output performance witnessed in the period 
1970-77, the period 1977-81 could acquire a remarkable output growth, 
averaging to 6.53 per cent per annum accompanying a higher percentage 
of employment (2. 7) growth per annum. This employment growth rate 
exceeded even the labour force growth (2.2) during this period, resulting in 
trimming down the backlog of unemployed for the first time (Rodrigo, 1994). 
This notable achievement was brought about, in many commentators view, 
by the radical policy departure from the inward-oriented, highly regulated 
economy approach followed in the preceding two decades towards a 
market-led, export-led and private sector-led growth approach from 1977 
onwards. Thus, with the liberalisation of the economy after 1977 the 
unemployment rate decelerated sharply. Accordingly, the unemployment 
rate declined to 11.7 by 1981/82 from the rate of 19.7 in 1975 (CBSL, 
1983). In addition to following the open economic policies, a major boost to 
employment generation in the late 1970s and the early 1980s came from 
the government's large-scale public investment programs such as the 
mega Machiavelli project, Export Processing Zones, Urban Development 
Infrastructure, and Housing projects implemented between 1977 and 1982 
(Kelegama and Trichelevam, 1995: Rodrigo, 1994). According to Stern 
(1984), these construction projects accounted for nearly half of the total 
employment increase over the period 1978-82. 
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Moreover, the increased employment opportunities in foreign countries 
provided a large outlet to relieve pressure in the domestic labour market, 
particularly during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, with the increasing 
demand for unskilled labour from Middle Eastern countries. For example, 
350,000 to 400,000 people found employment in Middle Eastern countries 
between 1977 and 1984 (CBSL, 1985). Further, under the 'Sirimaovo-
Shasthri' Agreement (1964), nearly 337,000 estate sector workers, persons 
of Indian origin, were repatriated during the period 1977-82, lessening the 
unemployment problem, particularly in the estate sector (Kelegama, 
Trichelevam, 1995). On the other hand, a considerable expansion of the 
domestic employment came from the expansion of services such as import 
trade, financial services, transport, tourism, etc., due to the liberalisation of 
the trade and payments system. Thus, as a whole, according to Korale 
(1988), 175,000 to 200,000 employment opportunities were generated 
annually during the period 1978/82 mainly due to migration, construction, 
and service expansions which took place during this time. 
However, the overall employment creation reversed after 1982 with the 
slow down of the annual average output growth from 6.53 in the previous 
period (1978-81) to 5.05 in the period 1982-85, and the average 
employment generation fell to about 54,000 per annum during the period 
1982-85 from the level of annual employment creation between 175,000 
and 200,000 during the period 1978-82 (Dunham and Kelegama, 1994; 
Korale, 1988) (see note under table - 5.11 ). As a result, the 
unemployment rate increased from 11. 7 per cent in 1981 /82 to 14. 1 per 
cent in 1985 (CBSL, 1986). In the literature the slowing down of 
employment after 1982 is mainly attributed to the completion of all the 
major public sector projects, declining migration to Middle Eastern 
countries for employment owing to slacking labour demand in these 
countries, certain subdivisions of the service sector reaching saturation 
point by the mid 1980s, and disturbance of the tourist industry by the ethnic 
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violence that erupted in the country from 1982 onwards (Kelegama and 
Thrichelvam, 1995; Rodrigo, 1994; CBSL, 1983). Then, GDP growth in the 
second half of the decade further decreased to 2.70 per cent per annum 
(see note under table - 5.11 ). This slow down in GDP reflected the 
combined effect of global circumstances (recession, protectionism, the 
second oil price hike etc.), as well as internal adversities of bad weather 
and the continued ethnic conflict and civil war situation between 1985 and 
1989 (Rodrigo, 1994). Thus, lower output growth brought about by the 
aforementioned reasons in the latter part of the decade caused the 
employment generation to be reduced drastically. This was reflected by 
the increasing rate of unemployment from 14. 1 per cent in 1985 to 15. 9 per 
cent in 1990 (QLFS, 1990). 
The high unemployment trend, however, began to reverse from 1990 
onwards with the reawakening of the private sector under the second 
phase of liberalisation launched from 1989 onwards (Kelegama and 
Thrichelvam, 1995). As a result, the annual average output growth from 
the 2.70 level in the latter part of the previous decade increased to 5.29 per 
cent per annum in the period 1990-2000 (see table - 5.11 ). The recovery 
in this time was mainly brought about by a rise in the private sector output, 
particularly in industries set up in Free Trade Zones. The export oriented 
industrial (EOI) strategy as the main vehicle of growth under the 1977 
economic reforms could not play a major role in employment creation in the 
immediate aftermath of the reform period. As explained earlier, the public 
sector construction projects and other outlets generated more employment 
than industries did in this period. However, contrary to the earlier 
behaviour, the manufacturing sector emerged as the more dynamic sector 
of the economy from the latter part of the 1980s decade (see table - 5.12). 
Thus, the export oriented industries especially appeared as the main 
driving force in generating employment after 1990 onwards. 
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For example, the EOI firms increased employment from 10,538 in 1980 to 
the tune of 100,000 by 1992 and then to 416,756 in 2002 (CBSL, 1981 and 
2002). 
Table - 5.12 
Real Growth of Production Sectors and GDP Growth (Percentages) 
Sector 1978- 1983- 1988- 1993- 1995- 1999 2000 
82 87 92 94 98 
Agriculture, Forestry & 
Fishing 4.0 2.0 1.9 4.1 1.1 4.5 1.8 
Mining and Quarrying 7.7 7.0 1.5 9.0 2.6 4.1 4.8 
Manufacturing 4.6 6.7 6.8 9.8 8.7 4.4 9.2 
Service 7.6 4.4 4.1 5.8 5.2 4.8 5.2 
GDP 6.2 4.1 4.0 6.3 5.1 4.5 6.0 
Source: Compiled from CBSL Annual Reports (various). 
Another major contributory factor to generate employment from the 
beginning of the 1990s has been foreign employment generation which 
remained at a higher rate, generating more than 150,000 new jobs per 
annum until 1998. Especially from 1999 onwards foreign employment 
indicated a considerably rapid increase, and the amount of new foreign 
employment increased to 203,665 in 2002 (CBSL, 2003). 
During the second phase (from 1989) and the third phase (from 1994) of 
liberalisation even the self-employment under different schemes continued 
to increase (Kelegama and Tiruchelvam, 1995; CBS, 2001 ). As a result, in 
this period self-employment and unpaid family workers increased from 35.4 
per cent in 1990 to 41.6 percent in 2000 (see Table - 5.10). 
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Thus, the aforementioned developments which took place after 1990 
contributed much to increase the employment and thereby reduce the rate 
of unemployment from 15.9 per cent in 1990 to 7.6 percent in 2000 (CBSL, 
various). However, in the year 2001, output (GDP) growth fell to -1.50 and 
it badly affected employment generation as reflected by increasing the level 
of unemployment to 9.2 per cent of the labour force in 2002. 
The above analysis shows that the employment avenues in foreign 
countries and out-migration for other reasons have also contributed much 
to reduce unemployment in the economy after 1977. However, the 
evidence in the last five decades suggests that the most important force 
determining the employment level in the country is the output growth in the 
economy. This historical phenomenon indicates clearly that in the eras 
where output growth increased employment growth too has increased while 
in the eras of economic down turn the employment growth too has 
dampened, suggesting that the most crucial factor in determining the 
employment in Sri Lanka is the total demand for labour derived from output 
growth of the economy. However, before arriving at such a conclusion, it is 
necessary to examine whether there are some other reasons which 
impinge on the labour absorption of the economy. So the subsequent 
section is devoted for this purpose. 
5.4.2 Mismatch Hypothesis 
Apart from the imbalance between the total supply and demand of labour 
discussed in the previous sections, over the years, several hypotheses 
have been put forward for explaining high rate of unemployment in Sri 
Lanka. Out of these explanations the 'skills mismatch' hypothesis, first 
articulated by the ILO Mission to Sri Lanka in 1971 is most influential 
(Rama, 1994). The mismatch hypothesis indicates that the types of work 
which people are willing and able to do, do not match the pattern of 
opportunities that are available, indicating that the unemployment that 
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prevails or a considerable part of it is the product of structural mismatch 
(ILO, 1971: 21). Emphasising the structural mismatch as an important 
cause for having a high level of unemployment, the ILO mission concluded 
that this mismatch had become chronic, and it was attributed primarily to 
the educational structure of the labour force and the 'formidable rate of 
educational expansion', drawing attention to the quality and content of the 
education as well. Although Sri Lankan workers are highly educated 
compared to similar workers in the region, there is a widespread concern 
that the education system, with its emphasis on white collar professions 
and public sector careers, does not fit the needs of the private sector. Put 
differently, the Sri Lankan labour force may be highly educated, but not 
particularly skilled (Rama, 1994: 11 ). 
Thus, those who stress the orthodox view of the structural imbalance or 
mismatch hypothesis believe implicitly that, although the economy has 
employment opportunities, jobs expected by a large amount of job seekers 
are not adequately found or they do not fit the prevailing jobs. However, a 
number of researchers (Gunatilaka, 1999; Dickens and Lang, 1996; 
Rodrigo, 1994; Kelly, 1993; Bowen, 1990; Gunatilleke, 1989) tested the 
mismatch hypothesis to identify its significance as a major reason to 
surface a high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka, and arrived at 
somewhat different conclusions. 
Theoretically, the concept of mismatch can be viewed from different angles 
and also there are a number of mismatches in the labour market 
(Gunatilleke, 1989: 2). Accordingly, mismatches may originate not only 
from the supply end through the failure to produce a workforce with the 
required skills, aptitude, and job orientation, but also can occur at the 
demand end where investments and choices of technology are made in 
disregard to the factor endowment of the economy. Consequently, this 
study attempts to identify and assess the mismatch by taking into account 
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the factors that originate from both supply and demand ends. In this 
section mismatch is reviewed mainly from the supply side whereas at the 
beginning of the next section, attention will be paid to the labour market 
distortions, considering such distortions taken together as a root cause for 
the emergence of a major mismatch from the demand side, leading to 
choosing inappropriate technologies in production as highlighted in the 
Literature Review (Chapter - 2) and thereby reducing the employment 
creation. 
Reliable information with regard to both of these aspects - mismatches of 
labour supply and demand, is sparse. Various surveys carried out so far 
on this subject do not bring data together, especially on the demand for 
manpower and the expectations of job seekers, in a manner that throw 
some light on any mismatch that has contributed to the high level of 
unemployment (ibid, 1989). The most conspicuous fact related to revealing 
the current manpower needs of employers is that although employers are 
very often critical of the educational system and its output the employers' 
organizations such as employers' federations etc have not, so far, clearly 
revealed the sort of labour output they expect from the educational 
institutes. In the absence of such data a number of other indirect methods 
are used to identify the nature of the issue of structural mismatch in the 
following section. 
Comparing the education attainment of the workforce with the occupational 
structure can be considered as a more appropriate starting point to 
commence the identification of existence of any mismatch in the Sri Lankan 
labour market. The system of mass free education up to university level 
that prevailed from the inception of the education system of the country has 
raised the education levels of both the total population as well as the 
workforce during the past five decades (see table - 5.13). 
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Table - 5.13 
Educational Attainment of the Population (Percentages) 
Indicator 1953 
1963 1973 1978- 1981- 1986- 1996-
1979 1982 1987 1997 
Literacy rate - 83.2 80.8 86.2 85.4 88.6 92.1 
No schooling 41.6 36.6 32.2 24.4 25.0 11.8 8.3 
Primary 46.8 39.3 37.9 38.9 37.9 41.1 35.7 
Secondary 9.8 19.6 23.9 26.4 25.8 32.1 41.1 
Tertiary 1.8 4.5 6.0 10.3 11.3 15.0 14.9 
Source: CBSL Annual reports (various) and Consumer Finances and Socio Economic 
Surveys of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1981/82, 1986/87 and 1996/97. 
Over the years, as data in table - 5.13 reveal, there has been a 
progressive rise in the proportions of the educated in the secondary and 
tertiary levels, and a corresponding decline in the proportions of those 
educated only up to the primary level and those who have not been to 
school. With these developments in the educational attainments of the 
workforce we can see how the country's occupational structure has 
changed over the years. 
The proportion of agricultural workers in the workforce, which was 53.0 per 
cent of the employed in 1953, has declined to 36 percent in 2000. The 
percentage of persons employed in manufacturing has increased from 7.3 
per cent in 1963 to 17.3 per cent by 1996/97 and then dropped marginally 
to 16. 7 in 2000. Also the labour absorption by the service sector increased 
from 35.6 per cent in 1963 to 40.3 per cent in 2000 (see table - 5.14). 
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Indicator 
Agriculture, 
Forestry 
and Fishing 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Service 
Table-5.14 
Occupational Structure (percentages) 
1963 1973 1978- 1981- 1986-
1979 1982 1987 
53.0 52.1 48.3 51.2 47.7 
4.1 4.5 6.6 8.8 7.6 
7.3 9.3 13.8 12.4 13.4 
35.6 34.1 31.3 29.6 31.3 
1996- 2000 
1997 
37.6 36.0 
7.5 7.3 
17.3 16.5 
37.6 40.2 
Source: Consumer Finances and Socio Economic Survey (various), Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
and CBSL Annual Report-2002 
Thus, the occupational structure of the economy appears to have changed 
with the changing educational attainments in the workforce. These 
changes, therefore, are in line with the normal trend of expanding and 
shifting economic activities, first from primary sectors to secondary and 
then to tertiary activities with advancement of the economic development. 
However, compared with some other countries, it seems that Sri Lanka's 
occupational structure has not changed sufficiently. In this respect Sri 
Lanka's situation can be compared with that of Bangladesh. Bangladesh 
labour force does not possess an educational development as Sri Lankan 
labour force has acquired. For example, compared with Sri Lanka's literacy 
rate of 0.91 per cent in 1998 Bangladesh's corresponding ratio was 0.40 
per cent (SLSED, 2001 ). Yet the employment distribution in the industrial 
sector in Bangladesh shows a faster increase than that of Sri Lanka. For 
example, the manufacturing sector's employment share in Bangladesh 
increased from 7.4 per cent in 1980 to 19.9 per cent in 1997 whereas in Sri 
Lanka the manufacturing sector's employment share increased only from 
10.5 per cent in 1980 to 16.5 in 1997 indicating that the changing rate in 
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industrial employment in Sri Lanka is not as fast as in Bangladesh 0/'/ E R-
I LO, 1998/99). Moreover, the employment share in the manufacturing 
sector in Sri Lanka even after 1995 has become stagnant (remaining 
between 16.5 and 17.5 per cent levels). Furthermore, the comparison of 
Sri Lanka's GDP share of the manufacturing sector (16.4 per cent in 1999) 
with those of Malaysia (29.4 per cent in 1999) and Indonesia (27.2 per cent 
in 1999), which have similar educational levels to Sri Lanka measured in 
terms of literacy rates, confirms that Sri Lanka's economic structure has not 
changed sufficiently to suit its educational attainments in the labour force 
(SLSED, 2001 ). 
The participation rates of both males and females too have increased 
substantially in Sri Lanka with a rapid increase of their educational 
attainments. For example, total labour force participation has increased 
from 32.7 per cent in 1963 to 50.3 per cent in 2000. These trends 
influence educated youth to find paid jobs outside the family, with a 
decreasing trend in concentrating on the agricultural sector and an 
increasing trend of entering into the other sectors such as the industrial and 
other service sectors. However, as indicated by the Consumer Finances 
and Socio Economic Survey (CFSES) of 1996/97 (the latest survey in this 
series) these other sectors' employment expansions are slow. For 
example, the CFSES reports that the employment ratio of regular and 
casual employees has increased only marginally from 49.3 per cent in 
1986/87 to 50.2 per cent in 1996/97. Thus, the data confirms the 
phenomenon of having a high level of mismatch between a higher rate of 
labour seeking paid employment in other sectors (manufacturing and 
service) and the creation of a lower amount of such jobs in those sectors. 
Another distinguishing feature of the Sri Lankan employment profile is the 
high incidence of unemployment among those in the ages less than 25 
years. 
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The age profile of unemployment as revealed by the data in table - 15 is 
skewed towards young, first time job-seekers. Accordingly, the rate of 
unemployment is high, as much as 36 per cent in the age cohort of 14-18 
years and 30 per cent in the age cohort of 19-25 years in 1996/97. The 
overwhelming majority, i. e. 76.3 per cent of the unemployed in 1981/82 
was below 25 years, and that percentage increased to 83 per cent in 
1986/87 while that rate decreased to 66 per cent by 1996/97 (see table -
5.15). 
Table-5.15 
Unemployment Rates by Age Groups from 1981/82 to 1996/97 
(Percentages) 
Age in Years 1981/82 1986/87 1996/97 
14-18 19.5 48.0 35.6 
19-25 56.8 35.0 30.4 
26-35 20.4 10.6 8.8 
36-45 2.6 3.2 2.4 
46-55 0.5 0.7 1.0 
Over55 0.1 0.6 0.4 
Source: Consumer Finances and Socio-economic Survey Sri Lanka, CBSL, 1986/87 and 
1996/97 
Thus, data show a declining trend in high unemployment among those 
under the 25 year age cohort after 1986/87. Advocates of the mismatch 
hypothesis highlight that unemployment levels rise with the increase in 
educational attainments. But, over the years unemployment in all 
educational levels shows a considerable decline with nearly the same rates 
while the GCE 0/L group dropped by 52.5 per cent and the GCE AIL group 
declined by 49.3 per cent from 1990 to 2000 (see table- 5.16). 
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Table - 5.16 
Unemployment Rates by Level of Education 
GCEA/L 
Period No Primary Secondary GCE HNCE Total schooling 0/LNCGE and 
above 
1990 3.4 5.2 17.2 23.8 29.4 15.9 
1991 4.0 4.9 14.9 25.0 24.7 14.7 
1992 3.5 5.4 16.1 21.8 20.7 14.6 
1993 3.0 4.9 13.7 21.3 23.2 13.8 
1994 2.6 5.0 13.0 19.6 23.8 13.1 
1995 1.9 3.0 12.8 18.4 19.9 12.3 
1996 2.7 3.4 12.2 16.4 18.9 11.3 
1997 1.3 2.3 10.8 15.7 19.0 10.4 
1998 1.0 2.4 9.0 13.7 17.5 9.2 
1999 0.4 1.9 8.2 13.6 17.9 8.9 
2000 1.2 1.0 7.5 11.3 14.9 7.6 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics - Quarterly Labour Force Survey (various). 
This trend does not provide evidence to prove that the rate of 
unemployment has increased with increasing educational attainments, as 
the mismatch hypothesis predicts. 
As defined at the beginning of this section the concept of mismatch 
signifies that expectations of a larger section of the workforce do not match 
the jobs that are available in the economy. 
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We can test this proposition by comparing the profile of expectations of the 
labour market entrants with the occupational profile of the currently 
employed labour force (See table - 5. 17). 
Table-5.17 
Employed Persons by Major Occupational Groups and Unemployed 
Persons by Expected Occupational Groups -1996/97 (Percentages) 
Occupational groups Employed Unemployed 
(desired rate) 
Professional, Technical & related workers 6.3 19.6 
Administrative & managerial workers 0.7 0.2 
Clerical & related workers 5.8 23.7 
Sales workers 12.0 4.4 
Service workers 5.4 6.6 
Agriculture, forestry workers & fishermen 36.0 2.6 
Production & related workers 26.2 30.3 
Workers not elsewhere classified 7.6 12.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Consumer Finances and Socio Economic Survey, Sri Lanka, CBSL, 1996/9i 
Examining employment preferences, we can observe that 43.5 per cent of 
the unemployed desire employment in professional, technical and clerical 
occupations. Yet in the current employment profile these three categories 
comprise only 24.8 per cent of all employed. On the other hand, even 
though the highest proportion of the employed are in the agriculture sector 
(36 per cent), only 2.6 per cent of the unemployed desire occupation within 
that sector. 
Further, the profile of expectation as reported in the Consumer Finances 
and Socio-Economic Survey of 1996/97 indicates that expectations rose 
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with increase of educational level. For example, expectation for 
professional, technical and related work was highest among graduates 
(82. 7 per cent). The other group with the highest aspiration to work in the 
professional and related workers category was the group with GCE AIL and 
higher qualifications (43.8 per cent). In the other extreme of the spectrum, 
about 86 per cent of the unemployed with the lowest education preferred 
jobs in the agriculture and service sectors (CFSES, 1996/97: 63). 
The other striking feature was that those in the 19-25 age group mostly 
preferred the 'white collar jobs' such as professional, technical, and clerical 
work while the unemployed in the relatively older age group (36-55) had a 
preference for employment in production and related worker categories 
(CFSES, 1996/97: 65). Thus, the profile of expectation indicates that 
expectations rise with increasing education, and also depending on age 
levels, and this phenomenon proves that there is a clear mismatch between 
the expectations of the unemployed and the status of available jobs. 
Another way to judge the extent of mismatch in the Sri Lankan labour 
market is to look at the duration of the unemployed waiting to find jobs. 
The data in this regard in the Consumer Finances and Socio Economic 
Survey, 1996/97 reveal that there are no significant differences for the 
periods spent looking for employment at the various educational levels. 
Prevalence of unemployment of duration of 1 to 2 years is common for all 
educational groups. However, it reports that long-term unemployment is 
most conspicuous among those who have obtained higher educational 
qualifications. The highest percentage of long term unemployment (38.5 
per cent) was reported among those who have obtained GCE AIL 
qualifications (CFSES, 1996/97: 64). Even among the illiterate 
unemployed, the proportion that has experienced a waiting period of over a 
year is not significantly different from those of the other categories. 
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Thus, the analysis of the waiting period of the unemployed at different 
educational levels does not reveal variations to the extent that would justify 
the inference that there is a noteworthy mismatch for any specific 
educational category. 
Further, extension of the analysis of the structural mismatch in the labour 
market enables us to identify several groups among the unemployed who 
are especially disadvantaged in their search for employment. These, 
according to the researchers on this subject, include female educated 
youth, Sinhala medium newly passed graduates, and youth in the 
plantation sector. According to the literature, in most of the developing 
countries, gender inequality in education is considered a principal reason 
why women are at a disadvantage in the labour market, but this is not the 
case in Sri Lanka. Of the South Asian countries, the only one to have 
achieved comparable literacy and enrolment levels for females is Sri 
Lanka. The young female job seekers have similar or more educational 
qualifications than males. For example, a little more than half of the 
population of unemployed women (55 per cent) has at least the GCE OIL 
qualification, as compared with 37 per cent of unemployed males with 
equivalent qualifications (Gunatilaka, 1999). During the last three decades 
there has been a substantial influx of women into the labour market in Sri 
Lanka, reflecting a strong and growing interest in labour force participation 
among women. For example, the proportion of the female population aged 
1 O years and over who are in the labour market, has increased from a fifth 
in 1963 to at least a third in 1996 (ibid, 1999). This trend is due to a variety 
of historic, cultural and developmental forces. These include heavy 
investment by State over several decades in the education for both male 
and female children, the gradual rise in the marriage age, the relatively 
favourable position for women in the family system, the generally 
widespread social acceptance of women's employment, and increasing 
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female employment in the private sector by the introduction of open 
economic policies (Gunatilaka, 1999; Malhorta and DeGraff, 1997). 
However, there has been a reported higher unemployment rate for females 
than males throughout the past decades indicating that chances of 
obtaining employment for females are significantly lower than that of males, 
especially when females move to higher educational levels. Most of the 
females who attained higher educational qualifications are looking for jobs 
as teachers, nurses, or clerks in the state sector, but none of them like to 
work in sectors such as agriculture, forestry and fishing. Their job 
preferences are guided by considerations such as job security and status 
(Gunatilaka, 1999; Gunatilleke 1989). But despite these aspirations, job 
opportunities for women are limited to a few sectors and a few industries. 
In the literature, the disadvantage that women have in comparison to men 
in obtaining employment is mainly attributed to gender wise factors which 
arise from both the job preferences of these females and from the 
preferences of employers (on demand side). Thus, a far lesser number of 
jobs are given to females in sectors such as heavy construction and some 
service sectors. In these sectors especially, studies have shown that 
employers often discriminate against women in their recruitment policies 
and favour males on the grounds of overhead costs, maternity leave and 
regularity of attendance. According to Gunatilleke (1989), some of these 
biases are ingrained prejudices arising out of a socio-cultural environment 
that tends to discriminate against females. 
However, within the aforementioned constraints, and also in a background 
of tapering off of employment opportunities in the public sector due to the 
public sector structural reforms carried out from the late 1980s, 
employment in the manufacturing industry is clearly the most viable choice 
for an increasing number of women particularly in the exporting sectors, in 
low skill operations. 
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In fact female numbers have exceeded that of males in industries such as 
garment, and other light manufacturing export industries (Gunatilaka, 
1999). Yet, expansion of female jobs in these low skill and low wage 
sectors with removal or weakening of minimum wage legislation as shown 
by Standing (1989) has resulted in females being exploited more also. 
Table - 5.18 
Proportion of Employed Persons by Major Occupational Groups 
1986/87 and 1996/97 (Percentages) 
Male Female 
Occupational category 
1986/87 1996/97 1986/87 1996/97 
Professional, Technical & 51.2 45.9 48.8 54.1 
Related workers 
Administrative & 87.0 77.1 13.0 22.9 
Managerial workers 
Clerical & Related workers 69.3 66.0 30.7 34.0 
Sales workers 81.0 76.0 19.0 24.0 
Service workers 63.6 71.2 36.4 28.8 
Agriculture, Forestry 65.1 62.7 34.9 37.3 
workers & Fishermen 
Production and related 73.3 69.5 26.7 30.5 
workers 
Workers not elsewhere 84.1 83.5 15.9 16.5 
classified 
Total 69.1 67.4 30.9 32.6 
Source: CFSES- CBSL, 1996/97 
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In this setting, Gunatilaka, (1999: 17) argues that women are being 
substituted for men at lower levels of employment while men are being 
upgraded. However, the fast trend in narrowing the gap between 
unemployed females and males that can be especially seen after the 
economic reforms introduced in 1977, and data revealed by CFSESs 
( 1986/87 and 1996/97) do not support Gunatilaka's ( 1999) argument of 
substituting women for men at lower levels of employment while men are 
being upgraded (see table - 5.18). According to CFSES, 1996/97, female 
occupation has increased in all occupational groups except in the group of 
'service workers' between 1986/87 and 1996/97. The most notable and 
observable fact is the surpassing of the male employment ratio over time 
by that of females in the professional, technical and related work category 
which is one of the highest status professional categories. 
Further, the unemployment rate of females throughout the past period 
shows a faster declining trend than that of males. For example, the males' 
unemployment rate has dropped by 50.8 percent from 1990 to 2000 
whereas that of females has dropped by 67.5 per cent during the same 
period (see table - 5.19). Yet, another clear situation that shows a 
mismatch is related to the case of newly passed Sinhalese medium (own 
language) university graduates. Currently there are about 30,000 such 
graduates in the employment queue (Sunday Lankadeepa, 2003: 5). The 
orthodox view of mismatch highlighted from the early 1970s can still be 
clearly applied in analyzing the employment problem of this group of 
graduates. These graduates either have not undergone a high level of 
quality education due to the drawbacks of the education system, or not 
acquired skills which can easily be adjusted to the changing situations in 
the job market. On the other hand, a sufficient number of public sector jobs 
with the lifetime security they expect are not being generated under the 
present economic system. 
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Table - 5.19 
Unemployment Rates (Percentage of Labour Force) 
Year Male Female Total 
1990 11.8 23.4 15.9 
1991 10.2 23.0 14.7 
1992 10.7 22.9 14.6 
1993 9.7 21.7 13.8 
1994 9.7 20.1 13.1 
1995 8.8 18.8 12.3 
1996 8.5 18.0 11.3 
1997 7.6 16.2 10.4 
1998 6.5 14.0 9.2 
1999 6.7 13.0 8.9 
2000 5.8 11.1 7.6 
Source: CBSL-Annual Reports, 1998 & 2002 
However, in some commentators' point of view, the education per se is no 
longer the crucial issue, but the language in education has become 
important in surfacing a strong mismatch among these graduates. The 
private sector, which has become the engine for growth and the major 
employer after 1977 economic reforms, always prefers those who can work 
in the English language which is the private sector's working language. In 
addition, at some of the recent work shops organised on this subject, the 
leading representatives of the business community expressed that 
university graduates were not prepared to undertake different tasks of 
varying status related to jobs. Contrary to these attitudes there is also 
anecdotal evidence that private firms fear the alleged anti-business bias of 
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college education (Rama, 1994: 11-12). However, the most prevalent belief 
is that job requirements of the formal private sector are not matched with 
the language as well as other abilities and willingess of own language 
graduates. 
Another highly disadvantaged group of youth is the unemployed of the 
plantation sector. This entire sector is plagued with absolute poverty 
(World Bank, 1995). The youths in this sector are highly deprived in 
obtaining a higher level of education by having fewer facilities. 
Consequently, these youths face great obstacles in the acquisition of 
human capital (such as a good tertiary education or technical education), 
and even if they did manage to acquire some educational attainment they 
find it difficult to obtain employment due to poor spatial and sectoral 
mobility. As anecdotal evidence reveals, even those youths who do not 
have a higher level of education have problems of not having a sufficient 
amount of work in the estates where they live, and therefore most of them 
have to share the existing volume of work since they are not prepared to 
move to other distant estates where labour is in shortage, or they are 
prevented to do so by the plantation sector trade unions. 
Thus, the analysis of available data presented so far in the present study 
suggests that the vigour of chronic 'skills mismatch', highlighted by the ILO 
mission in 1971 and some of the later researchers as a major reason for 
having a high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka has lessened over the 
years and now it seems that the situation created by structural mismatch 
has eased more. In fact some of the mismatches have reduced their 
robustness over time. Mismatch between male and female employment 
availability especially has lessened. Job expectation time does not show 
extreme bias towards one category of the educated. Unemployment rates 
for all educational levels have considerably lowered over time. 
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The conclusion thus arrived at by the present study on the skills mismatch 
is consistent with those of some other researchers. In a survey based on 
firms by Kelly and Culler (1990), 62 per cent of the managers interviewed 
said that workers know how to do their jobs compared to 30 per cent who 
disagreed, and 50 per cent acknowledged there were plenty of good 
workers available while 44 per cent disagreed. According to the World 
Bank (1993) study, the private sector firms did not view the shortage of 
qualified labour as a major obstacle to their development. Other studies on 
education and employment tend to reject the skills mismatch hypothesis. 
For example, Gunatilleke (1989) compared the educational level of entrants 
into employment to the output of the educational system, and concluded 
that there was no significant difference between the two. Aturupana (1996) 
showed that private returns to schooling were high, especially at the 
highest levels of education, suggesting that the Sri Lankan education 
system is relatively well geared towards the labour market. More recently 
Rama (1999) showed that the gap between the lowest acceptable wage 
and the average wage for workers with similar characteristics in Sri Lanka 
was on the decrease with increasing education, contradicting the skills 
mismatch hypothesis. 
5.4.3 Alternative Hypotheses on Unemployment 
Glewwe (1987) proposed another explanation for high unemployment in Sri 
Lanka. Under this hypothesis it has been highlighted that, as in many other 
countries, in Sri Lanka too public sector jobs are characterized by more 
stability, higher salaries, higher benefits, lower efforts and more prestige 
than their private sector counterparts. The superiority thus attached to the 
public sector jobs motivates labour market entrants to wait for job openings 
in that sector. Some of them would rather remain inactive than take the 
available jobs out of the public sector. Others would be willing to take'bad' 
jobs while waiting for 'good' ones. Dickens and Lang (1996) further 
developed the Gleww's ideas, and claimed that the Sri Lankan public 
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sector jobs are actually created with the deliberate purpose of alleviating 
the unemployment problem. Thus, this hypothesis justifies a credible 
reform of public sector recruitment and pay policies to reduce 
unemployment, highlighting that it would discourage the 'queuing' attitude 
for public sector jobs. However, in Sri Lanka public sector jobs are being 
reduced with the accelerated privatisation drive and the government current 
policy of not filling even the existing vacancies. Also the formal private 
sector salaries are higher than those of the public sector. Even the 
econometric results reported by Rama ( 1994) did not provide much 
evidence of a 'wage leadership effect' by the public sector jobs. 
Finally Rama (1994) presented the third explanation which emphasises the 
wedge between 'good' and 'bad' private sector jobs resulting from Sri 
Lankan labour market regulation, especially from the Termination of 
Employment of Workmen (Special Provisions) Act (TEWA) of 1971. The 
TEWA states that a worker who has spent one year or more with the same 
employer and has not committed a disciplinary fault cannot be legally 
dismissed, except with the consent of the Commissioner of Labour. 
However, firms with less than 15 workers are not subject to the TEWA 
while firms in FTZ zones find ways around it. As a result, some private 
sector jobs are precarious whereas others are almost for life. In this 
background, Rama suggests that many among the unemployed are willing 
to queue for the latter jobs, but are unwilling to take the former. Therefore, 
he proposes enacting less stringent firing regulations enforced more evenly 
across firms and sectors in order to reduce the wedge between 'good' 
(more secured) and 'bad' (unsecured) jobs and thereby to reduce the 
incentive to remain unemployed. However, the practicality of this 
suggestion is constrained due to the pressure coming from strong politically 
backed trade union movement for changing the present employment 
security regulations. Also, on the one hand most of the first time job 
seekers are not aware of these job security regulations to distinguish 
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between secured and unsecured jobs, while on the other hand employers 
have now increasingly adopted a practice of recruiting workers first as 
casual or on a temporary basis to avoid the effects coming from the 
regulations such as the TEWA without leaving any option to job seekers. 
Overall, this study concludes that in explaining the unemployment problem 
in Sri Lanka the structural mismatch can now provide more limited 
explanation than in the 1970s. Also, the recommendations of the other two 
hypotheses have limited prospects, and practically are difficult to 
implement. In this setting, the analysis made so far reveals that more 
importance can be attached to the total imbalance between the growth of 
employment (demand for labour) and the expansion of the workforce 
(supply of labour) in explaining the unemployment problem. Data on the 
output-employment relationship in the last five decades indicate that 
whenever the economy grew faster, labour absorption was also higher(see 
table - 5.11 and figure - 5.5). This emphasis is consistent with some other 
researchers' conclusions on the output-employment relationship. For 
example, Keribanda (1997: 249) stated that ups and downs in the rate of 
unemployment were closely linked with ups and downs in economic 
growth. Thus, the aforementioned evidence supports the hypothesis - 'the 
high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka has stemmed from a lack of 
employment demand at aggregate level rather than from the structural and 
other mismatch hypotheses'. 
Further, this study does not agree with some researchers and forecasters 
view on the trend of declining labour supply since Sri Lanka's labour force 
participation still remains at a lower level compared with that of world 
average. For example, the world wide labour force participation rate is 
around 77 per cent while Sri Lanka's participation rate still remains at a 
lower rate around 50 per cent, (Betcherman, 2002; D C S, 2003), indicating 
the possibilities for the Sri Lankan labour force participation rate to increase 
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substantially in coming decades. Thus, in this background, it is difficult to 
assume that the labour supply will diminish as most observers predict in the 
next decade or so to ease the unemployment problem. Consequently, this 
study places the highest emphasis on increasing the total labour demand 
through reducing the factor market distortions and increasing output for 
tackling the current unemployment issue in Sri Lanka. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter examines the possible causes for the appearance of a 
relatively high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka during the last few 
decades. They include the imbalance between supply and demand for 
labour at aggregate level in the economy and the famous skill mismatch 
hypothesis first presented by the ILO mission to Sri Lanka in 1971, and 
other major hypotheses developed subsequently for analysing Sri Lanka's 
unemployment issue. Accordingly, evidence is found to support the 
hypothesis - 'the high level of unemployment in Sri Lanka has stemmed 
from a situation of inadequate labour demand at aggregate level rather 
than from structural and other mismatches'. As a result, the chapter places 
essentially a more emphasis on imbalance between labour supply and 
demand at aggregate level than on the structural mismatch and some other 
mismatches in understanding and suggesting policy measures for tackling 
the current unemployment issue in Sri Lanka. Further, it presents facts, 
going against the majority view that the labour supply in the coming 
decades or so will be decreasing. Consequently, the chapter attributes the 
phenomenon of the high level of current unemployment to the insufficient 
aggregate demand for labour in an environment of a stable growth of 
labour supply. 
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Chapter - 6 
Labour Regulations and Labour Market Distortions 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter firstly outlines the evolution of labour regulations and 
institutions in Sri Lanka from the British Colonial period with the view to 
understanding how far they have covered different aspects of labourers' 
working life. Then, the decisive labour regulations, which are related to 
such important areas as minimum wages, employment security, social 
security, holidays and leave, and the industrial relations system are 
reviewed to identify their effect on determining labour market flexibility and 
thereby increasing labour absorption. The chapter concludes with the 
assessment of the behaviour of the cost of labour market regulations and 
institutions (distortions) to test the hypothesis - 'the cost of labour market 
distortions has decreased during the economic reform period', mainly 
through comparing the Sri Lankan labour market regulations with those of 
some other countries in the region. 
6.2 Labour Regulations and Institutions 
The foregoing chapter highlighted the role played by labour demand in 
relieving the unemployment problem in Sri Lanka. But the labour demand 
depends not only on the economic progress, but also on the technology 
through which labour inputs are converted into outputs. Studies such as 
Gupta (1989), Agarwala (1983), and Little (1982), highlight that capital-
labour ratios (technologies) are in fact sensitive to the relative cost of 
labour and capital. In this background, if the factor markets are distorted in 
favour of selecting capital intensive technologies, labour demand is 
lessened and the growth of employment is impeded. 
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As in the case of most of the developing countries, commentators are of 
the opinion that in Sri Lanka too, the labour market is highly distorted. 
Agarwala's (1983) study on 'Price Distortion and Growth' of 31 developing 
countries confirmed this belief, identifying Sri Lanka as one of the countries 
(among Bangladesh, Chile, Egypt, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Pakistan and 
Tanzania) having a highly distorted labour market in the 1970s. Such a 
conclusion has been made mainly taking into consideration the 
manufacturing sector's real wage changes, labour productivity, trade 
unions' influence, and government intervention in the labour market 
(Agarwala, 1983: 26-27). This study has measured the labour productivity 
based on changes of the per capita income of the sample countries, which 
in Gupta's point of view (1989: 39) is not a desirable measure to determine 
labour productivity. However, the conclusion arrived at by Agarwala is 
important for the present study for two reasons; one is that it confirms the 
general view that the Sri Lankan labour market was highly distorted during 
the controlled era of the 1970s, and the second is that it provides a good 
benchmark to see how labour market distortions have changed in the 
ensuing period in a background of carrying out the economic reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
Government intervention in the labour market through passing labour 
regulations is considered a major source of labour market distortions 
(Agenor, 1996: 274). In the economic history, governments intervened in 
labour markets on account of a variety of reasons. During the industrial 
revolution first commencing in England from the second half of the 18th 
century and then spreading to some other countries, mining and factory 
owners exploited extremely the male, female and child labour. This 
situation led the governments in those countries to enact a number of 
labour laws and establish state institutions to enforce these regulations to 
protect the working class from such 'exploitation' and bring about a better 
equity and industrial harmony (Husband, 1980: 2). 
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Where the Sri Lankan background is concerned regarding the 
commencement of labour regulations and labour administration, the need 
for such a requirement stemmed from hardships experienced by the 
workers whom British planters brought in from South India to work on 
plantations from the 1830s onwards. Thus, the commencement of the 
evolution of labour policy and legislation in Sri Lanka goes back to the mid 
19th century, and this process can be viewed in the following chronological 
order (see table - 6.1 and Appendices 3 & 4); 
1. Pre 1923 period 
2. Period between 1924 and 194 7, and 
3. Post 1948 period (ML, 1998). 
Pre 1923 period - During this period labour policy formulation was directed 
towards Indian immigrant labour employed in the plantation sector. Though 
a 'state non-intervention policy' was followed at that time, some labour laws 
had to be brought in due to the harsh conditions experienced by plantation 
sector workers (Balasuriya, 1998). Consequently, 7 ordinances mainly 
related to the various aspects of plantation workers were passed by the 
colonial government during this period (see Appendix - 3). It appears that 
the overall objective of these ordinances was to create a policy which was 
conducive to the expansion of the plantation industry. 
Period between 1924 and 1947 - During this period the labour policy 
catering to the plantation industry was not only further developed but 
extended to cover the labour working in other areas as well. With these 
expansions labour administration was also facilitated by the establishment 
of the Indian Immigrant Labour Department in 1923 which was renamed as 
the Labour Department in 1931 and the Ministry of Labour in 1931. Also, 
universal franchise granted in 1931 was an important landmark which 
highly influenced the State Council to take more steps to ensure labour 
protection and welfare in all areas of activities. In this context, 11 labour 
ordinances were passed during the period 1924-1947 (see Appendix - 3). 
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Among the ordinances passed during the period 1924-1947, the Minimum 
Wages (Indian Estate Labour) Ordinance No 27 of 1927 was important 
since it was recognised as the origin of the minimum wage policy in Sri 
Lanka and also, for the first time, the law accepted a few basic concepts 
such as; 
1. Minimum wage rates 
2. Legally defined general working day 
3. Minimum age for employment, and 
4. Tripartite representation (Balasooriya, 1998) 
On the other hand, the birth of an organized working class could be 
witnessed during this time. For example, in 1922, the Ceylon Workers 
Congress was formed while the Ceylon Mercantile Union came into 
existence in 1928. With the growth of these unions a series of strikes 
occurred in 1923, 1927 and 1929, and as a result, industrial unrest 
intensified during these years and developed into a mass struggle (ML, 
1998). This deteriorated industrial relations situation led the State to drop 
its non-intervention policy practised hitherto and draft some legislation such 
as the Industrial Disputes (Conciliation) Ordinance No. 3 of 1931 and the 
Trade Unions Ordinance No. 14 of 1935 with the view to suppressing the 
militant trade union actions. 
This period (1924-47), in contrast to the attempts made to control the 
labour movement, can also be characterised with the enacting of some 
ordinances to safeguard some labour rights and welfare while promoting 
employer employee relations. Thus, the Shops (Commercial 
Establishment) Ordinance No. 66 of 1938 was passed with the objective of 
regulating the number of working hours of employees and the business 
hours of shops. 
This ordinance was enacted amid strong objections from employers. Then, 
passing the Wages Boards Ordinance No. 27 of 1941 can be cited as an 
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attempt by the State to usher in a national wage policy for some categories 
of workers in the private sector. It can also be seen as an important forum 
for employers and employees to arrive at a consensus regarding different 
views they harbour concerning wages and service conditions of workers 
(Balasooriya, 1998). 
Table-6.1 
Selected Labour Legislations of Sri Lanka 
Ordinances passed before 1948 Acts passed after 1948 
1 Service Contracts Ordinance 1 Industrial Disputes Act (No. 43 of 1950) 
(No.11 of1865) 2 Shop and Office Employees (Regulation 
2 Medical Wants Ordinance employees and remuneration) Act (No. 19 of 1954) 
(No. 9 of 1912) 3 Employment of Women, Young Persons 
3 Estate Labour (Indian) Ordinance and Children Act (No. 47 of 1956) 
(No.10of1921)) 4 Employees' Provident Fund Act (No. 15 of 
4 Minimum Wages (Indian Estate 1958) 
Labour) Ordinance (No. 27 of 1927) 5 Employees Holiday Act (No. 6 of 1959) 
5 Industrial Dispute (Conciliation) 6 National Apprenticeship Act (No. 49 of 
Ordinance (No. 3 of 1931) 1971) 
6 Workmen's Compensation Ordinance 7 Termination of Employment Of Workmen Act (No. 45 of 1971) 
(No. 19 of 1934) 8 Holidays Act (No. 29 of 1971) 
7 Trade Unions Ordinance (No. 14 of 9 Employees Council Act (No. 32 of 1979) 
1935) 10 Foreign Employment Agency Act (No. 32 
8 Shops Ordinance (No. 66 of 1938) of 1980) 
9 Maternity Benefits Ordinance (No. 32 11 Employees Trust Fund Act (No. 46 of 
of 1939) 1980) 
10 Children and Young Persons 12 Payments of Gratuities Act (No.12 of 
Ordinance (No. 48 of 1939) 1983) 
11 Wages Boards Ordinance (No. 27 of 13 Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 
1941) Act (No. 21 of 1985) 
12 Factories Ordinance (No. 45 of 1942) 
Source: CPGJISL-1998, Ministry of Labour (ML). 
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Period between 1948 and 2002 - This post independence period was seen 
as the beginning of an era where the state had moved further away from a 
non-intervention policy to a welfare state policy implying a more maturity of 
labour policy being adopted in Sri Lanka. The beginning of this period was 
marked with the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act No. 43 of 1950. 
The underlying cause for the enactment of this Act and the subsequent 
amendments to it may be the large number of industrial disputes which 
surfaced during this period. Where the period of 1948-1970 is concerned, 
this was the period when trade unions prospered and a spate of strikes 
occurred. In this background, the principal objective of this Act is to 
prevent industrial disputes as soon as they occur to preserve industrial 
peace and harmony. Another important law enacted in the initial period of 
the post 1948 era was the Shop and Office Employees (Regulation of 
Employment and Remuneration) Act No. 19 of 1954 which replaced the 
earlier Shops Ordinance No. 66 of 1938 and provided a larger coverage to 
include working facilities, to regulate working hours and overtime, to 
enforce laws and regulations concerning wages and to grant leave and 
maternity benefits to female workers. Through the subsequent 
amendments to this Act minimum wage laws were extended to cover all the 
private sector workers as well. Within this broad era of the post 1948 
period the phase starting from 1956 was more significant on account of 
taking more steps to protect the working class and lifting their living 
conditions. Passing the political power from the right of centre United 
National Party (UNP) to the left of centre Mahajana Eksath Peramuna 
(MEP) in 1956 was instrumental in ushering in this new era of labour 
policies of Sri Lanka (M L, 1998). Accordingly, not only a large number of 
new labour laws and regulations were introduced during this period but 
also a large number of existing laws were revised (see Appendix - 4). 
Among the laws enacted after 1956, Acts passed to ensure social security 
of labour are especially important. The first Act brought in for this purpose 
217 
was the Employees Provident Fund Act No. 15 of 1958. This Act was 
amended on several occasions, and also can be considered as an Act that 
brought about a new trend in the labour policy (Rasaratunam, 1961: 34). 
According to this Act, the employer and employee both have to contribute 
monthly to the provident fund while the worker is employed until he reaches 
retirement age. The labour policy covering social security was further 
extended by the Employees Trust Fund Act No. 46 of 1980. The specialty 
of this act is that no contributions are due from the workers. Then, the 
Payment of Gratuities Act No. 12 of 1983 can also be considered as an 
important step to widening the social security during this period. 
Amendments made in 1985 to the Maternity Benefits Ordinance No. 32 of 
1939 and the Shop and Office Act No. 19 of 1954 also increased the 
benefits for labour, further strengthening their social security. Then, a 
number of measures against termination of employment were taken in this 
period too. Of them, the Termination of Employment of Workmen Act No. 
45 of 1971 was very important. The objective of this law, the confirmation 
of protection of employment of the workman, was in line with the labour 
policy of the post-independent era (M L, 1998). 
Thus, from the mid 19th century Sri Lanka has enacted 48 labour 
regulations which deal with various aspects of employment, working 
conditions and worker welfare (Appendices 3 & 4). Meanwhile, Sri Lanka 
became a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1948, 
and so far, Sri Lanka has ratified 39 ILO conventions and amended existing 
laws and enacted new laws to confirm with these conventions. As a result, 
Sri Lanka turned out to be one of the four countries which have ratified a 
highest number of ILO conventions in the Asian Pacific Region (Rajapaksa, 
1997 as cited in ML 1998). As a whole, relatively a larger number of new 
laws have been introduced in the period, 1948 - 2002, and, in particular, 
most these have been enacted either prior to widespread economic 
liberalisation started in 1977 or soon after that, with the intension of 
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providing social safety nets for the workers in the expanding private sector 
(IPS, 2003). 
Accordingly, during a period of more than one and a half centuries, the 
shape of the labour policy was determined mainly by political philosophies 
and economic policies followed in each of the eras. During the British 
colonial period from the mid 19th century to 1947 as well as in the post 
independent period from 1948 to 1956, Sri Lanka followed laissez-faire, 
capitalistic economic policies with minimum state participation. Then, after 
1956 the economic policy moved from a capitalistic economic system to a 
welfare state policy under more leftist bias governments until 1977. During 
this era, the trade unions and the labour movement became deeply rooted 
in Sri Lanka as described in the earlier sections. The political-cum-labour 
leaders became cabinet ministers in all the governments in this era as well 
as in the post reform period. As a result, labour movement during the 
period 1956-1977 became stronger not only through a large number of 
labour regulations being amended and enacted in favour of employees but 
also due to the political power they enjoyed with the support of their 
political and union leaders. 
Then, after 1977 Sri Lanka again turned to a free market economy under 
democratic socialist governments. Consequently, from then onwards the 
country has reached a new era under which its labour policies, labour laws 
and standards have been expected to be reviewed to conform to the 
changing situation (CBSL, 2000, Amarasinghe, 1998). Although the 
economy moved towards a free market oriented reform following the 
change in economic policies since 1977, until recent times (2002) the 
labour laws of Sri Lanka basically remained what they were prior to 1977 
economic reforms under the controlled economic and political regime. 
Thus, the phenomenon of maintaining stringent labour laws with the open 
economic policies being followed in Sri Lanka is not parallel to what is 
happening in most of the other parts of the world. 
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It is evident that the globalisation of trade has been associated with the 
explicit and implicit erosion of labour regulations and an increasing 
flexibility of labour markets. Firms everywhere are reducing their reliance 
on full-time workers being paid with fixed wages and various fringe 
benefits, and are increasingly resorting to casual, temporary, part-time, 
sub-contracting and contractual workers, eroding employment and income 
security (Standing, 1989). Employers in Sri Lanka also show a keen 
interest to work in a highly flexible labour market, particularly to face the 
high global competition directed to them with the introduction of open 
economic policies since 1977. These employers show that many of the 
labour regulations which were enacted and strengthened during the import-
substitution era are inappropriate for an open economy. They argue that a 
firm's competitiveness in the market economy depends on how rapidly and 
cheaply it can move resources in, around, and out of the production 
process in response to price signals in both input and output markets (EFC, 
1999). In this respect the stringent labour laws in Sri Lanka that protect the 
job security of workers and regulate almost all the terms and conditions of 
work are seen as constraining the capacity of firms to adapt their 
production structures to meet changing demands (Gunatilaka, 1999: 54-
55). Under this background, in most of the commentators opinion, the laws 
causing a large amount of rigidities in the Sri Lankan labour market have 
been the Termination of Employment of Workman Act No. 45 of 1971 
(TEWA), the Industrial Dispute Act No. 43 of 1950 (IDA), the Factories 
Ordinance No. 45 of 1942 (FO), the Shop and Office Employees Act No. 19 
of (1954) (SOEA) and the Employment of Woman, Young Persons and 
Children Act No. 47 of 1956 (EWYCA). 
The industrialists attack the Termination of Employment of Workmen Act 
(TEWA) No. 45 of 1971 more than any other statute ever introduced in Sri 
Lanka (Amarasinghe, 1992; Gunatilaka, 1999; CBSL, 2002). TEWA, 
among other things, mainly covers labour retrenchments and dismissals, 
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particularly on non-disciplinary grounds. An employer may wish to 
terminate the employment of an employee because of non-disciplinary 
reasons due to redundancy, incompetence, or an unattractive business 
environment. In accordance with the TEWA, for laying off workers for non-
disciplinary reasons, employers in the private sector with 15 or more 
employees are required to obtain written consent of the employee 
concerned or the prior written approval of the Commissioner of Labour 
before terminating employment of a worker who has worked not less than 
180 days in the preceding 12-month period. In the latter case, the 
commissioner of labour stipulates the amount of compensation that the 
employer is liable to pay for the worker's loss of employment, depending on 
the circumstances of each individual case. Where an employer terminates 
the employment of a worker in breach of the Act, such terminations are 
illegal, null and void, and are of no effect whatsoever (Gunatilaka, 1999). 
Those who are critical of the TEWA highlight that it is detrimental to the 
economic progress in a number of ways: 
1. The TEWA does not provide a clear-cut compensation formula for 
retrenchments, and also the commissioner's discretionary powers in 
determining compensation to be paid have not been defined. Under 
these situations employers became reluctant to hire workers because 
termination of their employees on grounds of retrenchment in order to 
restructure firms, and rectifying the mismatch between hired workers 
and their job demands, prove costly in terms of time and money. 
Thus the TEWA has been a major obstacle to attraction of investment 
in a more labour intensive nature (Amerasinghe, 1998). 
2. Job regulations under the TEWA have a negative effect on the 
productivity of workers. Because of extreme job security that the 
TEWA provides, employees know that there is little chance of 
dismissal and do not worry about things such as job evaluations. On 
the other hand, the stringent dismissal procedure imposed by the 
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TEWA encourages employers in using temporary workers who 
acquire fewer firm specific skills. Consequently, these tendencies 
badly affect productivity improvements (Jayaratna, 2003); 
3. Growing numbers of employers have adopted a number of unfair 
practices to evade the implications of the Act which seriously erode 
job security against the original purpose of the Act which was to 
ensure the security of employees at a time around 1970 when 
unemployment in the country was high (M L, 1998). Some of these 
unfair practices are fabricating 'evidence' of theft or some other types 
of misconduct and ridding themselves of the worker on disciplinary 
grounds, forcing voluntary resignations by making it uncomfortable for 
the employee to work in the establishment, making sure that workers 
sign undated letters of resignation before recruiting them to the 
organization, in the Free Trade Zones employers often withdraw the 
workers identity cards so that they can no longer enter the premises. 
There have been a few cases where employers have allegedly set fire 
to their factories and force their closure to evade the implications of 
the TEWA (Gunatilaka, 1999: 56-57). 
Moreover, Amarasinghe (1998) points out that the intention of the TEWA is 
clearly to control the private sector, as the law does not cover government 
corporations and statutory bodies. Besides, the Employers Federation of 
Ceylon (EFC) points out that the TEWA discourages employers having 
trained and experienced permanent employees and encourages using 
casual labourers, apprentices, and fixed term contract employees. This 
situation appears to be confirmed by the data reported in the latest 
(1996/97) Consumer Finances and Socio Economic Survey of the Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka. Accordingly, casual employees as a percentage of the 
labour force increased from 24.2 percent in 1986/87 to 29.8 per cent in 
1996/97. 
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Thus, the aforementioned constraints encourage domestic investors to 
resort to capital intensive investment to avoid disadvantageous situations 
created by the TEWA, and thereby limit job creation while it badly affects 
the attraction of foreign investors too, and limits job creation through foreign 
investments. Fallon and Lucas (1993) estimate that the weighted average 
drop in the long-run demand for employees at given output levels in India 
and Zimbabwe due to job security regulations were 17.5 per cent and 25.2 
per cent respectively. In Sri Lanka's case, although such estimation is not 
possible due to data constraint, fragmentary evidence as presented in 
some of the earlier paragraphs reveals that the TEWA is creating serious 
distortions, which in tum have adverse effects on employment generation 
(Gunatilaka, 1999; Jayaratna, 2003). 
Another Act the private sector has been criticising is the Industrial Disputes 
Act (IDA) No. 43 of 1950, which mainly covers termination of employee 
services on grounds of misconduct, and also consists of a set of 
requirements relating to labour relations, such as collective agreements, 
strikes etc. According to the IDA, if an employee was dismissed, he or she 
has the right of appeal to a Labour Tribunal (LT) for redress within six 
months of the termination. After making a proper trial, LTs are empowered 
to take three alternative actions in cases of unjustified dismissals. They 
include; LTs can order reinstatement with full back wages, or L Ts can order 
payment of compensation as an alternative to reinstatement, or where the 
employer has employed less than 15 workers L Ts can additionally order 
the payment of gratuity to employees. 
However, employers have long been resentful of the power of LTs to order 
the reinstatement of employees found to have been unjustifiably dismissed. 
They argue that such reinstatements would be harmful to upholding the 
industrial relationships in their enterprises (Amerasinghe, 1992: 37 
Gunatilaka, 1999: 59). 
223 
A second issue raised by employers is that the IDA does not lay down the 
basis (formula) on which compensation for unjustified dismissal should be 
calculated. Therefore, compensations are generally determined on a case-
by-case basis on the discretion of LT Presidents. Employers complain that 
in most of the cases LT Presidents are more sympathetic towards 
employees, and think that employees have a right to have some 
compensation for losing their jobs, whether or not terminations are justified. 
The third issue is related to the long delays taken by l Ts to give 
judgements since dispute settlement procedure specified in the Act is not 
time bound. For example, Weerakoon's (1996) survey of applications 
received by the L Ts between January 1985 and September 1995 reveals 
that the total settlement rate is only 28 per cent. Thus, the backlog of 
pending cases under L Ts increased to 16,000 by the beginning of 2002 
(CBSL, 2002: 169). It is reported that both employers and employees are 
worried about these delays. Employers complain that the delays 
associated with the LT system are a major obstacle to the decision-making 
process of investors, and they have to incur significant costs in terms of 
time and money in order to be rid of a worker and to reorganise their 
business. Further, employers point out that delays in the LT system 
encourage workers to increasingly resort to strike action on termination 
issues. For example, in 1995, roughly 35 per cent of all strikes in private 
establishments were explicitly related to issues of suspension and 
termination (DL, 1996). Also, in their opinion, the Act gives workers a free 
hand to decide the period of notice given before taking a strike action. 
Under the Act, once the dispute is referred to arbitration it is an offence to 
remain on strike. Recent experiences, however, have been different. 
There have been many instances where workers have remained on strike 
for many months after the conciliation process under the Act commenced. 
There have also been a few instances where unions have put forward new 
disputes after a strike has been referred to compulsory arbitration in order 
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to provide them with a legal defence to justify remaining on strike 
(Amarasinghe, 1998). Further, firms were not permitted to act against 
trade unions which are guilty of breach of collective agreements. These 
are clear illustrations of the failure of the existing dispute resolution system. 
The Wages Board mechanism under the Wages Board Ordinance No. 27 
of 1941 is also criticised for a number of reasons. State intervention in 
industrial relations is seen through the instrumentality of the Wages Boards 
set up under the Wages Board Ordinance. For example, the wage 
increases normally given to the public sector are very often extended to the 
private sector through the Wages Board mechanism. Under the Wages 
Board mechanism wages are fixed essentially depending on 'time rates' 
and adjusted by the cost of living factor. Consequently, the burgeoning 
cost of living was the major justification for an increase of wages rather 
than taking quality and productivity into consideration when wages are 
determined. This practice tends to make the Sri Lankan labour market 
unattractive, especially for foreign investors. 
The private sector complains that some regulations restrict hours of work, 
overtime and night work for some categories of employees, and such 
restrictions badly affect some industries, especially the garment industry 
(EFC, 1999). Statutory conditions relating to hours of work, overtime, and 
night work are set by the Wages Boards Ordinance No. 27 of 1941, the 
Factory Ordinance (FO) No. 45 of 1942, the Shop and Office Employees 
(Regulation of Employees and Remuneration) Act (SOEA) No. 19 of 1954, 
and the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act No. 47 of 
1956. It can be seen that there is little uniformity in the legal conditions 
relating to statutory hours of work whether between males and females, or 
between operative and non-operative grades (Gunatilaka, 1999). 
According to the restrictions imposed by the legislations, females in the 
operative grades are prohibited to be employed in overtime for more than 
100 hours in any calendar year. However, some micro-level surveys found 
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that especially in the garment sector a considerable percentage of 
employers do not regard statutory requirements on working hours. 
Further, employers complain that some laws are detrimental to current 
trends taking place in production processes, especially sub-contracting. 
Currently throughout the world, manufacturing processes are split to sub-
components so that they can be produced in different locations according 
to their comparative advantages. In this setting, as Sri Lanka integrates 
with the international economy, sub-contracting too expands rapidly. 
Although little data is found on this matter, anecdotal evidence indicates 
that sub-contracting comprises a significant component of business 
activities of many Sri Lankan firms (Gunatilaka, 1999; Jayaratna, 2003). In 
this background employers complain that the legal framework is not 
supportive and poses restrictions on sub-contracting of production 
activities. They especially criticise the situation brought about by the 1966 
amendment to the Wages Board Ordinance. Accordingly, the employer is 
made liable for the non-payment of wages to the worker by the sub-
contractor unless the employer is able to satisfy the Court that the 
employer has taken all practicable measures to ensure that wages have 
been paid. Further, the principal (employer) could be compelled by the 
Commissioner of Labour to discontinue the sub-contracting arrangement if 
it was found that a sub-contractor violated regulations related to wage 
payments. Thus, commentators on this subject suggest that efforts should 
be made to formalise such sub-contracting arrangements rather than 
encourage them to operate in the informal sector which is the de facto 
situation at present (Gunatilaka, 1999). 
In this setting, after the introduction of open economic policies, all the 
governments from 1977 onwards accepted that the Sri Lankan labour 
market has been highly inflexible, and correction measures should be very 
urgently introduced. This urgency is evident in a number of policy 
documents. 
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For example, 'The Industrial Policy Statement of 1987' was expected to 
introduce some changes in labour regulations and labour relations with the 
view to make the labour market more flexible which included the following 
steps; 
1. Amendments to the Termination of Employment (Special Provisions) 
Act No. 45 of 1971 
2. Introduction of unemployment benefits 
3. Codification of law 
4. Growth in productivity and real wages (IPS, 1987). 
Further, the 'Strategy for Industrialisation in 1989' presented by the 
Government states that the 'labour laws existing at present are weighted in 
favour of those who are already in employment and act as a disincentive to 
creation of new employment'. Also, this statement identifies the importance 
of adopting a productivity related wage determination system (Ministry of 
Industries, 1989: 15). 
The strategies outlined under the new government of Peoples Alliance 
(1994) appeared to be no different in this policy line. As a result, in the 
'New Industrial Strategy in 1994', the need for investor confidence to 
generate jobs is highlighted. In the 'Agenda for Action - Sri Lanka in the 
Year 2000' - two measures are given top priority. They are, to stop the 
'massive hiring' into the government sector and amend the Termination of 
Employment (Special Provisions) Act, with the view to reducing labour cost 
and boost overall employment generation, especially within the private 
sector (Agenda for Action, 1996: 17) .. 
Although insightful statements such as the ones stated in the earlier 
paragraphs have been made by almost all the successive governments 
from 1977 onwards regarding the need for a fresh focus on the challenges 
directed from the existing labour regulations and labour union rights to 
industry and the strategies which are essential to make Sri Lanka more 
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competitive in international trade, nothing came out to change this situation 
until 2002. Starting from 2002, four key acts on labour regulations were 
amended. Accordingly, in August 2002, section 68 of the Factory 
Ordinance of 1942 (FO) was amended to extend the limit of the number of 
overtime hours for female employees from 100 hours to 720 hours per 
year. Then, the Termination of Employment of Workmen Act of 1971 
(TEWA) was amended in January 2003 to have a clear formula for the 
Commissioner of Labour to determine compensation for terminated 
workers. The Industrial Dispute Act (IDA) of 1950 too was amended in 
January 2003 to minimise the time allocation for dispute settlement (CBSL, 
2003: 158-160). When these amendments are compared with a large 
amount of constraints created by the aforementioned regulations as 
explained in the earlier sections in this chapter, it appears that they have 
removed only a few major obstacles, leaving others to remain further. On 
the other hand, the Employment of Women, Young Persons, and Children 
Act of 1956 (EWYCA) too was amended at the same time, but the purpose 
was to enhance penalties for employers violating the conditions set out in 
the Act. Thus, the latter amendment seems inconsistent with the idea of 
creating a more flexible labour market so that investors can freely adjust 
their working with the changing global environment. Until these four labour 
regulations were amended in 2002, all the labour laws seen prior to 1977 
continue to operate to date. This phenomenon suggests that although the 
open market policies have been followed for two and a half decades, 
labour regulations have not been adjusted to be consistent with the 
changed economic environment. 
In this setting, the next section of the study attempts to see how these laws 
and practices have affected the cost of labour market distortions to 
employers in the 1980s and the 1990s, mainly by comparing some of the 
Sri Lankan labour market regulations related to social security and non-
wage labour cost with those in some other selected countries. 
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6.3 Labour Market Distortions in the Reform Period 
( 1977 - 2002) 
The labour laws in Sri Lanka do not apply across the board to all the 
segments in the labour market. The Sri Lankan labour market is a 
segmented market, mainly consisting of the regulated sector and the non-
regulated sector (Rama, 1994: 3-5; Kelly, 1992: 29). The regulated sector 
consists of the central and local government including state corporations, 
private firms, and the plantation sector. The remaining workers in the 
country are categorised under the non-regulated sector. The regulated 
sector (government and private sector firms) covered roughly one forth of 
Sri Lankan jobs: about 0.6 million of them are in central and local 
government, while the rest (1.0 million) are in the private firms and 
corporations. The plantation sector provides employment to 0.4 million 
workers (roughly 7 per cent of total employment in Sri Lanka). The rest of 
the Sri Lankan workers, around 4 million are in the non-regulated sector. 
All the regulated sector workers are subjected to labour laws and 
regulations, but with a few exceptions. For example, the TEWA does not 
apply to the private sector firms with less than 15 workers, and firms with 
fewer than 3 employees do not have to pay social security contributions. 
Yet, in the Sri Lankan labour market, a considerable share of workers (1/3) 
is directly covered by a profuse and intricate set of labour regulations 
(Rama, 1994: 3) (see Appendixes - 3 and 4). In such a background, most 
critiques argue that the existing laws are biased towards workers, and that 
they unnecessarily increase non-wage costs of labour, reduce labour 
productivity and restrict labour flexibility of firms to restructure (IPS, 2003). 
Thus, these pervasive labour market regulations raise the issue of whether 
high unemployment in Sri Lanka has emerged owing to policy-induced 
rigidities. 
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Consequently, the rest of the chapter aims at assessing how far Sri Lanka's 
labour market has been distorted on account of labour regulations, 
institutions and policy. 
As already discussed in detail under the literature review chapter there is a 
considerable disagreement on the impact of labour market institutions and 
policies on economic development and employment creation in developing 
countries. The orthodox view of this argument upholds that such 
interventions as minimum wage laws, employment security legislations, 
social security contributions, excessive holidays and leave, trade union 
influence etc. inevitably distort the labour market, forcing the cost of labour 
to increase above the market clearing level, particularly in the formal 
sector, and hence impair international competitiveness and eventually 
lessen the labour demand. Thus, those who highly emphasise labour 
market distortions promote exceedingly the case for economic reforms and 
labour market deregulation for developing countries to enhance their labour 
market 'flexibility' to bring about a positive effect on economic growth and 
speeding up of employment creation. Hence, in a background of 
implementing economic reforms with some changes in labour practices for 
more than two decades in Sri Lanka, we can test the first hypothesis of the 
study to determine how far 'the cost of labour market distortions has 
decreased during the economic reform period', mainly by looking at the 
trends in the behaviour of some important variables associated with labour 
demand during the reform period and by comparing the Sri Lankan labour 
market behaviour with that of the neighbouring and some of the fast 
developing East Asian countries depending on the data availability for the 
period for the1980s and the 1990s. This comparison is made in relation to 
the labour market behaviour of such variables as average and minimum 
wages, employment security legislation, holidays and leave, maternity 
benefits, and industrial relations 
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6.3.1 Minimum Wage Behaviour and the Wage Determination 
Interventionists (those who find faults with government intervention in 
labour market) always argue that minimum wages in developing countries 
are having a distorted effect, stressing that they are set too high relative to 
the average income and other wages in the economy, resulting in 
production costs to be increased in the formal sector and discouraging 
employment demand. Based on this view, we can see how levels of legal 
minimum wages in Sri Lanka have affected wage determination. The wage 
bargaining in the formal sector is a fairly elaborate process, involving two 
different institutional arrangements (Agenor, 1996: 283-4; Rama, 1994:4). 
The first arrangement involves tripartite 'Wages Boards', established under 
the Wages Boards Ordinance only for trades for which Wages Boards have 
been set up. There are about 37 such Wages Boards in existence, 
covering roughly 2.0 million workers (Siripala, 1995:26). These Wages 
Boards' role is to set nationwide minimum wages for each skill level in all 
sectors of the economy. Although these wages are relatively low, they are 
used as reference to adjust the wages of most workers. The second 
arrangement involves direct collective bargaining agreements between 
firms and unions, which usually set wages above the Boards' minima in 
exchange for labour peace (Rama, 1994: 4). 
Minimum wage regulations do not apply to the entire workforce alike. 
Wages in the Free Trade Zone firms are uniformly set by the Board of 
Investment (801) itself and this level of wages can be considered as the 
minimum wages effective for FTZs which are usually higher than elsewhere 
in the economy. However, it should be noted that the wage setting 
mechanism operated by the 801 is a purely administrative device and has 
no statutory basis whatsoever. (Gunatilaka, 1999:35). There are no 
Wages Boards for covering informal sector employees. Accordingly, 
workers about 50-60 per cent of the workforce who are employed in 
industries such as pottery, china and earthenware production, jewellery and 
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gem cutting, agriculture, construction, and some services are not covered 
by the minimum wage legislation (IPS, 2003). Wages in such trades are 
determined in a more market oriented environment than formal sector 
wages. Rising costs of living, movements in the market prices of related 
products and general economic conditions usually influence the market 
conditions for wages in the informal sector. However, according to Siripala 
(1995) and Weerakoon (2003), it seems that wages of more than a half of 
the 5 million private sector work force are related in some way or other to 
minimum wage regulations in Sri Lanka. 
Interventionist viewers have shown that labour costs in Sri Lanka are 
excessively high by international standards. Kelly (1992) reports that in 
certain cases, nominal wages are fully indexed to the cost of living, and as 
a result their adjustment is inflationary which leads to a wage push. Also, 
there is a leadership of public sector wages for a significant component of 
wage earners. In this setting, this section first aims at assessing whether 
average wages paid in the Sri Lankan manufacturing sector are 
excessively high compared to the other countries in the region, and then to 
examine whether minimum wages have any impact on wage determination. 
There is anecdotal evidence that most private firms in the regulated sector 
pay above the minima set by the Wages Boards, except for trainees. But 
studies carried out on this subject by such as Rama (1994) and Kelly 
(1993) reported that the average earning for a worker was about two 
dollars a day in the period 1992/93, and the average wage in Sri Lanka 
was similar to those in other highly regulated South Asian countries, but 
lower than those in much more flexible East Asian countries (Rama, 1994). 
This conclusion is further substantiated by the more recent figures shown in 
table - 6.4. Accordingly, Sri Lanka's wage cost is the lowest among the 
countries in the region. 
Having observed that Sri Lanka's average wages are low by international 
standards, we can see how minimum wage regulations affect wage 
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determination. As discussed in the literature review chapter, those 
(interventionists) who make out that there are broader benefits of labour 
market regulation indicating among other things, that minimum wages in 
most of the countries show a declining trend in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Consequently, when testing the effect of minimum wage regulation on 
wage determination in Sri Lanka, first of all we can examine whether Sri 
Lanka's minimum wages have gone down or not over the period 
concerned. Data in the first column in table - 6.2 show that average 
minimum wages in the sector of Industry and Commerce have increased 
throughout the reform period. But the behaviour of the minimum wage and 
consumer price indexes during the last two decades or so indicates that the 
real minimum wage has not increased. For example, from 1978 to 1998 
after introducing open economic policies the index number of minimum 
wages has increased only by 8 times from 100.0 in 1978 to 807.7 in 1998 
(Labour Statistics, 1999: 43). Meanwhile, the Colombo Consumer Price 
Index (CCPI) has increased from 100.0 in 1978 to a 1000.3 level in 1998 
indicating a 1 O times increase over this time (CBSL, 2002). Thus, 
comparison between increases in minimum wage index and CCPI shows 
that nominal minimum wages have not been adjusted in line with rising 
inflation, resulting in lowering the real minimum wages of Industry and 
Commerce over the period after introducing economic reforms in 1977. In 
such a condition the minimum wages has not operated as a binding 
constraint to create any positive impact on increasing wages during the 
reform period. 
Labour market impacts of minimum wages, not surprisingly, depend heavily 
on the level at which they are set (Betcherman, 2002: 41 ). The most 
important matter is to examine how far minimum wages are closer to 
average wages, and thereby we can obtain a clearer idea of the effect of 
minimum wages on wage determination. For this purpose, we can 
estimate the ratio between minimum wages and average wages. 
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Where the trend of the ratio between minimum and average wages is 
concerned for the period 1985-98 (see column 3, table - 6.2), it shows a 
number of small fluctuations, with the ratio increasing from 1985 to 1989 
and again going down to some extent in the period 1990-91 and once more 
showing an upward trend in 1992 and then demonstrating a declining trend 
towards 1998. 
Table- 6.2 
Average Minimum Wage Rates and Average Earnings in the 
Manufacturing Sector from 1985 to 1998 
Year Average minimum Average earnings Ratio to minimum 
wage rates ( daily) (daily) Rs. wages / average 
Rs. wage (percentages) 
1985 19.91 42.87 46.4 
1986 25.32 45.42 55.8 
1987 29.86 50.03 59.0 
1988 32.69 57.00 57.3 
1989 36.07 63.44 56.9 
1990 41.76 82.10 50.9 
1991 50.78 100.51 50.5 
1992 56.91 104.83 54.3 
1993 60.34 116.77 51.9 
1994 61.50 134.64 45.7 
1995 70.10 145.35 48.2 
1996 75.10 151.16 49.7 
1997 77.74 166.30 46.8 
1998 82.08 174.17 47.1 
Average 51.44 102.47 51.5 
Source: Labour Statistics-1999, Department of Labour 
Note: Wage rates and earnings are for the skilled and unskilled workers of the 
Wages Board Trades. 
234 
Thus, by and large, the trend in the ratio between minimum and average 
wages over the period 1985-1998 shows a somewhat stable situation, 
albeit fluctuating slightly. However, the actual effect of minimum wage laws 
on the functioning of the labour market depends not only on the level of 
minimum wages but also on how efficiently the laws are enforced. The 
arrears of under payment of wages revealed at inspections carried out by 
the officials of the Department of Labour shows an increasing trend in 
arrears of under payments in Sri Lanka for the period 1990-1998. Further, 
over time it shows that the difference between average and minimum 
wages has been expanding (see figure - 6.1). This indicates that there is a 
diminishing effect of minimum wage on wage determination in Sri Lankan 
manufacturing industries. This trend is consistent with Rama's (1994) 
findings. He found that most private firms in the regulated sector pay 
wages near or above the minimum. 
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Next, the average ratio between minimum and average wages for the entire 
period (1985-1998) can be considered. It was 51.5 for the study period. 
(See table - 6.2). This ratio indicates that the average minimum wage is 
slightly higher than one-half of the average wage rate, indicating that the 
minimum wage compared to the average wage is considerably low in the 
period concerned. 
Also, depending on the data given by some micro-level studies we can 
calculate the minimum/ average wage ratio for the garment factories in the 
Free Trade Zones. The relevant ratio for the FTZ garment sector takes the 
value 1. O 1. The major reason for this higher ratio would be that wages in 
BOI firms are uniformly set by the BOI itself and are usually higher than 
elsewhere. Yet, Sri Lanka's international competitiveness is not hampered 
by the higher minimum wage levels and its influence to wage determination 
in FTZs since Sri Lanka's wages are the lowest in the region (see table -
6.4). 
However, according to the data presented by Heward's (1997 as cited in 
Gunatilaka, 1999) study on the 200 Garment Factory Programme (factories 
which were set up outside the FTZs), the ratio between minimum and 
average wages varies in relation to the districts where factories have been 
set up. For example, the ratio in districts such as Galle, Gampaha, 
Krunagela, Monaragala and Nuwaraeliya takes values of 0.86, 0.77, 0.89, 
0.92, and 0.86 respectively. These results show that in the districts which 
are closer to the metropolis of Colombo the ratio takes lower values, 
indicating average wages are higher than legal minimum wages and, 
therefore, in these districts the influence coming from minimum wages in 
determining wages is not very strong. Even in the Free Trade Zones itself 
minimum/ average wages ratios for other industries reports a lower ratio. 
For example, the ratio of tanning, footwear and leather goods Industry in 
the FTZ at Katunayake was 0.65 in 1998. 
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Moreover, Sri Lanka's minimum wage / average wage ratio can be 
compared with some other neighbouring countries for which relevant data 
is available (see table - 6.3). Compared with the corresponding ratios of 
The Philippines 58.3 and Thailand's 61.7 - 75.8, Sri Lanka's minimum/ 
average wage ratio is much less. But Sri Lanka's ratio (51.5) is as high as 
a little more than double of South Korea's ratio of 24.1. 
Table - 6.3 
Labour Market Regulations in Some Selected Asian Countries in the 
Period 1985-1998 
Country Are there Minimum Notice Severance Unionizatio 
minimum wage(% period for pay n(% of 
wage laws of dismissal (monthly labour 
average (days) wages) force) 
wage) 
Bangladesh Yes - 30 3 3 
Hong Kong No - n.s 2 20.9 
India Yes 
-
14-30 0 24 
Indonesia Yes - n.s 4 -
S.Korea Yes 24.1 30 - 17.2 
Malaysia No - 28-56 - 15 
Pakistan Yes - 30 2 10 
Philippines Yes 58.3 30 3 12 
Singapore No - 7-28 0 14 
Sri Lanka yes 51.5 * * 18.8 
Taiwan China Yes - 20-30 3 34.9 
Thailand Yes 61.7-75.8 n. s 6 1.6 
Source: World Employment Report, 1996/97 National Policies in a Global Context 
ILO and Department of Labour, Sri Lanka. 
* decided by the Commissioner of Labour depending on each case. 
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This has happened so not because Korean minimum wages are low but 
because of higher average wages paid by Korean firms. On the other 
hand, in comparison to some of the Latin American countries, Sri Lanka's 
minimum/ average wage percentage is considerably higher. For example, 
the corresponding ratios around the mid 1990s for Argentina, Mexico and 
Chile are 33.3 per cent, 23.3 per cent, and 15.6 per cent respectively 
(WER, 1996/97). One of the reasons for these countries to have a lower 
minimum / minimum average ratio is the trend of their minimum wages 
falling in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (ibid). 
Table-6.4 
Wage Indicators for Selected Countries 
Country 
Annual labour cost per worker Real manufacturing wage 
in manufacturing (US $) # index (1990=100) 
China 729* 130 (1996) 
Indonesia 1008 131 (1996) 
Malaysia 3429 125 (1995) 
Thailand 2705 125(1997) 
Argentina 7338 100 (1997) 
Chile 5822 67 (1997) 
Mexico 7607* 99 (1997) 
Bangladesh 671 NIA 
India 1192 75 (1995) 
Sri Lanka 604 98 (1997) 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2001; ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour 
Market 1999; World Bank 2000. 
# Figures for 1990-94 which include wages I salaries, other remuneration paid to 
employees, and employer contributions to social security programmes on behalf 
of workers. * Figures for 1995-99. 
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In this background, we can examine how distotionary Sri Lanka's legal 
minimum wages are. If the minimum / average wages ratio is greater than 
1, it indicates that the minimum wage is higher than the market wage and it 
indicates a fully distotionary situation. On the other hand, if this ratio is 
closer to zero, minimum wage regulations have a negligible impact on 
market wage determination and it indicates a situation free of distortion. 
Using this criterion we can analyse the distotionary pressure come from Sri 
Lanka's minimum wages. Since Sri Lanka's minimum / average wage ratio 
was 51.5 per cent for the reform period, Minimum wages are relatively not 
high enough to create any substantial influence on increasing wage rates. 
As a whole, although minimum wages apply to a half of the 5 million private 
sector work force in Sri Lanka through Wages Boards mechanism and 
collective bargaining agreements minimum wages are not set at a high rate 
to affect their wage determination. Also, evidence shows that most of the 
private firms in the regulated sector pay above the minima set by Wages 
Boards. Further, during the reform period the real minimum wages did not 
show an increasing trend, and, therefore, they have not operated as a 
binding constraint to increasing wages during the reform period, and this 
situation is further confirmed by demonstrating a trend of increasing 
difference between average and minimum wages during the reform period. 
This expanding gap between average and minimum wages indicates that 
there is a diminishing effect of minimum wages on wage determination in 
manufacturing industries in the reform period. Even the comparison with 
the Asian region countries shows that Sri Lanka's average wage remains 
fairly at a lower level than most of the countries in the region (see table -
6.4). Consequently, taking all these evidence into consideration, we can 
safely conclude that Sri Lanka's minimum wages do not have a substantial 
distortional effect on increasing the employers wage bill. 
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6.3.2 Employment Security Legislations 
The labour market effects of strong employment protection legislations 
have been questioned, particularly by advocates of the distortions view. 
Therefore, the real challenge everywhere is to find a balance between 
flexibility and protection (Betcherman, 2002: 3). In this background, we can 
examine how far employment security legislations in Sri Lanka relative to 
the selected countries in the Asian region increase non-wage labour costs 
to employers. Most of the other countries except Sri Lanka face very 
similar levels of costs in terms of such events as the period of notice given 
for dismissal and payments of severance pay. For example, the notice 
period given for dismissal of an employee varies from 7 days to 56 days 
among these countries: in Singapore it varies from 7 days to 28 days, 
whereas in Malaysia it varies from 28 days to 56 days, based on the length 
of the service of the employee in both countries. Also, the statutory 
redundancy payment per year of service in the countries in the region other 
than Sri Lanka are within the range of typical international practice (see 
table - 6.5). But, Sri Lanka provides no such certainty, and the payments 
are determined by the Commissioner of Labour at his desecration which 
can be much higher than the other countries in the region. 
Hence, the Sri Lanka's employment security situation relatively to the other 
countries in the region shows a big difference. In Sri Lanka firing 
restrictions are set by the Industrial Dispute Act (IDA) and the Termination 
of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA). The former, which regulates 
disciplinary dismissals, does not put unreasonable conditions on private 
sector firms other than the excessive length of time for the review process 
taken by the Commissioner of Labour (Rama, 1994). The TEWA, in turn, 
prevents any retrenchment of a permanent worker (on non-disciplinary 
ground) in a firm with 15 or more personnel without the written consent of 
the employee concerned or the prior written approval of the Commissioner 
of Labour. Since the consent requires generous severance pay, the TEWA 
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is seen as a major constraint by private firms (UNCTAD, 2004; World Bank, 
1993). 
Table-6.5 
Collective Redundancies: Statutory Requirements 
Country Administrative Authorisation Statutory 
Required Redundancy Payment 
per Year of Service 
Bangladesh No 30 days 
India Yes, if over 100 employees in 15 days 
enterprise. Not applicable to 
managerial or administrative 
employees. 
Malaysia No 10-20 days 
Pakistan Yes, if closing down or retrenching 20 days 
more than 50 per cent of workers 
Thailand No Approximately 30 days 
Viet Nam No 2 weeks 
Sri Lanka Yes, if over 15 employees Not fixed: case by case 
Source: ILO 2000. 
Under the TEWA the review process concerning dismissal generally takes 
several years, during which firms have to keep paying the wage bill. In the 
event of the dismissal of an employee, the amount of compensation that 
the employer is liable to pay for the worker's loss of employment is 
calculated by the Commissioner of Labour depending on the circumstances 
of each individual case. 
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For such calculations there was not a clear formula until the relevant 
regulation was amended in 2002. On most occasions, the quantum of 
compensation ordered is beyond the paying capacity of the employer. It 
would not only affect the liquidity of the enterprise but also the future of the 
remaining employees of the firm. Sometimes employers feel that it has 
been economical to retain the services of employees rather than make the 
payment of compensation. According to the UNCTAD (2004) Report on 
Investment Policy Review of Sri Lanka, employers estimate that at least 1 O 
per cent of the current private sector workforce continues to be employed 
because TEWA makes it impossible or too expensive to retrench them. 
Thus, Sri Lanka's employment security regulations and practices severely 
limit employers' ability to rationalise or restructure businesses, and, 
therefore, in this sense Sri Lanka's labour market is the most inflexible 
market compared to those in other countries in the region, and, as a result 
this situation adds a higher non-wage cost to employers in Sri Lanka. 
6.3.3 Holidays and Leave 
In Sri Lanka, the law stipulates five categories of non-working days such as 
the weekly rest day, annual leave, leave to vote at elections, maternity 
leave and statutory holidays. But the entitlement of workers to these days 
of leave varies from sector to sector (Gunatilaka, 1999). On the other 
hand, more importantly, there is a debate on the extent of leave for workers 
in Sri Lanka. The conventional view is that Sri Lankan workers are entitled 
to too many public holidays that impose high costs on employers. For 
example, 5 out of 6, including an exCentral Bank governor of Sri Lanka, 
who expressed their views on the question, 'are holidays for Sri Lanka too 
many ?' in the News Paper Supplement in the Sunday News Paper, 'Erida 
Lankadeepa' (20/04/2003), are of the opinion that there were too many 
holidays in Sri Lanka. 
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However, the one out of the 6 person panel who disagreed with every other 
view in confirming that Sri Lanka has too many holidays is an 
exCommissioner General of Labour. Furthermore, employers especially 
complain that excessive holidays cause periodic stoppages of work, and so 
constrain the ability of firms to respond rapidly to changing market 
conditions. For example, Amerasinghe (1992: 25-27) estimated that the 
number of non-working days (holidays plus leave) in most private sector 
establishments was 167 days per annum, which leaves only 197 days of 
work each year for working. Some other commentators do not agree with 
the conventional idea of there being too many holidays for Sri Lankan 
workers. According to Gunatilaka (1999), views on excess leave are based 
on a fundamental misinterpretation of the holidays and leave entitlements 
of workers in the private sector. Weerakoon (2003) points out that leave for 
the private sector employees in Sri Lanka is not extreme, and sometimes 
less than some of the neighbouring countries such as Singapore and 
Malaysia. 
However, the debate on the number of days of leave can be resolved by 
considering and comparing actual leave entitlements for different 
categories of workers, and comparing this data with those of other 
countries (see table - 6.6). According to table - 6.6, the problems of too 
many holidays can be seen mainly in the case of public sector employees 
who are on holiday for about half of the year. The next category of 
employees who get the second highest amount of leave is those in the 
Shops and Office category. The third highest holiday beneficiaries are 
those benefiting de facto from the 1972 Extension Order. Plantation 
workers have the least number of non-working days, followed closely by 
workers in the 'Other Trades' category which include garment sector 
workers. 
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Table- 6.6 
Current Annual Holidays and Leave Entitlements of Sri Lankan 
Workers 
Shops Plantation Other Workers Public 
& Trade Trade affected by sector (covered (covered 1972 
by Wages by extension 
Boards) Wages Order 
Boards) (covered by 
Wages 
Boards) 
Holidays 
weekly rest 78 52 52 52 104 
statutory (paid) 8 3 8 8 10 
poya days (unpaid) 12 12 12 12 12 
Total holidays 98 67 72 72 126 
Leave 
Annual (paid) 22 22 22 22 32 
Sick /casual (paid) 7 0 0 28 21 
Total leave 29 22 22 50 53 
Total non-working 
days per annum 127 89 94 122 179 
Total working days 
per annum 238 276 271 243 186 
Source: Siripala 1995; EFC Handbook 1994 
Note that neither of these latter groups of workers is entitled to sick or 
casual leave, and that their total leave entitlement amounts to two thirds of 
that of workers in Shops and Offices, and a little less than a third of what 
public sector workers are entitled to. These two groups (Plantation and 
Other Trades workers) account for the highest percentage of private sector 
employees. 
But contrary to the Sri Lankan situation, Singaporean and Malaysian 
private sector workers are entitled to sick and casual leave as well. In fact, 
they are entitled to 60 days paid leave if hospitalised and otherwise 14 to 
21 days paid sick leave for a year (Weerakoon, 2003). 
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The size of the Sri Lankan work force is 7 million, out of which 5 million is in 
the private sector. The workers in this sector are entitled to 14 days annual 
leave and 22 days of paid holiday leave per annum (see table - 6.7). 
As a whole, evidences presented so far prove that although public sector 
workers have excessive holidays the majority of employees in the private 
sector in Sri Lanka have a much lesser number of holidays per annum. 
Having made clear the debate over too many holidays, we can next 
compare Sri Lankan private sector workers annual leave and paid public 
holidays with those of a few of other countries in the region depending on 
data availability. The data in table - 6. 7 reveal that China does not give a 
single day of paid annual leave while 15 days of such leave is given in The 
Philippines. Sri Lanka's annual leave for the private sector industrial 
workers is 14 days, and therefore it is not excessive (see column 1, table -
6. 7). Then, where the paid public holidays for the private sector industrial 
workers are concerned Sri Lankan workers enjoy the highest number of 
paid public holidays (22 days for a year) among the sample countries (see 
column 2, table - 6. 7). 
When this highest paid public holidays for the private sector workers, as 
compared to the neighbouring countries, is taken together with the 
extremely excessive public sector leave, they highly hamper private sector 
business activities in Sri Lanka. In the public holidays, the government 
offices, customs, banks, insurance companies and so on, which are 
essential for business activities, do not work, which suggests that the 
private sector work, particularly involved with international trade, is largely 
held up due to public holidays. Further, the Banking sector itself is entitled 
to 28 public holidays per year (Gunatilaka, 1999: 41 ). In this background, 
employers complain that intermittent public holidays encourage 
absenteeism and force the periodic stoppage of work. Also, in the mid-
week public holidays, transport facilities are also not sufficiently available 
for workers to come to work without delay. 
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Table - 6.7 
Annual Leave and Public Holidays in Selected Asian Countries 1995 -
2002 
Country Annual leave Paid public Hours per week in 
(days) holidays manufacturing 
Bangladesh 12 16 N/A 
Pakistan 14 10 N/A 
China None 7 N/A 
India 12 8 46.2 
Indonesia 12 12 N/A 
Malaysia 9 17 N/A 
Thailand 6 13 50.5 
Philippines 15 11 48.8 
Sri Lanka 14 22 49.5 
Source: ILO, Working time around the world, Vol. 14, 1995, Gunatilake, 1999, 
Weerakoon, 20 03. 
However, the average number of hours of work per week in manufacturing 
is roughly the same in Sri Lanka as in the other countries in the region (see 
column 3, table - 6.7). Nevertheless, as a whole, the international 
comparison is much less favourable to Sri Lanka as regards leave 
entitlement of Sri Lankan workers, and therefore it is possible to conclude 
that this situation obviously increases labour cost to employers. 
6.3.4 Maternity Leave 
Legal provisions relating to maternity benefits of Sri Lankan female workers 
are set out in three sets of regulations; the Maternity Benefits Ordinance 
(Amendment) No. 43 of 1985 which applies to women workers employed in 
the operative grades, the Shop and Office Employees' (Amendment) Act 
No. 44 of 1985 which applies to non-operative grades, and Establishment 
246 
Code - Public Administration (a) Circular No. 22/1989 amended by Circular 
No. 13/1995 which applies to public sector workers (Gunatilaka, 1999). 
Although slight differences are seen among sectors, by and large, 
entitlements to maternity benefits are similar across the sectors. The 
entitlements to maternity benefits are generally in keeping with ILO 
Convention No. 103 which stipulates at least 12 weeks maternity leave. In 
fact, prior to 1985 maternity leave was only for a 6 week period, and it was 
extended to 12 weeks from 1985 (but implemented in the private sector 
from 1987). Unless we compare the maternity leave facilities available for 
female workers in Sri Lanka with those in the other countries, we cannot 
decide whether or not Sri Lankan maternity leave and other facilities 
increase the non-wage cost to employers. Data in table - 6.8 help making 
such a comparison. Accordingly, Indonesia gives the shortest period of 
maternity leave (45 days) while Vietnam gives the longest period of 
maternity leave (up to 180 days). Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh offers an equal period of maternity leave (84 days). With the 
marriage age increasing and with diminishing birth rates, Sri Lanka's 
existing maternity costs to employers will be reducing. In this respect, Sri 
Lanka appears to enjoy a more advantageous situation compared to 
neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan where 
marriage ages are lower than those of Sri Lanka, and birth rates are much 
higher than those of Sri Lanka. 
Further, countries like Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam offer some 
additional cash payments. But in Sri Lanka there are no special cash 
benefits associated with maternity leave other than the payment of the 
regular salary. Where the nursing interval facility is concerned, such a 
facility is not given in Bangladesh, India, and Thailand among the sample 
countries. Countries other than India and Malaysia give only light work to 
those who are pregnant. 
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Table- 6.8 
Maternity Benefits in Selected Asian Countries, 1994-1998 
Country Leave Payment Nursing Working 
intervals conditions 
Bangladesh 42 days 100 % of wage from None Lighter 
employer work 
Cambodia 90 days 100 % of wage & bonus 1 hour or 2 half Lighter 
from employer hours work 
China 90days 100 % of wage from 2 half hours Light work 
employer 
India 84 days 100 % of wage from None No 
employer condition 
Indonesia 45 days 100 % of wage from Yes (no time Light work 
employer specified) 
Malaysia At least60 100 % wage from None No 
days employer condition 
Thailand 90 days 100 % ofwage-50 % of None Light work 
including wage from employer and 
annual the rest is from social 
leave security 
Vietnam 120 to 180 100 % wage and additional 1 hour Light work 
depending allowance of one month 
on nature wage for first 2 children all 
of work from social insurance fund 
Sri Lanka 84 days 100 % of wage from 1 hour or 2 half Light work 
employer hours 
Source: Employers' Federation, Handbook, 1996; Gunatilaka, 1999; ILO, Conditions of Work 
Digest: Maternity and Work, 1994 
Thus, as a whole, when Sri Lanka's duration of maternity leave and other 
related facilities are compared with those of other countries, facilities given 
to Sri Lankan female workers are by no means excessive. 
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Thus, the maternity leave and other related benefits do not therefore seem 
to be a factor that increases non-wage cost of employment in Sri Lanka. 
6.3.5 Social Security and Other Non-wage Labour Costs 
Non-wage labour costs include social security contributions and non-wage 
benefits - such as housing, health care, pensions, subsidised transportation 
and meals, and family allowances (Agenor, 1996: 280). Many countries 
maintain different types of social security programmes to ensure the 
workers welfare, but in certain cases these programmes add some 
excessive cost to employers, lessening their degree of competitiveness 
(see table - 6.9). 
Social security programmes are more common in developed countries than 
developing countries. Where countries in the Asian region are concerned 
in relation to the payment of unemployment benefits and family allowances, 
only Hong Kong runs both these programmes. Half of the countries in table 
- 6.8 have sickness and maternity allowance schemes while all the 
countries maintain work injury schemes. In this setting, where the Sri 
Lankan situation is concerned, Sri Lankan firms do not offer any special 
cash benefit in the case of sickness and maternity, and also do not have 
unemployment and family allowance schemes and, therefore, in terms of 
those schemes, Sri Lanka's non-wage cost to employers is zero (see 
appendix - 5). 
Then, under social security programmes, rates of social security 
contributions from workers and employers vary greatly from country to 
country. In many countries of the region, Employee Provident Fund (EPF) 
schemes operate as the major social security programme. In Sri Lanka, 
there are two types of social security schemes; the EPF and Employers' 
Trust Fund (ETF). In the case of the EPF, both employers and employees 
have to make contributions while only employers contribute to the ETF, and 
therefore, it is considered as an unusual vehicle (UNCTAD, 2004). 
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Where the highest combined contribution of an employer and an employee 
for the EPF is concerned South Korea contributes 42.9 per cent, then, 
Singapore contributes 40.0 per cent and Sri Lanka with the contribution of 
27.5 per cent occupies the third highest place in the region. The provident 
fund shares that only the employer has to pay in South Korea, Singapore, 
and Sri Lanka vary as 39.0, 20.0 and 19.5 percent respectively (see table -
6.9). 
Table -6.9 
Social Security and Non-Wage Labour Costs of Some Selected Asian 
Countries 
Country TLFSSB Worker(% TLFSSB Employer(% TLFSSB 
of earning) of payroll) Total(%) 
Bangladesh - - -
Hong Kong - - -
India Up to 11.5 Up to 14.7 Up to 26.2 
Indonesia 2.0 Up to 11.7 Up to 13.7 
S.Korea Up to 3.9 Up to 39.0 Up to 42.9 
Malaysia 10.5 13.8 24.3 
Pakistan 0.0 12.0 12.0 
Philippines 4.6 7.3 11.9 
Singapore 20.0 20.0 40.0 
Sri Lanka 8.0 Up to 19.5 Up to 27.5 
Taiwan, 
Up to 9.0 Up to 13.6 Up to 22.6 
China 
Thailand 1.5 Up to 3.5 Up to 5.0 
Source: Wortd Employment Report (1996/97), National Policies in A Global Context, ILO and 
Department of Labour, Sri Lanka. 
TLFSSB = Total Levies for Financing Social Security Benefits 
250 
These figures indicate that Sri Lanka's employers' contribution is lower than 
only that of South Korea and Singapore. But if the Sri Lankan employers' 
liability of paying the ETF (3 % of an employee's wage) is added to their 
share of the provident fund contribution, the cost of social security payment 
for Sri Lankan employers would be higher even than that of Singaporean 
employers. Compared to the cost to the employer in relation to other social 
security programs such as sickness and maternity, unemployment and 
family allowances, the cost of EPF contribution is much higher since such a 
contribution has to be made continuously for each and every employee 
until the employee leaves the organisation. Consequently, if employers 
have to pay a higher contribution to the provident fund, it obviously leads to 
lessening their competitiveness. In Sri Lanka, within the reform period, 
shares of contribution made to the EPF increased on a few occasions. 
Even the new schemes such as ETF (1980) and Payments of Gratuities 
Act (1983) were introduced within the reform period. Therefore, where 
these occurrences are concerned we can conclude that labour cost has 
increased during the reform period. 
The claim that employment and wage rigidities induced by excessive labour 
market regulation hamper the competitive position of developing countries 
can also be examined by looking at the macroeconomic trends in these 
countries. During the 1980s manufacturing output declined in many 
developing countries as a result of the debt crises and consequent 
problems of stabilization and adjustment (ILO, 1998/99). If employment 
security and other legislation were a real problem and an effective barrier to 
adjustment, this would show up in slow or lagged adjustment in 
employment in response to declines in output. But, in Sri Lanka, such an 
adjustment was not possible to be made mainly because of the rigidities of 
some labour laws such as the TEWA (1971) which does not allow worker 
retrenchment without having the Labour Commissioner's permission. On 
the other hand, it has been pointed out especially by the Employers 
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Federation that they are unable to adjust wages when facing unexpected 
shocks since minimum wages are set by Wages Boards and because of 
credible strike threat by unions for adjusting wages. Thus, in Sri Lanka, the 
movements in employment are not adequately responsive to the 
movements in output. This phenomenon is in contrast to most of the other 
countries where periods of declines in manufacturing output are 
accompanied by declines in employment. Therefore, these evidence 
shows that the Sri Lankan labour market is the most inflexible labour 
market with a high cost of labour adjustment in the Asian region. 
6.3.6 Industrial Relations 
In spite of the continuing trend from the middle of the 19th century to bring 
about labour legislation and to set up a dispute settlement mechanism, 
from time to time there have been a large number of industrial disputes and 
labour uproars which imposed a significant cost on the economy, 
particularly on account of productivity lost through wasting a large number 
of person-days (see table 6.9). However, it can be seen that in the period 
1972-1993 industrial relations were relatively peaceful. Such an industrial 
peace for the period 1977 - 93 was mainly brought about by repressive 
labour practices implemented by the Government during that period, rather 
than from the weakening of the forces of industrial conflicts (Gunatilaka, 
1999; Athukorala, 1996; Rama, 1994). In the period 1977-93, private sector 
firms did not face significant cost in terms of labour conflicts, and it was 
reported that less than O. 5 per cent of all the private sector workers went on 
strike in any single year in this period (Rama, 1994: 8). Also, the number of 
unions registered with the Commissioner of Labour declined between 1977 
and 1993. 
However, a surge of unrest occurred just after changing the repressed 
labour regime with the change of the government in 1994. The number of 
strikes increased with corresponding increase in number of days lost due to 
strikes. For example, the average number of days lost per year in the 
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period 1990-93 increased from 14,973 to 203,476 in the subsequent period 
of 1994-99 (see table - 6.10). During this period the number of trade 
unions registered with the Commissioner of Labour increased also. Thus, 
the failure of the labour regulations is evident not only from the occurrence 
of a large number of industrial disputes but also from the trend of the 
increasing rate of non-compliance with labour laws in all spheres of labour 
activities. Hence, as pointed out by Amarasinghe (1998), legal statutes 
and control alone cannot improve relations between capital and labour. 
Table - 6.10 
Man Days Lost Due to Strikes in Private Sector Industries 
Year Average number of man days lost per year 
1962-64 518,727 
1965-66 62,152 
1967-68 275,218 
1969 58,015 
1970-71 260,507 
1972-83 30,455 
1984 123,642 
1985-88 6155 
1989 813,269 
1990-93 14,973 
1994-99 203,476 
Source: Department of Labour, Sri Lanka. 
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The aforementioned data prove that existing labour regulations and 
practices have largely failed to promote good relations between employees 
and employers, and have made the Sri Lankan labour market inflexible. 
Commentators emphasise several reasons for industrial relations in Sri 
Lanka to be volatile from the initial period. In Gunatilaka's (1999) view, 
these reasons have been mutually reinforcing each other. A key factor 
identified in the literature for the failure to develop a cordial industrial 
relations system is the heavy reliance on state intervention through statute 
rather than on the mechanism of collective bargaining to equalise the 
unequal bargaining powers between labour and capital. In Sri Lanka, the 
collective bargaining tradition is not sufficiently developed and widespread 
(Amarasinghe, 1992). Representatives of employer federations very often 
point out that the Wages Boards Mechanism is a hindrance rather than a 
device for development of collective bargaining. In practice, Wages Boards 
prescribe minimum standards in relation to holidays, leave, wages and 
overtime rates on behalf of employees without allowing employees 
themselves to be involved in collective negotiations on these subjects. As 
a result, employees feel that their terms are decided elsewhere and their 
relationship with their employers is only to render service in return for what 
the State guarantees to them, through Wages Boards. The other 
disincentive for not creating peaceful labour relations comes from delays in 
the Labour Tribunal system, and, as a result, what is left is an industrial 
relations system which generates industrial conflicts rather than industrial 
peace. 
Sound industrial relations on the other hand depend heavily on mutual trust 
and confidence between the two social partners, employees and 
employers. But in Sri Lanka, there has not been such a tradition of 
developing mutual trust. The confrontational attitude initially emerged from 
the fact that the businesses were in the hands of the colonial power and 
the working class was of local origin, and then it developed to a class 
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conflict owing to the Marxist political leaders' influence. This situation led to 
developing antagonistic and uncooperative trade union movement in Sri 
Lanka. These adversarial relationships continued in the subsequent eras 
without any change. However, the trade unions as an independent 
movement in Sri Lanka are weak because they are fragmented along 
occupational, ethnic and ideological lines; and lack a common, collective 
identity. These characteristics stimulated trade union leaders to depend on 
politicians to win their demands. As Kearney (1971, 169-170) confirms, Sri 
Lankan trade unions have the Marxist approach to have party leaders as 
trade union leaders. He further identifies that other parties followed the 
same practice. Schregle (1982) too, confirms that most trade unions are 
appendages of political parties. This situation led to the developing of a 
militant trade union movement in Sri Lanka, stimulating workers and unions 
to resort to violence and unlawful activities when they are involved in 
industrial disputes such as strikes and so on. For example, a recent 
Central Bank survey on 'Industrial Relations and Productivity in 
Manufacturing' confirms this trend. Accordingly, civil law violations by 
strikers have increased from 16 cases in 1991 /93 to 24 in 1994/96 in 801 
and Non-801 companies (CBSL, 1996). Meanwhile, from the earlier period 
through the trade unions militancy a considerable amount of rights of the 
workers have been achieved, but at the cost of weakening the employer-
employee relationship. 
On the other hand, the management styles and attitudes of the majority of 
the employers too have not been conducive to developing good relations 
with employees. Gunatilaka (1999: 97) has identified that the majority of 
managers rely on archaic management practices which depend on social 
class, deferential behaviour and anti-union discrimination to 'control' rather 
than to 'manage' labour. These attitudes lead to developing harsh and 
exploitative management practices, and ultimately they emerge as the root 
cause for violent disputes. 
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Employers evade their statutory obligations on a significant scale and 
actively prevent the forming of unions. Older firms that are members of the 
Employers Federation generally comply with labour statutes and have built 
up considerable skills in bargaining and negotiating with trade unions, but 
even among the Federation's membership, around 30 per cent of the firms 
do not have unions (ibid, 1999). In this background the struggle for union 
recognition has generated a large number of disputes. For example, it has 
been estimated that as many as 70-80 per cent of strikes in any one year 
are really over the issue of union recognition. These trends suggest that 
many managers have not realised the role that trade unions can play in 
upholding industrial peace. 
However, the managers' fear of forming trade unions can be justified on 
certain grounds. They are opposed to unions which have links with parent 
unions outside the work place, stating that outsiders will use the unions to 
achieve their own (political) objectives. This was recognised as far back as 
1967 by the Committee of Inquiry into the Law and Practice of the Trade 
Unions Ordinance, which recommended that the Trade Unions Ordinance 
be amended to limit union officers to persons employed in the industry or 
trade in which the union is involved (Sessional Papers 28, 1967:25-26). 
Under this background managers suggest alternatively forming in-house 
unions. 
With this background, the majority of employers in Sri Lanka's business 
sector seem to think that maintaining good industrial relations on the shop 
or factory floor and increasing productivity levels is a matter for the 
government (through the repression of workers rights and legislative 
reforms), rather than for the managers themselves (Gunatilaka, 1999). But 
this line of thinking appears in contrast with what is happening in 
managerial practices in other fast developing countries. For example, in a 
country like Japan more emphasis is placed on work culture through 
cultivating favourable attitudes among all the agents of organisations for 
256 
their smooth functioning to ensure a higher productivity levels. Thus, to 
survive and prosper in the new economic climate with increasing 
competition due to globalisation, firms will have to increase productivity 
through constructive dialogue with workers and unions by adopting a 
management style that embraces participation, improving work culture, and 
promote a system that favours bargaining based on mutual interests 
between employers and employees at an enterprise level. However, 
Chandratilake's (1997) survey shows that there is now an emerging trend 
of instituting team leadership style of management by a number of export-
oriented firms as well as some local firms in Sri Lanka. 
Moreover, it appears that governments too had not taken any meaningful 
steps after the introduction of 1977 economic reforms to move towards an 
industrial relations system which is less reliant on legal controls and which 
promotes voluntary bargaining although it appears that this should be the 
need of the day (Gunatilaka, 1999: 100). As early as 1979, the 
government presented a White Paper on Employment, emphasising the 
reforms to be made in the industrial relations system, but nothing came of 
it. Then, in later governments policy documents too, somewhat lesser 
emphasis had been made about the need for improving industrial relations. 
In contrast to this trend, it seems that the present government (2001) has 
declared a more elaborated policy to improve the industrial relations 
system in the country. Accordingly, the government has recognised that 
the rigidities of the present labour relations framework and the adversarial 
approach of the industrial relations system have brought about negative 
results so far, resulting in an adverse impact on the attraction of 
employment-oriented investments both foreign and local and the 
productivity growth of enterprises. 
Thus, it seems that now the government has clearly understood the 
importance of improvement of a good industrial relations system for 
achieving industrial peace rather than depending solely on labour laws. 
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Yet the State did very little or nothing to persuade labour and management 
to move towards developing a more constructive relationship which helps 
settling disputes in an amicable, smooth and expeditious manner and 
thereby ensure smooth functioning of the labour market. These 
aforementioned trends indicate that proper measures, even after following 
open economic policies for more than a two and a half decades period, are 
not taken either by the government side or the employers' side or the 
unions' side to increase labour market flexibility in Sri Lanka. 
As a whole, the analysis made in this chapter shows that almost all the 
labour regulations imposed in the controlled regime have continued to be 
followed without any change in the reform period also. In addition, 13 new 
labour laws, giving more rights and facilities to workers, have been 
introduced within the reform period, making the labour market more 
inflexible. Even the system of industrial relations evolved prior to the 1977 
economic reforms has not seen any improvement to be consistent with the 
opened economic policies. Also the international comparison of Sri 
Lanka's critical labour laws shows that certain laws are much more 
stringent than the corresponding laws of the countries in the Asian region. 
Hence, the evidence presented in this chapter does not support the 
hypothesis - 'the cost of labour market distortions has decreased during 
the economic reform period'. Thus, it is possible to conclude safely that 
contrary to expectation, the degree of labour market distortions has not 
reduced irrespective of following liberalised economic policies for a period 
of more than two decades since the 1977 economic reforms. 
6.4 Summary 
The Sri Lankan labour market is highly regulated. Yet, the comparison of 
selected labour regulations with the other countries in the region shows 
only some labour regulations currently in force are having a high level of 
distortional effect on employment generation. 
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Accordingly, the minimum wage regulations in Sri Lanka do not have a 
positive impact on increasing employers cost of labour. But, quite the 
opposite impact on the cost of labour could be seen arising from the 
regulations related to the employment security, contributions to social 
security programmes, and the private sector and public sector holidays and 
leave. Although impediments produced by these latter labour regulations 
have been apparent for a long period nothing has been done until 2002 to 
change them. Instead, a number of new labour regulations have been 
enacted during the reform period offering more benefits and rights to 
employees. Further, it has been found that the weak industrial relations 
system too has imposed a tremendous cost, particularly in terms of losing 
out an increasing number of days due to strikes, and inability to acquire a 
higher level of productivity. Thus, employee-employer relations have not 
shown any improvement from the controlled era to be consistent with the 
open economic policy regime. Consequently, the evidence does not 
support the second hypothesis, - 'the cost of labour market distortions has 
decreased during the economic reform period'. Therefore, the chapter 
concludes that the cost of labour market distortions has increased during 
the reform period after 1977, suggesting that this phenomenon has 
retarded labour demand substantially in the reform period. 
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Chapter - 7 
Financial Liberalisation and its Impact on capital 
Market Distortions 
7 .1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with an explanation of how the Sri Lanka's financial 
market was first disturbed by abandoning the laissez faire economic 
policies from the late 1950s, and thereafter increasing the capital market 
distortions through government intervention in financial market activities 
until 1977. Then, the chapter goes on to explain the measures taken under 
the 1977 economic reform policy package to liberalise the domestic 
financial market. Next, the chapter presents extensive empirical evidence 
to show the degree of capital market distortions prevailed before the 1977 
economic reforms, and how far these distortions have been lessened 
subsequently by the financial market reforms in order to test the hypothesis 
- 'financial market liberalisation under economic reforms since 1977 has 
lessened the capital market distortions'. 
7 .2 Background for Rising Capital Market Distortions 
Sri Lanka, even after obtaining the political independence from the British 
colonial rule in 1948, followed laissez faire economic policies until the late 
1950s. During this era, especially before 1961 Sri Lanka's banking system 
was dominated by foreign commercial banks. In this period, although the 
financial market was not repressed, the banking sector was confined to 
organised sectors such as plantations, import and export sectors, and a 
few other trading activities in the Colombo city. An unorganised money 
market operated in other spheres of activities which provided short-term 
funds at a higher rate of interest (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1994). 
260 
However, from the late 1950s the country stopped following laissez faire 
economic policies on account of the continuous deterioration of the 
country's terms of trade. Also, contemporaneously, the political power 
shifted from the right wing to left wing political parties which further 
prompted government intervention in all spheres of activities in the ensuing 
period. Accordingly, the largest commercial bank, the Bank of Ceylon, was 
nationalised in 1961. In the same year, a new commercial bank under the 
government's control, the People's Bank, was formed to meet the financial 
needs of the rural people. The opening of new foreign bank branches and 
new accounts in foreign banks was prohibited. These actions, along with 
imposition of exchange control regulation due to increasing balance of 
payments problems, completely insulated the domestic financial sector 
from international capital markets from the early 1960s, and this state 
continued until 1977 (ibid, 1994). The two state-commercial banks with the 
monopoly power extended to them grew rapidly, spreading their branches 
even to the rural sector. In addition, the private sector insurance 
companies that functioned so far were stopped and the monopoly of 
insurance activities was given to the government Insurance Corporation 
from 1964 onwards. So, by the mid 1960s a large and growing percentage 
of industrial, trade, and agricultural sector activities became under state 
control. 
The period 1970-77 was characterised by further government intervention 
in the economy. In 1972, the government set up the National Savings 
Bank (NSB). By the mid 1970s the NSB accounted for over 50 per cent of 
total savings and time deposits mobilised through institutional sources. 
There was also an Employee's Provident Fund (EPF) that functioned from 
1958. The NSB and the EPF have been useful sources of captive funds for 
the government throughout this period. Nevertheless, the stock market 
activities decreased during the controlled era with the total share turnover 
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declining to Rs. 2.5 million in 1975 from Rs. 19.8 million in 1952 
(Karunatilake, 1991). This weakening in stock market activities is attributed 
in the literature to various forms of restrictions imposed on the private 
sector in this period. 
Thus, under dirigiste policies followed from the late 1950s Sri Lanka's 
currency was highly overvalued and the financial sector was extremely 
repressed by the mid 1970s. There was little room for independent 
financial intermediation. In fact, pervasive restrictions on the financial 
system produced a process of financial disintermediation. For example, 
the degree of financial intermediation measured by the M2 / GNP ratio 
declined or remained stagnant in most years by 1977 in comparison to that 
of the early 1960s (Khatkhate, 1982). In this background, two major state-
owned commercial banks held 82 per cent (in value) of all deposits in the 
banking system by the mid 1970s. Also, almost 60 per cent of the total 
credit extended by all financial market institutions was directly absorbed for 
budgetary purposes (Lee, 1987), and the balance was rationed in favour of 
preferred institutions, mostly to cover losses made by inefficient public 
corporations, and priority sectors under sector-specific lower interest rates. 
Under these policies the public sector expanded significantly. For example, 
by 1977, the share of GDP produced by the public sector had risen to 20.0 
per cent from 5. 7 per cent in 1961 (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 1991 ). 
Correspondingly, there was a relative contraction of the private sector 
activity in this period. In this setting the financial market remained highly 
repressed in following a regulated interest policy. This policy basically led 
to rationing credit at artificially low interest rates, which among other things, 
distorted capital market and encouraged increase in capital intensity in 
production in both the public and the private sectors, limiting employment 
creation and income distribution. This depressing economic performance 
experienced under highly controlled trade policies, with the maintaining of 
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an extremely repressed domestic financial market, paved the way for 
switching over to more open and market-oriented policies from 1977 
onwards. 
7 .3 Financial market liberalisation in Sri Lanka 
Financial market liberalisation in Sri Lanka was introduced as a part of an 
extensive package of economic liberalisation introduced in 1977 which 
included a series of far-reaching reforms such as trade liberalisation, 
significant exchange rate realignment, export promotion, new incentives for 
foreign investors, the limiting of the public sector participation, removal of 
price controls and government monopolies, and overhauling of financial 
markets (ibid, 1991 ). Thus, it can be considered that Sri Lanka 
commenced both trade and financial market reforms together. 
The major emphasis in financial market reforms were concerned with 
correcting negative real interest rates that appeared in the controlled 
regime before 1977. Accordingly, the bank rate was raised from 8.5 per 
cent to 1 o per cent in 1978, and this was followed by a sharp increase in 
interest rates on deposits at the government-owned National Savings Bank 
(NSB). Commercial banks followed suit. However, by 1980, due to rising 
inflation, real interest rates again became negative. The government 
responded to this situation by increasing NSB rates again. Since then, 
interest rates on deposits have been freely determined with the Treasury 
bill rate serving as the lowest limit and the deposit rates of the National 
Savings Bank (NSB) as the upper limit (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 1994). 
In the area of institutional reforms, foreign banks were allowed to set up 
branches in Sri Lanka. These new banks could increase their share of total 
bank deposits from 5 per cent in 1980 to 15 per cent in 1983. However, 
the share of commercial banks in total assets of the capital market 
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institution declined in the ensuing period with the rapid expansion in the 
operations of non-banking financial institutions, notably finance companies, 
foreign currency banking units (FCBUs}, leasing companies, and the 
Development Finance Corporation. These developments in banking and 
rapid expansion of other financial institutions create a background for some 
competition in deposit mobilisation and interest rates. An active inter-bank 
market also emerged (ibid, 1994). However, easing the financial 
repression from 1977 onwards reduced the pre-eminence of the two state-
commercial banks only marginally, and, therefore, in this background it is 
necessary to examine how far the measures taken under the financial 
market reforms lessened the financial market distortions in the subsequent 
period. This is done in the next section through developing some 
theoretical framework in order to analyse the issue depending on empirical 
evidence. 
7 .3.1. Theoretical Framework for Evaluating Financial Liberalisation 
Many commentators emphasise that financial liberalisation is critical for the 
success of trade reforms, and, therefore, it should be carried out in 
coordination with financial liberalisation, particularly with domestic financial 
market reforms 1. The term 'financial liberalisation' refers to any action to 
remove or reduce 'financial repression' and 'financial restrictions'. 
Financial repression occurs when the financial sector is not allowed to 
function according to the interplay of market forces (Chowdhury and Islam, 
1.Michaely et al. (1991) define trade liberalisation as a process of removing or reducing 
the implicit premium associated with quantitative restrictions (induding rationing in the 
case of price controls) that prevent individuals from carrying out the transactions they wish 
to undertake at prevailing (world market) prices. Thus, it is expected that trade 
liberalisation eliminates discrimination against exports and efficient import substituting 
activities and encourages a better allocation of resources. 
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1993) maintain a wide wedge between lending and borrowing, even if they 
are allowed to charge market rates (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1983; Fry, 
1989). The advocates of financial liberalisation highlight that in coordination 
with trade liberalisation, reforms of domestic financial markets can play a 
crucial role on both the demand and supply sides to make trade 
liberalisation a success (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 1991 ). As 
emphasised by these researchers the demand side complementarity of the 
financial market is related to the adjustment of the real exchange rates (the 
relative prices of traded to non-traded goods) following trade liberalisation. 
Depreciation of an overvalued exchange rate is a major undertaking of any 
liberalisation agenda, and it makes the real exchange rate move closer to 
the equilibrium market rate, encouraging a shift of resources to the 
production of tradeables. 
Therefore, sustaining real exchange rate around market equilibrium level is 
essential if the gains from liberalisation are to be enduring. Upholding such 
price competition is difficult because at the same time, trade liberalisation 
has favourable output and employment effects to raise aggregate demand 
through increasing demand for non-tradeables which may deteriorate the 
current account and thereby appreciate the real exchange rate (ibid, 1991 ). 
But if domestic financial market reforms increase the negative or low 
interest rate towards the market rate, as advocates of financial liberalisation 
argue, premature appreciation of the exchange rate can be avoided. Thus, 
if the financial regime is free from repression, the impact of an increase on 
income generated by trade liberalisation will lead to a stronger demand for 
traded goods. 
The final outcome of this process will be avoiding overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate, and thereby making sure of sustaining the gains from 
liberalisation (ibid, 1991 ). 
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On the supply side, the domestic financial market influences factor mobility 
through its impact on both the volume and allocation of credit. Therefore, 
funds should be channelled from inefficient sectors such as government 
and government priority sectors to the most efficient sector, mainly to the 
private sector. In other words, the direction of channelling finance 
occurring under repressed financial markets should be reversed. 
Increasing the real interest rate through the domestic financial market 
reforms over the sum of real rate of return on capital and the real resources 
cost of financial intermediation, can increase the financial deepening, 
leading to an expansion in the volume of institutional credit which was 
highly contracted under financial repression (ibid, 1991 ). 
However, by examining time series data of 56 developed and developing 
countries Jung (1986) has found only moderate support for supply-leading 
relationships. According to Jung, in the early stage of development, the 
financial sector is more important in facilitating transactions (demand-
following) than intermediations (supply-leading), and financial development 
consists more of substitution from currency to non-currency financial assets 
than of substitution from real to financial assets as implied by the McKinnon 
hypothesis. On the other hand, evidence on the supposed link between 
financial developments and savings performance is not overwhelming. For 
example, during 1971-80, India and Indonesia, with more repressed 
financial markets, could maintain more or less similar savings ratios to 
East-Asian NIEs which performed spectacularly in mobilising domestic 
savings, especially since 1970 with more liberalised financial policies 
(Chowdhury and Islam, 1993). A number of researchers, Fry (1984, 1985), 
Giovannini (1985), and the World Bank (1989) recognise the uncertainty in 
the relationship between real deposit rates and savings. 
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However, the econometric work (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 1991) on 
the behaviour of the private sector savings in Sri Lanka lends support to 
the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. Therefore, advocates of financial 
liberalisation highlight the possibility of a positive relationship between real 
interest rates and the rate of saving, and the resulting financial deepening. 
Thus, depending on the theoretical analysis, we can develop a number of 
criteria to measure the success of financial market reforms and thereby 
reduce capital market distortions. They include examination of: the trend in 
real interest rate; the availability of different financial assets; the financial 
deepening measured through M 1 / GDP, M 2 /GDP, and M 3 /GDP ratios; 
the trends in volume of credit channelled to the different sectors; and the 
behaviour of the exchange rate. The subsequent section analyses some 
empirical data selected in accordance with the criteria developed in the 
theoretical analysis in this section. 
7.3.2 Financial Liberalisation and Capital Market Distortions 
The data in table - 7.1 show the behaviour of nominal and real deposit and 
lending rates of the National Savings Bank (NSB) and commercial banks 
over time. Accordingly, in the controlled era (before 1977), all deposit and 
lending rates remained at a very low level, resulting in negative real interest 
rates in all spheres of banking activities (see table - 7.1). This 
phenomenon confirmed the view that the financial market in the controlled 
regime was highly repressed, limiting financial intermediation and 
availability of loanable funds which made financial rationing indispensable, 
giving credit to priority sectors at artificially low rate of interest. 
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Table- 7.1 
Nominal and Real Interest Rates (Percentage) 1971-1999 
Year National Commercial Commercial Difference 
Savings Bank Bank Deposit Banks Lending between 
Deposit Rates Rates Rates commercial bank 
deposit and 
lending rates 
1971-76 7.2 (-8.4) 5.0 (-10.6) 8.5 (-7.1) 3.5 
1977-83 14.9 (1.3) 13.8 (2.4) 16.3 (0.1) 2.5 
1984-87 14.2 (5.2) 9.8 (0.8) 20.2 (11.2) 10.4 
1988-92 11.9 (1.2) 12.2 (-1.9) 19.1 (5.1) 6.9 
1993-99 12.8 (3.2) 11.2 (1.6) 17.3 (7.7) 6.1 
1988 12.3 (-1. 7) 10.0 (-4.0) 19.1 (5.1) 9.1 
1989 14.3 (3.2) 12.5 (1.4) 18.0 (6.9) 5.5 
1990 16.5 (-5.0) 13.0 (-8.5) 18.6 (-2.9) 5.6 
1991 16.5 (4.3) 12.0 (-0.2) 19.6 (7.4) 7.6 
1992 16.5 (5.1) 13.6 (2.0) 20.2 (8.8) 6.6 
1993 15.5 (3.8) 13.8 (2.1) 20.4 (8.7) 6.6 
1994 13.5 (5.1) 11.5 (3.1) 17.8 (9.4) 6.3 
1995 14.5 (6.8) 11.5 (3.8) 19.9 (12.2) 8.4 
1996 14.0 (1.9) 12.5 (-3.4) 18.4 (2.5) 5.9 
1997 10.4 (0.8) 9.6 (0.2) 14.2 (4.6) 4.6 
1998 10.9 (1.5) 9.5 (0.1) 15.1 (5.7) 5.6 
1999 11.0 (6.3) 10.0 (5.3) 15.2 (10.5) 5.2 
Source: Up to 1984-87 from Athukorala and Rajapathirana (1991), and for1988 to 1999 
compiled from annual report (various issues) -Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
N B- Figures in brackets represent real interest rates. 
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This process highly distorted the capital market and made the price of 
capital low, which resulted in increasing capital intensity in manufacturing 
and thereby limiting employment creation. 
However, after the adjustment of interest rates as a part of the 1977 
financial market reforms the real interest rate began to show positive 
values in most of the years in the ensuing period, except in the years such 
as 1988, 1990, 1991 and 1996 (see table - 7.1). According to the 
Consumer Finances and Socio Economic Survey (CFSES) 1981/82 
(conducted by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka which shows a snapshot 
situation of activities of a month), all sectors such as urban, rural and 
estate, and all income groups had a positive net financial investment. 
This behaviour can be attributed to maintaining higher (positive real) 
interest rates after the 1977 reforms. Conversely, the CFSES 1986/87 
reported an entirely different picture, indicating that all sectors and different 
income groups had a negative net financial investment which was -3.6 as a 
ratio of the household income (see table - 7.2). 
Table-7.2 
Financial and Physical Investments as a Ratio of Spending Unit 
Income 1981/82, 1986/87 and 1996/97 
Year Financial Investment Physical Investment 
1981/82 + 9.0 
1986/87 -3.6 16.9 
1996/97 0.6 17.7 
Source: Consumer Finance and Socio Economic Survey-Sri Lanka, 1986/87 and 
1996/97. 
+ Financial investment was positive in 1981/82. 
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This situation is attributed to two major reasons; one was the gradual 
decline in interest rates towards the latter part of the 1980s, and the other 
was the collapse of some non-bank financial institutions due to liquidity 
problems in the mid 1980s. This resulted in loss of customer confidence in 
these institutions and resulting withdrawal of their fixed deposits. However, 
the CFSES 1996/97 reported a positive overall financial investment by all 
sectors in all income groups which was 0.6 as a ratio of household income 
(see table - 7.2). Although in terms of absolute value the increase in 
investment in 1996/97 is small, it can be considered as a big improvement 
when compared with the negative financial investment in 1986/87. 
Further, the distribution of financial investment among different financial 
instruments indicates that investment in company shares which was 
negligible in the CFSES 1986/87 has become popular in the ensuing years 
as reported in the CFSES 1996/97. As a whole, in the latest CFSES 
(1996/97), the fixed deposit dominated financial investment among the 
public and investment in company shares has taken the second place. 
Thus, steps taken under 1977 trade and financial reforms expanded the 
investment opportunities for the general public to invest in financial 
instruments. For instance, under the changed environment, compared to 
the situation in the controlled era, more opportunities have opened for 
investing in different financial instruments such as treasury bills, treasury 
bonds, unit trusts, debentures, and portfolio investment in the share market 
in a more competitive financial market and capital market. 
Next, the exchange rate behaviour covering both policy eras (controlled 
and open) can be considered. The data in table - 7.3 reveal how the real 
value of the rupee (domestic currency) in relation to the major currencies 
with which Sri Lanka mostly transacts has changed over the period (see 
table - 7.3). 
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Table - 7.3 
Exchange Rate Behaviour, 1990-2000 (Index, 1990=100) 
Year U.S.A Japan U.K. Germany India 
1975 49.0 36.5 30.8 38.2 70.0 
1980 109.6 99.8 102.8 90.5 163.6 
1985 108.6 91.6 77.8 75.6 127.2 
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1991 94.5 89.3 99.4 97.3 73.6 
1992 92.2 105.3 80.7 90.5 83.2 
1993 90.3 90.6 77.7 81.4 71.1 
1994 85.0 102.4 78.0 84.7 72.5 
1995 88.4 94.2 80.7 93.9 69.0 
1996 81.9 81.3 81.2 77.9 67.2 
1997 80.8 75.3 81.1 67.4 64.5 
1998 79.6 81.4 84.9 72.5 63.1 
1999 81.6 87.7 85.4 62.9 66.3 
Source: Reports on Sri Lanka State of the Economy (various), IPS, Colombo. 
During the controlled era (before 1977) the rupee was comparatively 
overvalued against all the major currencies. After devaluations in 1977 and 
1989, it reached a more real value (see table - 7.3). Accordingly, in the 
period 1978-80 the exchange rate could be maintained without letting it 
become overvalued. However, after 1980 the real value of the exchange 
rate started to appreciate, mainly on account of the government's inability 
to preserve economic stability. As a part of the 1977 reforms, it was 
expected that SOEs be privatised, but contrary to the originally declared 
policy, the SOEs had to be run through giving heavy subsidies for political 
reasons. For example, during the period 1977-85, almost 25 per cent of 
the total budgetary expenditure took the form of transfers to public 
enterprises. But, the comparative figure for the period 1970-77 was only 10 
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per cent (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 1991 ). So, this comparison 
indicates that the financial liberalisation was not able to show a better 
improvement in resource allocation in the first half of the 1980 decade. 
This was mainly because of the failure to maintain macroeconomic stability 
during the 1980s. The massive government projects had to be partly 
financed by increasing budget deficit, resulting in a high level of inflation 
which made it difficult to avoid real exchange rate appreciation in this 
period. 
Basic indicators of the financial depth of the economy are presented in 
table - 7.4. Accordingly, the M2 / GDP and the M3 / GDP ratios remaining 
at a lower level as experienced in the pre 1977 reform period indicate that 
during that regime the financial market was 'shallow' and depressed, 
indicating that there was a lack of alternative financial instruments in which 
people could save in a highly depressed financial market that in turn 
adversely affected the saving rate. Even after the 1977 reforms, the M1 / 
GDP ratio has not changed from the 14 per cent level that prevailed in 
1976 in the ensuing years until 1980, and then it went down and remained 
at 12 per cent in most years until 1994, and after 1996 it has further 
dropped to 1 O per cent (see table - 7.4). 
Where the behaviour of the M2 /GDP ratio is concerned, it was less than 21 
per cent in the controlled regime before 1977, but after the initial economic 
and financial market reforms it increased up to 31 per cent by 1982. Then, 
this ratio fell a little downward and again after 1992 it showed an increasing 
trend. Accordingly, while M1 continued to increase in real terms, its ratio to 
GDP declined. Meanwhile, the M2 / GDP ratio has increasing values 
throughout the period after initial financial market reforms in 1977. 
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Table- 7.4 
The Behaviour of the Financial Sector: Selected Indicators, 
1974 -1999 
(1986 = 100) 
Year M1 M2 M3 M1/ GDP M2/ M3/ NSB 
(%) GDP(%) GDP(%) deposi 
t rate 
(%) 
1974 51 33 34 12 19 26 7.2 
1976 64 42 42 14 21 27 7.2 
1978 65 50 51 14 26 33 14.9 
1980 71 62 61 14 30 37 14.2 
1982 72 76 76 12 31 39 18.0 
1984 65 70 70 11 28 36 18.0 
1986 100 100 100 12 28 36 14.2 
1988 115 100 99 15 31 39 12.3 
1990 105 100 98 12 28 35 16.5 
1992 112 121 118 12 31 38 16.5 
1994 140 158 158 12 33 42 13.5 
1996 118 159 157 10 33 42 14.0 
1998 128 175 173 10 31 39 10.9 
1999 145 199 196 10 32 41 11.0 
Source: Compiled from Annual Reports (various), Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
This pattern suggests a shift in household asset portfolios from cash 
holdings to saving and time deposits in response to favourable interest 
rates that came to exist after the 1977 reforms. Further, a high M2 / GDP 
ratio and its rapid growth in the reform period indicate that a large amount 
of loanable funds have been directed through the organised financial 
sector. 
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Then, the behaviour of the M 3 / GDP ratio shows an increase from an 
average level of 26.5 per cent in the period 1974-76 to 39.0 per cent in 
1982. This ratio further increased exceeding a 40.0 per cent level towards 
the end of the 1990s. This trend implies that people have increased their 
savings in non-commercial financial institutions as well. This phenomenon 
suggests that there is a clear development of savings and financial 
deepening towards the latter part of the 1990s decade with the increasing 
of the number of financial institutions, resulting in a remarkable 
improvement in financial intermediation. 
The distribution of bank credit is shown by table - 7.5 for both the 
controlled and open eras (see Appendix - 6 for all the years considered). 
Before the 1977 economic reforms, the public sector functioned as the 
driving force of the economy, absorbing most of the domestic credit 
available. For instance, between 1969 and 1975 an average of 72.4 per 
cent of domestic credit per year was absorbed by the government, public 
corporations and co-operative sectors, leaving only the remaining (27 .6 per 
cent) only for the private sector. However, after the 1977 trade and 
financial reforms the amount of credit flowing to the government related 
sectors began to lessen gradually. Yet, from 1981 to 1991 the priority 
sectors absorbed about 50 per cent of the credit extended by banks, 
indicating that the credit rationing has continued for more than a decade 
after the initial adjustment to the financial variables under 1977 reforms 
(See table - 7.5). 
A number of reasons can be identified for still absorbing a significant 
proportion of the bank credit by the government related sectors during the 
period 1981-1991. 
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Table- 7.5 
Domestic Credit Extended by the Banking System 1969-1999 
Year Government Government Co-operatives Private Sector 
(net)(%) Corporations(%) (%) (%) 
1969-1975 55.6 9.9 6.7 27.7 
1977 34.0 19.0 14.0 32.8 
r1981 37.7 13.2 3.8 45.3 
1985 34.4 7.5 2.2 60.0 
1989 35.3 13.6 1.2 50.0 
1993 22.1 4.9 1.2 71.9 
1995 15.8 3.8 1.8 78.6 
r1997 17.0 3.8 0.6 78.6 
r1999 23.0 3.4 0.4 73.2 
Source: Compiled from annual reports (various), Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
They included, despite the termination of the comprehensive Rural Credit 
Scheme which the Central Bank refinanced, establishing a number of other 
schemes for credit allocation such as improvement of the Medium and 
Long Term Credit Fund in 1979, establishment of the National 
Development Bank, and setting up of Regional Rural Development Banks 
(RRDBs). Under these arrangements credit was channelled at lower 
interest rates with the Central Bank's refinancing facilities, to priority 
sectors such as agriculture and Small and Medium Industries. Moreover, 
no attempts were made to reduce the government's absorption of financial 
savings mobilised through the captive financial institutions. About 90 per 
cent of the NSB's loan portfolio continued to take the form of investment in 
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government securities, and a similar pattern was observable in the 
operations of the government-managed Employee Provident Fund (EPF) 
and Insurance Corporations. Moreover, credit ceilings, and high reserve 
requirement ratios on commercial bank deposits, produced a credit crunch 
which negated the anticipated favourable supply side effects of financial 
reforms (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 1991 ). However, only after 1993 the 
private sector started absorbing a larger percentage (more than 70 per 
cent) of credit allocation. This indicates that a clear change in resources 
distribution has taken place only after more than a decade from the initial 
trade and financial liberalisation in 1977. 
Altogether, the aforementioned empirical evidence shows that the entire 
controlled era before 1977 was characterised on one hand, by having 
negative real interest rates and, on the other hand, by maintaining 
overvalued real exchange rates. These trends together highly distorted the 
financial and capital goods (plant and machinery) market, channelling 
limited funds accumulated through a shallow financial market to priority 
sectors at artificially low interest rates, and making imported machinery and 
other capital equipment cheaper, and thus encouraging high level of capital 
intensity in production which lessened the employment creation. However, 
the measures taken to liberalise the financial market from 1977 onwards 
have become considerably effective in making real interest rates positive 
for most of the years, and in improving financial deepening considerably 
with increasing the availability of funds which have been channelled to 
optimal projects largely in the private sector. These tendencies suggest 
that the financial liberalisation has been successful considerably in 
removing capital market distortions after 1977. 
Conversely, the appreciation in real exchange rate brought about 
predominantly by the government failure to maintain macroeconomic 
276 
stability during the reform period limited largely the success of financial 
market liberalisation. Thus, overvalued real exchange rates increased the 
degree of distortions by making the importation of machinery and capital 
equipment still cheaper which encouraged continuation of capital intensity. 
Thus, although the supply side complementarity expected to come from the 
financial reforms by sustaining real interest rates at a positive level to 
ensure the success of trade liberalisation has been significantly achieved 
its real effect has been held back substantially by the real exchange rate 
appreciation due to macroeconomic instability experienced throughout the 
reform period after 1977. Thus, these divergent trends do not fully support 
the hypothesis, - 'financial market liberalisation has lessened the capital 
market distortions', and therefore, the chapter concludes that capital market 
distortions remain at a fairly high level even after the economic reforms. 
7.4. Summary 
This chapter first outlines how the government intervention in the financial 
market increased in the controlled era before 1977. Then, empirical 
evidence is presented through such measures as the negative real interest 
rates and the lower level of the M2/GDP and the M3'GDP ratios to examine 
the proposition that the domestic financial market in the dirigiste regime 
was highly distorted and repressed with its inevitable effects of increasing 
capital intensity and limiting employment creation. However, with the 
financial liberalisation introduced under the 1977 economic reforms interest 
rates took positive values in most of the years in the ensuing period, and 
the M2 / GDP and the M3 /GDP ratios increased, contributing much to 
acquire a financial deepening and to mobilise more funds, lessening the 
requirement of credit rationing. As a result, distortions showed a gradual 
decline. Consequently, from the beginning of the 1990s a higher 
percentage of resources started flowing to the private sector which 
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indicates that there is a remarkable improvement in resource allocation of 
the economy. This behaviour confirms that the supply side 
complementarity expected to be gained from the domestic financial market 
reforms for the success of trade liberalisation has been significantly 
achieved. 
However, the appreciation of real exchange rates in most of the years after 
1977 reforms retarded the success expected to be brought about from the 
demand side complementarity of financial liberalisation. Thus, while the 
financial liberalisation itself contributed significantly to lessening capital 
market distortions through converting the negative real interest rate to 
positive rate the real exchange rate appreciation in most of the years in the 
reform period did not contribute much to reduce capital market distortions 
in the reform period. Consequently, this evidence is not fully consistent 
with the hypothesis, - 'financial market liberalisation has lessened the 
capital market distortions'. Thus, the chapter concludes that although 
capital market distortions during the reform period have been less than the 
pre-reform period they are not removed much by the steps taken under the 
1977 economic reforms. 
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Chapter-a 
Labour Productivity, Capital Intensity, Wage Behaviour 
and linkage effects 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences with an emphasis on the fact that labour absorption 
by manufacturing industries in Sri Lanka, particularly in recent years, has 
remained stagnated even after following economic reforms for a period of two 
and a half decades. This retardation in employment generation is further 
explained by drawing the attention to the growing output-employment gap in 
the manufacturing sector which has been already identified and highlighted in 
the previous sections of the study. In the chapter, the 4th hypothesis; - 'the 
trends in labour productivity, capital intensity, wage behaviour and linkage 
effects have not retarded employment generation in the manufacturing 
industry during the reform period 1977-2000' is tested. For this reason, 
changes in labour productivity are measured through the traditional growth 
accounting (Solow residual) procedure, the degree of capital intensity is 
attempted to be captured through calculating a number of simple ratios of 
capital utilization, and the real wage behaviour and the degree of linkage 
effects are grasped mainly depending on the secondary data, and the results 
of recent empirical research. 
8.2 Labour Absorption and Output-Employment gap 
Employment generation remains one of the most prominent objectives to be 
achieved through industrialisation, particularly from the late 1950s in Sri 
Lanka. Yet, two decades of industrialisation (from the late 1950s to 1977) 
through the import-substitution industrial (ISi) strategy became a failure, 
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evinced by the declining record of the manufacturing sector's share in the 
economy and increasing record of unemployment in that era. For example, 
the manufacturing sector's share in GDP declined from 16.7 per cent in 1970 
to 14.7 per cent in 1977, while the rate of unemployment was extremely high 
throughout this period and reached a peak level of 24.0 per cent of the labour 
force in 1973 (Korale, 1988). 
Thus, the failure to generate a sufficient amount of employment for a growing 
labour force and a number of other critical issues which surfaced in the ISi era 
paved the way for adopting the export oriented industrial (EOI) strategy from 
1977 onwards. But, even after following the EOI policies for more than two 
decades, Sri Lanka's industrial sector performance still remains at an 
unsatisfactory level. For instance, the manufacturing sector's share of GDP 
increased only from 14.1 per cent in 1977 to 15.8 per cent in 2001. Also, Sri 
Lanka's rate of unemployment (7.6 per cent in 2000) is substantially higher 
than those of all the other countries in the East, South-East and South Asia. 
Most of these countries have minimized their rate of unemployment 
remarkably by following EOI policies (WE R, 2001, CBS, 2001 ). 
In this background, one can question why export-oriented industrialisation in 
Sri Lanka has not generated a sufficient amount of employment? This lower 
level of employment generation is clearly reflected by a widening gap between 
industrial output and employment. Compared to the first phase of 
liberalisation ( 1977-89), in the second and third phases ( 1990-2000), a 
relatively larger gap between industrial output and labour employment has 
emerged (see table - 8. 1 ). A number of reasons can bring about such a gap. 
The following section discusses the influence of labour productivity in 
contributing to this gap. 
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Table- 8.1 
Growth and Gap of Manufacturing Industrial Output and Employment 
(Percentages) 
(1990 Constant Prices) 
Year Output Growth Employment Output-
(Average) Growth employment Gap 
(Average) (Average) 
1979 - 89 First Phase 6.60 5.20 1.40 
of Liberalisation 
1990 - 00 Second & 9.20 5.90 3.30 
Third Phases of 
Liberalisation 
Source: Calculated from Annual Reports (various issues) Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
8.3 Labour Productivity 
The oldest but still widely used indicator of factor productivity is labour 
productivity, measured as production per unit of labour input (Athukorala, 
1996). There is a close relationship between labour productivity and labour 
absorption. By definition, the rate of growth in output minus the rate of growth 
in labour productivity approximately equals the rate of employment as depicted 
below (Todaro, 2000: 277). 
~L / L = ~ Y / Y - ~ (Y / L) / (Y /L) 
where L =labour, Y = output, ~=change in the relevant variable. 
The above mentioned relationship suggests that if labour productivity is rising, 
fewer workers are required to produce any given level of output. However, 
contrary to this, some commentators (Athukorala, 1996; Horton at el., 1994) 
argue that there is a positive association between labour absorption in industry 
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and labour productivity. The underlying explanation for this bearing is that 
higher productivity of labour means a greater profit, which in turn, is invested 
mainly in capital saving technology, labour demand will be increased. On the 
other hand, maintaining a higher labour productivity than competitors leads to 
attract more investors and thereby generating more employment. Yet, the 
aforementioned definition is useful in examining the employment-output gap in 
developing countries, particularly at their early phases of industrialisation 1. 
In the Sri Lankan setting, there are disagreements about the level of labour 
productivity in manufacturing industry. Industrialists are of the view that labour 
productivity is low, and continuously declining. But, according to the Central 
Bank data, labour productivity shows an increasing trend throughout the 
reform period after 1977, and this trend is confirmed by an empirical study 
carried out recently on this subject. Accordingly, labour productivity in total 
manufacturing has increased at a compound annual rate of 7.5 per cent for the 
period 1981-1993 (Athukorala, 1996: 21). In this background, it is necessary 
to examine the more recent trends in labour productivity to examine its effect 
on labour absorption. Therefore, in the following section, changes in labour 
productivity are attempted to be measured through the traditional growth 
accounting (Solow residual) procedure related to the firms in the private FTZ 
sector, the private Non-FTZ sector and the public sector based on 
disaggregated industrial data for the 1990s. 
1. In the literature an inverse relationship between growth of labour productivity and 
employment is (to certain extent) emphasised. See World Employment Report (ILO) 1998-99 
that gives the data on growth productivity and employment in a number of selected countries. 
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8.3.1 Methodology and Data 
Time series data on the performance of manufacturing industries are not 
available in Sri Lanka for analysing factor productivity growth through an 
econometric estimation of the production function. Consequently, the 
traditional growth accounting (Solow residual) procedure is used to estimate 
productivity growth 2. This methodology enables us to employ industry level 
data from discrete time intervals for the 1990s. 
The oldest but still widely used indicator of factor productivity is labour 
productivity, measured as production per unit of labour input (Athukorala, 
1996). This index is constructed using value added of the output. Value 
added is deflated using the Central Bank of Sri Lanka's wholesale price index 
of commodity wise while capital and other inputs are deflated using sector 
wise of the wholesale price index. Labour input is not measured in terms of 
the number of hours worked although it is the ideal measurement to be used. 
But the number of hours worked can be changed due to change in part-time 
and full-time work arrangements, alteration of standard hours worked, and 
extraneous factors such as trade union actions, power cuts etc. 
Consequently, labour input in this study is measured as the number of persons 
employed rather than the number of hours worked. Data on employment, 
value added, input and end of year capital stock for manufacturing are 
extracted at the 4-digit ISIC level of industrial classification from the published 
and unpublished data records of Sri Lanka Census and Statistics. The study 
is carried out on the 1990s annual data. 
2. The two methodologies have been used in most research papers for decomposition of 
productivity growth, namely the growth accounting (Solow residual) method and the 
econometric estimation of production functions. See Felipe, J. (1999) for a description of 
these methods. 
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But with regard to all three sectors (private FTZ, private non-FTZ and the 
public sectors), data for 1992 are not available. Compared to the other two 
sectors, more consistent data is available for the private FTZ sector. 
Moreover, some years with highly fluctuating data for non-FTZ private sector 
and the public sector are dropped from the analysis by making a comparison 
with the Central Bank's sample data published in its annual reports. But such 
a drop out does not make a big difference since Solow residual method can be 
used for data from discrete time intervals. 
The labour productivity is defined in the following manner; 
LP= V/L 
where 
LP = Labour productivity 
V = value added 
L = number of workers (Athukorala, 1996) 3 
(1) 
Labour productivity growth can be defined as a residual growth in value added 
after accounting for growth of labour input (employment) as follows; 
LPG= ..:\V - ..:\L (2) 
3. This methodology was mainly adopted from Athukorala's (1996) study on Labour 
Productivity on Sri Lankan Manufacturing Industry, Department of National Planning, 
Colombo. 
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where LPG is labour productivity growth while ~ V and ~L are the 
corresponding growth rates of value added and labour input respectively. The 
equation - 2 clearly shows that labour productivity growth is simply the 
residual growth in value added after accounting for growth of labour input. 
Labour productivity growth or the residual growth obtained in this manner can 
be further disaggregated into two components, namely total factor productivity 
growth (TFPG) and capital labour substitution (capital deepening) in the 
production process. The procedure for decomposing labour productivity 
growth into TFPG and capital-labour substitution can be further understood 
through the following production function relationship. 
(3) 
where V denotes output, K and L represent capital and labour inputs 
respectively and A is the index of Hick's neutral technical progress. 
Logarithmic differentiation of (3) yields; 
(4) 
where the lower case letters v, k and I are logarithms of V, K and L 
respectively, and Svk=(of/8k) (K/V) and Sv1 = (of/81) (UV) are output elasticities 
of capital and labour respectively, d is the difference operator, and d1.1 is total 
factor productivity growth (TFPG). 
In order to isolate TFPG, equation - 4 can be written as; 
TFPG t = dVt - Svk dk - Sv1dl (5) 
Under the assumption of perfect competition, the elasticity of output with 
respect to each input is equal to its value shares in output. Further, these 
value shares sum up to one when the production function is assumed to be 
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homogeneous of degree one. With these two assumptions, the discrete-time 
approximation to equation (5) can be written as: 
TFPG t e = dVt- Svk dkt- Svidl t (6) 
where TFPGe is 'estimated' total factor productivity growth and Svk and 5v1 are 
the average shares of capital and labour in total value added which can be 
obtained in the following manner; 
Svk = %[Svk(t)+Svk(t-1 )] 
Sv1 = %[ Sv1(t)+Sv1(t-1)], 
assuming that 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Further, the equation - 6 can be arranged to reflect labour productivity growth 
consisting of its two components (as defined by the equation - 2), namely the 
growth of total factor productivity (TFPGe) and the contribution of capital 
deepening to labour productivity represented by [svk(dk- di)] in the following 
way. 
LPG= TFPGe + Svk(dk-dl) (10) 
8.3.2 Estimation Results 
Table - 8.2 displays the results of the decomposition of labour productivity 
growth into the contribution from capital deepening to labour productivity and 
the remainder as the total factor productivity growth (TFPG) which can be 
considered as the contribution coming from combined factor inputs to increase 
labour productivity 4• 
4. Labour productivity appeared in the third column in table 8.2 is obtained according to the 
formula - 1 described in the methodology and data section. 
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The estimates given in Table - 8.2 show a moderate improvement in labour 
productivity in the private FTZ sector during the second and third phases of 
liberalisation from a 6.53 growth rate in 1991 to a 7.08 growth rate in 2000. 
Labour productivity in the private non-FTZ sector shows a marginal increase 
from 6.21 per cent in1991-94 period to 6.41 per cent in the period 1996-98. 
But the public sector labour productivity throughout the period (1991-98) 
shows negative values. 
The second column in table - 8.2 indicates the contribution added to labour 
productivity through an increase in capital per worker (capital deepening or 
capital labour substitution) 5. The factor decomposition with regard to the 
private FTZ sector shows a continuously declining trend in contribution of 
capital deepening to labour factor productivity growth over time. For example, 
in 1991, a 2.22 growth rate has come from capital deepening to acquire a 6.53 
growth rate of labour productivity whereas it has declined to a 1.59 growth rate 
to acquire a 7.08 labour productivity growth in 2000. 
This decline has been the outcome of an increase in labour absorption at a 
higher rate than the expansion of the capital stock. Thus, the continuous 
declining of capital deepening in the private FTZ sector shows that 
improvement of labour productivity in that sector has come predominantly from 
total factor productivity growth, indicating that in the private FTZ sector the 
significance of capital deepening has decreased in the study period as an 
important factor in explaining labour productivity growth. 
5. Figures appeared in the column-2 is copied directly from the column-6 of the table 8.3. 
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Table 8.2 
Growth Rates of Total Factor Productivity, Capital Deepening, and 
Labour Productivity 
Contribution of 
Total factor !Capital Deepening to Labour Productivity 
Period and Sector Productivity Growth Labour Productivity Growth (LPG) 
(TFPG) (1) Growth S1cv(l1K-l1L) (3) = (1+2) 
(2) 
Private FTZ 
1991 4.31 2.22 6.53 
1993* 4.46 2.21 6.67 
1994 4.65 2.24 6.89 
1995 4.51 2.34 6.85 
1996 4.68 2.33 7.01 
1997 5.40 1.69 7.09 
1998 5.41 1.61 7.02 
1999 5.51 1.62 7.13 
2000 5.49 1.59 7.08 
Private Non 
FTZ* 
1991-94 5.14 1.07 6.21 
1994-96 5.20 1.14 6.34 
1996-98 3.84 2.57 6.41 
Public Sector* 
1991-94 -8.52 3.55 -4.97 
1994-97 -7.67 4.50 -3.17 
1997-98 -13.25 7.87 -5.38 
Source: Estimates based on data source and methodology given in the section 8.3.1 
* Continuous annual compound growth rates 
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Consequently, it is possible to determine that the labour absorption in the 
private FTZ sector has not been held back by the increasing trend in labour 
productivity since this increase in labour productivity, on one hand, might have 
encouraged investment in labour intensive productions, and on the other 
hand, it has not retarded labour absorption since it is not an extremely high 
labour productivity increase which might result in preventing a larger amount 
of employees being absorbed according to the above mentioned Todaro's 
labour productivity definition. 
Where labour productivity in the private non-FTZ sector is concerned for 
1990s, it has marginally increased but is lower than that of the private FTZ 
sector. The capital deepening in the private non-FTZ sector has contributed 
much more to the increasing labour productivity than that of the private FTZ 
sector. For instance, a 1.07 growth rate of capital deepening has contributed 
to acquire a 6.21 growth rate of labour productivity in the period 1994-96 while 
it has increased to a 2.57 growth rate of contribution to acquire a 6.41 growth 
rate of labour productivity in 1996-98. Thus, it is possible to determine that the 
degree of labour productivity has not contributed much to increase labour 
absorption in this sector compared to that of the private FTZ sector. This 
phenomenon, therefore, suggests that labour productivity in the private non-
FTZ sector is progressively more influenced by capital deepening. So, both 
the slightly increasing trend in labour productivity and the increasing 
contribution from capital deepening to labour productivity suggest that labour 
productivity has not much encouraged labour absorption in the private non-
FTZ sector in comparison to that of the private FTZ sector. A starkly 
contrasting pattern of labour productivity is shown in the public sector industry 
which shows a negative labour productivity growth since its position is rapidly 
eroding due to the speedy increase of privatisation of SOEs from the 
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beginning of the 1990s. In this sector, labour employment shows a faster 
decline than that of capital. 
Thus, the divergent trends appearing in labour productivity in different sectors 
do not allow for making a sweeping generalisation of the effect of labour 
productivity of manufacturing industry on labour absorption. Accordingly, the 
labour productivity trend in the private FTZ sector shows a clear positive 
impact while that of the private non-FTZ shows somewhat a lesser impact on 
employment creation. In contrast, the labour productivity in the public sector 
industries indicates a negative contribution to the employment creation in the 
1990s. 
8.4 Capital Intensity 
Capital intensity may, alternatively, be defined in terms of capital-labour ratio 
and capital-output ratio. While the former refers to technological choices 
made by the firm and is a possible source of efficiency, the latter is a measure 
of the productivity of capital (Kemal, 1993: 1250). Theoretically it is shown 
that there is a reciprocal relationship between capital intensity and labour 
absorption. Some empirical studies such as Agrawala (1983) too found that 
factor market distortions that emerged during the controlled eras in developing 
countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, highly encouraged capital 
intensity in the manufacturing sector, resulting in a highly restricted 
employment generation. The hypothesis testing in the chapter - 6 in this 
study reveals that the labour market in Sri Lanka even after 1977 economic 
reforms remains largely distorted. Further, the hypothesis testing in the 
chapter -7 discloses that capital market distortions have been only partially 
lessened through the financial market liberalisation from 1977 onwards. 
These findings suggest that capital intensity still remains at a high level in the 
manufacturing industry, resulting in a lesser employment creation. 
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This phenomenon is further confirmed by the widening gap between Industrial 
output and employment. As already shown this gap has increased from 1.40 
to 3.30 from the first to the second and third phases of liberalisation in the 
1990s. This increasingly expanded output-employment gap under EOI 
indicates that the amount of employment generation by manufacturing 
industries increases at a lower rate. 
Such a widening industrial output-employment gap can have emerged on 
account of a number of factors, out of which the contribution of capital intensity 
is further tested in the subsequent section. In this attempt, the actual level of 
capital intensity and its trends are captured through calculating a few ratios 
such as the average share of capital in total value added (S1<v), the capital / 
labour ratio (KIL), the growth of the capital stock (.!\K), the capital deepening 
(.!\K-.!\L), and the contribution of capital deepening to labour productivity growth 
[S1<v(f1K-f1L)J (see table - 8.3). These ratios have been calculated as regards the 
private FTZ sector, the private non-FTZ sector and the public sector 
manufacturing industries using 4-digit industrial data at the disaggregated level 
for the 1990s. Table - 8.3 shows the values of these ratios which will help us 
to determine the degree of capital intensity of the major sectors of the 
manufacturing industry. 
The first column of the table - 8.3 demonstrates how the share of capital in 
manufacturing output (S kv) changes in the 1990 decade. Accordingly, the 
ratio for the private FTZ sector has increased from 0.65 in 1990 to 0.83 in 
2000, representing an increasing share of capital in industrial output. The 
average capital share of the non-FTZ private sector too increased from a 
levelof 0. 70 in 1991-94 to 0.85 in 1996-98. In the public sector capital output 
ratio has recorded an increasing trend from 1.00 in 1991-94 to 1.81 in 1997-
98. 
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Table 8.3 
Change in Capital/Labour and Capital /Output, Capital Stock Ratios and 
Contribution of Capital to Labour Productivity Growth in the Manufacturing 
Sector 
Contributi 
onof 
Average Capital 
Share of Deepening 
Capital Capital to Labour 
in Total Labour Growth of Growth of Capital Productivi 
Period Value- Ratio Capital Employme Deepening ty Growth 
and added (KIL) Stock (4K) -nt (4L) (4K-4L) S11v(4K-4L) 
Sector (S11v) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private 
FTZ 
1990 0.65 - - - - -
1991 0.69 2.61 6.81 3.59 3.22 2.22 
1993 0.70 3.39 7.81 4.76 3.15 2.21 
1994 0.73 3.23 6.53 3.46 3.07 2.24 
1995 0.76 2.80 6.85 3.75 3.10 2.34 
1996 0.79 2.91 6.75 3.80 2.95 2.33 
1997 0.80 2.70 6.16 4.05 2.11 1.69 
1998 0.80 2.89 6.11 4.10 2.01 1.61 
1999 0.82 2.48 6.14 4.19 1.95 1.62 
2000 0.83 2.53 6.10 4.21 1.89 1.59 
Private 
Non FTZ 
1991 -94 0.70 2.70 4.54 3.01 1.53 1.07 
1994 -96 0.78 2.75 4.30 2.84 1.46 1.14 
1996- 98 0.85 2.81 4.11 1.09 3.02 2.57 
Public 
Sector 
1991 - 94 1.00 2.16 -0.33 -3.88 3.55 3.55 
1994 - 97 1.80 3.57 -6.21 -8.71 2.50 4.50 
1997 - 98 1.81 5.25 -2.22 -6.57 4.35 7.87 
Source: Estimates based on the data source and methodology explained in the section.8.3.1 
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The reason for this increase may be the declining output of the public sector 
due to rapid privatisation of SOEs. Column 2 in table - 8.3 indicates changes 
in the capital I labour (KIL) ratio for all three sectors for the 1990s. In the 
Private FTZ sector this ratio displays a slightly declining trend indicating that 
the capital intensity has increased slowly than the increase of labour 
absorption by this sector. On the contrary, in the non-FTZ private sector the 
KIL ratio has increased from 2.70 in 1991-1994 to 2.81 in 1996-98. The larger 
size of the KIL ratio in the non-FTZ private sector than that of the private FTZ 
sector indicates that the capital intensity in the private non-FTZ sector is 
higher than that of the private FTZ sector (see column - 2 in table - 8.3). The 
KIL ratio in the public sector too displays an increasing trend. The reason 
would be the rapid declining of labour employment in a background of 
stagnated or slightly declining capital investment in the public sector due to 
speeding up of privatisation of SOEs under the second and the third phases of 
liberalisation after 1989. Column 3 in table - 8.3 shows the change of the 
capital stock (flK) in all three sectors. In the private FTZ sector, investment in 
capital stock has increased from 1991 to 1993 and then, after 1995 it displays 
a slightly decreasing trend. The private non-FTZ sector also shows a slight 
declining trend in the growth of capital stock while the public sector is 
characterised by a negative growth in capital investment due to curtailing 
government funds flowing to this sector and the speeding up of privatisation of 
SOEs after 1990. 
Column 5 in table - 8.3 displays tendencies in capital deepening (flK-flL) 
related to all three sectors. Capital deepening in the private FTZ sector has 
declined continuously after 1990, suggesting that growth of labour absorption 
in this sector is larger than that of capital. Consequently, it is possible to 
determine that capital intensity has decreased in the private FTZ sector in the 
1990s. In the private non-FTZ sector, capital deepening demonstrates a 
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slightly declining trend from the period 1991-1994 to 1994-96, then after 1996 
it shows a rapidly increasing trend, reflecting a lowering or stagnated 
employment absorption by this sector in recent years. Capital deepening in 
the public sector displays a different picture. It remained at a high level in the 
period 1991-94 due to reducing labour employed in that sector. After 1997 
capital deepening in the public sector has again increased on account of 
higher reduction of employment than that of capital stock due to the increasing 
of privatisation of SOEs. 
Where the contribution of capital deepening to increase labour productivity 
growth [S1<v(l1K-t1L)] is concerned, as shown by column 6 in table - 8.3, there 
has been a diminishing effect of capital deepening on labour productivity in the 
private FTZ sector for the 1990s. However, an increasing contribution has 
been made by capital deepening to increase labour productivity growth in the 
private non-FTZ sector during this period. The public sector's capital 
deepening has increased since the employment level of the public sector has 
lessened without a commensurate declining of capital stock. 
Thus, a mixed contribution can be seen from capital intensity in different 
sectors to surface a widening gap between industrial output and employment 
in the 1990s. Accordingly, decrease in the capital labour ratio, growth of 
capital stock, capital deepening, and contribution of capital deepening to 
labour productivity growth (column, 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Table-8.3) under the 
private FTZ sector indicate that there has been a continuous decreasing trend 
in capital intensity in that sector compared to that of the private non-FTZ 
sector. This tendency suggests that the private FTZ sector is more labour 
intensive and thereby absorbs more employment than the private non-FTZ 
sector. 
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Hence, the pattern in reducing capital deepening in the private FTZ sector 
indicates that in the early 1990s the firms in this sector were building up their 
industrial capacities and in later years they were increasing their capacity 
utilization by absorbing labour at an increasing rate. As regards the non-FTZ 
private sector increasing the capital labour ratio, and capital deepening 
(columns 2 and 5 in table - 8.3) suggest a tendency of increasing capital 
intensity, and thereby retarding labour absorption in the non-FTZ sector 
particularly after the mid 1990s. 
8.5 Wage Behaviour 
Experience in the dynamic Asian economies over the last few decades 
illustrates that all variables such as industrial output, employment, labour 
productivity and real wages increased with the rapid industrialisation (WER-
ILO, 1996/97). However, industrialisation efforts in most of the other 
developing countries demonstrate divergent relationships among industrial 
output, employment growth, productivity and real wage increases. For 
instance, in most of the Latin American countries except in Colombia, Brazil, 
Bolivia and Panama real wages in the 1990s had declined when compared 
with the real wage levels that prevailed in the 1980s. It is also striking that 
Jamaica enjoyed strong output and employment growth, but with a declining 
trend in real wages. Although African countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe 
experienced a rapid growth in manufacturing output, their employment growth 
was negligible except for Mauritius. However, real wages in all these 
countries declined since the late 1980s. In South Asia, especially in India and 
Pakistan in comparison to the increase in manufacturing output the 
employment increase was inadequate. But, labour productivity and real 
wages in these countries evidenced an increasing trend from the mid 1970s. 
Among the Middle Eastern countries Jordan had a strong employment growth. 
In contrast, the employment growth in Egypt and Turkey remained low in spite 
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of significant output growth since the mid-1980s. It is also striking that, except 
in Turkey, real wages have fallen in other Middle Eastern countries since the 
late 1980s (WER-ILO, 1996/97). 
The aforementioned details disclose that there are only a few countries 
outside East and South-East Asia that have experienced a strong and 
sustained growth in manufacturing employment over the past two decades. 
These were Chile, Jordan and Mauritius, but none of these countries matched 
the combination of strong employment growth with rising labour productivity 
and real wages that could be seen in the dynamic Asian economies (ibid, 
1996/97). In this setting, we can see how Sri Lanka's manufacturing wages 
varied along with other relevant variables (industrial output, employment and 
labour productivity) during the last two decades or so under the export led 
industrialisation policies (see table - 8.4). 
Output-employment gaps in different phases reveal how industrial output and 
employment in the Sri Lankan manufacturing sector have changed over time. 
Accordingly, both industrial output and employment have increased during the 
reform period after 1977 although the output-employment gap has widened. 
As shown earlier the industrial output-employment gap of 1.40 in the period 
1977-89 has increased to 3.30 between 1990 and 2000. This suggests that 
growth in the industrial employment has not increased as rapidly as that of 
industrial output. Where labour productivity increase is concerned it has been 
shown by Athukorala's (1996) study that labour productivity in total 
manufacturing has increased at a compound annual rate of 7.5 per cent until 
the early 1990s. But the empirical analysis of this study shows that labour 
productivity only in the private FTZ sector and the private non-FTZ sector 
shows an increasing trend in the 1990s. 
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Table- 8.4 
Normal and Real Manufacturing Wage Indices of Sri Lanka 
Year Nominal wage index Real wage index 
1981 33.5 90.7 
1982 38.8 85.2 
1983 41.7 85.4 
1984 50.5 88.0 
1985 54.7 106.8 
1986 57.6 107.1 
1987 61.3 111.4 
1988 74.1 111.5 
1989 74.5 105.4 
1990 100.0 100.0 
1991 122.4 102.6 
1992 127.7 102.1 
1993 142.2 101.9 
1994 164.0 108.3 
1995 177.0 108.5 
1996 184.1 97.4 
1997 202.6 97.8 
1998 210.1 99.9 
1999 215.6 97.8 
Source: Athukorala, Labour Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector in Sri Lanka, 1996; Key 
Indicators of Labour Market, ILO, 1999; Sri Lanka, State of the Economy 2000, IPS 
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Under this scenario we can examine wage behaviour in the manufacturing 
industry. Nominal wage increases were largely limited to periodic adjustments 
under the nominal Wages Board mechanism (see table - 8.4). As shown by 
the real wages index in table - 8.4 there was a declining trend in the real wage 
during the first part of the 1980 decade. Then, in the latter part of the 1980s 
the real wage had increased, and after 1989 it had gone down until 1993. 
Afterwards it demonstrated an increasing trend in the period 1994 and 1995. 
However, the real wage declined again after1995. Moreover, the cost of 
labour too in Sri Lanka compared to other countries is still cheaper. Among 
the countries listed in table - 8.5 Sri Lanka's labour cost was the lowest in the 
1990s. Also, compared to most of the countries in the region Sri Lanka's real 
manufacturing wage index in the latter part of the 1990 decade was low. 
Thus, as a whole, in a background of a slightly fluctuating real wage at a 
relatively low level, labour absorption should be increased, and therefore it is 
possible to conclude that the wage behaviour of Sri lankan manufacturing in 
the reform period has not contributed to hold back labour absorption and 
thereby not contributed to increase output-employment lag. 
8.6 Linkage Effects 
Taking interdependencies among production activities, Hirschman (1958) has 
recognized two types of linkage effects; 'backward' and 'forward' linkage 
effects. Backward linkages measure the proportion of an activity's output that 
represents purchases from other domestic activities. Forward linkages 
measure the proportion of an activity's output that does not go to meet final 
demand but is used as an input into other activities (Thirlwall, 1994: 239). 
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Table- 8.5 
Wage Indicators for Selected Countries 
Country Annual Labour Cost for worker in Real Manufacturing Index 
Manufacturing ($) (1990 = 100) 
Argentina 7,338 100 (1997) 
Bolivia 2,343 112 (1996) 
Brazil 14,143 110 (1996) 
Chile 5,822 67 (1997} 
Colombia 2,507 109 (1997) 
Jamaica 3,655 74 (1992) 
Mexico 7,607 99 (1997} 
South Africa 8,475 102 (1993} 
Zambia 4,292 104 (1994) 
Zimbabwe 3,422 71 (1996) 
Egypt 1,863 87 (1995) 
Jordan 2,082 93 (1995} 
China 729 130 (1996) 
Indonesia 1,008 131 (1996) 
Malaysia 3,429 125 (1995) 
Thailand 2,705 125 (1997) 
Bangladesh 671 -
India 1,192 75 (1995) 
Sri Lanka 604 98 (1997) 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2001, ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour 
Market 1999. 
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Hirschman suggests that within the directly productive sector a useful 
development strategy would be to choose investment activities which bring 
about highest combined linkage effects. Unfortunately, one of the typical 
characteristics of developing countries like Sri Lanka is a lack of 
interdependence among production activities, and thus having low level of 
linkage effects. 
The dualistic economic structure that appeared from the mid 19th the century 
under the British colonial administration in Sri Lanka did not promote linkage 
relationships among the sectors of the economy. Accordingly, the 'enclave 
export sector' consisted of the output of primary industries such as plantation 
and mining which were destined directly to meeting export demands while the 
other requirements of the economy were met through imports until the late 
1950s (Ratnayake and Nayanananda, 1998; Karunaratna, 1973). This 
economic system started changing with the introduction of the import-
substitution industrial strategy from the late 1950s onwards. With this change 
also production of primary products for export market continued while the 
majority of manufacturing industries just transformed semi-manufactured 
imports to meet the final demand in the limited domestic market without 
creating a sufficient degree of linkages to the rest of the economy. Then, the 
ISi strategy was replaced by the export oriented industrial strategy (EOI) under 
the economic reforms from 1977 on account of its (ISi) dismal economic 
performance for nearly two decades of duration. Many studies highlight that 
export led industrialisation (ELI) strategy is more efficient than import 
substitution (IS) strategy because it allows greater specialization in production, 
exploitation of economies of scale, enhanced efficiency in the use of scarce 
resources, and greater national income (Ratnayake and Nayanananda, 1998). 
Yet ELI strategy too has been criticized for its inherent weaknesses such as 
the heavy dependence on foreign firms and imports which result in footloose 
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export activities with very few linkages with the rest of the economy 
(Lakshmen, 1988). Therefore, it has been argued that most successful ELI 
should generate a considerable degree of backward and forward linkages, 
particularly in terms of employment creation. However, even after switching 
over to the EOI strategy, it has been noticed that the spread effects of the 
manufacturing sector in terms of both backward and forward linkages are 
weak, perhaps due to the use of imported inputs. 
For instance, some manufacturing sectors, including garments, electrical 
equipment, and petroleum are heavily dependent on imported raw materials 
with an import content of more than 70 per cent (Athukorala and 
Rajapathirana, 2000; Ratnayake, 1988). On the other hand, among these 
industries also, a single industry, the garment sector accounts for more than 
two-thirds of the value of exports. This dependency on a single product for a 
higher percentage of export earnings, which has less value added, has further 
weakened backward linkages. So some commentators highlight that the 
labour absorptive capacity of Sri Lankan manufacturing is lower than that of 
other rapidly industrialising Asian economies which display greater 
diversification and technological upgrading of their manufactured exports 
(Wignaraja, 1998). 
Another trend within the manufacturing employment has been a shift towards 
the high-skilled sectors in developed countries and fast developing countries 
(WER, 1998/99). The proportion of employment in the high-skilled 
manufacturing industry has increased sharply in the fast-growing East and 
South-East Asian countries. It has also grown, in some Latin American, 
African and South Asian countries (see table - 8.6). 
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Table-8.6 
Employment in High-Skilled Manufacturing Industry 
as a Percentage of 
Total Manufacturing Employment 
Country 1985 1995 
East and South-East Asia 
China 51.9 44.4 
Hong Kong 36.8 38.6 
Indonesia 20.3 16.6 
Korea, Republic of 33.5 52.3 
Malaysia 36.2 51.2 
Philippines 23.7 26.4 
Singapore 62.8 77.6 
Taiwan 39.1 49.6 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 15.6 9.6 
India 30.0 34.6 
Pakistan 22.4 23.2 
Sri Lanka 10.1 9.8 
Source: Wortd Employment Report, ILO, 1998/99 
In other developing countries such as Bangladesh, Kenya, Mauritius and Sri 
Lanka there has been a shift away from high-skilled manufacturing 
employment. Some developing countries, therefore, have witnessed a change 
in the structure of employment towards high-skilled manufacturing industries. 
Indeed certain high-skilled sectors have experienced high growth rates of 
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employment, particularly in rapidly developing countries, but Sri Lanka's trend 
shows a reverse pattern in this regard. 
The changes in the domestic cost structure of non- Board of Investment (non-
801) industries in Sri Lanka indicates how far the industrial sector has used 
domestic resources and thereby increased value added and promoted 
backward linkages. Table - 8.7 shows the domestic cost structure of non-801 
sector industries. Accordingly, the percentage cost of total production of 
domestic factors of non-801 industries have marginally decreased from 50. 7 in 
1995 per cent to 49.9 per cent in 2002, indicating that value added and 
backward linkages have reduced further. The cost of domestic raw materials 
by non-801 firms declined from 32.2 per cent in 1995 to 30.2 per cent in 2002. 
This behaviour confirms the general view that trade liberalisation policy in the 
past two and a half decades in Sri Lanka indirectly encouraged the use of 
imported inputs for production process (Ratnayake and Nayananada, 1998). 
Further, the data in the columns under Wages and Interest in table -9 show 
that the cost on wages from 1995 to 2002 has decreased from 12.3 per cent to 
11. 7 per cent while that of interest has increased from 2.1 per cent to 2.5 per 
cent. Thus, declining cost on wages and increasing cost on interest suggest 
that the production process has become more capital intensive in the non- 801 
private sector firms from 1995 to 2002. 
Next, where the linkage relationships of the entire export sector of the country 
are concerned, including all sectors such as 801, non-801, and the public 
sector, we rarely find empirical studies carried out on this subject in Sri Lanka. 
In this respect the study carried out by Ratnayake and Nayananda (1998) is 
the only comprehensive study currently available. 
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Table- 8.7 
Domestic Cost Structure of Non-Board of Investment Private Sector 
Industries (Percentage of Total Cost of Production) 
Industry Power& Wages Raw materials Interest 
fuel 
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 
Food, beverage, & 2.1 3.0 11.4 9.4 45.6 36.8 1.3 1.6 
tobacco 
Textiles, garments & 5.3 4.2 16.5 14.7 10.3 13.1 2.6 2.5 
leather products 
Wood&wood 3.1 8.9 17.8 15.7 54.7 37.1 3.1 4.2 
products 
Paper & paper 2.6 3.5 9.3 12.1 18.1 18.1 4.0 4.1 
products 
Chemecal, petroleum, 5.9 5.1 10.7 12.9 27.3 29.1 2.8 3.7 
rubber & plastic 
products 
Non-metalic mineral 11.8 17.9 11.3 16.2 7.3 27.5 3.2 2.5 
products 
Basic metal products 10.6 8.9 8.5 10.4 10.1 34.6 0.4 3.8 
Fabricated metal 3.0 4.1 10.8 11.1 17.1 25.2 4.7 4.0 
products, machinery, 
& transport 
equipment 
Manufactured 5.6 4.6 18.1 12.5 62.6 33.4 1.4 2.1 
products n.e.s. 
Total 4.1 5.5 12.3 11.7 32.2 30.2 2.1 2.5 
Source: Annual Reports, Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various). 
Therefore, the analysis in the subsequent section mainly depends on the 
empirical data provided by this study, and its conclusions. This study records 
production and employment spread effects of Sri Lanka's export led 
industrialisation (ELI) for the period 1977-97 based on the Linnemanm ( 1987 
as cited in Ratnayake and Nayananda, 1998) model and some other indices 
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developed in the literature. The spread effects of export expansion in 17 
exportable industries in both primary and manufacturing sectors have been 
analysed though this study. Two types of linkages have been calculated: 
backward and forward linkages. These linkages are presented in terms of 
production and employment. 
The results are analysed using direct and indirect coefficients, and the indices 
of power of dispersion (see table - 8.8). Accordingly, in general, both primary 
and manufacturing sectors show weak backward and forward linkage effects. 
However, average total backward linkage coefficients (direct plus indirect) in 
the manufacturing export production (1.24) exceeds those of the primary 
export sector (1.08), indicating that the primary sector has low backward 
linkages compared with the manufacturing sector. The highest total backward 
linkages coefficient is found with structural clay (1.52). Structural clay, other 
manufacturing, other machinery, food processing and textile have relatively 
high backward effects on the economy. 
On the other hand, basic metal, electrical equipment, transport equipment and 
garments sectors generate comparatively low backward spread effects in the 
economy. The industries with the highest forward linkages are petroleum, 
other manufacturing, and structural clay while the weakest are garment, and 
electrical equipment. The study by Ratnayake and Nayananda (1998) 
confirms the general view that Sri Lanka's manufacturing industries have a 
very low level of backward linkages (see appendix - 7). Also, this study 
identified that the garment sector as one of the sectors which has a very low 
level of backward linkages. 
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Table- 8.8 
Backward Spread Effects of Export Expansion in Terms of domestic 
Production 
Sectors Direct indirect Total 
Primary sector Average (Tea 
Rubber, Coconut, Other 0.0674 0.0164 1.0838 
agricultural products, and Mining 
and quarrying) 
Manufacturing sectors 
Textiles 0.2092 0.0454 1.2546 
Garments 0.1147 0.0259 1.1406 
Transport equipment 0.0918 0.0164 1.1082 
Electrical equipment 0.0442 0.0105 1.0547 
Other machinery 0.2769 0.0567 1.3336 
Light engineering 0.1347 0.0239 1.1586 
Food processing 0.2675 0.0392 1.3067 
Agro. Chem. & fertilizer 0.1946 0.0342 1.2290 
Structural clay 0.4585 0.0676 1.5261 
Other manufacturing 0.3850 0.0821 1.4671 
Basic metal 0.08660 0.0179 1.1047 
Petroleum 0.1246 0.0219 1.1464 
Average 0.1991 0.0368 1.2358 
Source: Ratnayak & Nayananda (1998) 
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In this scenario, a continuous dependence (more than two decades) on a 
product with such a low level of backward linkages for more than two-third of 
the country's export earning indicates not only it contributes to create lesser 
amount of employment in manufacturing but also that the country's export 
structure is partially diversified 6. 
As a whole, having a trend of moderately increasing labour productivity along 
with a decreasing capital intensity under flexible wage behaviour, labour 
absorption should be increased in the private FTZ sector for the 1990s. But in 
the private non-FTZ sector with a slower increase in labour productivity than 
the private non-FTZ sector along with increasing capital intensity in recent 
years indicate a lesser labour absorption, suggesting that this sector 
compared to the private FTZ sector has been benefited to lesser extent by the 
flexible real wages in the economy. However, the public sector behaviour in 
labour absorption with respect to the trends in its labour productivity, capital 
intensity and real wage behaviour are highly eroded on account of the closing 
down of some of its activities and the rapid decrease of its size under 
increasing privatisation after 1990. On the other hand, it is found that linkages 
effects in manufacturing industries for almost all the sectors are very weak, 
and are further getting weaker. Accordingly, the evidence presented is not 
significantly consistent with the hypothesis - the trends in the labour 
productivity, capital intensity, wage behaviour and linkage effects have not 
retarded employment generation in the reform period, 1977-2000'. 
6. However, Athukorala (2000) points out that from the late 1980s onwards there has been a 
trend of increasing other labour intensive exports in the Sri Lankan manufacturing industry. 
Also, Athukorala and Santosa (1997) argue against using intersectoral linkages as a criterion 
for assessing the development impact of export-led industrialisation. In their view, specialising 
on production and export of light consumer goods is the most promising area in the early 
stage of export-led industrialisation in developing countries. Yet, the problem in Sri Lanka is 
its heavy dependence of export led industrialisation in Sri Lanka on low skilled manufacturing 
exports abnormally for a longer period of nearly three decades. 
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Consequently, the study concludes that capital deepening particularly in 
private non FTZ and the public sector industries, the continual low level of 
linkage effects among industries in all sectors have badly affected labour 
absorption in manufacturing industries. 
8.7 Summary 
Labour absorption by the manufacturing industry has been increasing 
continuously after 1977 economic reforms, but with a widening output 
employment gap. This indicates that industrial employment has not increased 
parallel to the increase of industrial output, implying a slower labour absorption 
by the manufacturing industry. 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter finds that: average labour 
productivity in both the private FTZ and the private non-FTZ sector industries 
has increased moderately while that of the public sector has declined for the 
1990s; the capital intensity has somewhat reduced in the private FTZ sector 
while it has increased in the private non-FTZ sector after 1996 and the public 
sector; and the real wage has fluctuated slightly during the reform period with 
a declining trend, especially in the recent times. 
Thus, the private FTZ sector with having an increasing labour productivity and 
decreasing capital intensity to some extent has taken the full benefit from the 
flexible real wage behaviour, and has shown a substantial increase in labour 
absorption in the 1990s. On the other hand, the private non-FTZ sector with 
having a lesser increasing of labour productivity than the private FTZ sector, 
but with increasing capital intensity after 1996 has shown that this sector has 
not responded much to the flexible real wages in the recent years, and its 
labour absorption shows a retarded situation after 1996. 
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The public sector as a rapidly diminishing sector owing to speedy privatisation 
of SOEs with negative labour productivity and higher capital intensity has 
reduced employment substantially in that sector from the beginning of the 
1990s. On the other hand, the study finds substantial evidence to believe that 
backward linkages in manufacturing industries, commonly for all the sectors 
are very weak, and, therefore, it is possible to determine that labour absorption 
by the manufacturing sector remains low partly due to weak linkage effects of 
manufacturing industries, and dependence of export led industrialisation in Sri 
Lanka on low skilled manufacturing exports abnormally for a longer period of 
nearly for three decades. Consequently, the aforementioned evidence does 
not fully support the hypothesis - 'the trends in labour productivity, capital 
intensity, linkages effects, and wage behaviour have not retarded employment 
generation in the reform period'. Accordingly, the chapter concludes that 
increasing capital intensity, particularly in the private non-FTZ sector and the 
public sector, and the dependence mainly on low value added industries for a 
longer period have considerably held back labour absorption in the 
manufacturing industry. 
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Chapter-9 
Elasticity Estimation and Factor Pricing Policy for 
Labour Demand 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter commences by providing a basis for testing the final 
hypothesis - 'further changes in relative factor prices (costs) will have a 
positive impact on labour absorption by manufacturing industry', -
dependent on the results of the other hypotheses tested in the previous 
chapters. Accordingly, it is seen clearly that factor market distortions have 
considerably held back labour absorption even after the 1977 economic 
reforms. In this setting, the chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the 
policies that can be designed for factor price manipulation to increase 
labour demand by estimating the average, long-run own wage elasticity of 
labour demand and output elasticity of labour demand for the major 
branches of the Sri Lankan manufacturing industry, through the flexible and 
data-dependent Box-Cox transformation method, using data on 4-digit 
industrial categories over the period 1990-98. 
9.2 Significance of the Elasticity Estimation 
The demand for labour derives mainly from that of output. But factor prices 
too play a major role in determining labour demand since a given level of 
output can be produced through different factor combinations, and choosing 
factor combinations is dependent on factor prices. Thus, the demand for 
labour is based not only on the demand for output but also on factor prices. 
The impact of the latter (factor price distortions) on employment forms the 
main theme of this study. Chapter 5 of the study, testing the first 
hypothesis concludes that the insufficient demand for labour at the 
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aggregate level of the economy matters more than anything else (various 
mismatches) for the emergence of a high level of unemployment in Sri 
Lanka. Chapter 6, testing the second hypothesis of the study, concludes 
that the labour market in Sri Lanka compared to those in the neighbouring 
countries in the region is highly distorted, and the degree of distortions has 
not been reduced during the reform period after 1977. Chapter 7, testing 
the third hypothesis of the study, presents strong facts to believe that the 
capital market in Sri Lanka is still distorted to a substantial extent 
irrespective of the financial liberalisation under the 1977 economic reforms. 
Consequently, it is possible to conclude that these trends in factor markets 
have clearly held back labour demand. 
Although during the first phase of economic liberalisation ( 1977-89) growth 
in the manufacturing sector could not surpass that of the service sector in 
employment generation, it became the fast growing sector of the economy 
after 1990, and thus the manufacturing sector contribution to lessen the 
unemployment rate was substantial, especially by a rise in private sector 
industrial employment through the measures taken under the second (1990-
94) and the third phases of liberalisation (1994 to date). Despite the 
improved rate of employment growth in the manufacturing industry, it has 
not kept up with the growth in industrial output. For example, the average 
industrial output-employment gap increased from 1.40 in the first phase of 
the liberalisation (1979-89) to the 3.30 level in the second and third phases 
of liberalisation (1990-00) as shown in the earlier sections of the study. 
Meanwhile, manufacturing industries show an increasing trend of labour 
productivity during this period. One recent study estimated 7.5 per cent of 
compound annual rate of productivity improvement from 1981 to 1993 
(Dept. of National Planning, 1996, p. 34). The present study finds that 
labour productivity in the private FTZ and the private non FTZ sectors has 
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increased at about 7 per cent annually while it has decreased in the public 
sector in the 1990 decade. 
On the other hand, real wage in Sri Lanka during the liberalisation period 
remained at a stable level or showed a slightly declining trend. Thus, in an 
environment of stable or declining real wages and increasing labour 
productivity, industrialists might be expected to demand more labour. 
Contrary to this expectation, labour demand has been increasingly retarded 
as evinced by the expanding output-employment gap in the reform period, 
giving allowance to thinking that, among other things, factor market 
distortions might have favoured choosing more capital intensive 
technologies in manufacturing and limiting labour absorption. Hence, 
policies to remove factor price distortions could contribute to higher 
employment and also to a better overall utilisation of scarce capital resources 
through the adoption of more appropriate technologies of production. But the 
success of such reforms in reducing unemployment depends partly on the 
substitution possibilities between labour and other factors of production. 
The higher the elasticity of substitution the greater will be the increase in 
labour absorption that can be achieved by removing factor price distortions 
and lowering the ratio of wages to the rental price of capital. Although 
numerous studies of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital 
have appeared in developing countries in recent years, Sri Lankan policy 
makers are not adequately guided by local estimates of such elasticities in 
their policy deliberations. 
Therefore, this study provides estimates of long-run labour demand 
functions for branches of the Sri Lankan manufacturing industry. The 
substitution and own-price elasticities reported here may provide some 
factual underpinning to debates about factor price distortions and industrial 
policies. The study also improves upon the methods used in previous 
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studies in developing countries by using an econometric approach that 
allows for variable elasticities to be estimated even with quite limited data. 
9.3 Methods and Data 
A general specification of the long-run labour demand function of an 
industry is: 1 
L=f(Y,w,t) ( 1) 
where L is the labour employed, Y is real output or value added, w is the 
real wage rate and tis a time trend representing technological change (see, 
for example, Hsing, 1989). As long as the industry is small relative to the 
whole economy, the elasticity of labour supply can be treated as infinite and 
this framework allows one to study the effect of exogenous changes in 
wages on the amount of labour that employers seek to use. 2 But to 
estimate equation (1) a functional form must be chosen and this can entail 
unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the production technology in 
the industry. For example, variants of the log-linear functional form: 
(2) 
where the b; are estimated coefficients and u is a random error, are widely 
used in labour demand studies because of the convenience of interpreting 
the coefficients directly as elasticities. 3 
1 . This static approach ignores the role of adjustment costs and the distinction between 
the amount of labour used and the intensity of its use ( employment versus hours per 
period). But lags in the adjustment of labour demand to its long-run equilibrium do not 
appear to be very long, so the parameters derived from long-run labour demand 
equations can be applied even to short-run policy questions (Hamermesh, 1986). 
2. In our data, the largest industry is Wearing Apparel (UNSIC 3220), with approximately 
180,000 employees. However, this represents less than 3.5% of the total employment in 
Sri Lanka so the assumption of infinitely elastic labour supply should be reasonable in 
this context. 
3. Examples of studies that use log-linear labour demand functions include Turner and 
Bowden (1997) and Lane, Hakim and Miranda (1999). 
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However, equation (2) implies that the industry uses Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production technology: 4 
(3) 
where y is the efficiency parameter, ¢ is the rate of Hicks-neutral technical 
progress, a is the distribution parameter, p is the substitution parameter, 
the scale parameter u= 1 if there are constant returns to scale and 
r, v > 0, 0 <a< I, and p ~ -1. 
The coefficient b2 in equation (2) estimates the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital, a = 1/(1 + p), and forces this to be a constant. 5 
Similarly, the b1 coefficient implies that the returns to scale do not vary, 
which is also an untested restriction. 
Another feature of equation (2) is that the estimated coefficient on the wage 
rate has to be adjusted to give the usual constant-output own-wage 
elasticity of labour demand 1'/LL· Specifically: 
1] u = -[1- m ]er (4) 
where mis the share of labour in total costs or total revenue (Hamermesh, 
1986: 433). 
4. For further description of this function, see, for example, Heathfield (1971 ), pp.64-68. 
5. Equation (2) can be derived from (3) by noting that the dual CES cost function, when 
constant returns to scale are not imposed (see Hamermesh, 1986: 437) is 
C = ya~"w1-a + [1-af r1-" yi-a). Note that the efficiency parameter is ignored to save 
clutter and that Ferguson (1969: 166) gives the detailed derivation for a linearly 
homogeneous CES function. Applying Sheppard's Lemma to the cost function and then 
taking logs gives In L = aln a-aln w+aln Y. 
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In contrast to the restrictive nature of CES production, there are many 
reasons for expecting cr to vary. New technologies may allow easier 
substitution of one factor for the other, while it may be harder to make 
further substitutions of capital for labour the higher is the capital-to-labour 
ratio. Hence, the trend in the literature is towards decreasingly restrictive 
ways of depicting labour demand, which allow complete flexibility in the 
degree of substitution between factors (Hamermesh, 1986). In many 
studies, this flexibility is achieved with translog functions (Christensen, et. 
a/, 1971 ), which are second order approximations to arbitrary production 
functions and allow variable substitution and output elasticities. But there 
can be multicollinearity problems when estimating these functions because 
of the need to form cross-product terms between all inputs (Hsing, 1993). 
Moreover, in many developing countries the full ranges of data on industrial 
input prices are not readily available, which limits the practical application of 
the translog cost function approach. 
Another approach to allowing variable substitution elasticities is to use the 
general Box-Cox (1964) transformation of variables,6 so that equation (1) 
becomes: 
L0 -1 (t,1, -lJ (Y,1, -lJ (uf-lJ o=Po+Pi T +Pi-;:- +A -A- +& (5) 
where oo - :s; B, l :s; oo +. Depending on the different values of e and 'A. 
estimated from the data, equation (5) covers a variety of functional forms, 
including log-linear when (} = l = O, linear when (} = l = 1, semi-log when 
B = O, l = 1, and reciprocal when (} = 1, J = -1. 
6. Examples of labour demand studies using this approach include Hsing (1989, 1989a), Bairam 
(1993) and Hsing and Mixon (1995). 
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The elasticity with respect to any independent variable, X; is given by: 
(6) 
which depends on the values of /J;, X;, L, B, and X 7 Only in the special case 
where B = 1 = O, does the elasticity reduce to a constant of /J;. Hence, 
equation (5) allows variable output, substitution and wage elasticities, while 
needing no more data than is used by the standard log-linear model. 
Therefore, we use equation (5) to estimate labour demand functions for Sri 
Lankan industry. 
The data is from the Annual Surveys of Industries (ASI), which are a total 
enumeration of industrial establishments with 25 or more employees and a 
random sample of establishments with 5-24 employees. Although this 
survey covers over 2000 establishments per year, the data on individual 
establishments are not available because of confidentiality restrictions. The 
usual alternative estimation strategy, of using a time-series of averages for 
specified industries, 8 is also not available. So the sample would be too 
small to give reliable estimates of equation (5). Instead, we follow the 
approach of Gajanan and Ramaiah ( 1996) and create a pooled time-series 
cross-sectional database of sub-industries observed across different years. 
7. Note that the elasticity with respect to the wage rate is the elasticity of substitution, a and that the 
own-wage elasticity of labour demand must be computed by substituting the variable elasticity from 
equation (6) into equation (4). 
8. Jha, Murty, Paul and Rao (1993) give an example of this approach. 
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Specifically, data were gathered on 59 ISIC 4-digit industrial categories, 
over the 1990-98 period. We assume that the production technologies are 
the same among sub-industries within a specific two-digit industry division 
but they may differ across divisions, so equation (5) is estimated separately 
for each branch of the manufacturing industry.9 Estimates are made for 
only seven of the nine branches of the Sri Lankan manufacturing industry, 
because there are insufficient sub-industry observations in Division 37 
(Basic Metal Industries) and Division 39 (Other Manufacturing Industries) 
(see Appendix - 8 for a description of all the industrial branches). This 
exclusion should not be too serious because these two branches contain 
only 3.6% of the employees and contribute only 2. 7% of the value-added for 
the manufacturing sector. Table - 9.1 gives the branch names and sample 
sizes, which range from 32 to 112, and reports the share of total 
manufacturing employment for each branch included in the analysis. 
Table- 9.1 
Descriptions of the Manufacturing Industries Included in the 
Analysis 
Division Number of Share of total 
code Division Title observations employment 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 96 19.5 
32 Textiles, wearing apparel and leather 80 52.8 
33 Wood and wood products 32 2.6 
34 Paper and paper products 32 3.2 
35 Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and 
plastic 80 8.4 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 40 5.8 
38 Fabricated metal products, machinery 112 4.1 
Note: The employment shares do not add to 100 because of the exclusion of Divisions 37 
and 39. 
9. This assumption is commonly made in cross-sectional studies of the manufacturing sector. See, 
for example, Laumas and Williams (1981). 
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The dominance of the clothing and textiles and food manufacturing 
industries in manufacturing employment is apparent so the employment 
elasticities for those branches of industry should have a major effect on 
overall labour absorption (see appendix - 8). The annual Survey of 
Industries report allows the total number of workers and average employee 
remuneration for each sub-industry in each year to be calculated. Output 
was measured by value-added, so the implicit production technology 
considered is one where labour and capital are combined to add value to 
raw materials and other inputs. 10 Output was deflated using the Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka's wholesale price index of commodity wise while capital 
and other inputs are deflated using sector wise of the wholesale price index. 
9.4 Estimation Results 
Table - 9.2 presents a summary of the results for the unrestricted Box-Cox 
models and hypothesis tests for the specific functional forms that can be 
derived from restrictions on the 'A. and e parameters. It appears that the log-
linear model, which can be derived from CES technology and widely used in 
previous studies of labour demand, is the appropriate functional form for 
only two branches of Sri Lankan industry: metal products and chemicals. 
The restricted Box-Cox model, with 'A.=9, is the appropriate functional form 
for another three branches of industry: textiles, wood products, and non-
metallic products, while the unrestricted Box-Cox model ('A.:;c9) is the 
appropriate functional form for food manufacturing and paper products. The 
linear functional form is decisively rejected by the data. 
10. We do not have information on the price and quantity of output for each industry so the use of 
value-added in the specification is based on the assumption that output prices are the same across 
the units of observation (Freeman and Medoff, 1982: 222). Because of the finely disaggregated 
nature of our sub-industries and the use of deflated values, this assumption may not be too 
objectionable. 
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Table- 9.2 
Test Statistics for Alternative Functional Forms 
Industry Branch 
31 I 32 33 34 35 36 38 
Unrestricted Box-Cox (J~) 
A. -0.20 0.16 -0.17 -0.04 -0.18 -0.41 -0.08 
e 0.04 0.13 -0.03 -0.27 -0.04 -0.19 -0.08 
LLF -864.81 -682.66 -251.46 -254.66 -657.16 -347.46 -816.49 
Restricted Box-Cox {l=O) 
1=0 -0.01 0.12 -0.17 -0.16 -0.07 -0.27 -0.08 
LLF -867.75 -684.40 -252.47 -257.86 -658.32 -347.70 -816.49 
LR test 5.87 3.46+ 2.02+ 6.39 2.31+ 0.49+ 0.01+ 
Log-linear (J=O=O) 
LLF -867.77 -689.14 -254.65 -259.05 -659.02 -350.04 -817.51 
LR test 5.91 12.94 6.39 8.78 3_73+ 5.17 2.05+ 
Linear (l=8=1) 
LLF -995.20 -815.34 -281.89 -288.99 -752.66 -381.09 -896.89 
LR test 260.77 265.36 60.86 68.66 190.99 67.28 160.81 
Note: LLF is the maximised value of the log of the likelihood function and LR test is the 
likelihood ratio test (distributed as x.2) used to compare the unrestricted Box-Cox model 
(1.#8) against the restricted versions (indicates that the estimated restricted model is not 
statistically significantly different from the unrestricted one at the 0.05 test level). 
Table - 9.3 contains the estimation results, using the specific functional 
form for each branch of industry that the hypothesis tests in Table - 9.2 
indicate as most appropriate. The coefficient on value-added (/h) and on the 
real wage rate (/k) have the expected signs and are statistically significant at 
the p<0.01 level for all seven branches of industry. The time variable shows a 
positive sign in all but one branch but is statistically significant in only the 
chemicals and metal products industries. This lack of a significant time trend 
may just reflect the short time-series covered by the data. 
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Table- 9.3 
Estimation Results for Selected Functional Forms of Employment 
Demand Equations 
Industry Branch 
31 32 33 34 35 36 38 
Po 2.734 7.817 3.464 2.699 5.205 2.670 5.202 
(2.96r (20.16)** (59.25)** (36.51r (13.61)** (21.84)** (25.88r 
P1 0.175 0.191 0.037 0.017 0.188 -0.005 0.168 
(0.97) (1.52) (1.08) (1.06) (1.96)+ (0.29) (2.79r 
3.380 1.439 0.357 0.156 0.855 0.350 0.656 
1h (14.04)** (58.55)** (11.34)** (18.42)** (16.12)** (7.81 )** (17.12)** 
-3.039 -2.092 -0.224 -0.087 -1.075 -0.243 -0.590 
th (9.64)** (10.64)** (4.02)** (2.60)* (8.76)** (9.12r (4.83)** 
R2 0.73 0.98 0.89 0.93 0.81 0.77 0.79 
N 96 80 32 32 80 40 112 
e 0.037 0.116 -0.174 -0.268 0.000 -0.275 0.000 
A. -0.201 0.116 -0.174 -0.043 0.000 -0.275 0.000 
Note: Absolute value of asymptotic conditional t-statistics in parentheses; +significant at 
10%; "significant at 5%; ...... significant at 1%. 
The only coefficients that can be interpreted directly as elasticities in Table 3 
are for Divisions 35 and 38, where the restriction that A.=8=0 holds. These 
estimates of the ( constant) elasticity of substitution suggest that it is easier to 
substitute capital for labour in the chemicals industries than it is in the metal 
products and machinery sector. The output elasticities are also significantly 
less than 1.0, so a 10% rise in value-added would cause labour demand to 
rise by only 8.5% (Division 35) or by only 6.6% (Division 38). Because the 
output elasticity is the inverse of the elasticity indicating returns to scale, this 
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less-than-proportionate rate of labour absorption suggests that there are 
increasing returns to scale in these two sectors. 
The output and substitution elasticities in the other five branches of industry 
vary over time and across sub-industries, and are computed according to 
equation (6). To summarise these variable elasticities, the averages for 
each branch of industry are reported in Table - 9.4. The averages in the 
first and last years of the sample are also plotted in Figure 1, so that any 
tendency for the production technology and labour demand to become more 
flexible may become apparent. 
The elasticity of substitution varies widely between the branches of Sri 
Lankan industry, with the substitution of capital for labour appearing 
relatively easy in the food processing and non-metallic mineral industries, 
but relatively hard in the metal products, paper and wood products 
industries. In the food, beverage and tobacco sector, the high value of cr 
combines with the low share of labour in value-added to give a highly 
elastic response of long-run labour demand to own-wage (11u = -1.24). The 
own-wage elasticities in the other branches of industry range from around -
0.8 in chemicals and non-metallic mineral products to around -0.4 in the 
machinery, metal, wood and paper products industries. The employment-
weighted average of the own-wage elasticities is -0.80, so a 10% fall in the 
real wage would be expected to lead to an 8% increase in industrial 
employment in the long-run. The output elasticities, shown in the final 
column of Table - 9.4, indicate that the constant returns to scale 
assumption is appropriate only in the textiles, apparel and paper products 
industries. In the other branches of industry, the output elasticity is between 
0.66 and 0.86, so a 10% rise in value-added will lead to a slightly less than 
proportionate rise in labour demand. This tendency for output to rise more 
than inputs indicates increasing returns to scale. 
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Table- 9.4 
Average Values of Estimated Elasticities 
Elasticity of Labour share of Own-wage Output 
Division substitution value-added elasticity elasticit 
code (o) (m) ( 7JLL) y 
( 7JLY) 
31 1.44 0.14 -1.24 0.74 
32 1.01 0.31 -0.70 1.00 
33 0.67 0.39 -0.41 0.70 
34 0.62 0.34 -0.41 0.98 
35 1.07 0.20 -0.86 0.86 
36 1.24 0.32 -0.82 0.72 
38 0.59 0.32 -0.40 0.66 
Average 1.08 0.27 -0.80 0.90 
Note: The average uses weights based on the share of each division in total 
industrial employment. 
How have these elasticities been changing over time? Figure - 9. 1 shows 
that from the beginning of the sample period in 1990 until the end in 1998, 
there was a marked increase in the output elasticity for the paper products 
sector. But because this branch of industry employs only 3% of the 
industrial workforce, the overall labour absorptive capacity is unlikely to 
have fallen by much, especially because there were only slight changes in 
the output elasticity in the two sectors where most employment is located: 
food processing and textiles and apparel. There were also small increases 
in the own-wage elasticity (i.e., more elastic) in Divisions 31, 33 and 36, 
which were offset by slight falls in Divisions 32 and 38. Hence, there is no 
consistent trend for labour demand to become more or less own-wage 
elastic over the period studied. 
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9.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
The results reported above are based on an econometric approach that is 
designed to allow flexible substitution and wage elasticities even with quite 
limited data. However, the Box-Cox model used here does imply some 
properties of the regression disturbances that econometricians may 
sometimes disagree with (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Therefore, it is 
worth checking to see whether the substantive results about the elasticities 
would change if a different modelling approach was used. To carry out this 
robustness check, the log-linear labour demand function given by equation 
(2) was used for all branches of industry and the employment-weighted 
average elasticities were re-calculated. Using the log-linear functional form, 
the average elasticity of substitution for the manufacturing sector is 
calculated as 1 . 06 and the average own-wage elasticity of labour demand 
as -0.78. These values are quite close to the results reported in Table 4, so 
this may give some grounds for confidence that the results do not just 
reflect the particular functional forms used. A second sensitivity analysis 
was to include a cross-price effect (for capital services) in the labour 
demand equation because the empirical labour demand literature is evenly 
divided between studies and include those that exclude this cross-price 
(Hamermesh, 1986, Table 8.2). To carry out this analysis, an approximate 
rental price of capital, PK was calculated (for the stock in vehicles, plant and 
machinery and buildings) following an approach used by Jha et.al. (1993): 
where M;r is the value of fixed capital stock at constant prices and d;r is the 
rate of depreciation in the sub-industry and year concerned while ft is the 
Weighted Average Prime Lending Rate published by the Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka. 11 
11. This interest rate varies only across time and not across industries. 
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Figure 9.1 
Estimated Elasticity of Labour Demand with Respect to Output and 
Real Wages 1990 and 1998 
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The Box-Cox transformed labour demand function was then estimated and 
the tests of functional forms and calculation of the elasticities proceeded in 
the same manner as before. The results of the sensitivity analysis in Table 
- 9.5 shows that one effect of including the proxy for the rental price of 
capital is that for two more branches of industry, the constant elasticity 
functional form appears appropriate (see table - 9.5). 
Table - 9.5 
Estimation Results With Cost of Capital Variable Added to the Model 
Industry Branch 
31 32 33 34 35 36 38 
-
-1.12 -0.99 -0.57 -0.59 -0.94 -1.23 -0.63 1/u 
- 0.22 0.12 0.19 0.05+ 0.42 -0.1 o+ 0.18 17LK 
- 0.55 0.87 0.53 0.93 0.51 0.76 0.50 1/LY 
e 0.000 0.088 -0.173 -0.260 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A. 0.000 0.088 -0.173 -0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: +indicates that the estimated elasticity (or the regression coefficient when 
the elasticity is variable) is not statistically significantly different from zero at 
p<0.05). 
Adding the rental price of capital to the model also usually made the 
estimated own-wage elasticities larger (that is, more elastic) although not by 
much. This small change is consistent with the finding of Hamermesh 
(1986) that the own-wage elasticity of labour demand does not vary much 
between those studies that include the price of capital and those that do 
not. Another effect of adding the price of capital was to further reduce the 
output elasticities, providing further indications of the increasing returns to 
scale. The cross-price elasticity of labour demand with respect to the rental 
price of capital appears to be small in all branches of industry except for 
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chemical products, although it was statistically significant in all but two 
branches. 
As a whole, test results of the 2"d and 3rd hypotheses in the previous 
chapters of the study clearly indicate that 1977 economic reforms have not 
been successful in removing factor market distortions, especially labour 
market distortions. Based on this scenario, the chapter estimated 
substitution and output elasticites of labour demand with the view to 
evaluating the effectiveness of the policies that can prescribe factor price 
manipulation (removing distortions) to increase labour demand in 
manufacturing industries. Accordingly, it is found that elasticity of 
substitution varies widely among the branches of manufacturing industry 
with the average of 1.08, indicating that substitution of capital for labour is 
easy and high for most of the industry branches, and the employment-
weighted, long-run average own wage elasticities of the major branches of 
manufacturing industries is as high as - 0.80. However, these high 
elasticities were obtained taking the wage cost into consideration, not non-
wage costs arising from high costs of labour termination, costs of other 
undue regulatory impositions on labour and costs of poor industrial 
relations. Therefore, particularly in a background of already having a 
relatively low level of real wages, these elasticities suggest that reducing all 
aspects of non-wage costs by removing labour market distortions and 
lessening the relative cost of labour to capital by reducing capital market 
distortions, labour absorption in the manufacturing sector should be 
increased. Thus, these facts highly support the hypothesis - 'further 
changes in relative factor prices (costs) will have a positive impact on 
labour absorption by manufacturing industry'. Further, the estimated output 
elasticity of labour demand of 0.9 indicates that there is a high potential to 
increase labour absorption through increasing industrial sector output. 
Altogether, the chapter concludes that there should be a great potential to 
increase labour absorption in the manufacturing industry by reducing the all 
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aspects of non-wage costs and relative cost of labour to capital through 
removing factor market distortions and acquiring a rapid industrial output 
growth. 
9.6 Summary 
The test results of the 2"d and the 3rd hypotheses in chapter 6 and 7 
respectively suggest that high level of factor market distortions appeared in 
the pre-reform period have continued to the post-reform period too without 
much change. In this setting this chapter attempts to find whether there is 
scope for factor market reforms to have any impact on industrial labour 
demand through estimation of substitution and output elasticities of labour 
demand in the manufacturing industry. The estimations show that the 
elasticity of capital-labour substitution is high although it varies widely 
across the branches of industry. Then, the average, long-run own-wage 
elasticity of labour demand for the manufacturing sector is estimated as -
0.80. This relatively high level of elasticity considered wage cost, not non-
wage cost arising from various forms of labour market distortions. 
Therefore, in an environment of already having a low level of real wages, 
the chapter concludes that on one hand, labour absorption should be 
considerably increased by reducing non-wage costs, and on the other hand 
by reducing relative cost of labour to capital through removing capital 
market distortions. Thus, these estimates highly support the hypothesis -
'further changes in relative factor prices (costs) will have a positive impact 
on labour absorption by manufacturing industry'. On the other hand, the 
estimated output elasticity of 0.9 indicates that Labour absorption can be 
further increased by acquiring a high level of industrial sector output growth. 
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Chapter-10 
Summary, Conclusion, Policy Implications and 
Suggestions 
10.1 Introduction 
This final chapter commences in providing an overall summary for the 
background under which the hypotheses of the study are formulated. 
Then, the test results of each hypothesis are summarised, and based on 
this sum up, the conclusion of the whole study is presented. The chapter 
ends with giving some policy implications derived from the study and 
making a few suggestions for further work. 
10.2 Overall Summary 
The need for the diversification of the Sri Lankan economy was felt from 
the time of the First World War (1914-1918), and a number of commissions 
and committees such as the Industries Commission (1922), the Banking 
Commission (1934), and the Committee on Industrial Development and 
Policy ( 1946) recommended the setting up of new industries with the main 
objective of catering primarily to the home market and thereby making the 
economy less susceptible to the caprices of the market abroad (Oliver, 
1957: 28). However, as shown by Snodgrass, industrial activity remained 
an insignificant part of Ceylon's (Sri Lanka's) economy before the Second 
World War (Snodgrass, 1966: 168). 
During the period prior to the Second World War, the aim of the industrial 
policy was predominantly to promote private enterprise to engage in 
industries. Even the recommendations of the Industries Commission 
(1922) were meant to assigning a larger role to the private enterprises for 
investing in manufacturing industries after commencing them by the 
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Government. Throughout this era even the State Council hoped to channel 
funds from the state-aid bank to private enterprises (Oliver, 1957: 81). 
Irrespective of this policy and efforts, local investors who engaged mainly in 
primary product processing activities, import-export trade and plantations 
could not be attracted to invest in the manufacturing industry until the end 
of the 1950s, excepting the Second World War period (1939-45) during 
which along with the public sector the private sector too responded well to 
the sellers' market created by war scarcities. Afterwards, in 1946, a new 
policy statement on industry was issued taking into consideration the failure 
to attract private capital into industries, particularly during the pre-war 
period and the situation that the war-generated industries faced just after 
the War. Under the new industrial policy, state ownership and 
management were considered the preferable means to progress in 
industries, and the responsibility of promoting basic industries was 
assigned to the public sector while non-basic industries were set aside for 
the private sector (Oliver, 1957). This industrial policy continued as the 
official policy until 1952. 
Nevertheless, the new industrial policy was questioned by the World Bank 
team that came in 1952, and it disapproved completely the state ownership 
and management in industries. Subsequently the government adopted a 
programme formulated mainly in line with the World Bank Mission's 
recommendations (1952). The central objective of the industrial strategy 
under this programme was to reduce the state's direct involvement and to 
encourage the private sector. Thus, in the period 1954-56, the 
government's industrial policy shifted its emphasis from the large-scale 
basic industries to small-scale industries and the role of the state from the 
primary investor to a promoter. 
Even, under this policy change, the private sector did not come forward to 
invest in manufacturing as expected. Some critics attribute the failure to 
attract private sector capital to the manufacturing industry to the first two 
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post-independence governments' policy of apathy towards industrialisation. 
Still others emphasise that Sri Lanka did not make use of its relatively high 
economic strength in the post-independence era to increase its economic 
advancement due to the holding of a false sense of security about the 
viability of the existing system (Athukorala and Huynh, 1987). This lack of 
concern on the Government's side, as Kruger (1995) observed, was not in 
line with the policies followed by most of the other newly independent 
countries at that time. Hence, Sri Lanka continued the tradition of following 
laissez-faire economic policies, making the private sector apprehensive to 
go for a competition with high quality manufacturing products freely 
available in the local market. 
Besides these, this study attributes the failure of industrialisation in this era 
to some other factors as well. Firstly, the incentive package provided by 
the government in an environment following laissez-faire economic policies 
was not strong enough to attract local capital for manufacturing. Secondly, 
many restrictions enforced by the Government, due to the pressure 
directed from lobbying activities of various groups such as those involved in 
national political freedom and leftist political movement, contributed 
substantially to the emergence of some market distortions for the first time, 
commencing from the pre-independence era and the spreading of them in 
later years. These distortions and a number of other steps taken in favour 
of the local business class discouraged foreign investment in industry. 
Thirdly, technological defects associated from the beginning of the 
industrialisation, particularly with regards to the public sector industries 
hindered achieving sufficient industrial development throughout the period 
until the late 1950s. Consequently, the basic structural features of the 
classical export economy in Sri Lanka continued without any change for 
quite some time even after obtaining political independence in 1948. 
Meanwhile, the role of industrialisation was widened further by the need in 
providing employment for the rapidly increasing workforce surfaced due to 
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the population explosion commencing from the late 1940s. In this 
background, shifting the political power from the United National Party 
(UNP) to the People's United Front (PUF) in 1956 brought a decisive policy 
shift. Accordingly, the new government, with its political ideology of a more 
bias towards socialism, placed the highest emphasis not only on the 
restructuring of the classical export economy that was based on a few 
plantation crops but also on employment creation for the growing labour 
force through a speedy industrialisation. 
The new industrial policy appeared to reverse the pre 1956 trend by 
shifting emphasis back from private to public investment. Basic industries 
appeared once again to be reserved for the state (Oliver, 1957: 87). The 
new industrial policy adopted was clearly stated in the Ten-Year Plan 
(1959-68), and the Plan argued that if Ceylon (Sri Lanka) were to pursue 
industrialisation on a substantial scale there would appear to be no 
alternative but to initiate a serious and effective policy of protection which 
should go beyond the familiar infant industry argument (Ten Year Plan, 
1959: 34). 
Further, at this time, the country's foreign reserves fell to a very low level. 
For this reason, laissez-faire economic policies followed so far could not be 
continued. In the background of rapidly depleting foreign assets that the 
country possessed by the late 1950s and the little foreign aid available, the 
Government had to adopt a drastic course of action to curtail imports. 
Thus, the Government policy after 1957 was on the one hand to curtailing 
imports while on the other hand was to encouraging the establishment of 
domestic industries under protectionist policies through offering an 
attractive package of incentives. As pointed out by Kruger (1995: 3), 
similar to most of the other developing countries, the automatic protection 
and other government measures taken to develop import-substitution 
production constituted a highly powerful incentive for private producers in 
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Sri Lanka too. In this background, both the public and private sectors 
established a sizable number of manufacturing units. 
Although more expansion in industrialisation could be witnessed during the 
early phase of the import-substitution industrialisation (ISi) ( 1960-1964) 
than the preceding period, the ISi reached a limit within a short time of its 
commencement due to facing increasingly strong supply-side constraints 
which were created by severely deteriorating export earnings of major 
primary export products, poor inflow of foreign capital due to the uncertain 
economic condition created mainly by following socialist measures, and the 
inability to gear manufacturing products for the export market. Thus, ISi 
became stifled within a short period of its commencement (by the end of 
1964), and even failed to pass the easy substitution phase of the IS 
industrialisation. 
On the contrary, the second phase of the ISi (1965-70) commenced with 
dismantling some of the protectionist barriers erected in the first phase of 
IS industrialisation (1960-64) through a policy known as half-hearted or 
partial liberalisation (Karunaratna, 2000). Under this policy the supply of 
raw materials and other inputs that industry required could be enhanced by 
obtaining a sizable flow of external finance in the latter years of the 1960s, 
resulting in a rapid expansion in industrial output. 
Conversely, the new regime which came to power in 1970 did not approve 
the partial liberalisation policies followed by the previous administration and 
returned to a stringent ISi strategy with a greater direct government 
involvement than even the first ISi regime (1960-64). Thus, the public 
sector became the driving force in the economy in the third phase of ISi 
(1970-77). In this environment, corresponding to the expansion of the 
public sector, there was a relative contraction of the private sector and 
multinational industrial activity in this period (Kelegama and Wignaraja, 
1991 ). 
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On many fronts, the developmental efforts during the third phase of import-
substitution industrialisation (1970-76) experienced a setback, reflecting a 
drop of the GDP growth rate to 2. 9 per cent in the period 1970-76 from the 
5.3 per cent per year in the period 1965-69. The manufacturing sector's 
share in GDP declined to 14.1 per cent in 1977 from 16.7 per cent in 1970 
which proved the failure of industrialisation under the ISi strategy during 
that period. 
Employment generation for the rapidly growing workforce also fell short of 
what was needed. Unemployment increased from 15.6 per cent in 1971 to 
24.0 per cent in 1973 (Korale, 1992). Accordingly, import-substitution 
industrialisation for a period of two decades failed to generate a sufficient 
amount of employment. In this setting, the present study concludes that a 
sufficient amount of employment could not be generated through IS 
industries due to the insufficient availability of industrial input requirements 
in most of the years, and having a high level of capital intensity in industries 
which was created by pervasive factor market distortions in the ISi era. 
Increasing evidence that import-substitution industrialisation failed to 
promote development in Latin America, South Asia and elsewhere began 
to stimulate a shift of opinion towards outward looking policies from the late 
1970s (Grill and Riedel, 1995: xiv). Thus, for Sri Lanka also as for most of 
the other countries, as Kruger (1995: 20) emphasises, the outward-oriented 
trade strategy became a sine qua non to acquire a type of rapid growth 
commensurate to the growth experienced by East-Asian economies which 
were following outward-oriented industrialisation policies with great 
success. In this background, Sri Lanka introduced a number of far reaching 
steps to liberalise its economy starting from 1977, and the economic 
liberalisation so far constitutes three phases; the first wave of liberalisation 
(1977-89), the second wave of liberalisation (1989-94) and the third wave 
of liberalisation (1994 onwards). 
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The performance of the economy in the initial years of the 1977 reform era 
was remarkable. The overall outcome of the increase in gross domestic 
investment and other measures taken under the new policy was reflected 
by a parallel increase in the average rate of economic growth in the post-
reform period. Thus, GDP grew, on average, by 6.2 per cent per annum 
during the first five years following the trade liberalisation (1978-82) as 
compared to the lower GDP growth rate of 2.9 per cent per annum 
recorded in the controlled era, 1970-77. The average growth rate, 
however, in the subsequent periods fell to 4.1 per cent in the period 1983-
87, and to 4.0 per cent in the period 1988-92. Then, the average growth 
rate of GDP increased to 6.3 per cent in the period 1993-94, and again it 
fell to 5.2 per cent in the period 1999-2000. Industrial performance also in 
the first liberalisation period (1977-1989) under the export oriented 
industrialisation (EOI) was substantially superior to that of the pre-1977 
import-substitution regime, indicating an increase from the low average 
annual growth of 1.1 per cent in the 1970-77 period to 4.6 per cent in the 
period 1978-82, and to above 6 per cent during the rest of the period. 
However, the high growth momentum acquired in the immediate aftermath 
of the 1977 reforms could not be maintained in the ensuing years, 
particularly after 1982 due to the inability to maintain a stable 
macroeconomic climate during the rest of the reform period. The Sri 
Lankan government's macro economic fundamentals deteriorated due to 
government fiscal profligacy (Karunaratne, 2000). Further, this loss of 
macroeconomic stability led to overvaluing the exchange rate irrespective 
of the devaluation of money on several occasions through increasing 
inflation in the reform period. But, this behaviour was in contrast to what 
happened in other rapidly growing developing countries. As Kruger ( 1995) 
emphasises one of the hallmarks of the East-Asian policy regimes has 
been the relatively narrow range in which real exchange rates have 
fluctuated. But in Sri Lanka, it is possible to conclude that stabilisation and 
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structural reforms did not go together in complementing each other and, as 
a result, particularly in the first phase of liberalisation (1977-89) the success 
was severely limited. 
Then, again, under the second phase of liberalisation, starting from 1989 a 
number of steps such as further liberalisation, accelerating privatisation, 
devaluation of the rupee, and further scaling down of the nominal tariff 
were taken. With these changes in place and a more nominal condition 
prevailing in the country, the economy emerged showing a fast trend of 
expansion, particularly in the private sector manufacturing activities from 
1990 onwards. 
The export oriented industrialisation (EOI) after the 1977 reforms, unlike 
the ISi, played an important role in the transformation of the export 
structure of the country by increasing the share of manufactures (excluding 
petroleum products) in total merchandise export from 5 per cent in 1976 to 
77.2 per cent in 1998-2001 (Athukorala, 1996; 2000; CBSL, 2002). In the 
transformation of the export structure the role of foreign firms was 
substantial. However, the robustness of the direct private foreign 
investment is questioned because a few low skilled industries rather than a 
diversified range of manufactured exports have dominated Sri Lanka's 
export growth, indicating that the country's export structure has been only 
partially diversified after following EOI policies for more than two and a half 
decades. 
The other most important objective of the export-led industrialisation is to 
generate a sufficient level of employment. In comparison to the high level 
of unemployment that prevailed in the controlled era, in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1977 reforms employment generation increased 
substantially, as evidenced by the reduction of the rate of unemployment 
from about 20 per cent in 1977 to 11 per cent by 1981 /82. However, the 
overall employment generation reversed after 1982. As a result, 
unemployment remained at a high level in the second half of the 1980 
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decade. Then, with the gradual fading away of some of the shocks that 
emerged in the latter part of the 1980s and with the reawakening of the 
private sector under the second phase of liberalisation commencing from 
1989 onwards, the high unemployment trend began to reverse. Yet, the 
two-digit open unemployment experienced from the mid 1950s continued 
even after the 1977 reforms until 1997, and by 2002 nearly one in ten 
labour force participants was still out of a job. Further, Sri Lanka's current 
unemployment rate is substantially higher than that of most of the countries 
in East, South-East, and South Asia (WER, 2001 ). 
In this background the study examined the strength of the manufacturing 
sector to reduce the unemployment in the country. Accordingly, it was 
found that from 1990 to 2000 the manufacturing industrial sector recorded 
the highest percentage of employment growth, which was 40 per cent 
compared to the 18 per cent increase in employment in the service sector. 
The agricultural sector had 28 per cent of negative employment growth. 
Further, the empirical evidence presented by Ratnayake and Nayananada 
(1998), shows that the average total backward linkage coefficient in the 
manufacturing export production (1.24) exceeds that of the primary export 
sector (1.08), indicating that the former sector is capable of generating 
more employment than the latter sector. 
Moreover, this study estimates, that the industrial sector should acquire at 
least 12 per cent of annual growth rate (at constant prices) to absorb fully 
the annual increase of labour force on the basis of 16.6 per cent of the 
labour force being employed in the manufacturing sector in 2000, and the 
average annual increase of labour force of 2.0 per cent. Under the EOI 
strategy so far that much of industrial growth rate has not been achieved. 
Yet, it shows that the industrial sector alone with the average growth of 6.0 
per cent between 1991 and 2000 has absorbed % (50 per cent) of the new 
entrants to the labour force annually. This suggests that the relative 
strength of the manufacturing sector's labour absorption is very high. 
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Thus, this study concludes that the heavy reliance upon the manufacturing 
sector to solve the unemployment problem in Sri Lanka is a policy 
advocacy made in the right direction 1. Therefore, in this framework, the 
study emphasises the importance of identifying the current constraints that 
limit this sector in creation of employment, and then, examines further 
potentials that the manufacturing sector possesses in absorbing more 
labour. 
The examination of the manufacturing sector output-employment data 
during the last few decades by this study found that there has been a 
widening gap between the industrial output and employment in the reform 
period (after 1977). The average output-employment gap of 1.40 in the 
period 1979-89 (in the 1st phase of the liberalisation) has increased to 3.30 
in the 1990-00 period at constant prices (in the 2"d and 3rd phases of 
liberalisation). This widening out-put-employment gap indicates that there 
is a phenomenon of jobless growth, suggesting that the amount of labour 
absorption by manufacturing industries is inadequate. 
In this study this inadequacy in employment creation is mainly assumed to 
have appeared as a result of holding back labour demand on account of 
the factor market distortions while the study gives some weight to labour 
productivity behaviour, increase in capital intensity, real wage behaviour 
and the extent of backward linkages as some other factors behaviour of 
which may have further contributed to widening the manufacturing sector 
output-employment gap in an environment of following outward-oriented 
policies. 
1 The major policy prescription by policy advisors, the donor agencies, and accepted by the two 
major political parties to develop the country is still the export-oriented industrialisation. 
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The study, therefore, attempted to assess the impact of the aforementioned 
factors on retardation of labour absorption (widening output-employment 
gap) in the manufacturing industry by making a set of prior hypotheses and 
testing them. 
These hypotheses are: 
1. The high level of unemployment prevailing in Sri Lanka has stemmed 
from a situation of disequilibrium between labour supply and labour 
demand at aggregate level rather than from structural and some other 
mismatches. 
2. The cost of labour market distortions has decreased during the 
economic reform period' (1977-2000). 
3. Financial market liberalisation under economic reforms since 1977 
has lessened the capital market distortions. 
4. The trends in labour productivity, capital intensity, wage behaviour 
and linkage effects have not retarded employment generation in the 
reform period (1977-2000). 
5. Further changes in relative factor prices (costs) will have a positive 
impact on labour absorption by the manufacturing industry. 
10.2.1 Summary of the Test Results of the First Hypothesis 
The first Hypothesis - 'the high level of unemployment prevailing in Sri 
Lanka has stemmed from a situation of disequilibrium between labour 
supply and labour demand at aggregate level rather than the structural and 
some other mismatches'-was tested with a view to asses the strength of 
labour demand at aggregate level in the economy against mismatches in 
determining employment generation. 
Demand for labour, as a derived demand, depends on output growth. If the 
output growth in an economy were not expanded enough to absorb the 
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entire labour force or the labour supply, the result would be some 
proportion of unemployment. Thus, it is logical to analyse the 
unemployment problem in the perspective of the aggregate labour supply 
and labour demand. 
A major pressure to the appearance of a phenomenon of high 
unemployment in the 1960s and the 1970s came from the supply side of 
labour, particularly from the rapid expansion of the labour force due to the 
post-war population momentum and a fast increase of the labour force 
participation (Rodrigo, 1994). However, the upshot came from the labour 
supply to increase unemployment started showing a diminishing effect 
owing to declining population growth from the beginning of the1990s with 
the country entering the third face of its demographic transition. On the 
other hand, where the demand side of labour is concerned this study found 
most importantly that employment demand has positively varied with the 
economic growth acquired under different economic regimes during the last 
five decades. Therefore, looking at the employment issue in terms of the 
output-employment relationship as highlighted in the literature review is 
consistent with historical evidence in Sri Lanka also as most of the other 
developed and developing countries. 
The review of the data under the 1st hypothesis found that the annual 
employment growth rate of 2.0 per cent was accompanied by the annual 
output growth (GDP) rate of 5.40 per cent in the period 1951-52. 
Thereafter, the average employment growth rate fell to 0.6 per cent in the 
period1953-1963 2. 
2. Whenever the references for data are not given in this concluding chapter, please consider that 
they are from the various Annual Reports published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
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This low rate of employment was brought about by falling annual economic 
growth rate to 3.03 per cent in this period; mainly due to the failure of 
import-substitution industrialisation and other regulated policies followed 
from the late 1950s onwards. Then, compared to the previous regime a 
higher annual employment growth rate of 1. 7 per cent was accompanied by 
a higher output growth rate of 4.99 per cent per annum in the period 1964-
1970. The rapid industrial growth acquired under the partially liberalised 
policies followed in the latter part of the 1960s contributed much to push 
the GDP growth rate to a higher level in this period. 
Afterwards, the employment growth fell to a very low level of 0.5 per cent 
per annum with a dropping of the annual output growth rate to 2.99 per 
cent in the period 1970-77 due again to the failure of import-substitution 
industrial policy and other highly regulated economic policies during that 
period. On the contrary, the period 1977-81 could acquire a remarkable 
output growth, averaging to 6.53 per cent, accompanying a higher growth 
rate of employment of 2. 7 per cent per annum. This notable achievement 
was brought about in many commentators view by a radical policy 
departure from following a highly regulated economy approach to a market 
led approach from 1977 onwards. 
Thereafter, from 1982 onwards economic growth slowed down 
continuously up to 1990 mainly due to macroeconomic imbalances 
averaging the economic growth per annum to 4.40 per cent which 
accompanied an average annual employment growth of 2.30 per cent. 
Then, with the rapid growth of private sector led industrialisation under the 
second and third phases of liberalisation the average annual economic 
growth could be increased to 5.29 per cent which brought about a 2.50 per 
cent growth rate of annual employment in the period 1990-00. 
This historical phenomenon indicates clearly that in the eras where output 
growth increased employment growth too has increased while in the period 
of economic down turn the employment growth too has dampened. 
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Also, it seems that there has been a substantial contribution from industrial 
growth to increase output growth of the economy in each era. However, 
dependent on the past tendencies the labour demand derived from the 
aggregate output growth can be considered as the most significant factor of 
employment generation in the economy. 
However, before arriving at a firm conclusion on this matter, the study 
examined whether there were some other reasons which would impinge on 
the labour absorption of the economy. In this respect, attention was paid to 
some important hypotheses which have been put forward for explaining 
high unemployment in Sri Lanka. Out of these explanations the 'skill 
mismatch' hypothesis, first articulated by the ILO mission in 1971 was 
examined. Those who stress the orthodox view of the mismatch 
hypothesis believe that although the economy has employment 
opportunities, jobs expected by a large amount of job seekers are not 
adequately found or they do not fit the prevailing jobs. They further 
highlight that a number of mismatches exist concurrently under the 
structural mismatch hypothesis. 
Evidence presented in Chapter - 5 reveals that the orthodox view of 
mismatch highlighted in the 1970s can still be clearly applied only in few 
instances. Thus, as a whole, the analysis of available data suggests that 
the strength of chronic 'skill mismatch' highlighted by the ILO mission in 
1971 and some of the later researchers as a major reason for having a high 
level of unemployment in Sri Lanka has now lessened since most of the 
mismatches have reduced their vigour over time. 
On the other hand, Glewwe (1987) and Dickens and Lang (1996) 
presented another hypothesis which emphasises the superiority attached 
to the public sector jobs in motivating labour market entrants to wait for job 
openings in the public sector. But fewer evidences are found to prove the 
validity of this hypothesis. 
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Finally, Rama (1994) presented a third explanation which emphasises the 
wedge between 'good' and 'bad' private sector jobs resulting from Sri 
Lankan labour market regulation, and he further highlights that there are 
many other jobs which are not subject to much protection. As a result, 
some private sector jobs are precarious whereas others are almost for life. 
In this background Rama identifies that many among the unemployed are 
willing to queue for the latter jobs but are unwilling to take the former. 
Therefore, he proposes the enacting of less stringent firing regulations 
enforced more evenly across firms and sectors in order to reduce the 
wedge between 'good' (more secured) and 'bad' (unsecured) jobs and 
thereby to reduce the incentive to remain unemployed. However, the 
practicality of this suggestion is constrained by the strong trade union 
opposition to change the present employment security regulations. On the 
other hand, most of the first time job seekers are not aware of the job 
security regulations while employers have now increasingly adopted a 
practice of recruiting workers first on a casual or temporary basis to avoid 
the effects of these protective laws. 
Accordingly, on the basis of the aforementioned evidence the hypothesis -
'The high level of unemployment prevailing in Sri Lanka has stemmed from 
a situation of disequilibrium between labour supply and labour demand at 
aggregate level rather than from the structural and some other mismatches' 
cannot be rejected. Consequently, this study concludes that in explaining 
the unemployment problem in Sri Lanka more importance can be attached 
to the total imbalance between the labour supply and the labour demand 
arising form output growth than to the structural and other mismatches. 
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10.2.2 Summary of the Test Results of the Second Hypothesis 
The second hypothesis - 'the cost of labour market distortions has 
decreased during the economic reform period (1977-2000)' was tested to 
see if the high level of labour market distortions experienced in the 
regulated regime has lessened after following liberalised economic policies 
for a period of more than two decades. This hypothesis was tested by 
comparing the Sri Lankan labour market regulations with those of the 
neighbouring and some of the fast developing countries depending on the 
data availability, for the period of the1980s and the 1990s, paying attention 
to changes in labour regulations and practices within the reform period in 
Sri Lanka. This comparison is made based on; 1) minimum wages, 2) 
employment security legislations, 3) holidays and leave, 4) maternity 
benefits, and 5) industrial relations 
Minimum wages - First, the data comparison, which was made between 
the behaviour of the minimum wage index and the consumer price index 
during the last two decades, indicates that the minimum wages have not 
operated as a binding constraint to creating any positive impact on 
increasing wages during the reform period. Also, over time the difference 
between average and minimum wages has expanded, indicating that there 
is a diminishing effect of minimum wage on wage determination in Sri 
Lankan manufacturing industries. 
Second, an examination was made to see how far minimum wages are 
closer to the average wages to acquire a clearer idea of the effect of 
minimum wages on wage determination. For this purpose, a simple 
criterion was developed by the study based on the minimum / average 
wage ratio. Accordingly, if the ratio is greater than 1, it indicates that the 
minimum wage is higher than the market wage and it reflects a fully 
distotionary situation. 
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On the other hand, if this ratio is closer to zero, minimum wage regulations 
have a negligible impact on market wage determination and it indicates a 
situation free of distortion. In Sri Lanka, the ratio between average legal 
minimum wages to average wages determined by Wages Boards for the 
manufacturing sector workers was calculated as 0.5 for the period 1985 to 
1998. This ratio indicates that the average minimum wage is 1/2 of the 
average wage rate, indicating that the minimum wage compared to the 
average wage is considerably low. However, the relevant ratio for the 
garment sector in FTZ zones takes the value 1.01. Yet, Sri Lanka's 
international competitiveness is not hampered by the higher minimum wage 
levels and its influence to wage determination in FTZs since Sri Lanka's 
wages are the lowest in the region 
Finally, a comparison of the Sri Lankan minimum wage / average wage 
ratio with those of the other countries was made. Accordingly, the ratios of 
the Philippines (0.6) and Thailand's (0.6-0.8) are higher than Sri Lanka's 
ratio (0.5). However, when compared with South Korea's ratio of 0.2, 
Argentina's ratio of 0.3, Mexico's ratio of 0.2, and Chile's ratio of 0.2, Sri 
Lanka's ratio is much higher. But this phenomenon does not indicate that 
Sri Lanka's minimum wages are higher than the minimum wages in these 
countries since the wage levels in these countries are much higher than in 
Sri Lanka. For example, Argentina's wage level is 12 times, Malaysia's 6 
times, India's 1.9 times, and Bangladesh's 1.1 times higher than that of Sri 
Lanka's wage levels in the mid 1990s. As a whole, the above mentioned 
evidence shows that the minimum wage regulations do not have a 
distortional effect to increase the employers wage bill in Sri Lanka. 
Employment Security Legislations - In Sri Lanka without the written 
consent of the employee concerned or the prior written approval of the 
Commissioner of Labour, a permanent employee in the private sector 
cannot be retrenched for non-disciplinary reasons. 
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This dismissal procedure takes on a long delay during which firms have to 
keep paying the wage bill. On the other hand, the Commissioner of Labour 
calculates the compensation to be paid to retrenched employees 
depending on the circumstances of each individual case. For such 
calculations there was not a clear formula until the relevant regulation was 
amended in 2002. On most occasions the quantum of compensation 
ordered was beyond the paying capacity of the employer. 
Moreover, the data comparison reveals that the period of notice given for 
dismissal and payments of severance pay in other countries are much 
simpler, clearer and quicker than in Sri Lanka. Thus, international 
comparison clearly confirms that Sri Lanka's employment security 
regulations and practices are the toughest, and are extremely delayed in 
being implemented, which severely limits employers' ability to rationalise or 
restructure their businesses. 
Holiday and Leave - The study firstly, compared the leave entitlement of 
different categories of workers. Accordingly, the public sector employees 
are on 179 days holiday for a year. The workers in the Shops and Office 
category enjoy 127 days of holiday for a year. Then, those benefiting de 
facto from the 1972 Extension Order are entitled to 122 days of holiday for 
a year. Next, workers in the 'Other Trades' categories, including garment 
sector workers, are entitled to 94 holidays for a year. Plantation workers 
have the least number of days of holiday, 89 days for a year. These latter 
two groups account for the highest percentage of private sector employees, 
and compared to other categories their holiday entitlements are extremely 
low. 
Next, the study compared the Sri Lankan private sector workers annual 
leave and paid public holidays with those of a few other countries in the 
region depending on data availability. 
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This comparison reveals that Sri Lankan workers enjoy the highest number 
of paid public holidays (22 days for a year) among the sample countries 
compared. Thus, the international comparison is much less favourable to 
Sri Lanka where the Sri Lankan workers leave entitlement is concerned. 
On the other hand, the private sector work within Sri Lanka, particularly 
involved in international trade, is largely hampered by an extremely large 
amount of public holidays. 
Maternity Leave - In Sri Lanka, prior to 1985 maternity leave was only for 
a 6 week period, and it was extended to 12 weeks from 1985 (but 
implemented in the private sector from 1987). The international data 
comparison in the region reveals that Indonesia gives the shortest period of 
maternity leave (45 days) while Vietnam gives the longest period of 
maternity leave (up to 180 days). Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh offer a similar period of maternity leave (84 days) among the 
countries compared. Thus, as a whole, when Sri Lanka's duration of 
maternity leave and other related facilities are compared with those of other 
countries, facilities given to Sri Lankan female workers are by no means 
excessive. 
Social Security Regulations and Labour Costs - The comparison that 
was done between the size of the contribution made by employers in Sri 
Lanka and those of the employers in a few selected countries in the region 
reveals that Sri Lankan employers have to bear considerably higher costs 
in respect of contributions to the two social security schemes; the 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and Employers Trust Fund (ETF) 
schemes. The provident fund shares that only the employer has to pay in 
South Korea, Singapore, and Sri Lanka vary as 39.0, 20.0 and 19.5 per 
cent respectively while the relevant contributions in all other countries in the 
region are lower than those of these three countries. These figures 
indicate that Sri Lanka's employers' contribution is only marginally lower 
than that of Singapore. 
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But if the Sri Lankan employers' liability of paying the ETF (3 % of an 
employee's wage) is added to their share of the provident fund contribution, 
the cost of social security payment for Sri Lankan employers would be 
higher than even that of Singaporean employers. Further, in Sri Lanka 
within the reform period (after 1977), shares of contribution to be made to 
the EPF increased on a few occasions, and even the ETF scheme for 
which only employers are bound to contribute was introduced within the 
reform period (in 1980), and therefore, where these occurrences are 
concerned we can conclude that labour cost arising from labour security 
regulations in Sri Lanka has increased during the reform period. 
Industrial Relations - In the period 1977-93 except 1989, the private 
sector firms did not face a high cost in terms of labour conflicts, mainly due 
to following repressive labour practices rather than because of weakening 
of the forces of industrial conflicts (Gunatilaka, 1999). However, a surge of 
unrest occurred just after the change of the repressed labour regime in 
1994 evidenced by the increase of the average number of days lost per 
year on account of strikes, from 14,973 in the period 1990-93 to 203,476 in 
the subsequent period of 1994-99. 
Thus, the fact that the number of persons-days lost due to increased 
industrial disputes after 1993 suggests that the labour relations system in 
Sri Lanka remains in a poor state. The study concludes that more than 
anything else the poor state of labour relations has highly distorted the 
labour market in Sri Lanka. In this background, the study identified a 
number of reasons which have contributed largely to continuing this poor 
industrial relations system from the controlled era to the reform period. 
They include: i) in Sri Lanka, the collective bargaining tradition is not 
sufficiently developed and widespread to develop good relations between 
employers and employees; ii) long delays involved in giving decisions with 
regard to labour disputes under regulations such as TEWA and the Labour 
Tribunal system promote industrial conflicts rather than settle them; iii) the 
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confrontational attitude that emerged between the two social partners, 
employees and employers from the colonial era and later strengthened 
through the influence of Marxist and other political parties has continued 
across the ISi era to the EOI era, contributing much to damaging the 
industrial relations system; iv) a work culture has not been created to 
develop favourable attitudes among workers towards their organisations; V) 
management styles followed by most of the employers do not promote 
industrial relations; and vi) governments too have not taken any meaningful 
steps after the introduction of 1977 economic reforms to move towards an 
industrial relations system which is less reliant on legal controls and which 
promotes voluntary bargaining although it appears that this should be the 
need for the changing environment that emerged after 1977 economic 
reforms. 
Altogether, the aforementioned evidence shows that contrary to the 
conventional view, the minimum wage regulations in Sri Lanka do not have 
a large positive impact on increasing employers' costs of labour. But quite 
the opposite impact on the costs of labour could be seen arising from the 
regulations related to the employment security, contributions to social 
security programmes, and the private sector and the public sector holiday 
and leave. These regulations have a considerably high positive effect on 
increasing employers' non-wage labour costs in Sri Lanka. Also, cost of 
social security has increased during the reform period, starting from 1977, 
and 13 new labour regulations relating to various aspects of working life 
have been enacted from 1978 to 1995. Moreover, it has found that more 
than anything else the highly deteriorated industrial relations system has 
damaged labour market flexibility in Sri Lanka and thereby imposed a huge 
cost to employers without showing any improvement of labour relations 
from the controlled era to be consistent with open economic policy regime. 
Thus, the aforementioned evidence is not consistent with the hypothesis 
that 'the cost of labour market distortions has decreased during the 
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economic reform period'. Consequently, the chapter concludes that the 
costs of labour market distortions have significantly increased during the 
reform period after 1977, resulting in retarding the labour market demand 
considerably. 
10.2.3 Summary of the Test Results of the Third Hypothesis 
The third hypothesis - 'The financial liberalisation under economic reforms 
since 1977 has lessened financial market distortions' - was aimed at 
assessing the success of the financial liberalisation in lessening the high 
level of capital market distortions which emerged due to following 
repressive financial policies prior to 1977. This hypothesis was tested 
using a number of criteria such as the trend in real interest rate; the 
financial deepening measured through M1 / GDP, M2 / GDP, and M3 / GDP 
ratios; the trends in volume of credit channelled to the different sectors, and 
the behaviour of the real exchange rates. 
Empirical data analysis showed that in the controlled era ( 1971-76) all 
deposit and lending rates remained at a very low level, resulting in negative 
real interest rates in all spheres of banking activities during this period. 
Also, the examination of the exchange rate behaviour indicated that the 
rupee was comparatively overvalued against all the major currencies 
before 1977. These trends proved the fact that the capital market before 
1977 was highly distorted. Basic indicators of the financial depth of the 
economy, the M2 / GDP and the M3 / GDP ratios remained at lower levels 
while the M1 / GDP ratio had higher values in the pre-1977 reform period 
indicating that during that regime the financial market was 'shallow'. 
However, after financial market liberalisation under the 1977 reforms, the 
analysis of empirical data reveals that the M1 / GDP ratio has dropped while 
the M2 / GDP and M 3 / GDP ratios have increased. This pattern suggests 
a shift in household asset portfolios from cash holdings to saving and time 
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deposits, and increased their savings in non-commercial financial 
institutions as well. This tendency indicates that there is a clear 
development of savings and financial deepening after the financial market 
reforms. 
Further, the data analysis reveals that after the 1977 financial market 
reforms the amount of credit flowing to the government related sectors 
began to lessen gradually, from 72 per cent before 1977 to 50 per cent in 
1981/91, and then to less than 30 per cent from 1991 onwards. Thus, it is 
possible to conclude that funds are distributed more efficiently after the 
financial market liberalisation. 
Moreover, after the adjustment of interest rates towards the market 
equilibrium rate as a part of the 1977 financial market reforms the real 
interest rate began to show positive values in most of the years in the 
ensuing period, except in the years such as 1988, 1990, 1991 and 1996, 
and therefore, it is possible to determine that capital market distortions that 
appeared in the controlled era have significantly lowered in the reform 
period. 
But real exchange rate appreciation noticed in most of the years in the 
reform period has significantly limited the success of removing capital 
market distortions through financial market liberalisation. Thus, the study 
concludes that although the financial market liberalisation has substantially 
contributed to lessening the capital market distortions (discouraging capital 
intensity) by raising interest rates towards market equilibrium rates its effect 
has been retarded by exchange rate overvaluation. These divergent trends 
in real interest rates and real exchange rates during the reform period do 
not support the hypothesis - 'the financial liberalisation under economic 
reforms since 1977 has lessened capital market distortions'. Therefore, the 
study concludes that financial liberalisation has not been successful in 
removing capital market distortions significantly. 
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10.2.4 Summary of the Test Results of the Fourth Hypothesis 
The fourth hypothesis - 'the trends in labour productivity, capital intensity, 
wage behaviour and linkage effects have not retarded employment 
generation in the reform period, 1977-2000' was formulated with the view to 
capture the effects of; 1) labour productivity, 2) capital intensity 3) wage 
behaviour and 4) linkage effects (other than the effects that come from 
factor market distortions which have already been identified through testing 
the 2nd and the 3rd hypotheses) on holding back the labour absorption or 
widening the output-employment gap in manufacturing industries. 
Labour Productivity - According to a recent empirical study, labour 
productivity in total manufacturing has increased at a compound annual 
rate of 7.5 per cent for the period 1981-1993 (Athukorala, 1996). In this 
background, the present study examined the more recent trends in labour 
productivity using the traditional growth accounting (Solow residual) 
procedure related to the firms in the private FTZ sector, the private non-
FTZ sector, and the public sector, based on 4-digit disaggregated industrial 
data for the 1990s. 
The estimate results reveal that the labour productivity growth rate in the 
private FTZ has increased from 6.53 per cent in 1991 to 7.08 per cent in 
2000. The factor decomposition with regard to the private FTZ sector 
continuously shows a declining trend from the contribution of capital 
deepening (3.22 per cent in 1990 to 1.59 per cent growth rate in 2000) to 
labour productivity growth over time, indicating that improvement of labour 
productivity in that sector has come predominantly from the total factor 
productivity growth. Thus, the decline in capital deepening indicates that 
labour absorption in this sector is increasing at a higher rate than the 
expansion of capital accumulation. 
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When the average growth rate of labour productivity in the private non-FTZ 
sector is concerned for the 1990s, it has increased from 6.21 per cent in 
1991-94 to 6.41 per cent in 1996-98. These growth rates are lower than 
those of the private FTZ sector. On the other hand, as the factor 
decomposition suggests capital deepening in the private non-FTZ sector 
has made an increasing contribution (1.07 per cent in 1991-94 to 2.57 per 
cent growth rate in 1996-98) to raise labour productivity, indicating labour 
absorption in that sector being retarded. 
A starkly contrasting pattern of labour productivity is shown in the public 
sector industry which shows a negative labour productivity growth since its 
position has been rapidly eroding due to the fast increase in privatisation of 
SOEs from the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, the divergent trends that 
appeared in labour productivity in different sectors do not allow for making 
a sweeping generalisation of the effect of labour productivity of the 
manufacturing industry on labour absorption. 
Capital Intensity - The contribution of capital intensity to the widening 
output-employment gap is attempted to be captured through calculating a 
few ratios such as capital I labour (KIL) ratio, growth of the capital stock 
(l1K), and capital deepening (l1K-l1L) with regard to the private FTZ sector, 
the private non-FTZ sector and the public sector manufacturing industries 
for the 1990s. 
Accordingly, in the private FTZ sector the capital output ratio has declined 
while the growth of capital stock has gone down from 1993 to 2000. Also 
capital deepening for this sector shows somewhat declining trend for the 
1990 decade. Thus, based on these declining ratios, it is possible to 
determine that capital intensity has gone down, indicating higher labour 
absorption in the private FTZ sector in the 1990 decade. . In the private 
non-FTZ sector the average share of capital in total value added, the KIL 
ratio, the growth of capital ratio and capital deepening have increased, 
reflecting a decline in the labour absorption towards the end of the 1990s. 
352 
The finding by this study on capital intensity of the private non-FTZ sector 
is consistent with the Central Bank data on employment creation by this 
sector. According to these figures, employment creation has been retarded 
in this sector after 1995. Also when the domestic cost structure of non-FTZ 
firms is examined it shows that cost on interest payments has increased 
from 2.1 per cent of total domestic cost in 1995 to 2.5 per cent in 2002, 
while the cost on wages has declined from 12.3 per cent in 1995 to 11.7 
per cent in the corresponding period, confirming that capital intensity in the 
private non-FTZ sector has increased in recent years. On the other hand, 
the public sector with its shrinking activities due to privatisation shows an 
entirely different situation in increase of capital deepening due to higher 
reduction of employment than the reduction of capital stock in the 1990s. 
Wage Behaviour - The examination of the real wage index reveals that 
there was a declining trend in the real wage during the first part of the 1980 
decade. Then, in the latter part of the 1980s the real wage had increased, 
and after 1989 it had gone down until 1993. Afterward, it again 
demonstrated an increasing trend in the period 1994 and 1995. However, 
as a whole, these fluctuations were trivial. Then, after 1995 the real wage 
has been displaying a continuously declining trend. Moreover, among the 
countries compared, Sri Lanka's labour wage was the lowest in the 1990s. 
Thus, altogether, in a background of declining real wage labour absorption 
should be increased. 
Linkages - The empirical study carried out by Ratnayake and Nayananda 
(1998) on 'production and employment spread effects of export led 
industrialisation for the period 1977-97 reports that the spread effects of the 
export manufacturing sector in terms of both backward and forward 
linkages are weak. In this background, this study attempted to identify the 
backward linkages through examining changes in the domestic cost 
structure outside the Board of Investment (non-BOI) industries dependent 
on the data availability. 
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This investigation shows that the cost on domestic raw materials by non-
BOI firms declined from 32.2 per cent in 1995 to 30.2 per cent in 2002. 
This indicates that backward linkages in the non-BOI industrial sector show 
a declining trend over time. 
Another trend found by this study is the changing employment structure in 
Sri Lanka more towards low skilled industries such as garments, jewelry 
etc, which have weakest backward linkages, as revealed by the reduction 
of employment in high skilled manufacturing industries from 10.1 per cent 
in 1985 to 9.8 in 1995 (WER, 1998/99). This phenomenon clearly proves 
that in the BOI sector also backward linkages have declined over time. 
But, this trend is deviating from what is happening in manufacturing 
employment in the fast-growing East and South-East Asian countries 
where high skilled sectors are rapidly expanding while the growth of low-
skilled sectors such as textiles and wearing apparel have been very low or 
negative. In these countries, the high skilled sectors have experienced 
high growth rates of employment (ibid). 
As a whole, according to the test results of the 4th hypothesis, having a 
trend of increasing labour productivity along with a decreasing capital 
intensity under flexible wage behaviour, labour absorption should be 
increased in the private FTZ sector for the 1990s. But in the private non-
FTZ sector with a slower increase in labour productivity in recent years 
along with increasing capital intensity indicate a lesser labour absorption 
suggesting that this sector compared to the private FTZ sector has been 
benefited to lesser extent by the flexible real wages in the economy. 
However, the public sector behaviour in labour absorption cannot be 
analysed with respect to the trends in its labour productivity, capital 
intensity and real wage behaviour as done in respect of the other two 
sectors since its activities are highly eroded on account of the closing down 
of some of its activities and the rapid decrease of its size under increasing 
privatisation after 1990. 
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Moreover, it is found that linkages effects in manufacturing industries for 
almost all the sectors are very weak, and are further getting weaker. 
Accordingly, the evidence presented is not significantly consistent with the 
hypothesis - the trends in the labour productivity, capital intensity, wage 
behaviour and linkage effects have not retarded employment generation in 
the reform period, 1977-2000'. Consequently, the study concludes that 
capital deepening particularly in private non FTZ and the public sector 
industries, the continual low level of linkage effects among industries in all 
sectors have badly affected labour absorption in manufacturing industries. 
10.2.5 Summary of the Test Results of the Final Hypothesis 
Test results of the 2"d and 3rd hypotheses clearly show that 1977 economic 
reforms have largely failed in removing factor market distortions, especially 
labour market distortions. In this setting, it is necessary to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the policies that prescribe factor price manipulation 
(removing distortions) to increase labour demand in manufacturing 
industries. The success of such policies depends mainly on the size of the 
substitution elasticites. 
Hence, the final hypothesis - 'further changes in relative factor prices 
(costs) will have a positive impact on labour absorption by manufacturing 
industry' was tested by estimating long-run own wage elasticity of labour 
demand along with output elasticity for the major branches of the Sri 
Lankan manufacturing industry through the flexible and data dependent 
Box-Cox transformation method using data on 4-digit ISIC industries 
categories for the period 1990-98. Accordingly, it is found that elasticity of 
substitution varies widely among the branches of manufacturing industry 
(from 0.62 to 1.44) with the average of 1.08, indicating that substitution of 
capital for labour is easy and high for most of the industry branches. The 
employment-weighted, long-run average own wage elasticities of the major 
branches of manufacturing industries was found as -0.80, so a 1 O per cent 
355 
fall in the wage cost would be expected to lead to a 8 per cent increase in 
industrial employment in the long-run. Consequently, this high level of own 
wage elasticity (usually more than 0.50) indicates that factor price policy 
should have an important effect on labour demand in this setting, and 
therefore, this evidence is significantly consistent with the hypothesis -
'further changes in relative factor prices (costs) will have a positive impact 
on labour absorption by manufacturing industry'. Yet, it is necessary to 
emphasise that the estimated elasticities considered only wage cost of 
labour, not non-wage costs arising from high costs of labour termination, 
costs of other undue regulatory impositions on labour and costs of poor 
industrial relations. Consequently, to the extent that these non-wage costs 
remain high, the potential for labour absorption, indicating by this relatively 
higher average wage elasticity may not be realised. So, the chapter 
concludes that there should be a great potential to increase labour 
absorption in the manufacturing industry by reducing the all aspects of non-
wage costs, particularly in an environment of already having a low level of 
real wages, and by decreasing relative cost of labour to capital through 
removing factor market distortions. 
10.3 Conclusion 
The study in essence at the outset concludes that the insufficient demand 
for labour at aggregate level in the economy, arising from poor economic 
performance, matters more than mismatches for a high level of 
unemployment appearing in Sri Lanka, emphasising that the retardation of 
labour demand in the manufacturing sector, particularly would contribute 
much to exacerbate the unemployment issue. 
In the policy environment of attaching the highest prominence to export-
oriented industrialisation (EOI) to create employment under the 1977 
economic reforms, the study, through assessing the industrial sector's 
performance during the reform period, mainly in the 1990 decade, 
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concludes that the manufacturing sector is the most dynamic and the 
strongest sector in generating employment in the Sri Lankan economy. 
Yet, taking the widening output-employment gap identified for the first time 
by this study into consideration, it is concluded that there is a trend of the 
appearance of jobless growth or a weak demand for labour in industry. 
The study, in this setting, hypothesised that mainly factor market 
distortions, and then, labour productivity behaviour, increasing capital 
intensity, real wage behaviour, and the poor state of linkage effects have 
contributed to hold back labour demand in the manufacturing industry. On 
the strength of the test results of the relevant hypotheses the study 
concludes that factor market distortions have contributed significantly to 
retard labour demand. 
The study, in particular finds that in comparison to some of the countries in 
South-East and South Asia the Sri Lankan labour market is the most 
distorted market. Also, the degree of labour market distortions has 
increased further during the reform period. However, the study reveals that 
capital market distortions compared to the previous controlled era have 
partly been reduced by the financial market reforms after 1977. 
As for labour productivity the study traced that labour productivity has 
increased in the private FTZ and the private non-FTZ sector moderately 
while it has rapidly declined in the public sector during the reform period. It 
was also noticed that in the private FTZ sector, the contribution that comes 
from capital deepening to increase labour productivity is less than that of 
the private non-FTZ sector, confirming that a larger influence has been 
exerted from the total factor productivity growth to increase labour 
productivity in the private FTZ sector than that of the private non-FTZ 
sector. On this basis, the study concludes that labour productivity increase 
in the private FTZ sector has made a higher contribution to increase labour 
absorption than that of the private non-FTZ sector. Moreover, having found 
that capital deepening in the private non-FTZ sector after 1996 and the 
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public sector throughout the 1990s has increased while it has declined in 
the private FTZ sector the study concludes that capital intensity in the 
private non-FTZ and the public sectors has retarded labour absorption than 
the private FTZ sector. 
The study, considering the movement in real wages with small fluctuations 
in the reform period, especially with the continuously declining tendency in 
recent years, and having the lowest wage levels in Sri Lanka in comparison 
to the South East and South Asian countries in the 1990s, concludes that 
where wage behaviour alone is concerned, it has not contributed to 
decelerate labour absorption in the manufacturing industry. 
On the other hand, the study arrives at a conclusion that backward linkages 
in the Sri Lankan manufacturing industry are not only low but also are 
showing a trend of further shifting towards lower value-added products in 
contrast to the trend noticed in other rapidly developing countries. The 
study, therefore, concludes that this phenomenon has contributed 
substantially to weaken labour demand in the manufacturing industry. 
Finally, the results of the estimation of the production function for the 
manufacturing industry suggest that there is a high, albeit variable, degree 
of substitutability between capital and labour in the branches of Sri Lankan 
manufacturing industry. In this background the study concludes, on the 
basis of the employment-weighted average of long-run own-wage elasticity 
(-0.80) and output elasticity (0.90), that there are high potentials to increase 
labour absorption in the manufacturing industry by lowering non-wage 
labour costs arising from labour market distortions and lowering labour cost 
relative to capital by correcting capital market distortions, and increasing 
industrial output respectively. 
As a whole, these findings and various conclusions, and the analysis made 
so far in the previous chapters in the study lead to drawing two major 
conclusions that have mainly contributed to retard labour demand in the 
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manufacturing industry. The first major conclusion is that factor market 
distortions, particularly the labour market distortions entrenched in the ISi 
era have continued to the EOI era, and have encouraged the selection of 
labour saving technologies. The second major conclusion is that linkage 
effects in the Sri Lankan manufacturing industry have been remaining at a 
very low level, showing a further deceleration, for an abnormally longer 
period than other countries which follow similar policies in the region, and 
this trend has considerably retarded the labour demand in the 
manufacturing industry. 
10.4 Policy Implications 
Having identified that the factor market distortions rooted in the highly 
regulated economic policy environment prior to 1977 have not lessened 
even in the post reform period of more than two and a half decades, the 
main contribution made by this study is to show that there is a clear scope 
for factor market reforms to have a substantial impact on further increase in 
labour demand in the manufacturing industry. The results of the estimation 
of demand for labour function show that the average long-run employment 
weighted elasticity of substitution is as high as 1.08, indicating that there is 
a great potential for substituting capital to labour in the branches of 
manufacturing industry in Sri Lanka. In this setting, it is further found that 
the average long-run employment weighted own wage elasticity is -0.80 
which indicates that 1 O per cent slash of labour cost arising from various 
non-wage cost areas, particularly in a background of already having a low 
level of real wages, and capital market distortions can bring about an 8 per 
cent increase in employment generation. Consequently, removing factor 
market distortions that act to raise the cost of labour relative to the cost of 
capital is likely to have a significant impact on labour demand. Such 
reforms may be urgently needed because the widening output-employment 
gap identified by this study shows that there would be an increasing trend 
of jobless growth in an environment of already having a high level of 
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unemployment in the country. In this context, the output elasticity of labour 
demand was also estimated by the study to assess the impact of output 
increase on labour demand. The estimated output elasticity gave a value 
as high as 0.90 indicating that 10 per cent increase in output brings about 9 
per cent increase in employment. These high values of elasticities suggest 
that removing factor market distortions and increasing industrial output 
should substantially increase labour demand in the manufacturing industry. 
In this framework, it is extremely important to formulate correct policies and 
implement them efficiently to reduce the factor market distortions and to 
increase industrial output as well. Given the high level of trade union 
opposition to remove existing labour regulations, especially employment 
security laws, the most feasible means to reduce labour market distortions 
would be firstly to improve the industrial relations system (through 
developing the present collective bargaining mechanism, removing delays 
of settling labour disputes, gradually introducing productivity based wage 
systems, promoting in-house trade unions, encouraging employers to adopt 
more modern and participative styles of management, creating favourable 
attitudes among workers for developing a healthy work culture etc.). Also, 
steps should be taken quickly to amend certain old and irrelevant labour 
laws and some clauses in certain laws for which the organised labour 
movement does not have much objections, and thereby increasing labour 
market flexibility. 
On the other hand, for increasing industrial output the only possibility that 
appears to have been envisaged presently is the continuation with the 
export led industrialisation policy. Yet, the success of this policy, as 
experienced during the reform period after 1977, largely depends on 
maintaining a healthy macro economic environment. Sustaining such a 
macroeconomic climate helps not only to increase industrial output by 
ensuring a rapid export led industrialisation through strengthening the 
economy's international competitiveness but also it keeps the extent of 
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capital market distortions at a lower level through avoidance of real 
exchange rate overvaluations. Also, the maintenance of a successful 
macroeconomic environment, particularly through controlling inflation can 
minimise the pressure that may come from labour unions to increase 
wages to be matched with the increasing cost of living. In this background, 
if policies designed to increase industrial output and lessen factor market 
distortions are implemented in isolation, they will not be functioning 
successfully. Therefore, policies intended to lessen the factor market 
distortions and to increase industrial output should be implemented in such 
a way that they are complementing each other to ensure a rapid increase in 
labour demand in manufacturing industry by influencing both input and 
output sides of the production function of the whole manufacturing industry. 
10.5 Suggestions for Further Work 
Although the main objective of this study is to evaluate trends in the factor 
markets and their effect on labour absorption in the manufacturing industry, 
the study, in addition, found that the low level of backward linkages with 
further shifting of the industrial export structure towards low value added 
products over time has contributed substantially to hold back labour 
demand in the manufacturing industry. Since handling such an issue in 
detail is beyond the scope of the present study, it is proposed for future 
researchers to carry out detailed studies for examining reasons such as low 
level of technology development, weak technological adaptability, and lack 
of development of entrepreneurial skills among young people which we can 
expect to have contributed to the appearance of a trend of dominance of 
low value-added products with low linkage effects in the Sri Lankan 
manufacturing industry for a long period. Also, the study found that the 
capital intensity in the private FTZ sector has been showing a somewhat 
declining trend while capital intensity in the private non-FTZ sector 
demonstrating an increasing trend. 
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Therefore, if future research can be directed to investigate into these 
divergent movements in capital intensity between the major sectors of the 
manufacturing industry it would be helpful in formulating further relevant 
policies to enhance employment creation in the manufacturing industry in 
Sri Lanka. 
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Appendix -1 
Sources of Official Statistics 
1. Annual Survey of Industries, 1990-2000, Sri Lanka 
2. Asian Development Outlook (various), Asian Development Bank, 
Manila 
3. Central Bank Annual Reports (various}, Sri Lanka 
4. Industrial Year Book of Industrial Statistics (various), UNIDO, Vienna 
5. Key Indicators of Labour Market (various), ILO, New York and London 
6. Labour Statistics, Department of Labour, Sri Lanka 
7. Quarterly Report of the Sri Lanka Labour force Surveys (various), 
Department of Labour, Sri Lanka 
8. Report on Consumer Finances and Socio Economic Surveys, 
(various), Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
9 World Economic Outlook, IMF, Washington, D. C. 
1 O. World Labour Reports, I LO, Geneva 
11 Year Book of Labour Statistics, ILO, Geneva 
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Appendix - 2 Population Pyramids - All Sectors 
1963 
Female Male 
6.3 8.2 
13.4 11.3 
11.5 10.4 
11.6 11.4 
11.9 12.3 
15.3 14.6 
13.6 13.4 
Age Group 
46 - 55 
36-45 
26 - 35 
19 - 25 
14 -18 
10 -13 
5-9 
0-4 
1996/97 
Female Male 
I 
11.2 110.21 
13.6 12.9 
15.1 13.6 
12.0 11.4 
II 11.3 11.7 
I 7.8 9.3 
I 8.3 8.9 
i 
7.7 8.4 
(Numbers within the blocks indicate the percentage of population by age and sex) 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics 
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Appendix-3 
Labour Ordinance 
Labour Ordinances passed before 1948 
1 Service Contracts Ordinance (No. 11 of 1865) 
2 Registration of Domestic Servants Ordinance (No. 28 of 1871) 
3 Medical Wants Ordinance (No. 9 of 1912) 
4 Chauffeurs Regulations Ordinance (No. 23 of 1912) 
5 Diseases (Labourers) Ordinance (No. of 1912. 6 Estate Labour (Indian} 
Ordinance (No. 10 of 1921)) 
7 Tundu Prohibition Ordinance (No. 43 of 1921) 
8 Indian Immigrant Labour Ordinance (No. 1 of 1927) 
9 Minimum Wages (Indian Estate Labour} Ordinance (No. 27 of 1927) 
10 Industrial Dispute (Conciliation) Ordinance (No. 3 of 1931} 
11 Workmen's Compensation Ordinance (No. 19 of 1934) 
12 Trade Unions Ordinance (No. 14 of 1935) 
13 Mines (Prohibition of Female Labour Under Ground} Ordinance 
14 Shops Ordinance (No. 66 of 1938) 
15 Maternity Benefits Ordinance (No. 32 of 1939} 
16 Children and Young Persons Ordinance (No. 48 of 1939) 
17 Wages Boards Ordinance (No. 27 of 1941) 
18 Factories Ordinance (No. 45 of 1942) 
19 Mines, Quarries and Mineral Ordinance (No. 55 of 1947} 
Source: Ministry of labour, Sri Lanka 
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Appendix-4 
Labour Acts 
Labour Acts passed after 1948 
1 Industrial Disputes Act. (No. 43 of 1950) 
2. Labour Inspection (Maintenance of Secrecy) Act. 
3 Shop and Office Employees (Regulation employees and remuneration) Act (No. 19 of 1954) 
4 Fee-charging Employment Agencies Act (No. 37 of 1956) 
5 Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act (No. 47 of 1956) 
6 Employees' Provident Fund Act (No. 15 of 1958) 
7 Inspector of Labour (Change of designation) Act (No. 7 of 1958) 
8 Employees Holiday Act (No. 6 of 1959) 
9 Interim Devaluation Allowance of Employees Act. (No. 40 of 1968) 
10 Trade Union Representatives (Entry into Estates) Act. (No. 25 of 1970) 
11 National Apprenticeship Act (No. 49 of 1971) 
12 Termination of Employment Of Workmen Act (No. 45 of 1971) 
13 Estate Quarters (Special Provisions) Act (No. 2 of 1976) 
14 Holidays Act (No. 29 of 1971) 
15 Mines and Mineral Law (No. 4 of 1973) 
16 Privilege Leave (Private Sector) Law (No. 14 of 1976) 
17 Budgetary Relief allowances of Workers Law (No. 1 of 1978) 
18 Employment of Trainees (Private Sector) Act. (No. 8 of 1978) 
19 Fuel Conservation Five Day Week Act (No. 11 of 1978) 
20 Payments of Gratuity and Other Monetary Benefits to Repatriates ( Special 
Provisions) Law (No. 34 of 1978) 
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21 Special Allowance of Workers Law (No 17 of 1979) 
22 Supplementary Allowance of Workers Act. (No. 17 of 1978) 
23 Employees Council Act. {No. 32 of 1979) 
24 Foreign Employment Agency Act {No. 32 of 1980) 
25 Employees Trust Fund Act. (No. 46 of 1980) 
26 Allowances to Plantation Workers Act. (No. 72 of 1981) 
27 Payments of Gratuities Act. {No. 12 of 1983) 
28 Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act. {No. 21 of 1985) 
29 Sri Lanka Vocational Training Authority Act. {No. 12 of 1995 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Sri Lanka 
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Appendix-5 
Social Security and Non-Wage Labour Costs of Some Selected Asian 
Countries 
Counby Oki age Sickness and Work injury Unernployme Family 
disability and maternity nt allowances allowances 
death 
Banglades 
0 X 0 X X 
h 
Hong Kong X X X X X 
India X X X 0 0 
Indonesia X 0 X 0 0 
S.Korea X 0 X 0 0 
Malaysia X 0 X 0 0 
Pakistan X X X 0 0 
Philippines X X X 0 0 
Singapore X 0 X 0 0 
Sri Lanka X 0 X 0 0 
Taiwan, 
X X X 0 0 
China 
Thailand 0 X X 0 0 
Source: World Employment 1996/97 National Policies in A Global Context, ILO, 
Department of Labour, Sri Lanka 
x = existing, o = not existing. 
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Appendix-& 
Domestic Credit Extended by the Banking System 1969-1999 
Year Government Government Co- Private Total (Rs. 
(net)(%) Corporations operatives Sector(%) Million) 
(%) (%) 
1969-1975 55.6 9.9 6.7 27.7 4837.1 
1969 61.4 6.7 3.9 28.0 3803.3 
1971 60.7 8.0 6.5 24.7 4480.5 
1973 55.0 8.7 7.7 28.4 4831.7 
1975 45.1 16.3 8.8 29.5 6232.8 
1977 34.0 19.0 14.0 32.8 8796.1 
1979 19.5 22.4 12.7 45.4 14971.8 
1981 37.7 13.2 3.8 45.3 33966.5 
1983 35.6 8.9 3.7 51.8 49243.0 
1985 34.4 7.5 2.2 60.0 59226.1 
1987 35.8 9.8 1.5 53.0 75565.5 
1989 35.3 13.6 1.2 50.0 102321.2 
1991 31.1 10.5 1.3 57.1 134226.2 
1993 22.1 4.9 1.2 71.9 158708.8 
1995 15.8 3.8 1.8 78.6 223799.0 
1997 17.0 3.8 0.6 78.6 272733.0 
1999 23.0 3.4 0.4 73.2 374120.0 
Source: Compiled from annual reports (various), Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
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Appendix-7 
Spread Effects of Export Expansion in Terms of Employment 
Sectors Direct Indirect Total P'" 
Primary sector 
Tea 0.0552 0.0025 0.0557 3.1470 
Rubber 0.0218 0.0010 0.0228 1.2427 
Coconut 0.0087 0.0013 0.0100 0.5471 
Other agricultural products 0.0254 0.0008 0.0262 1.4316 
Mining and quarrying 0.0128 0.0003 0.0131 0.7168 
Average 0.0248 0.0012 0.0259 1.4170 
Manufacturing sector 
Textiles 0.0178 0.0037 0.0215 1.1738 
Garments 0.0065 0.0021 0.0086 0.4702 
Transport equipment 0.0047 0.0012 0.0059 0.3219 
Electrical equipment 0.0011 0.0007 0.0019 0.1020 
Other machinery 0.0027 0.0029 0.0057 0.3095 
Light engineering 0.0080 0.0017 0.0096 0.5251 
Food processing 0.0029 0.0036 0.0064 0.3517 
Agro. Chem. & fertilizer 0.0030 0.0013 0.0043 0.2362 
Structural clay 0.0092 0.0053 0.0145 0.7905 
Other manufacturing 0.0087 0.0080 0.0168 0.9146 
Basic metal 0.0015 0.0017 0.0032 0.1720 
Petroleum 0.0002 0.0025 0.0028 0.1518 
Average 0.0055 0.0029 0.0028 0.1518 
Source: Ratnayake & Nayananda (1998). 
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Appendix-a 
Industry division and employee Distribution, 1998 
Industry Division Distribution Persons 
of Persons engaged per 
Engaged Unit 
29 Other mining 0.6 50 
31 Food, beverage & tobacco 14.2 78 
32 Textile, wearing apparel & lather 53.2 302 
33 Would , wood products & furniture 1.8 45 
34 Paper products, printing & publishing 2.1 94 
35 Chemicals, petroleum, rubber, plastic 9.2 126 
36 non-metalic mineral products 2.6 60 
37 Basic metal industries 0.5 172 
38 Metal products, machinery & equipment 5.0 103 
39 Other manufacturing industries 5.1 267 
41 Electricity, gas and steam 3.8 14,136 
42 Water works and supply 1.9 7017 
Total 100.0 151 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, 1998, Department of Census and 
Statistics, Colombo. 
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